– Mišo Leković –
Moscow’s Suspicion and Reprimands Directed at Tito
Tito informed Moscow about the negotiations with the Germans only after Đilas and Velebit returned, believing that it was then — after their talks in Zagreb — that firmer conclusions could be drawn about the outcomes. Once again, as he had regularly done up to that point, Tito kept the Comintern informed about what he considered important, while also seeking its opinion. In telegrams he sent almost daily — whenever conditions allowed — to the Executive Committee of the Comintern, Tito reported1 on the situation in Yugoslavia: on the combat operations of partisan units across the country, on enemy actions and reprisals, on all major political developments, movements and processes, especially the Chetniks’ collaboration with the occupiers and quisling forces, as well as the support they received from the Yugoslav government-in-exile and the Western Allies. There was no issue of any real significance that Moscow was not informed about, including those that might be considered delicate. As already mentioned, on October 14, 1942, he informed the Comintern about his conversation with engineer Hans Otto and about the German proposal to hold talks between representatives of the Supreme Headquarters of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia and the German plenipotentiary general in Zagreb, Glaise von Horstenau.2
Tito’s telegrams became especially frequent during the enemy’s “Weiss” offensive. From January 20, 1943, when the offensive began, until the end of March, Tito sent 58 telegrams to the Comintern, reporting primarily on the progress of the offensive. He emphasized that the Chetniks were fighting on the side of the occupiers under the orders of the government-in-exile (“I believe all of this is being done under the orders of the London-based exile government”), and that the partisan forces, with a large number of wounded, were in a critical position, urgently appealing for assistance.
Particularly notable in this regard was his dispatch of January 31, in which he almost pleaded for every effort to be made to provide material aid to the fighters and the people, who were facing immense deprivation and hardship:
“I must ask you again: is it really impossible for you to offer us any kind of assistance? Hundreds of thousands of refugees are facing starvation. After 20 months of our heroic, almost superhuman struggle, can no way be found to help us? For 20 months we’ve fought without the slightest material support from any side. I assure you that our wonderful, heroic people of Bosnia, Lika, Kordun and Dalmatia have fully earned the maximum support. We are again facing an outbreak of typhus, but we have no medicine. Our people are dying of hunger, yet they do not complain. These starving people give our fighters their last piece of bread, while they themselves die of hunger; they give their last pair of socks, shirts or shoes, while they go barefoot and bare in this winter. Please do everything in your power to help us.”3
A response from Moscow arrived only on February 11. While expressing admiration for the heroic struggle of the National Liberation Army, it stated that “due to insurmountable technical obstacles,” assistance could not be sent. The telegram read:
“You must not, even for a moment, doubt that if there existed even the slightest possibility of supporting your noble, heroic struggle — we would have done so long ago.
“The Soviet people, together with all our leaders, stand fully on your side, filled with admiration and deep fraternal sympathy for the National Liberation Army.
“On multiple occasions, we personally discussed with Josif Vissarionovich the ways and possibilities of helping you. Unfortunately, despite all efforts, we have not succeeded in positively resolving this task due to insurmountable technical obstacles. We will continue making efforts to overcome these difficulties and to find ways and means of sending you assistance.
“As soon as such possibilities arise, we will do everything necessary.
“Can you really doubt that?
“Please understand the current situation correctly and explain it to your comrades-in-arms. Do not be disheartened, but channel all your strength to endure this extremely difficult trial. You are carrying out a great cause — one that our Soviet homeland and all freedom-loving nations will never forget.
“Fraternal greetings to all comrades and best wishes in your heroic struggle against the cursed enemy. Djeda” (pseudonym for the Executive Committee of the Comintern).4
Tito acknowledged the reasons why aid from the Soviet Union could not be delivered, but he continued to request it, hoping that the technical obstacles to airlifting the requested military supplies would eventually be overcome. Thus, on March 4, while reporting on the extremely difficult — nearly critical — situation of the partisan forces in the Neretva Valley as they fought to save the wounded, Tito sent the following dramatic message, which also carried an undertone of reproach towards the wartime Allies: “Can we hope for any kind of help from the Allies? Please reply, as it is uncertain how much longer we can endure this level of strain. Our losses are enormous, and the wounded are seriously hindering our operations.”5
A response from Moscow soon arrived, but like the previous ones, it offered no hope that material aid would be forthcoming. The Comintern merely reaffirmed its full moral and political support for the National Liberation War. The text of its telegram, dated March 7 — only partially deciphered — read (brackets mark uncoded parts):
“Although we (are considering) all possibilities and (making) efforts (…) in your (favour) (you cannot) count on serious material support in the near future. From here, we are doing our utmost to support your heroic struggle. We are sending you information, proclamations and documents (…). We are broadcasting radio programs in English and French. We are mobilizing public opinion in England and America to support you in order to bring about a faster shift in the position of the British government in favour of the Supreme Headquarters and against the betrayal by D. Mihailović and his Chetniks (…). For now, rely solely on the strength of your own people.
“We sincerely wish that you continue to display the same (…) and determination that has so far (inspired) all freedom-loving people around the world, and that you withstand even the (most) severe trials until effective aid becomes possible — so that the (…) fascist enemy may be destroyed (…).
“Dear heroic partisan comrades (…), ‘struggle (…) of the world.’”6
On the same day he received this telegram, Tito informed the Comintern of the successful outcome of the intense and dramatic eight-day battles in the Prozor-Gornji Vakuf-Konjic sector, during which the immediate danger to the fate of the wounded had been averted. He also reported the capture of a German major — a battalion commander. However, Tito did not inform Moscow about the negotiations that subsequently took place over exchanging that German officer and other prisoners. He waited until those talks were concluded. Only on March 30 — once the process was practically complete (though Velebit was sent to Zagreb again for further talks) — did Tito report to Moscow that two delegates of the Supreme Headquarters had stayed in Zagreb, where they negotiated with German representatives regarding the exchange of prisoners. He shared some details the delegates had learned, which might be of interest to Moscow. The text of Tito’s telegram read:
“Secret. There is a mass outbreak of typhus and relapsing fever among our units. This is our most dangerous enemy, but we lack the means and conditions to combat it. After two months of continuous fighting, our soldiers are extremely exhausted and easily succumb to this epidemic. We cannot provide rest or quarantine for them, as the enemy does not allow it and we must continue offensive operations.
“During the stay of our two delegates in Zagreb from March 20 to 25 — related to the exchange of German and Croatian prisoners for our comrades held in prisons and concentration camps — German authorities and officers made various attempts to initiate different talks. On that occasion, our comrades learned the following:
“1. Authoritative German circles do not believe in an English invasion of Europe.
“2. In Africa, the British have about 250,000 soldiers while the Germans have only 50,000, yet the British are not launching serious operations.
“3. The Germans do not trust the Italians and suspect that they are negotiating with the British — especially Prince Umberto’s circles and via the Vatican. The Germans are also aware that Mihailović’s Chetniks are connected to London, also through the Vatican. German military circles are pleased and amused that we are breaking Italian divisions, and they speak with contempt about the Italian army.
“4. The Germans openly told our delegates that they consider the national partisan movement the most dangerous threat to their interests in the Balkans. They know they cannot destroy us entirely, but they hope to break our army into small detachments and eliminate our bases.
“5. They suspect that we have three submarines in the Adriatic Sea.
“6. The German envoy in Zagreb expressed through one major (referring to engineer Hans Otto, a reserve major — M.L.) his wish to meet with me.
“7. The Germans believe they will win before the end of this year and that an agreement with the British is possible.
“Not only among our fighters, but also among all the peoples of Yugoslavia, there is growing resentment towards the British for not opening a second front in Europe — with many believing that the British deliberately want to weaken the Soviet Union in its difficult struggle with the Germans.
“Please advise what can be done regarding this issue.”7
Tito’s telegram was received unfavourably in Moscow, with thinly veiled dissatisfaction. It was unacceptable there that a communist party — a member of the Comintern — would take independent action without consulting the Executive Committee of the Comintern, or more accurately, Moscow. The leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) had undertaken steps, such as initiating negotiations with German authorities over the exchange of prisoners and other issues, without prior approval. Moscow had already expressed disagreements and issued criticism and reprimands to the Central Committee of the CPY regarding certain decisions that, in the opinion of the Soviet government, were not aligned with its interests or with inter-Allied commitments. These included giving brigades the designation “Proletarian,” and the intention to form a government-like body at the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) session. Moscow was particularly sensitive to the criticism coming from Yugoslavia’s national liberation leadership towards both the Yugoslav government-in-exile and the British government for their support of the collaborationist Draža Mihailović and his Chetniks. Therefore, Moscow warned that AVNOJ should not be positioned “in opposition to the Yugoslav government in London,” that “at this stage” the monarchy-versus-republic question should not be raised, and that the issue of Yugoslavia’s regime would be decided after the country’s liberation. It stressed that “the Soviet Union is in contractual relations with the Yugoslav king and government, and any open opposition to them would create new difficulties in the joint war effort and in relations between the Soviet Union on one hand, and England and America on the other.” Moscow insisted that the National Liberation War should not be viewed “solely from a national point of view, but also from the international perspective of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition.”8
This time, too, Moscow responded with surprisingly sharp language, openly expressing its doubts and suspicions regarding the intentions of the Supreme Headquarters in the aforementioned negotiations. Although prisoner exchanges between warring parties are common and have existed as long as warfare itself, Moscow sent Tito a message expressing surprise — even reproach — as to why the Supreme Headquarters was exchanging prisoners with the Germans and why it was sending its delegates to negotiate with them. There was even criticism of the fact that the German envoy in Zagreb had expressed a desire to meet with Tito. Moscow demanded an explanation from Tito, which could be interpreted as a sign of its growing distrust of the CPY leadership. Its suggestion that the negotiations were “linked to German policy” and that the Germans intended to use them to suppress the National Liberation War could be seen as casting doubt on the CPY’s ability to discern the true intentions of the Germans. The CPY leadership was called upon to take into account the interests of the Soviet Union, but there was little understanding shown for the steps it was taking in the interest of the National Liberation War.
The text of the Comintern’s telegram — mistakenly dated March 3 by the cipher clerk, though actually sent on March 31 — read as follows (this telegram too was not fully deciphered):
“We are puzzled by the fact that you are exchanging war prisoners with the Germans. You are sending them delegates who are conducting all sorts of negotiations with the Germans, and the German envoy in Zagreb has expressed a wish to meet with you personally. What is going on here? (…) A fierce war is being waged against the occupiers, and suddenly there is contact between you and the Germans. Isn’t all of this tied to German policy — using our people to incite internal conflicts among (…) thereby achieving the destruction of (…). I ask for your explanation on this matter. Furthermore, the fact that there is widespread dissatisfaction among the people regarding the British is completely understandable. But don’t you think that, at the present moment, the interests of the National Liberation War (…) the dissatisfaction with the British (…) the incitement of hatred among the people should be directed against the occupiers, and first and foremost, against the Germans (…) without a doubt this could weaken the (…) necessary hatred of the people. Awaiting your response. Djed.”9
Tito’s Disagreement with the Comintern’s Criticism and His Response to Moscow
Tito and the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPY, who had been involved in the negotiations, received the Comintern’s telegram with deep dissatisfaction. They felt insulted by the display of mistrust from those they least expected it from — particularly given that the CPY leadership, by organizing and successfully conducting a relentless struggle against the occupiers (among other things, to aid the Soviet Union in its difficult fight), had clearly demonstrated its determination to carry the National Liberation War through to final victory — even without anyone’s help.
Tito openly and without reservation expressed this dissatisfaction and disagreement with Moscow’s criticism in a telegram he sent to the Executive Committee of the Comintern on April 3:
“Your dispatch of March 3 (again, the date is mistaken — M.L.) was very hard for us to accept. Your confusion and doubts regarding my report suggest a certain mistrust and suspicion towards our actions. That fact, after two years of superhuman efforts in this struggle, is of no encouragement to us in this difficult situation — on the contrary.”
Tito then offered broader explanations as to why the negotiations for prisoner exchange had been conducted, listing the reasons that justified them. That portion of the telegram read:
“As for the exchange of war prisoners, the situation is as follows:
“1. We had only 27 Germans in captivity, most of them civilians. These Germans had been with us since the liberation of Jajce, and talks about exchanging them for our responsible comrades and commanders had already begun in Livno, where a group of eight German civilians was exchanged. Even then, the Germans wanted negotiations, but we delayed them.
“However, this is mainly about exchanging Croatian Domobran officers — 100 men who refuse to join our army. We have no means to feed them, and to liquidate them would be politically highly inappropriate and would have serious consequences.
“2. You need to understand that under the conditions of our struggle, we cannot bring a large number of war prisoners along with us.10 We used to do so, and almost always the prisoners would end up back in enemy hands — and we never got any of our people back from the clutches of the occupiers. Since the offensive in Serbia until now, we have lost about 1,000 captured Germans and Italians this way. Such individual exchanges were also carried out with the Italians in Montenegro, Dalmatia and Croatia, without weakening our struggle against the occupiers — quite the opposite.
“3. In Pavelić’s concentration camps and prisons, hundreds of patriots and our senior comrades are still alive and have not yet been killed. Their rescue through exchanges is very important to the broad masses in Croatia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, etc., not to mention its significance for our national army, which sees this as proof of our concern for our people.
“4. That the German envoy (ambassador — M.L.) in Zagreb wishes to speak with me — despite all the filth written about me in German and Croatian newspapers — is not our doing. It certainly doesn’t mean I want to talk to him, nor have I even considered it.
“5. In this merciless struggle of ours, especially recently, the casualties have been predominantly among party cadres, who must always lead by example. These losses are so severe that they pose a serious threat to our national army. Therefore, we must rescue as many of our comrades as possible from the enemy’s clutches to join our ranks.”
As an additional reason for sending a delegation to Zagreb, Tito cited the urgent need to obtain medicine for typhus, as the outbreak of this deadly disease had already decimated units and threatened the operational capacity of the divisional group. Compounding this was the fact that fighters were also dying from exhaustion and starvation. His telegram stated:
“The delegates who went to Zagreb regarding the exchange were also tasked with acquiring medicine against typhus, etc. In recent days, a full-blown typhus epidemic has broken out. In addition, due to exhaustion and starvation from two months of fighting, our fighters are simply beginning to die: a fighter appears healthy, just exhausted, but suddenly drops dead. And these are not isolated cases.”
Tito also emphasized the severe shortages of food and medicine, which were causing extreme suffering among the fighters, the wounded and the sick — and bitterly criticized the lack of material aid from the wartime Allies:
“We now face an extremely difficult problem of supplying food and medicine for the fighters and wounded. Our fighters are getting no rest; the fighting is continuous, and we receive no material aid from anyone. The Soviet Union cannot help due to technical difficulties, and the British — who also call themselves our Allies — are aiding the occupiers’ allies and our worst enemies — Mihailović’s Chetniks.”
Criticizing the British for helping the Chetniks — collaborators of the occupiers — Tito also expressed his dissatisfaction that Moscow was not denouncing the Chetniks. He addressed the Comintern with the following words: “We do not understand why Slobodna Jugoslavija no longer mentions Mihailović’s Chetniks (since March 23, that radio station had stopped broadcasting news about battles against the Chetniks, which Tito had been sending in his telegrams to the Executive Committee of the Comintern — M.L.). The fighters, AVNOJ and the people are all expecting an answer, especially now when we are engaged in heavy battles against those Chetniks. Please tell us what’s going on.”
Finally, Tito rejected Moscow’s criticism with clear disapproval, emphasizing that the National Liberation Movement had not deserved such reproach and that any mistrust towards its leadership was unfounded. He also stressed the CPY leadership’s responsibility to its people and its movement: “You can be sure,” Tito emphasized, “that our struggle will remain untarnished, just as it has been so far. But you must also know that we are responsible for the lives of several million people who trust us and our fight — and we must act in a way that preserves that trust. In conclusion, I repeat: we did not deserve your reproaches, and they were very painful to us.”11
Moscow did not reply to this telegram, and the subject was never again mentioned in the radio messages exchanged thereafter. It is certain, however, that the tone of Tito’s response did not sit well with the Soviet leadership or the Comintern (which, in fact, was officially dissolved around this time). Tito later made brief reference to this in a speech delivered at a public gathering in Jablanica on November 12, 1978, marking the 35th anniversary of the Battle of the Neretva. Reflecting on the negotiations held with the Germans in March 1943, he said:
“About that matter (the negotiations — M.L.), I had difficulties with Stalin, whom I was informing through the Comintern. I reported that we were exchanging prisoners with the Germans, bearing in mind, among other things, that we were starving — that men were collapsing and dying from exhaustion. He replied to me very harshly, reproaching us for exchanging prisoners with the enemy. But with whom else were we supposed to exchange them if not with the enemy? I then replied briefly to Stalin: ‘If you cannot help us, leave us alone — we’ll manage somehow.’ When I met Stalin in Moscow in 1944, he sharply rebuked me for such a response. I looked at him and said: ‘Comrade Stalin, had you been in my place, you probably would’ve written an even harsher message.’ He fell silent.”12
As can be seen, Tito informed Moscow only about the prisoner exchange. On other issues that the Supreme Headquarters had attempted to raise during the negotiations — such as gaining recognition of the National Liberation Army as a warring party, and the proposal for a temporary ceasefire — but which were not discussed due to the German side’s refusal, Moscow was not informed. This was entirely understandable: Tito reported only on what was actually negotiated and on what an agreement had been reached. Moreover, there was a degree of caution and restraint, as it was expected that the Soviet side would likely not look favourably upon such moves by the Supreme Headquarters — even though they were motivated by humanitarian concerns and subordinated to broader strategic military and political goals. The idea was that by offering temporary and limited — in fact, only superficial — concessions, time could be gained to help the main group of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia extricate itself, along with a large number of wounded and sick, from an extremely difficult, nearly critical, situation. The aim was also to relieve pressure from German forces and defeat the main Chetnik units before the landing of Anglo-American troops in the Balkans, thereby creating favourable conditions for a push into southern Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia.
Tito’s restraint was understandable, considering past experiences and Moscow’s repeated demonstrations of misunderstanding — and even distrust. Up to that point, Moscow had already responded with disagreement and reproach to the criticisms and protests coming from Yugoslavia — from the leadership of the National Liberation Movement — regarding the support that the Yugoslav government-in-exile and the Allied powers were providing to Draža Mihailović. It was therefore a reasonable assumption that Moscow would once again react sharply — especially if it were to learn that the Supreme Headquarters had dared to enter into negotiations with the German authorities, without prior consultation or approval from Moscow, on matters that fell within the domain of “state diplomacy.” This concern was, after all, confirmed by the Comintern telegram, which expressed disagreement even with activities as normal and customary as those concerning the exchange of war prisoners. (Đilas notes that in April 1944, during his stay in Moscow with General Velimir Terzić — Deputy Chief of the Supreme Headquarters — he spoke with Georgi Dimitrov, General Secretary of the Comintern. “At one point,” Đilas writes, “Dimitrov mentioned our negotiations with the Germans — in a non-accusatory, non-suspicious tone: ‘At the time, we were worried about you, but fortunately, everything turned out well.’ I didn’t respond; I took it as a passing recollection.”)13
(Translated from the Serbo-Croatian original: Mišo Leković, Martovski pregovori 1943., Narodna knjiga, Beograd 1985, pp. 171-182.)
Notes
1 Arhiv Jugoslavije mikrofilm, T-120. r. 212, s. 162488.
2 J. B. Tito, Sabrana djela, knj. 12, str. 15.
3 Isto, knj. 14, str. 349 (napomena 348).
4 Isto, knj. 14, str. 298.
5 Isto, knj. 14, str. 121.
6 Isto, knj. 14, str. 349 (napomena 348).
7 Isto, knj. 14, str. 349 (napomena 348).
8 Isto, knj. 13, str. 270 (napomena 65).
9 Isto, knj. 14, str. 349 (napomena 348).
10 As early as February 22, Ranković wrote to Tito that the captured enemy soldiers were “unfit for further travel,” that many of them had fallen ill — including with typhus — that they were incapable of carrying the wounded or performing any kind of labour, and that they represented “a great burden,” and should be sent home. (Arhiv CK SKJ. Fond CK KPJ. br. 1943/114).
11 Isto, knj. 14, str. 349 (napomena 348).
12 J. B. Tito, Vojna djela, knj. 6, str. 229.
13 M. Đilas, “Une guerre dans la guerre Yougoslavie 1945,” Paris, 1979.