– Srđan Cvetković –
Institute for Contemporary History
NEO-COMINFORMISTS
Crackdown on the Pro-Soviet Opposition in the SFRY and the Kidnapping of Vlado Dapčević
ABSTRACT: This article analyses the crackdown on the pro-Soviet opposition — the so-called neo-Cominformists — during the 1970s in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Neo-Cominformist groups were discovered across the country (primarily in Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia), with the crackdown culminating in arrests prior to the illegal congress of the New Communist Party of Yugoslavia (NKPJ) held in Bar in 1974, followed by the kidnapping of key figures of the movement — Vlado Dapčević and Mileta Perović.
Keywords: New Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Vlado Dapčević, Yugoslavia, communism, political repression.
At the start of the 1970s, state security services began using the term “neo-Cominformist” to label all those who challenged the system of socialist self-management from a position of unitarism and proletarian internationalism, advocating for pro-Soviet policies and opposing capitalist and market-oriented elements in Yugoslav society. They were often viewed more broadly as “bureaucratic-statist forces,” regarded as one of the “most socially dangerous groups of internal enemies — a fifth column,” since their actions were “based on assessments of the inevitable collapse of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia’s (LCY) policy and the outbreak of a global crisis that would provoke foreign intervention, particularly by Warsaw Treaty countries.”1 Many of these individuals had no actual connection to the Cominform period, but were instead dogmatic communists with sympathies towards the Eastern Bloc and the USSR. In terms of social background, neo-Cominformists were most commonly retired officers of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), mainly former partisan fighters, members of internal security organs and other predominantly older individuals — including supporters of Ranković’s faction. Many were well into their seventies or eighties and were often repeat offenders who had previously received long prison sentences (M. Ćulavić in Montenegro, Đ. Bikićki, Đ. Šargin, Radulović, M. Stevanović, K. Jovović in Serbia, among others).
In Serbia, members and activists of the New Communist Party of Yugoslavia (NKPJ) were primarily Serbs and Montenegrins, particularly from the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. In Kosovo, political offenders followed a general pattern: Albanians were charged with nationalism and separatism, while Serbs and Montenegrins were accused of supporting authoritarianism and NKPJ membership — reflecting the opposing attitudes these ethnic groups had towards the state structure. Advocacy for authoritarianism among Serbs and Montenegrins can be understood through the sense of vulnerability that emerged after Ranković’s fall, positioned in contrast to the increasing Albanian nationalism and separatism. In this context, there may have been an intentional effort to create a false symmetry in the state’s persecution of hardliners (Serbs and Montenegrins) and Albanian separatists. Of course, neo-Cominformists were far fewer in number than nationalist elements and were mostly older individuals (unlike the often very young Albanian separatists), but the state — fearful of the “Brezhnev Doctrine” — responded with harsh measures. The same can be said for NKPJ members, primarily Serbs in Bosnia and Vojvodina, who opposed decentralization or, as they saw it, the gradual disintegration of the state. They were often former partisan fighters disillusioned with what they perceived as the disintegration of the country they had fought for — a result of the self-management and administrative reforms of the 1960s and 70s. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, the renewed persecution of Cominformists was often used as a pretext to suppress Serbian nationalist intellectuals, serving as a counterbalance to Croatian nationalism.
Of all the bureaucratic-statist forces, the neo-Cominformists and Cominformist returnees — according to State Security (SDB) reports — were the most active and best organized, with ties to Cominform emigrants, making them the most dangerous as a potential fifth column. In the early 1970s, it was estimated that around 2,000 of the original 5,000 Cominform emigrants remained active (some had died, others returned to Yugoslavia), with only about 200 actively engaging in anti-Yugoslav political activities. The SDB viewed them as extensions of the KGB or other Eastern or even Western intelligence agencies. Their activities were especially noted in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Romania, France and Belgium.2 It was estimated that in the event of a crisis, together with other “bureaucratic-statist forces” in the country, they could mobilize more than 5,000 individuals for “extreme fifth-column activity, acting destructively and engaging in violence.” In an extreme scenario, it was believed they might ally themselves with “enemies of pro-Western forces both domestically and abroad.” In addition to neo-Stalinist elements, many “supporters of the condemned group from the Fourth Plenum” were also expected to join them. Some former Cominformists had genuinely revised their views, while others were said to be “cynically exploiting the system to gain positions for more effective hostile activity.” They were reportedly recruiting new followers, including among student youth.3
Neo-Cominformists had been mentioned in security reports since the 1960s, but their activities were more closely monitored after 1968 (the Czechoslovakia intervention) and especially after the Croatian “maspok” in the early 1970s. Their activities largely consisted of political propaganda and translating Russian literature. Notable figures in Serbia included Milivoje Stefanović Dolinski, Ranko Đurić, Sava Stojanović, Ranko Simić, Milan Colić and others. They were believed to enjoy the support of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and People’s Republic of Bulgaria’s intelligence services, and allegedly had contacts with Chetnik émigrés in the West — viewed as proof of the group’s extremism.4 A majority of Cominformists — previously less active and unorganized — were reinvigorated by the student protests of 1968 and even more so by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. This revival was reflected in frequent public statements supporting the student anti-bureaucratic revolution, criticizing self-managed socialism, market reforms and endorsing the USSR’s intervention in Czechoslovakia. A total of 3,700 such public statements were recorded, alongside frequent contacts with “bureaucratic-conservative forces” (Rankovićists!), segments of the Cominformist émigré community and Soviet diplomatic representatives.5 Writer Dragoslav Mihailović cited testimonies from Cominformists claiming that, after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Party Committee of the League of Communists in Bela Crkva had drawn up a list of “Goli Otok inmates” to be arrested — and even liquidated — if necessary.6
The culmination of hostile activities, along with the attempt to establish an illegal organization, occurred in the period following Josip Broz Tito’s Letter of September 1972, the fall of the liberals, the crackdown on the Croatian Spring (maspok) and Tito’s rapprochement with Brezhnev. Supporters of a hardline approach and the USSR believed that the moment they had awaited since Stalin’s death had finally arrived. This period also saw attempts to create the first major illegal Cominform organizations since 1948 — primarily in Serbia and Montenegro. These groups tended to be concentrated in larger urban and industrial centres. They appeared sporadically in Belgrade, Zagreb, Bosanska Dubica, Budva, Ljubljana, Skopje and Sremski Karlovci. As in 1948, they were most prominent in Montenegro and Serbia (with some activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Generationally, they were composed mostly of middle-aged and older individuals, rarely youth. A significant portion were returnees — some with decades-long prison records from Goli Otok and other prisons and labour camps.7
Between 1974 and 1976, five of a total of thirteen groups acting from bureaucratic-statist positions — mostly neo-Cominformists — were uncovered. The SDB of Montenegro dealt most extensively with this type of internal enemy. Reports note that the Montenegrin SDB was closely monitoring “bureaucratic-statist” elements, including the group around Vlado Dapčević in Brussels. Additionally, two literary works of “pro-Cominform content” were discovered.8 In Serbia, the SDB in Vojvodina was particularly active in uncovering these elements. In Operation Krug, the SDB identified twenty-two extreme Cominformists from Novi Sad, Belgrade, Zrenjanin, Ljubljana and other locations. The most influential among them were listed as M. Stefanović Dolinski from Belgrade and Đuro Šargin from Kikinda. They had planned to send a declaration on the status of Cominformists — with signatures from around eighty former MPs, writers and other prominent citizens (mostly former Cominformists) — to foreign diplomatic missions and the United Nations.9 By the end of 1976, a total of seventy-nine individuals had been convicted in the SFRY for activities based on Cominform ideology.10
Allegedly in coordination with Cominformist émigrés, they worked on drafting “programmatic” and “statutory” documents, printed and distributed other hostile materials, and advocated for forming a movement — that is, rallying a “broader circle of anti-socialist and anti-self-management elements” based on a bureaucratic-statist platform.11 While there was no real threat of Stalinists returning to power in Yugoslavia, the political leadership needed another political-police confrontation to consolidate its power and demonstrate strength to both East and West. Some Cominformists noted that the authorities were especially cautious towards them in the context of the Czechoslovak intervention and the potential for a leftist “fifth column” that might support a Soviet intervention. Heightened surveillance of the pro-Soviet opposition is also linked to Brezhnev’s alleged offer — on the eve of May Day in 1971 during the Croatian Spring — of assistance and armed intervention in the event of internal unrest, which may have further alarmed Yugoslav authorities. Lawyer Jovan Barović, a keen observer of the political climate and repression, noted that the anti-Cominform trials also aimed to “dispel widespread misconceptions about the government’s political direction and its relations with the USSR. Certain Cominformists had been particularly outspoken during the Czechoslovak occupation and afterwards, especially following the measures taken against liberalism. They openly claimed to be the party’s left wing, intended to push out right-wingers from the LCY…”12
Former intelligence officer Milan Trešnjić viewed their elimination through the lens of global political relations: “I know for a fact that the Ustaša émigrés during the Brezhnev era relied heavily on the KGB. The KGB also counted on the Cominformists, which, in my opinion, is why Vlado Dapčević was kidnapped — to intimidate the rest. The state, particularly after the Czechoslovak crisis, was sensitive and cautious about the USSR and its intentions. The Cominformists were mostly honest and naive people, with a few careerists and fanatics. They hoped that the 1972 unrest during the Croatian Spring would lead to Soviet intervention and bring them to power.”13 A mid-1970s SDB report estimated that the group of active neo-Cominformists numbered around 100 people. They advocated “the establishment of bureaucratic-centralist relations and abandoning the policy of independence and non-alignment, were directly connected to the Cominformist émigré community and were guided by foreign sources. They distributed hostile materials and promoted the creation of a ‘movement’ — gathering a broader circle of anti-socialist and anti-self-management elements.”14 Yugoslavia’s extensive state security apparatus had effective cooperation with the KGB, which, after the Bar Congress, warned all Yugoslav “Cominformists” in the USSR that they would be arrested and expelled if they acted against Tito and Yugoslavia.
The New Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Bar Congress of 1974. The most serious illegal organization in the country was assessed to be the so-called New Communist Party of Yugoslavia (NKPJ), which was to be established at a founding congress in Bar. According to SDB findings, the party aimed to seize power, which — according to its “ideologues” — could be achieved peacefully by uniting all “socialist, people’s democratic and anti-Titoist forces,” though they did not rule out the possibility of “responding to force with force.”Reportedly, they had established ties with certain actors in Eastern Europe and were preparing declarations for the press and international public, writing letters to top state and party officials in the USSR, and addressing various forums and congresses.15
The Coordinating Committee for founding the new KPJ had been formed as early as 1971. Subsequent groups emerged in Peć, Priština, Novi Sad, Belgrade, Banja Luka, Tuzla and Bar, among others. NKPJ members included Mileta Perović, Momčilo Jokić, Komnen Jovović, Slobodan Lazić, Branko Bošković, Đorđe Bikicki, Đura Šargin and others. Both the movement and the congress were allegedly led from abroad and dismantled from within Yugoslavia by the SDB. The congress was organized by a group of disillusioned communists, mainly from Montenegro and Kosovo and Metohija, on the anniversary of the German invasion of Yugoslavia during the Second World War. It was scheduled for April 6-7, 1974, in the villa of history professor Dr. Branislav Bošković from Priština. Twelve people were in attendance, and they intended to elect a Central Committee, Politburo, Supervisory and Audit Commissions, editorial staff of the Iskra newspaper, a General Secretary, and to adopt a Program and Statute and issue a Proclamation. The Yugoslav regime was accused of restoring capitalist relations, asserting that the system was not a dictatorship of the proletariat but rather the personal rule of J.B. Tito and a form of ideological revisionism. All attendees were arrested by Montenegrin SDB operatives on April 6, 1974. Initially, thirty-six people were detained, with several hundred sympathizers and supporters later apprehended across Yugoslavia. Trials were held throughout 1974, primarily in courts in Peć, Titograd, Belgrade, Novi Sad and Banja Luka.16
Sentences ranged from five to fifteen years of imprisonment. In the first wave, fifty-four people were convicted. In the largest group — the Peć group — twenty-two individuals received relatively lighter sentences, except for Branko Bošković (sentenced to 13 years) and Komnen Jovović, labelled the key organizer for contacts with Cominformist émigrés, who received 14 years. Six others were acquitted, and sentences for another seven were quickly reduced. The Novi Sad group received harsher punishments — of the eleven convicted, more than half received between 11 and 13 years in prison, and none were recommended for clemency. In the Belgrade group, two of seven members were proposed for clemency in 1977 (Vlado Dapčević and M. Perović had not yet received final verdicts). In the Banja Luka group, one of seven was proposed for clemency, and in the Mostar group, one out of seven was recommended for release.17
Jokić and some other Cominformists believed that the neo-Cominformists were prosecuted and sentenced more harshly than all other dissidents, as there existed a possibility that they could gain recognition from other communist parties — in China, Cuba or the USSR — in case of deteriorating relations.18 At a session of the Presidency of the SFRY during discussions on amnesty or pardon, P. Stambolić remarked on the severity of the sentences, particularly in the case of the Novi Sad group: “The world will learn that we released former Ustaše, Chetniks, and those guilty of verbal offences and dropped charges against them, but that we struck hard in the Novi Sad case.”19 This perspective is supported by an SDB report from 1974, which stated:
“We must not underestimate the activity of former Cominformists. The arrest of the group that held the illegal congress in Bar does not mean we uncovered the true ‘Central Committee.’ The service had been monitoring some channels linking Cominformist émigrés with individuals in the country, but this illegal gathering came as a surprise. We believe the main actors behind this group are abroad, and we have directed our investigation accordingly.” (This referred to V. Dapčević and M. Perović, who were kidnapped in 1975 and 1977, respectively.)20 However, according to other claims, the congress was partially staged by State Security with an SDB mole among the émigrés, in order to capture Vlado Dapčević and more effectively carry out the arrests of Cominformists.21
An interesting and controversial case is that of Bogdan Jovović (1913-2000), one of many returned Cominformists who eventually struck a deal with the authorities. A participant in the National Liberation War since 1943, he was a former JNA major in Priština.22 He was first convicted in 1949 under the Cominform line and sentenced to 11 years of strict imprisonment, but was amnestied in late 1955. After his release, as Yugoslav-Soviet relations worsened in 1958, he escaped with a group of around 15 Cominformists to Albania, and by 1960 they had all relocated to the USSR. He stayed in Kiev until 1975, where he was politically active in forming the NKPJ, being elected to its leadership alongside Perović. In 1975, both of them moved to Paris. According to SDB reports, in November 1977, Jovović contacted the Yugoslav consulate in Zurich to request a passport for return and offered his cooperation to the Yugoslav authorities. The stated reasons were his disillusionment with the movement and a personal conflict with Mileta Perović, with whom he had broken off collaboration. Jovović reportedly handed over valuable material on his own and other Cominformist émigré activities, the NKPJ and foreign support — information that was of great use to the Security Service.23
Upon arriving in Belgrade, an investigative judge launched proceedings against Jovović, who rejected the defence attorneys J. Barović and V. Kovačević — hired by his brother Komnen. Due to his voluntary (or possibly coerced) cooperation, he served as a kind of “cooperating witness” in Perović’s trial and in the dismantling of the Cominformist émigré network, after which the case against him was dropped (and his brother Komnen was soon released from prison). It is telling that Jovović’s surrender occurred after Perović’s arrest and just before the major amnesty on November 29, 1977. There are indications that Jovović had been cooperating with the SDB earlier, as noted in a memo by F. Herljević. It stated that the pardon of Jovović (first publicly announced after the A. Ranković affair) aligned with the “policy of differentiation, fragmentation and mutual suspicion among certain hostile actors, as well as the protection of the methods and tools(underlined by S.C.) that the SDB had applied in recent years towards some of those involved in hostile activities.” This move also had a positive effect in “neutralizing the impact of hostile propaganda in foreign media regarding SDB operations abroad” (referring to accusations of Dapčević and Perović’s kidnappings).24 At an earlier session of the SFRY Presidency, Herljević had been more direct: “I would kindly ask that we be given a release order for Jovović — because we are in certain relations with him.”25 Vidoje Žarković emphasized that Jovović’s public pardon would send the message that: “We’ve broken that party, we’ve differentiated them and we’re even offering a way out if someone among that gang wants to surrender. We’ll gain politically on the international stage — showing that we’re not vindictive, that we don’t go around cutting off heads — when someone repents, see how we treat them.”26 After the amnesty, Bogdan Jovović emigrated to Kiev with his brother Komnen, where he no longer showed interest in political activities.27
The Kidnapping and Conviction of Dapčević and Perović
Mileta Perović (1923) was a pre-war communist from a farming family in Peć. During the Second World War, he was arrested by the Italian occupiers and sentenced to death for an assassination of a leading Ballist figure. His sentence was commuted to 101 years in prison, from which he escaped. After the war, as a JNA officer, he served as a military attaché at the Yugoslav embassy in Tirana. He was first arrested in March 1949 and sentenced by a military court in Belgrade to 18 years of forced labour for anti-state activity under the Cominform line. He served his sentence in Stara Gradiška prison — where Yugoslav Army, UDBA and militia members were held — and was later transferred to Goli Otok, where he endured severe torture until his release. He was pardoned in late 1956, but upon release, he resumed illegal political activity as a coordinator of Cominform cells in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana and Kosovo.28 Soon after, along with Vlado Dapčević and about 15 other Goli Otok survivors, he escaped to Albania and continued his Cominform-related political work. All but one (who settled there and started a family) moved to the USSR in 1962, where they took up permanent residence.29 There, Perović studied economics and earned a PhD in political economy in the city of Kherson. From 1965, he worked as a researcher at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.30
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, he organized active political work in Kiev, establishing contacts with Cominformists in Czechoslovakia and France. He formed a party cell including Dimitrije Šobot and the Jovović brothers, Branko and Bogdan, with the goal of expanding the network and activity. Together with Dapčević, he set up the KPJ Centre for Western Europe. In February 1974, he sent Bogić Jovović to Prague as a representative of the NKPJ Initiating Committee from the USSR to meet with the local cell led by Ivan Sinanović. Through Komnen Jovović — the party representative inside Yugoslavia — materials were supposed to be smuggled into the country for discussion at the founding congress.31
At the Bar Congress of the illegal Communist Party of Yugoslavia (unofficially held as the Fifth Congress, April 6-7, 1974), a Politburo was elected, and Mileta Perović was appointed General Secretary of the KPJ. He managed to evade arrest by fleeing from Moscow to France, escaping both the KGB and the Yugoslav SDB. Perović left the USSR in October 1975 and spent the following two years in France, Bulgaria, Sweden, Finland, the United Kingdom and Israel, engaging in academic work and attempting to expand the party’s reach. According to the indictment, in early 1976 he held a Politburo meeting of the (New) KPJ in Paris, during which they decided to organize a Sixth Congress, establish new cells32 and strengthen ties with Cominformist émigrés in Eastern Europe (such as N. Sandulović in Poland, I. Sinanović in Czechoslovakia and others). Reports also mention meetings with the pro-Chetnik Serbian National Renewal and discussions on identifying minimal shared interests in opposition to the Yugoslav regime. Perović gave interviews to French and Belgian newspapers, in which he harshly criticized the SFRY government. While in Paris, he wrote a book entitled Titoism – Ideology, Politics, Economy: A Critical Analysis of Theory and Practice and prepared for publication the poem He Died by Jole Stanišić, which crudely insulted the President of the SFRY. He was expelled from France just prior to the visit of Yugoslav Prime Minister Džemal Bijedić, after which he moved through Israel, Bulgaria, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom — until he was captured by Yugoslav security forces.
He was kidnapped from Italy in early 1977. Provocateurs invited him to a meeting in the town of Paradiso, near the Yugoslav-Italian border. There, he was abducted and handed over to Yugoslav authorities. Allegedly, Italian mafia members carried out the abduction on behalf of the Yugoslav secret service. The entire operation — codenamed General Secretary — was reportedly led by Sveta Kunc, an operative of the Slovenian SDB. Perović was bound in a car and, at the border near Nova Gorica, transported into Yugoslavia, where — according to the official police report — he was arrested. He was flown from Slovenia to Belgrade in a special aircraft, accompanied by N. Nikolić, a high-ranking officer in the Yugoslav SDB. From early July 1977, the detainee was held in a luxury apartment near Belgrade’s main train station.33 He was defended, like Dapčević, by lawyer Jovan Barović, and later by Veljko Kovačević after Barović’s death. The court rejected the defence’s requests to officially establish when, where and how the accused had been deprived of liberty, as well as the fact that Perović was an Israeli citizen. One of the key witnesses for the prosecution was Cominformist émigré and longtime associate Bogdan Jovović, who reportedly surrendered voluntarily and cooperated with the SDB. In the West, his kidnapping and prosecution were largely covered only by the left-wing press — most notably the Paris-based L’Humanité. On April 13, 1978, Perović was sentenced by the District Court in Belgrade to 20 years in prison (later reduced to 15 years in 1986). He served his sentence at the Sremska Mitrovica Correctional Facility (in order to separate him from Dapčević, who was in Zabela prison) until December 27, 1988, when he was finally pardoned — after 10.5 years of imprisonment, or a total of 19 years and 3 months if his earlier Goli Otok sentence is included.34
The case of Vlado Dapčević. Vlado Dapčević was a pre-war communist and a participant in the National Liberation War, but had previously been expelled from the Party for disciplinary reasons. After the war, he was appointed a lecturer at the Higher Party School, and in 1947 became Head of the Yugoslav Army’s Department for Agitation and Propaganda. Following the Cominform Resolution and the Fifth Congress of the KPJ, Colonel Vlado Dapčević, along with Generals Arso Jovanović and Branko “Kađa” Petričević, allegedly attempted to flee across the Romanian border under the pretext of going hunting. On the night of August 11-12, 1948, they ran into an ambush: Arso Jovanović and their guide were killed. Petričević was captured the next day, while Dapčević was arrested on September 2 near Subotica, during an attempted escape across the Hungarian border. His trial took place nearly two years later, from June 1-4, 1950, before the Military Court in Belgrade. The indictment, filed by military prosecutor Ilija Kostić, charged them with working to undermine the unity and defensive strength of the Army, betraying the homeland and violating their “oath of loyalty to the people and the Supreme Commander” by organizing an illegal group of traitors aiming to overthrow the top state bodies of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia by force and with the help of a foreign power. Dapčević was sentenced to 20 years in prison and served eight years before being amnestied in 1956.35
Dapčević remained a hardline Stalinist throughout his Cominform-era biography. He served time in Zabela, Stara Gradiška and finally Goli Otok, where he was subjected to the notorious Petrova rupa — a punishment cell where he was brutally beaten by reformers.36 After his release, he briefly worked at the Association of Film Artists of Serbia (UFUS), where he remained until 1958, when he fled to Albania. From there, he passed through Romania and eventually reached Moscow. Restless and revolutionary by nature, he did not settle even in the USSR, where he reportedly faced a lack of understanding and Soviet “opportunism.” As a result, he moved to China, then Belgium and even planned to relocate to Cuba. By the early 1970s, the Yugoslav secret service had already dispatched operative Slobodan Mitrić to monitor and assassinate him — an operation Mitrić eventually revealed to Dapčević, exposing the mission.37
Kidnapping and trial in 1975. Vlado Dapčević was arrested for the second time on August 8, 1975, following a scandalous kidnapping in Romania, carried out with the help of the Romanian security service DIE — despite Dapčević being a Belgian citizen. Reportedly, in exchange for assisting in capturing Dapčević, the Yugoslav authorities were supposed to bring Romanian dissident F. Brădescu from Paris to Belgrade and extradite him — an exchange that ultimately didn’t happen because Brădescu grew suspicious and refused to travel. Ion Mihai Pacepa, former head of the DIE who defected to the United States in the mid-1980s, described a 1973 conversation between Tito and Ceaușescu regarding Dapčević’s abduction: “Comrade Ceaușescu, I ask you to lure him into Romania, arrest him and secretly hand him over to us. I would be eternally indebted to you. Banović and Gorenc are ready and capable of organizing everything for you in the West. You wouldn’t have to lift a finger.” Ceaușescu reportedly replied firmly: “Let your intelligence service lure Dapčević into Romania and secretly transfer him to Belgrade. I’ll turn a blind eye. But I don’t want to get my own hands dirty with Dapčević.”38 According to Pacepa, on July 30, 1975, Silvio Gorenc and Draško Jurišić arrived in Bucharest with a team of operatives to organize the kidnapping. The operation involved six agents from the Yugoslav SDB and nine operatives from DIE.39 Despite warnings that it was a trap, Dapčević travelled to Bucharest, accompanied by Đoka Stojanović, a friend from Brussels.40 He stayed at the Dorobanți Hotel, with the visit’s purpose being to see wartime comrades and fellow Cominformist exiles — Đorđe and Svetislav Markušev41 and Aleksandar Opojević,42 who had been living in Bucharest since fleeing Yugoslavia after 1948. The visit to Opojević lasted from the afternoon into the late evening. As they were walking back to the hotel,43 at around midnight between August 8 and 9, the kidnapping occurred at the Dorobanți Hotel. During the incident, Aleksandar Opojević and Đoka Stojanović were killed, and Dapčević was rendered unconscious. According to Pacepa, Opojević and Stojanović were killed in the hotel elevator due to a storm and heavy rain, which led to “unplanned excessive use of force” under unexpected conditions. Opojević died instantly, while the severely injured Stojanović later succumbed to his wounds. Ceaușescu was reportedly furious about the killings and the potential reaction of Western public opinion — as he had, since the early 1970s, worked to portray himself as a liberal communist akin to Tito.44 After crossing the border, the bodies were dumped near the village of Begejci, where provincial police and state security secretly buried them as unidentified persons at the Tomaševac cemetery, following orders from higher authorities to cover up the case.45 Vlado Dapčević himself rarely spoke publicly about the details of his abduction, except in one controversial interview with journalist Slavko Ćuruvija.46
By mid-August 1975, all traces of Đoka Stojanović had vanished from the apartment of his brother Ivan Stojanović, including birth records, photographs, letters and other belongings. The apartment was later searched multiple times, and Ivan was put under surveillance and received threats. Polet Stojanović, Đoka’s wife, despite numerous telephone threats from Yugoslavia (for which she received protection from the French police), sent appeals to international human rights organizations, French and Belgian authorities, the leaders of 35 countries attending the CSCE in Helsinki (an especially sensitive issue for Yugoslavia), and to F. Herljević, the federal secretary for internal affairs (SSUP). At the end of 1975, Herljević responded: “At the time Vlado Dapčević was taken into custody, Stojanović was not with him. We are unaware of his current whereabouts. At the request of his parents, Yugoslav authorities have initiated a search.”47 Yet, on September 1, 1975, Herljević submitted a report on the successful arrest of Dapčević, for which he was officially praised on September 27, 1975. Around the same time, Romanian Prime Minister Manea Mănescu visited Yugoslavia, where an agreement was signed to prevent the illegal emigration of Romanian citizens (i.e., a readmission treaty). Shortly after, Nicolae Ceaușescu made his 11th visit to Yugoslavia.48
Vlado Dapčević regained consciousness on August 9, 1975, in Belgrade’s Central Prison, after which he was transferred to a military prison in Voždovac. He refused to sign a statement claiming he had been arrested in Yugoslavia, as per the official version. On December 25, 1975, the Tanjug news agency announced that “Vladimir Dapčević has been arrested on Yugoslav territory while engaging in hostile activity.” At his closed-door trial, he was skilfully defended by the well-known lawyer Jovan Barović, who had been hired by Dapčević’s sister, Danica. One of the central points of the defence was the fact that he had been kidnapped. Barović’s son, Nikola Barović, recalled: “At the request of Vlado Dapčević and his wife Micheline, through his sister Danica, my father accepted his defence. Knowing that my father was representing Dapčević, the brother of the slain Đorđe Stojanović — Ivan — ended up being his last client. Ivan visited him on February 5, 1979, the night before my father died in an unexplained car crash, when a truck loaded with grain hit his Mini Morris on the Belgrade-Zagreb highway as he was heading to a hearing in Pećinci.”49
At a secret and staged trial, Vlado Dapčević was charged with a severe form of “association for the purpose of engaging in hostile activity against the people and the state.” Jovan Barović’s defence, which persistently argued that the entire case was orchestrated by the SDB and that Dapčević had been kidnapped, was a thorn in the side of the security service. In May 1976, F. Herljević reported to the Presidency of the SFRY: “…The current trial of Dapčević — lawyer Barović is behaving poorly. He’s travelling to Belgium, this will cause problems. We need to act offensively…” (emphasis added — S.C.)50 In seeking amnesty, Barović argued that Dapčević had opposed the Bar Congress, that he was pro-Chinese and anti-Soviet at the time of his arrest, and that he had criticized Russian expansionism — a stance he reiterated during the trial. Finally, Barović pointed out that Dapčević’s actions had never gone beyond verbal statements and planning. A conviction, Barović warned, would damage the country’s international image and cause diplomatic issues with Belgium, where Dapčević had a family — “unless the goal is to prove that the SDB can find and bring to justice any enemy, no matter where they are.”51 At the request of Dapčević’s wife, Micheline, Barović was received by the Belgian foreign minister Simone, who insisted on Dapčević’s release. Nonetheless, a first-instance death sentence was handed down on June 5, 1976 — highly unusual, as after 1953, the death penalty for political offences was almost never imposed, except in cases of terrorism. In an appeal to Yugoslav authorities, Barović emphasized that Dapčević was tired of it all and wanted to settle down with his wife and their eight-year-old daughter. There were even tacit offers on the table that he would not publicly speak about the kidnapping or mention the fate of Đ. Stojanović and A. Opojević. “After multiple conversations with him, I feel he would commit to being ‘quiet’ and loyal if given the opportunity to normalize visits to Yugoslavia with his family — which he sincerely wants. Such a resolution would help in a delicate case — the disappearance of a certain Đoka Stojanović, who was with him that night in August. Dapčević’s stance on Stojanović is that he knows nothing about it and cannot provide any information. He insists (especially emphasized in separated letters — author’s note) on maintaining that position, despite the fact that Stojanović disappeared at the same place and time when he himself was kidnapped from the Dorobanți Hotel… The issue of Stojanović remains troubling, but both Dapčević and I remained passive, despite pressure from Stojanović’s family and their representative, lawyer Defosse, now a minister in the Belgian government.”52 The final verdict was delivered on June 21, 1976. Due to Dapčević’s age, pressure from the Belgian government and his family, as well as his participation in the National Liberation War, the death sentence was commuted — first to 20 years, then reduced to 15. He ultimately served 13 years in the correctional facilities in Sremska Mitrovica and Zabela.53
Shortly before his release, the controversial journalist Slavko Ćuruvija — a former SSUP analyst — conducted an interview with Dapčević, which was later published as a bestselling book.54 In June 1988, two years before the end of his sentence, Dapčević was released, placed under surveillance and escorted to the airport, from where he flew to Brussels.55 In total, Dapčević had spent 21 years and 2 months in prison. However, this lengthy incarceration did not shake his ideological convictions — upon release, he declared: “Today, I trust no one as much as the Party of Labour of Albania!”56
It was only in the early 1990s — through an anonymous letter and a serialized report in Duga magazine entitled “Call the SDB for Murder”57 — that the public learned about the secret burial of unidentified persons at Tomaševac Cemetery. After numerous delays and interference throughout the 1990s — including the disappearance of autopsy reports and witness statements — a criminal investigation was reopened in 2001. The remains of Aleksandar Opojević and Đoka Stojanović, who had been killed and buried in secret, were exhumed after 27 years and reburied. On May 27, 2002, by order of investigative judge Peter Kiš of the District Court in Zrenjanin, the exhumation was carried out in the presence of the victims’ families, lawyers and journalists. A new autopsy conducted by Professor Dr. Milan Simić of the Institute for Forensic Medicine in Novi Sad confirmed that Opojević and Stojanović had been murdered.
Notes
1 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 45, 74. sednica, Specijalni rat protiv SFRJ, 23 april 1977, 31.
2 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 24–1975, 26. sednica, Neka aktuelna pitanja bezbednosti – izlaganje saveznog sekretara za unutrašnje poslove Franje Herljevića 18. mart 1975, 2; AJ, SIV 130, 558, AJ, SIV 130, 558, Savezno izvršno veće, Analiza osposobljenosti i efikasnosti organa unutrašnjih poslova, SSUP mart 1970, 80.
3 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 45, 74. sednica, Specijalni rat protiv SFRJ, 23. april 1977, 33.
4 Ocena delovanja unutrašnjeg neprijatelja i stranih obaveštajnih službi u Srbiji prema materijalu RSUP-a od 10.01.1972, AJ, 837, KPR II-5-d, kutija 202, Dokument ustupljendobrotom Pere Simića, 17; AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 45, 74. sednica, Specijalni rat protiv SFRJ, januar 1977, 64–65.
5 AJ, SIV 130, 558, AJ, SIV 130, 558, Savezno izvršno ve_e, Analiza osposobljenosti i efikasnosti organa unutrašnjih poslova, SSUP mart 1970, 81.
6 It is alleged that a meeting of the district committee was held with the presence of trusted individuals from the UDBA. Branko Šinžar, the public prosecutor of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, attended the meeting and brought an order from the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia to compile lists of “Goli Otok inmates” who, in the event of an aggression against the SFRY, would be either liquidated or arrested. The main proponents were Stanković Zdravko Ljupče and Tomašević Rada, retired heads of the secret police; D. Mihailović, n. d., 24.
7 AJ, SIV 130, 558, AJ, SIV 130, 558, Savezno izvršno veće, Analiza osposobljenosti i efikasnosti organa unutrašnjih poslova, SSUP mart 1970, 81.
8 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 24-1975, 26. sednica, Neka aktuelna pitanja bezbednosti – izlaganje saveznog sekretara za unutrašnje poslove Franje Herljevića, 18. mart 1975, 2.
9 Isto, 3.
10 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 46, 75. sednica, 12. april 1977, Informacija o amnestiji i pomilovanju lica osuđenih za političke delikte.
11 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 37, 46. sednica, 8. jul 1976, Prilog iz oblasti bezbednosti za izveštaj Predsedništva SFRJ, 3.
12 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 654, Predstavka advokata Jovana Barovića Predsedništvu SFRJ, 22. novembar 1977, 15.
13 Svedočenje majora Ozne i bivšeg konzula u Štutgartu Milana Trešnjića, Beograd, 29. januar 2009; M. Trešnjić, Vreme razlaza, Beograd 1989, 178.
14 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 39, 61. sednica, 19. oktobar 1976, Nacrt izveštaja o stanju u zemlji 8. oktobar 1976, Zaštita ustavnog poretka, 65-71.
15 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 45, 74. sednica, Specijalni rat protiv SFRJ, 23 april 1977, 30-33.
16 Arhiv KPD S. Mitrovica, Dosije Milete Perovića, Presuda Mileti Peroviću, K. br. 7/78; M. Jokić navodi broj od čak 826 ukupno uhapšenih što je nerealno, M. Lazić, Kostolomci iz Spuža, Intervju sa Momčilom Jokićem, Ilustrovana politika, 26. avgust 2006.
17 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 52, 89. sednica, 22. novembar 1977, stenogrami, 62.
18 M. Lazić, Kostolomci iz Spuža, Intervju sa Momčilom Jokićem, Ilustrovana politika, 26. avgust 2006.
19 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 52, 89. sednica, 22. novembar 1977, stenogrami, 62.
20 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803. fasc. 18-1974, Informacija o nekim problemima bezbednosti i radu organa unutrašnjih poslova, oktobar 1974,1-8.
21 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 56, 98. sednica, 20. april 1978, Predlog za oslobođenje od krivične odgovornosti Bogdana Jovovića, 17. april 1978, 1-4.
22 Originally from Đulići near Ivangrad, from the respected standard-bearer family of Bogić Camić Jovović. He graduated from a business academy and the Institute of National Economy in the USSR. He was later accused of embezzling large quantities of gold while in office, although according to another version, he refused to falsely accuse an innocent person of the same; AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 56, 98. sednica, 20. april 1978, Predlog za oslobođenje od krivične odgovornosti Bogdana Jovovića 17. april 1978, 1-4.
23 The reason for the falling-out is said to be that Perović allegedly did not appoint him as a member of the Central Committee of the Party at the “founding congress” in 1974, but only as a member of the “revision commission.” AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 56, 98. sednica, 20. april 1978, Predlog za oslobođenje od krivične odgovornosti Bogdana Jovovića 17. april 1978, 1-4.
24 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 56, 98. sednica, 20. april 1978, Predlog za oslobođenje od krivične odgovornosti Bogdana Jovovića, 17. april 1978.
25 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 52, 89. sednica 22. novembar 1977, stenogrami, 56.
26 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 56, 98. sednica, 20. april 1978, Predlog za oslobođenje od krivične odgovornosti Bogdana Jovovića, 17. april 1978, 1-4.
27 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 56, 98. sednica, 20. april 1977, Diskusija u vezi predloga za oslobođenje od krivične odgovornosti Bogdana Jovovića, stenogrami, 37-44.
28 According to Perović’s recollection, only a few prisoners were left behind them, including Veljko Žižić, Kemal Agolit and Milivoje Stefanović. – R. Danilović, n. d., 131.
29 Arhiv KPD S. Mitrovica, Dosije Milete Perovića, Presuda Mileti Peroviću, K. br. 7/78.
30 At the academy, Perović worked as an associate in the field of criticism of non-Marxist socio-economic theories. He remarried here and had a son, Mihajlo, with Tamara Borisova, a Ukrainian (he already had two sons from his first marriage — Milorad (1947) and Predrag (1948)); Arhiv KPD S. Mitrovica, Dosije Milete Perovića.
31 Arhiv KPD S. Mitrovica, Dosije Milete Perovića, Presuda Mileti Peroviću, K. br. 7/78.
32 Isto.
33 According to one version, a certain Mirkana Obrenović, a wealthy woman from Vienna who lived in Lugano, offered herself as his associate and companion back in Kiev. She managed to convince Perović to go on a trip to the Italian town of Paradiso. There, Mileta Perović was allegedly kidnapped by young fascists, who demanded a ransom for him. The kidnapping was reportedly paid off to the Milan mafia with 150,000 marks from a secret fund of the Yugoslav SDB. – M. Lopušina, n. d., Kidnapovanje pukovnika.
34 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 63, 98 sednica, 20. april 1978, Diskusija u vezi predloga za oslobođenje od krivične odgovornosti Bogdana Jovovića. stenogrami, 37-44; Arhiv KPD Sremska Mitrovica, Dosije Mileta Perović.
35 S. Cvetković, Između srpa i čekića, Beograd 2006, 382; R. Danilović, n. d., 130.
36 S. Ćuruvija, Ibeovac – ja Vlado Dapčević, 32. Dapčević describes a dramatic argument in 1948 at the family table over the Cominform Resolution, when brothers Peko and Vlado drew pistols on each other in front of their mother.
37 “I was even more proud of myself for being entrusted with the task of tracking down and ultimately liquidating such an important enemy of our country as Vlado Dapčević. I believed that this feat would make me famous as a secret agent. Everything was planned — to go to Brussels, eliminate him, then defect to the Netherlands… The warm smile and kindness in Vlado’s eyes won me over and probably awakened some human qualities in me… His image reminded me of our great hero Sava Kovačević.” Z. Jovanović, Umesto potezanja revolvera pozdrav s Dapčevićem, Ispovest jednog razočaranog udbaša, feljton Danas, 10. maj 2004.
38 The arrangement for cooperation between the security services — the Yugoslav SDB and the Romanian DIA — on the liquidation of political enemies in exile was allegedly agreed upon at the Tito-Ceaușescu meeting in Brioni in 1973. According to the author, in return, the Serbian service was expected to eliminate Romanian dissidents in the West: J. Poćepa, Crveni horizonti, Beograd 1990, 435-437, 444; Borba, 3-4. februar 1990; Yugoslavia Freedom to conform, U. S. Helsinki Watch Commitee, New York, August 1, 1982, 22.
39 J. Paćepa, Crveni horizonti, 432 i dalje u poglavlju XXIII.
40 Đoka Stojanović, born in 1937 in Niš, was the son of Vasko, who worked as a top-level railway expert before and after the Second World War. He had two sons, Đoka and Ivan, and a daughter, Marijana. Đoka completed grammar school and, from a young age, held strongly leftist, pro-Russian beliefs. In the early 1960s, he was convicted for attempting to cross the border illegally, but was granted amnesty in 1962. He managed to flee to Italy on October 20, 1963, and from there to France, where he was granted asylum. He became politically active in the French Communist Party and was involved in the events of 1968 in Paris, where he was part of the moderate wing led by Charles Tillon, opposing a revolutionary approach. He married Polet Le Trioner in the late 1960s and had three children — sons Aleksandar, Nikola and Marko. In the early 1970s, he moved to Brussels for work. He met Vlado Dapčević, who also lived in Brussels and had married the daughter of a chocolate manufacturer, Micheline, by chance in late 1974. Until Dapčević left for Romania, he had visited Đoka’s home only two or three times. Đoka joined Dapčević out of pure curiosity — to see what a real socialist country looked like, since he held a Yugoslav passport: Svedocenje Ivana Stojanovića iz Beograda, dato autoru 15. januara 2009.
41 Brothers Đorđe and Svetislav Markušev, originally from Zrenjanin, were communists and participants in the National Liberation War. They emigrated to Romania after 1948 and were longtime friends of Vlado Dapčević.
42 Aleksandar Opojević, Dapčević’s friend from the war years and a participant in the National Liberation War, later trained as a pilot in the USSR. He became a colonel in the Yugoslav Air Force and commander of the Zemun Airport in Belgrade. In March 1949, as an Cominformist, he defected by plane from Vršac to Romania. He first served as director of a Romanian radio station, specifically its Serbian-language program, and eventually rose to become the director of a Bucharest film distribution company, a position he held shortly before his death.
43 The statement of Marija Opojević, wife of A. Opojević, is cited — she was the one who soon informed Vlado Dapčević’s wife, Micheline, about the disappearance of the three men. Micheline then contacted Stojanović’s wife, Polet, who went on to notify international organizations. Više u: Lj. Ponjavić, Čekala ga robija na Golom otoku, feljton Zločin iz državnih razloga, šesti nastavak, Glas javnosti 20. jul -10. avgust 2002.
44 To create a new image of Romania, a special operation by the Security Service was devised under the name Horizon. In order to cover up the incident, two operatives were immediately sent with the passports of Dapčević and Stojanović to cross the border and travel to Belgium, as a precaution. This was intended to provide cover for the disinformation that they had left Romania: J. Paćepa, Crveni horizonti, Beograd 1991, 442.
45 The investigation into the killings was abruptly halted. Blagoje Tasić, the district prosecutor, terminated the investigation, and court president Tomislav Đurđević marked the file Kri-117/75 as “strictly confidential.” Later, in literature and testimonies, those named as the operatives responsible for the deaths of the two men included Luka Banović from Belgrade, head of the SDB, Silvio Gorenc from Krško, Draško Jurišić from Split and eight other members of the Romanian DIE; Svedočenje Ivana Stojanovića iz Beograda, dato autoru 15. januara 2009; Lj. Ponjavić, Enigma Dapčević, feljton „Zločin iz državnih razloga“, (1), Glas javnosti 20. jul – 10. avgust 2002.
46 “On our last evening, Aleksandar Opojević invited us to dinner. There were four of us: the host, Markušev, Stojanović and me. Around eleven o’clock, we headed back to the hotel… As soon as we set off, we noticed a white car following us… When we arrived at the Dorobanți Hotel, about 20 people were standing near the elevators. There was no key at the reception. They gave us a spare. I left the other two in the middle of the room and went down to the reception to schedule a wake-up call. When I turned around, the two of them were gone. I got into the elevator — a crowd of people came in behind me. As I stepped out and headed towards the room, who knows how many people rushed at me — the blows came from all directions. My hands and feet were tied. Like a package! And one of them held a baton in my mouth… They took me to some villa surrounded by a garden, and through my eyelashes I saw them carrying Opojević and Stojanović too… I woke up the next evening in the basement of the Central Prison in Belgrade, in a cell…”, S. Ćuruvija, Ja ibeovac Vlado Dapčević, Beograd 1990, 146.
47 Privatna arhiva Ivana Stojanovića, brata Doke Stojanovića; Lj. Ponjavić, Laži Franje Herljevića, feljton Zločin iz državnih razloga (10), Glas javnosti 20. jul – 10. avgust 2002.
48 J. Paćepa, n. d., 553.
49 He claims that the fate of his father was decisively influenced by the revelations in the Opojević-Stojanović case, including his “oppositional activity” through his legal practice. He adds that Jovan was afraid he was saying too much to Ivan Stojanović, fearing for his safety. Stojanović confirms that Barović appeared frightened during their last meeting and avoided talking about the Dapčević case: “Oh, you’re here about the divorce, please wait outside!” he said, only to later tell him privately not to come or call — that he would phone him instead. Shortly after that, news broke that lawyer Barović had died in a traffic accident; Svedočenje advokata Nikole Barovića, dato autoru 15. aprila 2008. i 29. maja 2009. u Beogradu; Svedočenje Ivana Stojanovića iz Beograda, dato autoru 15. januara 2009.
50 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 35, 52. sednica, 26. maj 1976, Usmeni izveštaj o bezbednosti Franje Herljevića – beleška S. Kuhar generalni sekretar Predsedništva SFRJ.
51 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 654, Predstavka advokata Jovana Barovića Predsedništvu SFRJ 22. novembar 1977. Upon arriving in Belgium, V. Dapčević married Micheline, the daughter of a wealthy and influential chocolate manufacturer, with whom he had an eight-year-old daughter at the time.
52 AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ, 803, fasc. 654, Predstavka advokata Jovana Barovića Predsedništvu SFRJ, 22. novembar 1977, 1-6.
53 Arhiv KPD Zabela, Dosije Vladimira Dapčevića.
54 According to the testimony of Ivan Stojanović, Slavko Ćuruvija was a longtime employee of the SDB, and he first saw him in the summer of 1982, when Ćuruvija was the Secretary for Information of the SSUP. Ćuruvija later became the first to bring up the issue of the Cominformists and V. Dapčević shortly before his release from prison, and later published a book on the subject. According to Stojanović, Ćuruvija received them at the secretariat rather harshly and indifferently, saying: “Get out — what else could he expect if he worked against the state!”; S. Ćuruvija, Ibeovac – ja Vlado Dapčević, Beograd 1990.
55 S. Ćuruvija, Ibeovac – ja Vlado Dapčević, 134.““All those years in Zabela were easier for me than a single day on Goli Otok,” Dapčević stated before his release from the Zabela Correctional Facility.
56 During the renewal of parliamentarism, V. Dapčević founded his own Party of Labour, modelled after the Albanian one. In 1991, he was publicly rehabilitated, his pension was restored and he was granted an apartment. He did not take further part in the search for the bodies of Opojević and Stojanović, nor did he pursue legal justice or the punishment of those responsible. This behaviour could be explained by a settlement previously mentioned by Barović — that Dapčević’s release was conditioned on a promise not to“make too many waves.” “He now behaves in an entirely proper manner towards our country,” Stane Dolanc would say of him in an interview in the late 1980s. Više u feljtonu Pozovi SDB radi ubistva, Duga 1990, br. 417-419, Borba, 12. februar 1990, 3.
57 The letter arrived at the editorial office of Politikin svet, whose editor at the time was Zoran Bogavac (former editor of Duga). It is believed that the tip-off came from within the police, specifically from an inspector from the Zrenjanin area; Svedocenje Ivana Stojanovića iz Beograda, dato autoru 15. januara 2009.
(Translated from: Neoibeovci, Istorija 20. veka, 2/2012, 147-164).