– Dr. Kosta Čavoški –
Delimitation of Federal Units
The federalization of Yugoslavia was carried out on a national basis with all the difficulties and inconsistencies that this carried in its wake. Strange enough, AVNOJ (The Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia), the authentic framer of the constitution and supreme representative body during the war and following the liberation until the Constitutive Assembly was convened, had no part in the territorial delimitation of the federal units. Hence, Mihailo Djurić’s statement on December 14, 1945, at the fifth session of the Constituent Committee of the Federal Assembly that the borders between the federal units had not been legalized, may seem quite astounding: “There is no law defining the borders between individual federal units. A law must be passed to that effect.”1 Djurić uttered these words following Moše Pijade’s explanation according to which the borders between individual federal units had appeared in a natural way. “Demarcation between individual federal units is a task which falls within the jurisdiction of the whole country. In other words, in the event of a dispute, it is the Assembly that will be called upon to settle it, if there is no such dispute, the borders will remain in the form they naturally appeared.”2
Moše Pijade’s explanation is wrong. Natural boundaries can only appear between civilization and savagery. Borders between federal units depend always on someone’s decision. Of course, these boundaries can be natural ones, such as rivers and mountain ridges but they are also the object of a choice, agreement or unilateral imposition. Behind a decision on delimitation there is always somebody’s and some sort of political will. The question is whose will had it, in fact, been.
A moment ago we pointed out that this had not been, during the war, the will of AVNOJ as the supreme legislative representative body. Instead, it was the narrow leadership of the CPY, constituted in war conditions by a handful of leaders surrounding the General Secretary, Josip Broz Tito, whose decisions were always final, that made far-reaching decisions about which federal units would form new Yugoslavia and within which borders they would be established. Edvard Kardelj also had a crucial role in decision-making on this issue, along with the remaining two belonging to the so-called “big four” — Aleksandar Ranković and Milovan Djilas. Here, we must scrutinize the nature of the decisions adopted by the select leadership of the CPY in respect of this question. There is no doubt about it that the select Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had previously reviewed proposals of other decisions which AVNOJ or its Presidency adopted under the form of an appropriate legal act. This is nothing unusual and is commonly practiced by political parties that are represented in parliament or in some other representative body. Unlike situations when proposals were previously considered and subsequently adopted by AVNOJ, decisions regarding the establishment and mutual delimitation of federal units were ultimately made by the select leadership of the CPY, which means that even when they were made orally (which was most frequently the case) they were immediately legally effective. That is why Moše Pijade was able to say that the new National Assembly would settle questions of demarcation between federal units only if a new dispute was to arise. Otherwise, borders would remain such as they had been established on the basis of earlier decisions.
However, Moše Pijade’s comments about the natural emergence of borders between federal units can also be interpreted differently. It is possible that Moše Pijade had wanted to say that the federal units preceded the forming of new federal Yugoslavia, in other words that it was on the relics of old Yugoslavia that first the federal units had been formed, that they had themselves defined their territory and settled border disputes between them, and it was only then that on the basis of an agreement signed between them that federal Yugoslavia was established. Yet, neither this interpretation coincides with the historical truth. The decision to build Yugoslavia along Federal lines and to set up AVNOJ as the supreme legislative and executive representative body had been passed before most of the federal units were genuinely constituted.
It now remains for us to describe how and on what basis the select leadership of the CPY had carried out the territorial delimitation. It was quite by accident that we discovered these exceptionally significant and far-reaching historical facts in regard to which virtually no mention was made in the minutes of the war sessions of the Politbureau of the CC CPY which have been preserved and published. We found them in the reconstructed shorthand notes taken at the AVNOJ Presidency session of February 24, 1945. Concerning the demand of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) and the Territorial Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Croatia (ZAVNOH) that three, i.e. four of their representatives be in the AVNOJ Presidency, the question was brought up of whether all federal units were proportionally represented in AVNOJ, proportionally to the number of inhabitants on their territory, since AVNOJ was a one-chamber representative body. On that occasion, Secretary Mile Peruničić declared: “All our lands, all our federal units are not proportionally represented in AVNOJ. Such were the conditions underlying our work. On the average, the smallest number in the AVNOJ came from federal Serbia.”3 Peruničić arrived at this conclusion by comparing the population of the federal units within the then borders (February 1945), on the basis of the census of 1931, and the number of their representatives in AVNOJ. This survey4 first indicates that in addition to the six federal units existing also today, there were also four regions the status and affiliation of which had not, until then been decided on — a) Vojvodina, b) Kosovo and Metohija, c) Sandžak and d) Pančevo and Zemun. Further on, additional explanations were given regarding the borders of federal units:
“Slovenia was to be within the borders of the former Drava Banovina; Croatia within the borders of the former Sava Banovina with 13 districts of the former Coastal Banovina and the Dubrovnik district from the former Zeta Banovina; Bosnia and Herzegovina within the borders established by the Treaty of Berlin; Serbia within the pre-Balkan War borders with the districts taken from Bulgaria by virtue of the Treaty of Versailles; Macedonia, Yugoslav territory south of Kačanik and Ristovac; Montenegro within the borders established prior to the Balkan War along with the Berane and Kotor districts and Plavo and Gusinje.”5
This was, thus, the authentic territorial status which the select CPY leadership had attributed to each federal unit during the war. What first strikes us is the fact that, with the exception of Macedonia, different federal units had been taken in borders within which they had existed in different periods of history, in a span of over sixty years — from 1878 to 1939. And what is worst, in the case of some federal unit, their most favourable borders were taken, in the case of others, the least favourable were chosen. We shall prove this point.
Slovenia was placed within the borders of the Drava Banovina, established on the basis of the Law on the name and division of the land into administrative units of 1929. In respect of the rest of Yugoslavia, these are its present borders. Without the shadow of a doubt, this was the best possible solution for Slovenia since virtually all Slovenes on the territory of the Yugoslavia of the time found themselves in one federal unit. Even the Plenum of the Slovene Liberation Front, without having received previous consent by AVNOJ, passed a decision on the annexation of the Slovene coast and all other annexed parts of Slovenia, which encroached upon relations with foreign countries, Italy and Austria.
Macedonia, too, was granted the most favourable territorial status. The border which is some 10, that is 15 km south of Kačanik and Ristovac is Macedonia’s present border with Serbia. It was favourable in that there were no Macedonians north of that border, whereas a considerable number of Serbs, Turks and Muslims had remained within the borders of Macedonia. It so happened that on August 3,1945, the AVNOJ Presidency adopted a law on the revision of the allotment of land to colonists and farmers in Macedonia and in the region of Kosovo and Metohija,6 by which colonized Serbs and Montenegrins who had received land for their war merits, though, in most cases, land that had never before been tilled, in other words village meadows or paid for it with their own money, could be virtually driven out of Macedonia and partially, from Kosovo and Metohija. Still, unlike with the Slovene Liberation Front and the Croatian leadership, the Macedonian leadership was not able to decide on the annexation of parts of neighbouring states inhabited by Macedonians.7
Bosnia and Herzegovina were also granted an extremely favourable territorial status, in view of the fact that they were also placed within the frameworks of their historical borders, confirmed by the Congress of Berlin in 1878. It is thanks to this, that this federal unit had been granted an access to the sea via Neum as a result of which Croatian Dalmatia had been cut in two. However, the advantageous territorial status granted to Bosnia and Herzegovina had different implications for the nations living there. From the standpoint of the interests of a nation to have all its members gathered together in one federal unit, the borders confirmed by the Congress of Berlin were only favourable to the Muslims. They would have been even more favourable had they also incorporated the Muslims living in Sandžak which was subsequently divided up between Serbia and Montenegro. On the other hand, this was not the best possible solution as far as the Croats and Serbs were concerned, as these borders separated them from their parent units. If, as a basis for the federalization of new Yugoslavia, the principle of the federal units’ national homogeneity were applied, then the fact that a large number of Croats and Serbs had remained outside the borders of Croatia and Serbia is sharply at variance with that principle. There are those who would argue that on account of the inter-mixing of the population similar to that of Switzerland, in Bosnia and Herzegovina it would be equally difficult to draw ethnic borders between the Croats, Serbs and Muslims. This is undoubtedly correct, but also points to the drawbacks as well as the advantages of the principle of national homogeneity because, while it was applicable to the case of Slovenia, it could not be applied in the same manner to the other Yugoslav nations.
Montenegro’s borders were taken to be those existing prior to the Balkan War, meaning that, like in the case of Serbia, the results it had scored in the liberation war against the Turks had not been recognized. However, unlike with Serbia, this was largely made up to Montenegro as it was given the districts Berane, Plav, Gusinje, which Montenegro has won in the last war against the Turks, as well as the Kotor district (from Herceg-Novi to Bar) which had been a part of Austria-Hungary at the time of the Balkan Wars and even before that. The following districts remained outside the war-established AVNOJ Montenegro: Pljevlje, Bijelo Polje, Djakovica and Peć which Montenegro had taken in the war against the Turks.
The territorial status which Croatia had obtained during the war has been the object of different interpretations. The basis of its territory was the Banovina of Croatia established by virtue of the Cvetković-Maček agreement of August 26, 1939 which comprised, along with the Sava and Coastal Banovinas and the district of Dubrovnik, also the districts of Ilok, Šid, Brčko and Gradačac. Might we also add that within, the frameworks of the historical borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Coastal Banovina or rather the Croatian Banovina incorporated the districts of Travnik, Fojnica, Bugojno, Livno, Prozor, Konjic, Mostar, Ljubuški and Duvno, i.e. a substantial slice of Herzegovina and central Bosnia. Indeed, this was the first territorial and administrative unit after many centuries that covered all three historical Croatian provinces, central Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia.8 During the Austro-Hungarian rule and even earlier on, Dalmatia had belonged to Austria, while central Croatia, Slavonia and later on Military Krajina belonged to Hungary. However, the above territory which had been delineated during the war did not coincide fully with the territory of the Banovina of Croatia but was rectified, in other words reduced by the historical borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were given precedence over the borders of the former Banovina of Croatia. Thanks to this, the Herzegovinian communes predominantly populated by Croats were left out of the Croatian Banovina. This was also the case with the districts of Brčko and Gradačac in Northern Bosnia. Thus, the AVNOJ Croatia had a somewhat smaller territory than the pre-war Croatian Banovina. However, we must not overlook the fact that even at the time one reckoned with the expansion of Croatian territory to encompass lands which had in the period between the two wars belonged to Italy and that the Supreme Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Croatia, without the consent of AVNOJ, decided to annex Istria, Rijeka, Zadar and the annexed parts of Croatia and the Croatian Adriatic islands to free Croatia.
There was much confusion about the territorial status of AVNOJ Serbia which was placed within the borders existing prior to the Balkan Wars (the so-called pre-Kumanovo Serbia), to which two districts taken from Bulgaria after World War I were added. This, in fact, means, that Serbia had not been recognized the results it had achieved in the liberation wars against the Turks and Austria-Hungary, which it had waged from 1912-1918, in other words, that Serbia was granted, on the basis of decisions of the supreme party leadership, a status which totally ignored the wars that it had fought. It is particularly interesting to compare the borders of AVNOJ Serbia and the so-called Nedić ones under German occupation. They are practically identical except for the southern and south-eastern borders. War-time AVNOJ Serbia comprised Novi Pazar and a part of Kosovo in the area around the Trepča mine, including Kosovska Mitrovica which did not come under Serbia in the AVNOJ times.
Established in such a manner, the borders of the federal units gave rise to many awkward questions. Why was it that for different federal units different borders established at different periods of history were taken — in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this was 1878, for Montenegro and Serbia, 1912, prior to the Balkan War, for Slovenia 1929, and for Croatia 1939? Why was not the same year taken?
These are not academic questions but rather far-reaching political issues, as the choice of different years put some federal units in a position of inequality. Let us take, for example, Croatia and Serbia. What, indeed, would have happened had the same year for both federal units been chosen, either 1912 or 1939? If it had been 1912, Serbia would have been established within the borders of pre-Kumanovo Serbia and Croatia within its administrative borders within Hungarian frameworks, comprising Central Croatia, Slavonia and Military Krajina, thereby excluding Dalmatia. In that case, Dalmatia, Vojvodina, Sandžak, Kosovo and Metohija would have been in a position to decide for themselves about their own respective status since they would have found themselves outside these borders. If such had been the case, each of the above-mentioned regions could have made its own decision about whether at all it wished to join Croatia or Serbia and under what conditions — whether as an integral part or as a separate region with a higher or lower degree of autonomy. If, on the other had 1939, had been chosen, then Croatia would have found itself within the Croatian Banovina borders, and Serbia would have spread to the whole of the Yugoslav territory east of the Banovina of Croatia, following the separation of Bosnia, of the territory formerly belonging to Montenegro, the territory 10 or 15 km south of Kačanik and Ristovac (present-day Macedonia) and Sandžak as controversial territories to which both Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia could have laid claim. In that event, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Metohija would have been considered an integral part of Serbia and they would not have been in any position to decide for themselves if they wanted to become a part of Serbia and under which conditions, whether as an autonomous province or as its integral part.
Besides, an even more awkward question might be asked if for different federal units the same year had been chosen, why had not the procedure been the same when defining their respective borders? A difference in procedure can be seen in the examples of Serbia and Montenegro. Both Serbia and Montenegro had been set up within borders dating back to before the Balkan War, but Montenegro had in addition received the districts of Berane, Plav and Gusinje which Montenegro had acquired in the First Balkan War and Serbia had received two districts inhabited by Bulgarians, a territory annexed to it following Bulgaria’s defeat in World War I. It should also be added that Montenegro had obtained the Kotor district, stretching from Herceg Novi to Bar which after long centuries of Turkish rule in the Balkans did not go to Montenegro but first to the Venetian Republic and then to Austria. As for Serbia, it did not receive any of the lands inhabited by Serbs which were outside the Serbian borders during the Turkish rule until 1912.
There is also some confusion caused by the delineation of borders between, on the one hand, Croatia, and, on the other Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here, there is a discrepancy between the historical borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1878 (established much earlier by the Karlovac Peace Treaty of 1699), and the borders of the Banovina of Croatia of 1939. Precedence was given to the former at the expense of the latter. It had, however, not been explained why this was done. It is true that the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina are historical borders but not ethnic ones. The borders of the Banovina of Croatia had been defined in accordance with the principle of national homogeneity. As the war-time leadership of the CPY opted for the formation of national federal units — not for some sort of Swiss cantons which were most often established within their authentic historical borders, but rather in favour of Soviet republics based on the principles of national self-determination — it remains unclear why precedence had been given to historical rather than ethnic borders. The reasons for this solution were obviously not ones of principle but mainly of a pragmatic nature.
Finally, there also remains the question why the most favourable borders were not recognized to some federal units, even then when no other federal unit laid any claims to territories within these borders. We are alluding here to Serbia. The wartime leadership of the CPY had not made the territories of Vojvodina (taken as a whole) and Kosovo and Metohija a part of Serbia although none of the other neighbouring federal units (neither Croatia, nor Macedonia, nor even Montenegro) had laid claim to them, nor had any of the decisions of the Second Session of AVNOJ explicitly mentioned their special status.
Negative Delimitation of Serbia’s Borders
Whoever attempted in the period between 1924 and 1945 to reduce Serbia to its “right” measure (and this was, at best, today’s “Serbia proper”) must have been aware of the former borders of Serbia, before it had become a part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, on December 1, 1918. In the First Balkan War, Serbia freed the so-called old Serbia from the Turkish yoke. Old Serbia covered the territory currently occupied by the greater part of Novi Pazar Sandžak, Kosovo and Metohija (without the western part of Metohija which had belonged to the Montenegro of the time) and Vardar Macedonia (present-day SR of Macedonia without an insignificant part of the Strumičko polje which had been annexed to Yugoslavia following Bulgaria’s defeat). On the eve of the unification, Vojvodina and Montenegro were annexed to Serbia — Vojvodina by a decision of the Great National Assembly in Novi Sad on November 25, 1918, and Montenegro by a decision of the Great National Assembly of the Serbian Nation in Montenegro on November 26 (13, according to the old calendar), 1918.
While the CPY believed that Yugoslavia was a “one-national state”9and championed “the idea of national unity and of all nationalities in the country”10 no one was either bothered by a small or big Serbia nor had the question of which lands were and which were not Serbian been raised. As of 1924, when, by order of the Comintern, the CPY began its struggle to abolish “pan-Serb hegemony,” the sensitive issue of establishing which lands were non-Serb (Slovene, Croatian, Albanian, etc.) and which only could be Serb had become a matter of great concern. Thus, indirectly, the borders of some future AVNOJ or Brioni Serbia were being established. As far back as in 1924, the CPY questioned Vojvodina’s affiliation to Serbia when concluding that the imperialist peace treaties had “subjected the compact masses of Hungarians, Germans and Romanians in Vojvodina”11 to exploitation by the Serbian bourgeoisie.” As it was considered the duty of the Parly to help movements of exploited nations to establish their own independent states and “in order to free the Albanians,”12 Serbia’s right to parts inhabited by Albanians was implicitly contested.
The Third Congress of the CPY held in Vienna, in June 1926, acted along similar lines. In the Congress’ resolution on the national question, quoted as non-Serb lands were not only Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia but also Montenegro and Vojvodina which questioned the validity of the decisions passed by the Great National Assembly of Vojvodina and of the Great National Assembly of the Serbian Nation in Montenegro regarding their annexation to Serbia. As, along with this, mention was made of the forming of national movements13 in both provinces, it is clear that, even then, there was a need to form new nations and independent states on the territory of “Versailles Yugoslavia.”
The Fourth Congress of the CPY in Dresden, in October 1928, marked the most radical attempt at confining Serbia to its “proper” measure. Moreover, it was stated at the Congress that Montenegro “had been deprived of its autonomy as a state and annexed to the State of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia thanks to French and English imperialism.” It was thus considered as being under foreign rule, that is “under the savage occupier regime”14 of the pan-Serb bourgeoisie. The communists of the time believed that other regions and nations within the borders of “Versailles” Yugoslavia were also under a similar occupier regime. These were “considerable Albanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian territories”15 which are today within the borders of the SR of Serbia and the SR of Macedonia. Reference is more specifically made to “Hungarian territory in Northern Vojvodina, annexed to Yugoslavia on the basis of the Treaty of Trianon,”16 “the annexation of Albanian parts in occupied Macedonia and in Kosovo”17 and “the annexation of old Bulgarian territory (Caribrod and Bosiljgrad)”18. This explains why the Fourth Congress of the CPY had shown solidarity with “the Albanian revolutionary movement represented by the Kosovo Committee”and had appealed to the working classes “to support, in every way, the struggle of the dismembered and oppressed Albanian nation for an independent and united Albania,”19 as well as to recognize “the Hungarian national minority in Northern Vojvodina the right to secession.”20The only thing they had failed to mention was the need to restore to Bulgaria, “old Bulgarian territory” which had been seized by force.
It should be noted that the Fourth Congress of the CPY had not viewed the status of national minorities from a reciprocal standpoint. Therefore, in the same way that it sought to protect the oppressed Albanian, Hungarian and Bulgarian minorities within the borders of “Versailles Yugoslavia,” it could have also insisted that the position of the endangered Serbian national minority which had been deprived of its rights be improved in Hungary, Romania and Albania. Since this is a case of acting differently in identical situations, it is hard to say whether the first had been done for the sake of sympathy for the Albanians, Hungarians and Bulgarians, and the second had not been done of hatred for the Serbs, or whether in both cases state reasons had been at stake, that is to say the need to break up Yugoslavia and wipe it from the geopolitical map of Europe to ensure the security of the Soviet Union. Whatever the case may have been, need we recall that hatred, like love, is blind to equality as the core of justice.
The Fourth National Conference of the CPY held in Ljubljana in December 1934, shared more or less the same views about the Serbian nation’s territorial integrity. As far as it was concerned, the “forming of the Versailles Yugoslavia” was tantamount to the “occupation of Croatia, Dalmatia and Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Vojvodina by the Serbian troops”21 and it was thus demanded that the “Serbian occupier, the Serbian troops and militia, as well as Serbian Chetniks be driven out of Croatia, Slovenia, Dalmatia, Vojvodina, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo.” The unoccupied, i.e. Serbian part of “Versailles Yugoslavia” was the territory of present “Serbia proper.”
In 1935, in face of the rising danger of fascism and the shift in the foreign-political interests of the first country of socialism, the Yugoslav communists abandoned the struggle for breaking up “Versailles Yugoslavia” and began to advocate its preservation, internal restructuring and federalization. In so doing, however, and there is a tendency to overlook this fact, they did not change their position with regard to the Serbs as a hegemonistic nation nor their endeavours to reduce Serbia to its “right” measure for the sake of the freedom and well-being of other nations since: “a small and weak Serbia — meant a strong Yugoslavia,” as the slogan goes. In a decision of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia concerning the tasks facing the CPY following the 7th Congress of the Communist International, passed on August 21, 1935 in Moscow, it was demanded that not only the Slovene, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Bosnian national assemblies be convened but also the Vojvodina national assembly, whereby Vojvodina was set apart from any future Serbia.22
Although on this occasion Kosovo and Metohija had not been explicitly mentioned, this in no way implied that the pre-war Yugoslav communists considered them part of Serbia. This is best illustrated by the resolution of the Fifth National Congress of the CPY held in October 1940 which was drafted by J.B. Tito. It, indeed, called for a struggle “for the freedom and equal rights of the Arnaut minorities in Kosovo, Metohija and Sandžak” (no mention was made of Western Macedonia — comment by K.Č.) and demanded “that all colonized elements thanks to which the Serbian bourgeoisie oppressed the Macedonian, Arnaut and other nations be driven out.”23 The non-Serb character of these and other regions was also affirmed by Tito’s efforts in favour of “national language in schools, in courts and in the army (underlined by K.Č.) in parts inhabited by Macedonians, Slovenes, Albanians, Germans, Hungarians, Romanians and other national minorities” and his calling for the struggle “against Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Albanians etc. doing their military service outside their homeland.”24
In defining the areas of pre-war Yugoslavia under occupation and those that could only be Serbian, a fairly negative attitude was shown to Serbia and the Serbs. Perhaps, the best example of this can be seen in the case of Montenegro. Despite persistent communist propaganda, it was a hard job in pre-war Yugoslavia to convince the Montenegrins that they were under the foreign domination of Serbian conquerors and occupiers. Thus, it was noted with regret at the Fourth National Conference of the CPY in December 1934, that there still existed among the old Montenegrin communists instances of “opportunistic deviations from the Party line with regard to the national question. There are comrades, who, in defending the memory of Jovan Tomašević, state that the so-called unification between Montenegro and Serbia in 1918 was a progressive move.”25 For the CPY leadership of the time, this was not a sufficient reason for reviewing communist national policies but only an incentive for publishing a brochure “in which, as they said, they would explain the party’s position regarding the Montenegrin issue and show all the forms in which Serbian imperialism oppressed and plundered the Montenegrin nation.”26
The most difficult of all is to understand the position of the CPY leadership of the time regarding the liberation wars which small Serbia had waged from 1912 to 1918. It even saw in the liberation of Kosovo and Metohija from the Turkish yoke the occupation of territory belonging to someone else. Not to speak of the contempt with which it looked upon and how wrongly it described the Serbian struggle and victory in the First World War without which it would not have been at all possible to form Yugoslavia. And worst of all, this hostile attitude to the liberation struggle of the Serbian nation had not been the result of an uncritical acceptance of some Marxist or Bolshevik judgments about that struggle but the fruit of far more lasting and profound misunderstandings, rifts and hatred. The founding father of Third International communism, Vladmir Ilyich Lenin, had spoken very favourably about the liberation struggle waged by the Serbian nation. In his opinion: “The national element in the present war represents only the war of Serbia against Austria… It is only in Serbia and among the Serbs that there exists a long-standing liberation movement involving millions among the ‘national masses,’ the ‘continuation’ of which is Serbia’s war against Austria. Had that war been an isolated one, i.e. had it not been linked up with an all-European war, with the selfish and plundering aims of England, Russia and others, then all socialists would have been duty-bound to wish the Serbian bourgeoisie every success — this is the only right and absolutely necessary conclusion to be drawn from the national aspect of the present war.”27 As far as the between-war leading communists were concerned, even Lenin was no authority when it came to identifying the enslavement of other nations and the occupation of territories belonging to others in the liberation struggles of the Serbian nation.
INDIRECT ESTABLISHING OF SERBIA’S BORDERS BY QUOTING THE INDEPENDENT STATES, OR FEDERAL UNITS SURROUNDING IT
The very moment the Comintern had decided that Yugoslavia had to be dismembered into independent states, and the CPY helpfully acquiescing to execute the decision immediately, the question of their number and the territory they were to occupy was raised. The question of the borders between the federal units emerged in much the same way, when the Comintern had concluded, and the CPY agreed, that Yugoslavia should be preserved as a unified state provided that it was federalized. In both cases, Serbia’s, or rather Serbia proper’s borders with neighbouring states, that is with federal units had been delimited indirectly.
Thus, for instance, whenever Vojvodina was mentioned as a future federal unit, its borders to Croatia were never completely defined as the question of Srem and Banat (the Serbian Dukedom under Austria-Hungary covered Banat, Bačka and Bardnja). Yet, it was always certain that the borders between that Vojvodina and Serbia were on the Danube and Sava. The borders between the future independent (or independent and united) Macedonia were also not clearly delimited, since no one in the CPY wished to become seriously involved in genuine ethnic demarcation. The prevailing tendency was to keep Serbia within its pre-Kumanovo borders, that is to say to question its every right to any region that it had liberated in the First Balkan War. The same sort of reasoning also applied to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The very moment the Yugoslav communists had reached the conclusion that Bosnia and Herzegovina should become autonomous, in other words, a separate federal unit, its borders with Serbia were not ethnic but rather historical ones. These were in fact the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina such as they had been established by the Congress of Berlin of 1878. Of course, the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Croatia should also have been historical ones but, unlike in the case of Serbia, there were no serious attempts at and decisions about delineating the border between Croatia on the one hand, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other (more about this, later on in the article) bearing in mind ethnic considerations in such a way that the Bosnian and Herzegovinian regions predominantly populated with Croats should be placed within the borders of Croatia.
The position with regard to Montenegro as an independent state or federal unit was indeed an interesting one. Although Montenegro shared a similar fate to that of Serbia in the liberation wars from 1912 to 1918, the Yugoslav communists, when proceeding to delimit the state territory of Montenegro proved to be far more cooperative than in the case of Serbia. To begin with, the inclusion of the Kotor Bay in Montenegro was generally not a controversial issue, although that area had, until 1918, been a part of Austria. There were even instances when the leading Yugoslav communists seemed, judging by the jurisdiction of the Montenegrin Provincial Committee of the CPY, inclined to envision Sandžak in Montenegro rather than in Serbia. Yet, in spite of all this, the future borders between Montenegro and Serbia were quite undefined, including Montenegro’s borders with Metohija. The main obstacle lay in the inability of the Yugoslav communists of the time to find a reliable measure for differentiating between Serbs and Montenegrins, as, for example, was religion for differentiating between Serbs and Croats, and language for telling the difference between Croats and Slovenes.
Finally, the borders between Kosovo and Metohija and Serbia were another matter to be discussed in the light of the statements about Kosovo and Metohija becoming part of future united Albania or a federal unit within Yugoslavia. In the interwar years and during World War II, these borders had never been delimited, but it was implicitly understood among the leading Yugoslav communists that if it came to a confrontation between Serbian historic rights and Albanian ethnic rights, precedence would be given to the latter.
Now that we have pinpointed the areas of the independent states or rather of future federal units with which so-called Serbia proper was to border, we shall pass on to an analysis of CPY documents mentioning, in one way or another, the dismemberment of Yugoslavia or its federalization. The very fact that some regions were referred to as independent states or federal units gives us some indication of the lands which were intended for Serbia. For instance, by mentioning Vojvodina as a future federal unit the implication was that it would not be a part of Serbia and vice versa.
The idea that Yugoslavia should be broken up into several independent states which would subsequently, under worker-peasant governments, unite into a Balkan or Balkan-Danubian federation was for the first time more resolutely voiced among the ranks of the CPY in 1923. Admittedly, these views, staunchly backed by the Comintern, did not prevail immediately. As far back as January 1924, the Third National Conference pronounced itself in favour of preserving Yugoslavia in one way or another, provided it was federalized. This was substantiated by a conclusion of the Third Conference stating that the immediate consequence of the hegemony practiced by the Serbian bourgeoisie was the “defensive grouping of the Croatian and Slovene nations and national minorities as well as the movement for the autonomy of Montenegro, Bosnia and Vojvodina, and for the independence of Macedonia.”28 Here we can already discern six federal units: Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Vojvodina, while Serbia was not mentioned at all, although the existence of the Serbian nation was not disputed.
Immediately following this Conference, a sharp conflict broke out within the Party itself, particularly in respect of the national question. This dispute also spread to the Independent Workers’ Party (NPRJ), through which the illegal CPY publicly operated. In accordance with the resolution of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern concerning the national question in Yugoslavia, NRPJ concluded, without the shadow of a doubt, that in order to establish national equality it was essential to break “imperialist Yugoslavia” into an independent Croatian and Slovene republic, independent Macedonia, as well as to liberate the Albanians.”29 The Decision of the NRPJ National Council regarding the “Dispute in the Party,” also spoke of “independent Montenegro.”30 Consequently, independent Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro were mentioned and it is quite possible that the annexation of Kosovo and Metohija to Albania had also been envisaged because reference was also made to the liberation of Albanians. Serbia was not mentioned, on this occasion either.
The further influence of the Comintern and of Stalin himself was particularly noticeable in the decision of the Third Congress of the CPY which convened in Vienna, in June 1926. Its decisions speaks of national movements in Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Vojvodina and Montenegro,31 which were, in fact, future independent states or parts of neighbouring states into which Yugoslavia was to disintegrate. Neither this decision makes any mention of Serbia, or independent Serbia.
The position of the Third Congress of the CPY regarding individual irridenta and separatist national movements is rather interesting. One of the central tasks in Vojvodina was that the CPY “wage a struggle against all instances of oppression of national minorities and the imperialist annexation (underlined by K.Č.) of Vojvodina and to curb the negative attitude of a portion of the Hungarian comrades in respect of the Hungarian irridenta (underlined by K.Č.) in Vojvodina.”32 In other words, in view of the party policies of the time, set out at the Third Congress, the annexation of Vojvodina to Serbia, and, subsequently, to Yugoslavia constituted an act of imperialist annexation, and that, hence, Hungarian irridentism, i.e. the movement for the annexation of Vojvodina, a part of it, to Hungary was both justified and legitimate. They even went as far as stating that the position with regard to the Hungarian irridenta should be a positive rather than a negative one.
The most far-reaching and the most radical decision about the Yugoslav national question was passed by the Fourth Congress of the CPY, held in Dresden, in October 1928. This Congress adopted a decision on the forming of the independent states of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia (“independent and united”), “independent and united Albania” (implying the annexation of Kosovo and Metohija to Albania) and the secession of Northern Vojvodina inhabited by Hungarians and its annexation to Hungary.33 The Serbian communists were only instructed to recognize the “right to secession and… armed rebellion”to other nations and national minorities (Albanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians and others) and to give them “systematic aid”34 incarrying out that intent. However, these documents made no mention whatsoever of the state of the Serbian nation. This held no interest at all as far as the Comintern and the leadership of the CPY of the time were concerned.
The Fourth National Conference of the CPY which took place in Ljubljana, from December 24 to 25, 1934, reiterated its recognition of “the right to self-determination up to secession of all oppressed nations — Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, etc.”35 As this was not the end of the list of oppressed nations, we can, in all certainty, add the Albanians, since, in another section, stress was laid on the CPY’s support to the national-revolutionary organization in Kosovo.36 In addition, the document referred to all the future independent states which were to be built on the ramparts of Yugoslavia. These were Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia and Vojvodina.37
In August 1935, following the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, the decision of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPY regarding the tasks of the CPY following that Congress,38 the idea of breaking up Yugoslavia was explicitly renounced. Although the term “federation” was not explicitly used, it was, nevertheless, evident that this was, as far as the CPY was concerned, the new future of Yugoslavia. Yet, the attitude towards the Serbian nation had not changed. At best, Serbia was envisaged within the borders of present-day Serbia proper. In “The Letter For Serbia,” of November 2, 1936, drafted by J.B. Tito, seven federal units were mentioned.39 They were not specifically enumerated, but it was pointed out that “Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and even Vojvodina and Bosnia and Herzegovina would form their national assemblies (parliaments) which would be sovereign in deciding on national and regional requests regarding their state system.”40 Kosovo and Metohija were, on this occasion, left out, only to reappear in March 1940, in Tito’s article entitled “The Offensive of the Reaction Against the Laborious Masses.” The article deals, inter alia, with “nationally oppressed masses in Macedonia, Montenegro, in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vojvodina.”41 As for the state of the Serbian nation, again the borders of today’s “Serbia proper” were envisaged.
The Fifth National Conference was the last large gathering of the Yugoslav communists at which the CPY’s national policies were shaped and with which it entered the war. In the resolution of the Conference, which convened in October 1940, federal units which were to form the Yugoslav federation had not been explicitly mentioned. On the other hand, it was understood that the component parts of Yugoslavia were individual regions. These were Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Metohija and Kosovo and Vojvodina.42 This party gathering, too, tapered down Serbia to “Serbia proper.”
The first years of war witnessed no manifest change in the CPY’s stand regarding the setting up of federal units which were to form the Yugoslav federation. This is the conclusion we can infer from some articles and documents. One of the most famous writings of the time was J. B. Tito’s article “On the National Question in Yugoslavia in the Light of the National Liberation Struggle,” published in the party paper in December 1942. The article mentioned, on a number of occasions, the nations and provinces in which they lived. Referring to “Versailles Yugoslavia,” Tito stated that the “Croats, Slovenes and Montenegrins were… subjugated nations,” and the “Macedonians, Arnauts and others… enslaved and subjected to extermination.”43 He also spoke of Serbs and Muslims as nations, although, in his view, Muslims were basically a special religious group (he used a small letter at the beginning of that word). Seeing as how he also alluded to both the German and Hungarian national minorities, it is obvious that he made a distinction between nations and national minorities. In his opinion, “Macedonians, Arnauts, Croats, muslims,”44 constituted nations, along with Slovenes, Serbs and Montenegrins, while Hungarians, Germans and others were national minorities. In this article, Tito used the expression “unsettled question” when referring to the future federal units. “The question of Macedonia, the question of Kosovo and Metohija, the question of Montenegro, the question of Croatia, the question of Slovenia, the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” will be easily settled to the mutual satisfaction of all concerned, by the very fact that it will be settled by the nations themselves — concluded Tito…45
THE TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE CPY AS A MODEL FOR THE FEDERALIZATION OF YUGOSLAVIA
If we were to closely scrutinize the gradual evolution of the territorial organization of the CPY, in the period from 1934 until the Second Session of AVNOJ in 1943, we could readily see that the division into regional party organizations was the precursor, with the exception of the case of Dalmatia, of the subsequent division into federal units and regions the status of which was only to be resolved after the end of World War II. There is nothing unusual in this. While they were still a party of the opposition operating deep underground, the communists were not able to have any bearing on the division of Yugoslavia into administrative or federal units, but were, however, able to shape their regional organizations and units according to their idea of a future federalization of Yugoslavia which they would carry out once they came to power.
As the initial indication of the CPY’s division into regional organization according to the conception of the future federalization of Yugoslavia, we might mention the decision of the Fourth National Conference stating that “within the frameworks of the CPY, the CP of Croatia and the CP of Slovenia and in a very near future, the CP of Macedonia should be founded.”46 This was not correct because the decision on forming these national parties had been adopted in 1934, i.e. at a time when the position of the CPY and of the Comintern regarding the need of breaking up Yugoslavia into a number of independent national states had still been effective. From this, the reader of today can easily grasp the unusual circumstance that the Fourth National Congress had not simultaneously decided to form the CP of Serbia, which was established only 11 years later (in 1945). It was the view of the leading Yugoslav communists of the time that it was only the members of the nationally oppressed nations who were entitled to form their own national communist parties, whereas communists belonging to nations which were believed to be the hegemon of “Versailles Yugoslavia” were to be deprived of that right. This view was indirectly confirmed by Vladimir Bakarić who said that: “We namely formed the parties of Slovenia and Croatia, with the intention of forming the party of Macedonia, as parties of oppressed nations (underlined by K.Č.) within a unified party in which the ‘ruling nation’ (i.e. the Serbian nation, comment by K.Č.) would not have its party.”(underlined by K.Č.)47
Bakarić’s words were confirmed by the minutes of the Split plenum of the CC CPY, held in June 1935. They revealed that at the Fourth National Conference of the CPY, certain demands had been put forward for the creation of the CP of Serbia and that such a demand had been rejected.48 This was only a further confirmation of the reluctance of the CPY to settle the question of forming the CP of Serbia in the same manner that it went about settling the question of the national communist parties of Croatia and Slovenia, which speaks to the everlastingly present prejudices not only with regard to the Serbian bourgeoisie but also with regard to the Serbian proletariat, and even the entire Serbian nation.
Thus a national party organization was not envisaged in the case of Serbia, but rather a provincial one. What still remains is to establish the territory that it covered. The “Report on the Party (from Walter, Yugoslavia)”49 deals with the communist parties of Slovenia and Croatia and provincial organizations in Dalmatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vojvodina. All these organizations had provincial committees. Macedonia was to have the same provincial organization, but the provincial party leadership had not yet been formed. Walter went on to say that in Kosovo and Metohija, “a provisional leadership had been formed which was managing party work there.”50 As Vojvodina already had its provincial organization, it was possible for the CPY Provincial Committee for Serbia to develop its activities on the territory of Serbia proper alone. In later party documents, the party organization of Kosovo and Metohija was mentioned along with the party organizations of Vojvodina and Serbia. Thus, it was stated in the resolution of the Fifth National Conference that the CPY had succeeded in “establishing party organizations and provincial leaderships in Macedonia, Metohija and Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.”51
Finally, besides the Vojvodina provincial and Kosovo-Metohija organizations, the Novi Pazar Sandžak was to be excluded from the Provincial Party Organization of Serbia and annexed to the Montenegrin party organization as emerges from Tito’s statements of December 1940: “The Provincial Conference of the Party for Montenegro, Metohija, Kosovo, Sandžak and Boka Kotorska has shown… that this was one of the strongest organizations of the CPY.”52 Thus, the provincial organization of the CPY for Serbia had been virtually reduced to the area of pre-Kumanovo Serbia.
AVNOJ AND BRIONI SERBIA
This manner of determining the area covered by provincial party organizations would not have, naturally, evoked such suspicion had it not subsequently served as a model for delimiting the borders of individual federal units. We might even say, and immediately prove, that the so-called AVNOJ federalization of Yugoslavia and the delimitation of federal units, which was carried out during the war, coincided, by and large, with the territorial delimitation of regional CPY organizations with which that Party had entered the war. It was, however, unfortunate, that the national communist parties were formed for Slovenia and Croatia and there was the intention of setting up one for Macedonia too, while for the rest of the country, a provincial pattern of party organization had been planned which did not follow the principle of national homogeneity. In the first case, the endeavour was to carry out an ethnic delimitation, while in the second case, this had simply not been the intention, although one must have realized, in so doing, that individual nations, and more specifically, the Serbian nation would be brought in a position of inequality vis-a-vis the other nations, the Slovene, Croat and Macedonian nations. This may be readily seen by a comparison between the CP of Croatia and the provincial organizations of the CPY for Serbia, which virtually ranked the same as the provincial party organizations of Dalmatia within the frameworks of Croatia or the provincial organization of Vojvodina.
When the CP of Croatia was founded as a national organization, it was only understandable that it strove to include party units and organizations from all regions which were predominantly inhabited by Croats. Hence, it was provided that the territorial jurisdiction of the CP of Croatia would incorporate along with Croatia and Slavonia, “including Vukovar and Vinkovci,” and Dalmatia, “including Dubrovnik,” also a substantial slice of Bosnia and Herzegovina — Banja Luka, Duvno, “the right bank of Herzegovina, excluding Mostar, i.e. the western region of Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited by the Croatian population, bordering with Dalmatia.”53 This was what Djuro Salaj had in mind at the Fourth National Conference when he said: “The only thing we must do is find the right solution to the question of delimiting Croatia and Dalmatia and certain areas of Bosnia bordering with them, should form part of the territory of Croatia.”54 Those who favoured this approach to establishing the CP of Croatia’s territorial jurisdiction, actually had in mind the area which the future independent Croatia state was to cover, or, more specifically, the idea of the state and territorial unity of the Croatian nation. This idea was advocated within the framework of the Communist Party’s official policies which was perhaps best expressed in the joint statement of the CPY and the CP of Italy in which it was said that both communist parties would struggle “for driving out the Italian occupier from Istria and Albania, as well as the Serbian occupier from Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo” and “for the achievement of the self-determination, liberation and unity of the Croatian, Macedonian, Albanian and other oppressed nations both in Yugoslavia and Italy.”55 This idea of the state and territorial unity of the Croatian or Macedonian nations was, we must hasten to say, a legitimate one provide the same congruent idea on the state and territorial unity of all other Yugoslav nations, without exception, including that of the Serbian nation, was recognized and advocated in the same way. Unfortunately, the CPY in the interwar years had never wanted to pose the question of the Serbian nation in the same way that it did the national questions of Slovenia, Croatia or Macedonia. This explains how it happened that the provincial organization of the CPY for Serbia entered the war with a territory which comprised no more than pre-Kumanovo Serbia (along with the Caribrod and Bosiljgrad districts), in other words, Serbia without Vojvodina, without Kosovo and Metohija and without the bulk of Sandžak. This was the decisive reason quoted by the highest leadership of the CPY during the war for reducing Serbia to pre-Kumanovo Serbia along with two former Bulgarian districts.56 AVNOJ Serbia was, therefore, even smaller than today’s “Serbia proper.” During the whole war, the question of the status of Vojvodina and Sandžak had not found a solution, while, in the case of Kosovo and Metohija, it was not quite certain whether it was to form part of Yugoslavia or Albania. It was only once the war had ended that a larger portion of Sandžak had been annexed to Serbia, whereas, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Metohija, became a part of the SR of Serbia on the basis of a decision to that effect passed by their self-constituted organs, which could have implied that they might have also gone to some other republic or state. Thus, Serbia covered a far wider area than the one attributed to it by the Comintern and the war-time CPY, even though Kosmet had a considerable degree of administrative autonomy, and Vojvodina, in addition to the administrative also a judicial autonomy. It would seem that even such a Serbia, with two provinces which it alone had, caused much anxiety among the hard liners of the Comintern type. Consequently, when the Constitution of 1974 which had been mainly drafted on Brioni Island, and the subsequent Constitution of the SR of Serbia, the focal point of interest was the full equality between provinces and republics, by virtue of which Brioni Serbia was reduced to “Serbia proper.” Thus the old idea of the Comintern of reducing Serbia to its “right” measure was once again put into effect.
Notes
1 Constitutive Committee of the Federal Assembly and the Assembly of Nations, Shorthand notes, p. 100.
2 Ibidem.
3 The legislative work of the AVNOJ Presidency and of the Presidency of the Provisional National Assembly, November 19, 1944-October 27, 1945, Beograd, Presidency of the National Assembly, s.a., p. 52.
4 Ibid., p. 58.
5 Ibidem.
6 Ibid., pp. 546-553.
7 The National Committee of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia, at its session of June 24, 1944, recognized the Macedonian nation’s historical aspirations for the unification of all its parts, but precluded an official demand to be made to that effect “Given the present international circumstances, the internal status of the Macedonian nation, the state of affairs in the neighbouring countries and the extent to which the armed struggle of the Macedonian nation had evolved, it would, perhaps, be premature for the Macedonian nation to put forward their national aspirations in the form of a demand for action, either on the part of the highest representatives of federal Yugoslavia, or on the part of the leading bodies of the Macedonian nation. If such a demand were to be formulated at the present times, the unity of the anti-Hitler coalition of the united nations would be undermined, thus placing both Yugoslavia, as a whole, and the Macedonian nation, in particular, in an unfavourable international position.” — Nešović, op. cit., pp. 205-206.
8 For one of the founders of the Banovina of Croatia, Dr. Vlatko Maček, even this appeared to be a partial solution because subsequently, on April 11, 1941, he supported the proclamation of the Independent Stale of Croatia “over the entire historical area of Croatia,” i.e. from the Sutla to the Drina and even a little beyond the Drina.
9 The First Congress of the CPY’s unification, held between April 20-25, 1919, The Historical Archives of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Beograd, Historical Department of the CC CPY, 1949, Volume II, p. 14.
10 Second (Vukovar) Congress of the CPY, from June 20-25, 1920, op. cit., Volume II, p. 42.
11 “Resolution on the National Question” (Independent Workers’ Party of Yugoslavia through which the CPY operated after it had gone underground), January 1924, Archives of the CC LCY, CI Fund, 1924/1-6a; quoted from Branko Petranović, Momčilo Zečevlć, Jugoslavenski federalizam. Ideje i stvarnost, (Yugoslav Federalism, Ideas and Realities), Beograd, “Prosveta,” 1982, Vol. I, p. 278.
12 Historical Archives of the CPY, Vol. II, p. 339.
13 Ibid., p. 111.
14 Ibid., p. 153.
15 Ibid., p. 182.
16 Ibid., p. 154.
17 Ibid., p. 183.
18 Ibidem.
19 Ibid., p. 163.
20 Ibidem.
21 Ibid., p. 261.
22 Ibid., p. 370.
23 Josip Broz Tito, Sabrana djela (Collected Works), Beograd, Publishing Centre “Komunist,” 1979, Volume VI, pp. 63-64.
24 Ibid., p. 119.
25 Archives of the Central Committee of the CPY, CI Fund, 1934/276-1 quoted according to Jugoslavenski federalizam (Yugoslav Federalism), Vol. l, p. 592.
26 Ibidem.
27 V.I. Lenin, Izabrana dela (Selected Works), Beograd, “Kultura,” 1960, Vol. 9, pp. 256-257.
28 Historical Archives of the CPY, Volume II, p. 69.
29 Ibid., p. 333.
30 Ibid., p. 339.
31 Ibid., p. 111.
32 Ibid., p. 98.
33 Ibid., pp. 162-163.
34 Ibid., p. 162.
35 Ibid., p. 264.
36 Ibid., p. 262.
37 Ibid., p. 266.
38 Ibid., p. 370.
39 Josip Broz Tito, Sabrana djela (Selected Works), Vol. III, p. 37.
40 Ibid., p. 36.
41 Ibid., Vol. V, p. 50.
42 Ibid., Vol. VI, pp. 53-55.
43 Yugoslav Federalism, Vol. I, p. 742.
44 Ibid., p. 746.
45 Ibid., p. 747.
46 Historical Archives of the CPY, Vol II, p. 231.
47 Vladimir Bakarić, “Vreme herojskih dela” (The Time of Heroic Deeds), “Politika” of May 25, 1977, p.2.
48 Archives of the CC LCY, CI Fund, 1935/316-1-4, quoted according to Desanka Pešić, Jugoslovenski komunisti i nacionalno pitanje (The Yugoslav Communists and the National Question) 1919-1935, Beograd, “Rad,” 1983, pp. 267-268.
49 J.B. Tito, Collected Works, Volume IV, pp. 89-94.
50 Ibid., p. 93.
51 Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 59.
52 Ibid., p. 98.
53 Archives of the CC LCY, CI Fund, 1935/54; quoted according to D. Pešić, op. cit., p,268.
54 Archives of the CC LCY, CI Fund, 1934/276-1; Protocol IV of the CPY Conference, December 24, 1934; quoted according to D. Pešić, op. cit., p.268.
55 Proleter, No. 4, April 1933, p. 16.
56 See my article “From the History of the Creation of New Yugoslavia,” “Književna reč” of December 25, 1986.
(The Creation and Changes of the Internal Borders of Yugoslavia, The Ministry of Information of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade 1994, pp. 33-56.)