– Excerpt from “The History of the Military Art of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation War of the Albanian People” –
The advance of ANLA units for the liberation of several regions in Montenegro, the Sandžak and Višegrad
At the end of November 1944, the Albanian National Liberation Army (ANLA) was successfully carrying out its final operations to fully liberate the country from the German occupiers. Meanwhile, two of its brigades (the 3rd and 5th Assault Brigades), in coordination with the national liberation forces of Kosova, had liberated Kosova. After concentrating in several of its main centres, they worked to strengthen the authority of the national liberation councils and to eliminate remnants of the reactionary forces.
The General Command of the ANLA, taking into account the request from the command of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army (YNLA) that some of our units pursue the German occupiers into Yugoslav territory, ordered on November 18, 1944 the formation of two divisions using the units operating in Kosova and northern Albania. These were the 5th Assault Division — composed of the 3rd, 5th and 25th Assault Brigades — and the 4th Assault Division — composed of the 6th, 7th, 8th and 22nd Assault Brigades.
The Political-Military Situation and the Plans of Both Sides
The German troops that managed to retreat from the Balkans had concentrated in the southwestern part of Yugoslavia, mainly in the regions of Montenegro and Bosnia, where they had organized a defence to secure the withdrawal of a large number of troops — up to half a million soldiers — towards the north. The German command assigned responsibility for securing this retreat to the 297th, 181st and 22nd Grenadier Divisions, which had established a wide defensive belt stretching from Podgorica to Prijepolje. This line closed off all routes that could cut off the withdrawal of forces along the Podgorica-Kolašin-Bijelo Polje-Prijepolje-Višegrad corridor. To further secure the retreat of forces coming from the direction of Montenegro and Užice towards Višegrad, the German command had also organized another line of defence located about 5 to 10 kilometres south of Višegrad.
Facing these German forces directly were units of the 2nd Corps of the YNLA, which were launching continuous strikes against them.
The first German defensive line extended along the dominant heights on the right flank of the Podgorica-Mataševo-Bijelo Polje motor road, as well as along both sides of the Sjenica-Prijepolje road. The enemy had placed particular importance on holding the commanding heights and populated centres, where they had organized strong defensive positions. Key strongholds in the German defensive system included Tuzi, Bioče, Medun, Brskut, Lijeva Reka, Veruša, the heights of Jadovnik, Aljinovići, Praviševo and others. From these positions, enemy garrisons could cover the gaps between them with interlocking fire from heavy weapons and artillery. Additionally, the German command had set up two or three deeper defensive lines extending near key passes and populated centres. The enemy garrisons were equipped with fortified fire points, underground shelters with heating, and were connected by a system of trenches and communication ditches. The operations had been planned well in advance, so the forces were well supplied with ammunition, food and clothing. The enemy had also organized direct defence of cities such as Podgorica, Kolašin, Bijelo Polje, Prijepolje, Priboj and Višegrad.
These cities had become storage and readiness centres for large quantities of artillery, tanks and transport vehicles to support their combat operations. German forces were also supported by aviation units based in Podgorica and Višegrad. These conditions and preparations facilitated the retreat, manoeuvring and timely resupply of the German troops.
The German units and detachments, though heavily damaged by the Balkan partisan armies, still maintained their organizational structure and combat capability. However, their morale and political state were extremely low due to the heavy losses they had suffered.
The General Command of the ANLA ordered the General Staff of the 3rd Assault Corps that the 5th and 6th Assault Divisions should pursue the enemy beyond the border into Yugoslav territory and link up with Yugoslav partisan forces and the Red Army. The enemy was to be pursued along two key operational directions: Sjenica-Prijepolje-Višegrad and Podgorica-Prijepolje-Višegrad.
Success in combat operations along each of these directions would affect the other, but the advance of the 5th Assault Division played the primary role. If it reached the Prijepolje-Priboj road, it would force the German forces to retreat more quickly from the regions of Montenegro, as they would face the risk of complete encirclement.
To implement the order of the General Command, the General Staff of the 3rd Assault Corps ordered the General Staff of the 6th Assault Division to cross the state border, enter the regions of Montenegro, and — in coordination with YNLA units — continue fighting for the liberation of those regions. Then, it was to pursue the enemy further into southern Bosnia. Meanwhile, the 5th Assault Division was assigned the task of marching from Kosova towards the Sandžak (in Serbia) and, upon engaging the enemy, continuing combat operations to liberate those regions.
Main Operations of the 5th and 6th Assault Divisions in Yugoslavia
The combat actions of the Albanian divisions in Yugoslavia took place in three main operations: in Montenegro, in the Sandžak and in southern Bosnia. To provide a complete overview of their planning and development, a brief description is presented below.
After the liberation of Shkodra, the units of the 6th Division had concentrated in its surrounding areas and continued combat operations to eliminate remaining reactionary elements. The division’s staff transmitted the order from the 3rd Assault Corps to move rapidly northward and continue military operations in the regions of Montenegro. The 6th and 22nd Assault Brigades, which were closest to the state border, were tasked with identifying the organization of the German defence and then continuing the offensive — the 6th towards the Medun-Bioče direction, and the 22nd towards the Dečić-Podgorica direction.
At the beginning of December, both units crossed the border and began reconnaissance operations to identify enemy positions and the terrain.
Through continuous observation and with the help of the local population, the staff of both brigades determined that the first line of German defence ran east of the villages of Dečić, Tuzi, Gornji Tuzi, Dinoša, Medun, Kosor and further north. Based on this information, both units launched combat operations on December 4. The 6th Assault Brigade operated along the Kosor-Medun front, while the 22nd Assault Brigade acted along the Dinoša-Dečić front. As a result of the fighting, the enemy was forced to withdraw and abandon several isolated outposts from the first defensive line, though the overall defensive system remained intact. Intense battles were fought by both sides for the fortress in the village of Medun, which enabled the continuation of the offensive on both flanks and provided oversight of the Morača valley — the enemy’s retreat route. Although German forces had carefully organized the defence, the fortress was captured by the 6th Assault Brigade but could not be held for long due to enemy counter-attacks using tanks, armoured vehicles and aircraft. The brigade then concentrated its attack on the right flank and, acting decisively, made significant progress, capturing the village of Bioče and taking control of the Podgorica-Mataševo motor road. The positions seized in Bioče endangered the German retreat from Podgorica, prompting the enemy to launch several large-scale counter-attacks with tank support, successfully retaking the area. Meanwhile, the 22nd Assault Brigade also engaged in fierce fighting. After capturing several enemy positions, it reached the prepared German defences at Dinoša, Tuzi and Dečić, where combat continued for several days.
The actions of both brigades played a critical role in initiating and facilitating the main offensive operation of the division. The entire first German defensive line and additional positions further inland were uncovered, the enemy suffered losses in personnel and weaponry, and came under constant pressure. While awaiting the arrival of the other two brigades, the division’s staff gained a clear understanding of the front and planned the offensive operation, formalized in the order of December 7 and supplemented by additional orders and instructions. The division would attack with all four brigades on the front line, from Veruša to Dečić. The main strike would be delivered by the 7th Assault Brigade and part of the 8th Assault Brigade in the Kvilin-Bioče direction. Two secondary attacks would be carried out, including one by part of the 6th Assault Brigade in the Dečić-Podgorica direction. By cutting off the enemy’s retreat routes in Lijeva Reka and Bioče, the objective was to achieve two major encirclements: one between Bioče and Lijeva Reka, and the other between Podgorica and Bioče. The division’s command post for directing the operation was established in Pikalj. The 6th Assault Brigade was also tasked with coordinating with the Yugoslav 9th Brigade, which would operate on its right flank.
For the supply of food, the brigades’ logistics units were ordered to rely on the local population in these areas, as well as on the divisional supply base located at Hani i Hotit. Medical care for the severely wounded would be provided at the divisional hospital in Shkodra, while a forward aid station was set up in the centre of the front line to provide first aid. Detailed instructions were given for the provision and use of ammunition and other supplies. Each brigade was required to keep one battalion in reserve.
During the night of December 7-8, the brigades moved into position and took up their attack lines. The 6th Assault Brigade, after replacing the Yugoslav 9th Brigade — which shifted to its right flank — deployed from Veruša to Lijeva Reka with the goal of cutting off the German retreat. The 8th Assault Brigade, positioned in Donji Kosor, was to attack on the left flank of the 6th Brigade to eliminate the enemy in Brskut. Another main force of the 8th Brigade, in coordination with the 7th Brigade, would carry out the principal attack. The 7th Assault Brigade, stationed on the Ubli-Pikalj front, with its main forces working jointly with two battalions from the 8th Brigade, aimed to destroy the enemy ahead and advance into Bioče. Its other units, in cooperation with the 22nd Brigade, would push towards Podgorica. The 22nd Assault Brigade, deployed in Dinoša and Dečić, was tasked with destroying German garrisons and liberating Podgorica in coordination with the 7th Brigade.
On the morning of December 8, the units launched a surprise offensive across the entire front. Fighting was intense throughout the day, but progress was slow because the enemy exploited prepared positions and their superiority in military technology. As the operation progressed, it became clear that better coordination between units and more concentrated action — especially on the right flank — was essential to cutting off the German retreat.
To address this, an operational staff was created, composed of a commissar, commander and a staff member from the 6th and 8th Assault Brigades. This command was also to coordinate with the Yugoslav 9th Brigade, but that cooperation failed, as the Yugoslav forces did not act according to plan.
The capture of Mount Lijeva Reka by the 6th Brigade would fully encircle the German forces. This would force the German command to concentrate its efforts on breaking the encirclement, easing the pressure on other directions for the Albanian partisan forces. Both sides focused their attention on this point. The German command had prepared several defensive positions to protect this mountain. The forces of the 6th Assault Brigade, making use of the rough terrain, fog, snowstorm and bitter cold, managed to surprise and seize the first positions in Veruša and advanced towards Mount Lijeva Reka. This success was due to the heroism, sacrifice and determination of the fighters of the 6th Battalion. During the night of December 10-11, one company from this battalion approached the enemy’s positions on Mount Lijeva Reka by surprise and captured an entire garrison. They then quickly moved deeper into enemy lines, attacking the German shelters with hand grenades. The enemy suffered heavy losses and retreated in complete panic. Despite launching a counter-attack with tanks, armoured vehicles and large forces, the enemy failed to recapture the positions due to strong partisan resistance. Only after several hours of intense artillery fire were the partisan forces forced to withdraw.
Fierce fighting also took place on other fronts. The forces operating in the main offensive direction managed to seize several enemy positions and reached the vicinity of Bioče, gaining control over the German retreat route. In this situation, the operational staff tasked the 6th Assault Brigade and two battalions of the 8th Assault Brigade with carrying out ambush operations to accelerate the enemy’s encirclement and destruction.
In response, the German command launched two large counter-attacks with tanks and armoured vehicles — one in the Kolašin-Kosor direction and the other in the Podgorica-Kosor direction. After several hours of heavy fighting, the enemy managed to achieve its objective by employing tanks and artillery.
The progress achieved in the Bioče and Lijeva Reka directions facilitated the advance of the 22nd Assault Brigade, which succeeded in liberating Tuzi and Dečić and reached the outskirts of Podgorica. The enemy maintained and reinforced positions in Dinoša, Sjenica, Bioče, Zlatica and on the heights along the right side of the road, including Mount Lijeva Reka. After nearly a week of successful fighting, “the division’s staff, in another order, emphasized to the brigades that combat operations should proceed at a faster pace in order to force the enemy to retreat along the road, to be cut off at Lijeva Reka, in Zlatica-Bioče, and to be encircled between Tuzi and Podgorica and between Bioče and Lijeva Reka.”1 The division’s forces redefined their objectives, continued the offensive and succeeded in cutting off the German retreat routes at Lijeva Reka, Veruša and Brskut, while advancing to Podgorica on the left flank. Surrounded and fragmented, the enemy concentrated its forces to break through the lines. With superior manpower and equipment, it managed to break out and continue its retreat. Meanwhile, the 22nd Brigade liberated Podgorica, and other forces pursued the retreating enemy south of Mataševo, where on December 20 the enemy broke contact and continued its march towards Bosnia. After around 20 days of bloody fighting, the 6th Division succeeded in liberating all populated centres in Montenegro along and to the right of the Hani i Hotit-Podgorica-Kolašin road, inflicting over 1,300 enemy casualties,2 many wounded, and capturing a large quantity of weapons and other military equipment.
This operation was set to begin once the units of the 5th Assault Division completed their march from the regions of Kosova to the Sjenica area. The 3rd and 5th Assault Brigades were to move along the route Arbica-Istog-Ražaje-Tutin-Sjenica, while the 25th Assault Brigade would advance in the direction of Ferizaj-Lipjan-Dobrevo-Merlica, then join the route followed by the 3rd and 5th Brigades. On December 19, 1944, the division staff and the two brigades reached the Sjenica region and took their positions: the staff in Sjenica, the 3rd Brigade to its south and the 5th Brigade to its northeast. The units took measures for security, resupply and medical care for the sick, while the staff assessed the situation by meeting with the organs of the national liberation councils and Yugoslav forces.
The 5th Division was assigned to launch an offensive on both sides of the Sjenica-Prijepolje road, positioned between the 22nd and 37th Divisions of the YNLA. After evaluating the situation, the division staff prepared the operational plan. It decided to launch the offensive on both sides of the road along the Sopotnica-Šušure-Donje Lopiže-Praviševo front, with two brigades (3rd and 5th) on the front line and the 25th Assault Brigade, which had not yet arrived, held in reserve. The objective of the operation was to encircle and destroy the enemy defending the Sjenica-Prijepolje axis and to liberate the town of Prijepolje. Once the 25th Brigade entered the operation, the offensive would continue towards Priboj.
The 5th Brigade was assigned to relieve the 22nd Brigade of the Yugoslav 37th Division, to attack along the Praviševo-Donje Lopiže front, outflanking the enemy from the right in the Praviševo-Prijepolje direction, destroy it, and in coordination with the 7th Assault Brigade, liberate Prijepolje. The 3rd Assault Brigade would attack along the Šušure-Sopotnica front, flanking the enemy from the left in the Sopotnica-Prijepolje direction, destroy it, and — jointly with the 5th Assault Brigade — liberate Prijepolje. The division staff, logistics units and field hospital were to be based in Sjenica. During their advance from the staging areas to their assault positions, the forces of both brigades successfully repelled attacks by Chetniks3 and Dražinovci.4 On the night of December 20, the forces reached their launch positions, during which the 5th Assault Brigade relieved the Yugoslav 12th Brigade. Due to the fighting with Dražinovac and Chetnik forces, the element of surprise for the operation was lost. The enemy was placed on alert and, during the troop rotation, launched a counter-attack on the 5th Brigade’s front — but it was repelled without difficulty.
On the morning of the attack, the division’s forces launched an offensive across the entire front. Fighting was extremely intense. The enemy defended fortified positions, and its resistance — particularly in the villages of Karaula and Aljinovići — was strong. Under these conditions, the battles lasted several days. The forces of the 3rd Assault Brigade, concentrating their main blow in the northeast of the Jadovnik plateau, managed to reach the Milošev Do area on December 22. In that direction, the enemy prepared a counter-attack, but it failed completely before it could be launched. Meanwhile, the 5th Assault Brigade continued its offensive and advanced further on the left flank towards Aljinovići. During five days of fierce fighting, the division’s units inflicted significant losses on the enemy, captured several of its positions and uncovered its entire defensive system. In this situation, the division staff issued the second operation order, which called for the offensive to continue along the outer flanks of both brigades, with the goal of cutting the enemy’s retreat route from Prijepolje to Priboj, encircling and destroying its forces.
On December 27, the offensive resumed across the entire front. The fighting took place in rugged mountainous terrain, under harsh winter conditions, with snowfall and extreme cold, and against well-prepared enemy defences. Progress was slow, but the partisan forces forced the enemy to abandon several positions and retreat by three to four kilometres. To increase the pace of the offensive, the division staff decided to commit the 25th Assault Brigade to the 3rd Brigade’s sector, as the latter was running low on ammunition and had been affected by a typhus outbreak. The troop rotation was carried out without interrupting combat operations. Once the 25th Brigade entered the fight, the offensive gained momentum. The division’s units overran enemy positions, successfully repelled counter-attacks, and by January 10 had reached the outskirts of Prijepolje. On January 11, 1945, they liberated Prijepolje, after which the Yugoslav 9th Brigade entered the town. Pursuing the now rapidly retreating enemy, the division’s units liberated Priboj on January 12 and reached the border of southern Bosnia.
The offensive operation of the 5th Assault Division in the Sandžak was successfully completed. Its units forced the enemy into retreat, inflicting heavy losses. In Prijepolje alone, the enemy left behind 175 dead, and a significant quantity of military equipment was captured. During these battles, the division solidified as an operational unit and gained valuable experience for future operations. Meanwhile, the command of the Yugoslav 2nd Corps requested that the 5th Assault Division halt its pursuit of the enemy and regroup in Sjenica, where it would undergo medical treatment to counter the typhus epidemic.
This operation was a continuation of the pursuit of the enemy into the interior of Yugoslav territory. The German forces that had managed to retreat into Montenegro, in order to secure the Užice-Višegrad-Rogatica motor route, organized defences that blocked the main approaches from Priboj-Dobrun-Višegrad and Rudo-Višegrad. The German command had prepared defensive lines between these two directions, located 5 to 10 kilometres south of Višegrad.
According to the offensive plan carried out in Montenegro, the forces of the 6th Assault Division had concentrated as follows: the 6th Assault Brigade in Lijeva Reka and Veruša, the 7th and 8th Assault Brigades around Kolašin, and the 22nd Assault Brigade in Bioče. The units remained in these areas for several days, taking measures to continue the pursuit.
On January 3, 1945, the staff of the 6th Assault Division ordered the units to begin marching in the general direction of Kolašin-Bijelo Polje-Pljevlja-Rudo-Višegrad, with the task of engaging the enemy and continuing the offensive. The marching order was: 7th Brigade, 8th Brigade, 22nd Brigade, division staff, and finally the 6th Brigade. This formation did not hold throughout the entire march, as units often deviated from the main road to find shorter routes and secure food supplies from the villages they passed through. To direct and monitor the units’ movements, the division staff advanced by stages along the main road. By January 10, the 6th, 8th and 22nd Brigades had reached the Pljevlja area, while the 7th Brigade was still lagging behind. In the Pljevlja region, the division regrouped its units and continued marching towards Rudo, where they encountered the Lim River and came into contact with German advance units. Under cover of artillery fire, the enemy withdrew, destroyed the only bridge over the Lim River, and took up positions on the far side near Rudo. The 6th and 22nd Assault Brigades organized a combat river crossing. Selected assault groups, trained in swimming and supported by other units, crossed the river at multiple points and attacked the enemy, which offered strong resistance. After two days, the bridge was repaired, and both brigades resumed their advance to engage the enemy.
The march was carried out under difficult conditions. There were significant shortages of food and winter clothing. Most of the weaponry and supplies were carried by hand. Additional obstacles such as destroyed bridges and damaged roads also had to be overcome — which the division’s forces managed successfully using improvised means. The units arrived in southern Bosnia at different times and therefore did not engage in combat simultaneously. Using the rough terrain, the cover of night and poor weather conditions, reconnaissance patrols determined that the enemy’s main defensive line passed through: Gornja Rijeka-Turjak, Zagore-Mirilovići-Drinsko-Strmica, and deeper in along the Dobrun-Višegrad-Međeđa road. The enemy had established strong defensive positions with field fortifications, fire points and numerous obstacles.
On the night of January 17-18, the 6th Assault Division’s forces took up their positions for the offensive. The 6th Brigade advanced from Drinsko to Čačići, while the 22nd Assault Brigade moved from Šahovići to Suva Gora. Both units organized their combat formations in two lines, deploying three battalions in the first line and two in the second. However, during the offensive actions on January 18, the brigades achieved no significant results, as the enemy outnumbered them and the attack was not well-coordinated between the units.
Continuing the offensive, the 6th Assault Brigade succeeded in capturing Drinsko and Čačići and took control of the Višegrad-Međeđa railway. This success facilitated the operations of the 22nd Assault Brigade and placed the German forces in a difficult retreat position. In an attempt to avoid this threat, on January 20 the enemy launched a counter-attack with large forces. Despite shortages of ammunition, our forces put up strong resistance. The brigade staff supplied the units with ammunition from the second-line reserves, leaving them only a minimal stock. The enemy, after launching another counter-attack with even larger forces, managed to recapture Drinsko and Čačići. Meanwhile, the 22nd Assault Brigade was engaged in fighting towards Suva Gora, and the 7th Assault Brigade entered combat in the direction of Dobrun. Nevertheless, progress was limited due to the enemy’s numerical and technical superiority.
The enemy discovered a gap of 3 to 4 kilometres between the 6th and 22nd Brigades and attempted to exploit it by inserting a battalion and a reconnaissance company in the direction of Kalica to strike our forces from the rear. However, it failed in this objective, as it was struck by the 6th Assault Brigade before it could deploy into combat formation. Although none of the division’s three units managed to seize key objectives, they inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and laid the groundwork for the offensive operation to liberate Višegrad. The division staff, based in Rudo, planned an attack with three brigades, outflanking the enemy from both sides to encircle and destroy it in the Višegrad area. The 6th Assault Brigade was tasked with continuing its advance through Mirilovići, Drinsko and Čačići to reach the western side of Višegrad. The 22nd Assault Brigade was to advance through the centre, towards Šahovići and Suva Gora, and reach Višegrad. The 7th Assault Brigade was to attack in the Dobrun direction and, flanking from the right, reach the northern outskirts of Višegrad to complete the encirclement. The 8th Assault Brigade was held in reserve.
On January 24, the partisan forces launched an offensive across the entire front. Although they fought with determination, progress was limited because the enemy had strong forces, well-prepared positions and the terrain was extremely rugged and snow-covered. Only the 7th Assault Brigade succeeded in capturing Dobrun. The offensive continued in the following days, but was carried out at unit level and, at times, by entire brigades. This form of combat was dictated primarily by severe winter conditions — particularly the extremely low temperatures.
To allow rest for the units engaged in direct combat and to continue the offensive, the division staff withdrew the 6th and 22nd Assault Brigades from the operation and deployed the 8th Assault Brigade into battle. The offensive resumed, and the 8th Assault Brigade liberated Drinsko and Čačići and launched continued attacks on the Višegrad-Međeđa railway. The 7th Assault Brigade, despite engaging in intense combat, made only limited progress due to the strength of enemy forces. After several days, the 6th Assault Brigade re-entered combat on the left flank of the 8th Brigade to conduct demonstrative operations. The other two brigades were tasked with attacking the enemy towards Višegrad, with the goal of separating its forces from one another, cutting the road from both directions — Dobrun-Višegrad and Višegrad-Međeđa — and carrying out a “…pincer manoeuvre that would quickly close in north of Mirilovići-Okrugla.”5
On February 5, all three brigades resumed the offensive and, during the day, succeeded in capturing several positions south of Višegrad and repelled enemy counter-attacks, consolidating the ground they had gained. The offensive then continued at the battalion and company level. Using the rugged terrain and weather conditions, small units moved around the enemy’s flanks and rear, launched surprise attacks, inflicted losses and forced the enemy to abandon positions and retreat deeper. The fastest advance was achieved by the forces on the right flank. Their breakthrough east of Višegrad and control of the retreat route west of the city placed the enemy in a state of encirclement. This forced the Germans to abandon their positions south of the city and hasten their retreat. In this situation, all three brigades launched an assault. After heavy fighting on February 13 — lasting through the night — they entered the city of Višegrad and liberated it on the morning of February 14, 1945. The operation to liberate the regions south of Višegrad and the city itself was carried out entirely by the forces of the 6th Assault Division.
General Summary
During the pursuit of the retreating enemy — which was withdrawing rapidly and had organized defensive lines far apart from one another — partisan forces were required to carry out long marches in unfamiliar terrain and under extremely difficult weather conditions in order to make contact with the enemy. The 5th Division covered approximately 200 kilometres on foot from Kosova to Sjenica, while the 6th Division marched about 250 kilometres from Montenegro to southern Bosnia. Completing these marches was one of the major challenges faced by the committees, bureaus and cells of the Communist Party, as well as the command staffs of the partisan units.
The division staffs, understanding the urgency and importance of their tasks, took comprehensive measures to quickly prepare the troops for marching. Necessary instructions were issued to ensure the march was conducted with order and discipline. Key factors contributing to the success of the march included: the commands’ efforts to secure the troops, continuous coordination, food supply, and properly timed rest breaks adapted to the terrain and weather conditions. Each vanguard brigade deployed a battalion in front, and additional precautions were taken to secure the flanks of the columns, assigning a company or a platoon as needed. Reconnaissance patrols were sent ahead of the vanguard to scout routes and gather intelligence on the enemy and collaborating forces. Upon detecting enemy garrisons or collaborationist bands, they promptly informed their commanders. As a result of these measures, our forces were never caught by surprise. Breaks were generally taken every hour of marching, but during poor weather — such as heavy snowfall and limited visibility — they occurred more frequently. In general, the units marched during the day and rested at night, settling in villages along the route. On average, about 30 kilometres were covered each day, with a marching speed of approximately 3 km/h — a high standard given the severe weather, rough terrain and supply challenges. Both motor and footpaths were used, and for the transport of division and brigade logistics, special columns were organized using pack animals and carts that moved along the motor roads.
After the marches, the brigades were concentrated in areas covering six or seven villages. Command and control of brigades and battalions during the marches was maintained through messengers within the brigades, radio communication at division level and in-person meetings. The division staffs moved with short stops, meeting with brigade staffs to issue supplementary instructions, while brigade staffs generally led the marching formations.
During rest periods, all necessary precautions were taken to safeguard the troops and maintain combat readiness. Thanks to these preparations, the divisions and brigades completed their marches within the required time while maintaining unit cohesion and readiness for combat.
Operating in unfamiliar territory, against an enemy defending from one line to the next, and under severe weather conditions, placed a responsibility on the division and brigade staffs to organize continuous reconnaissance. All cadres and partisans contributed to this effort, treating reconnaissance as a collective responsibility.
In addition, special importance in gathering detailed intelligence on the enemy was placed on the special forces — the reconnaissance squads, groups and information sections attached to brigade and division staffs. To carry out this task, various methods were employed, including surveillance-based reconnaissance, scouting groups and patrols. Patrols usually moved ahead of the main formations to identify movement routes and gather information, while reconnaissance groups operated from the troop concentration areas into the zones of active combat, where they closely identified enemy positions and reported their findings. “Today, on December 31, 1944,” reported the 2nd Battalion to the staff of the 5th Assault Brigade, “our reconnaissance squads approached enemy positions and gathered information on their forces and locations.”6
The tasks fulfilled by specialized reconnaissance units were not limited to identifying the enemy’s front-line defences. In order to understand the organization of enemy defences in depth and estimate the number of enemy forces, reconnaissance groups crossed the front lines and penetrated into the enemy rear, gathering more complete data on its structure, strength and combat capability. “From Višegrad to Rogatica,” reported the chief of intelligence of the 22nd Assault Brigade, “three German regiments are concentrated… these regiments each have four battalions, and each battalion has between 200 and 300 soldiers.”7
Beyond identifying enemy positions, the partisan reconnaissance units had another crucial task: assessing the environment where future combat operations were expected. Environmental reconnaissance included gathering information about the local population’s stance towards the war, topographical features, movement routes and potential passages. In one report from Višegrad, which provided intelligence on both the enemy and the surrounding environment, specific mention was made of the Drina River, which runs along the western edge of the city: “The river can be crossed at the Štitarevo ford using boats. Pack animals can also cross by swimming, tied behind the boats as long as they are not carrying loads.”8
From the operational areas of the reconnaissance groups working in the enemy rear, it becomes evident that division-level groups penetrated up to 10 kilometres behind the front lines, brigade-level groups up to 5 kilometres, and battalion-level groups up to 3 kilometres.
Thanks to these forms and methods of enemy reconnaissance, the staffs of partisan units were able to gain a comprehensive understanding of the enemy’s defensive structure and successfully plan and carry out offensive operations.
The three offensive operations also provide valuable experience in the operational structuring of divisions and the combat formations of brigades. Based on the organization of the enemy’s defence, the terrain, weather conditions and the capabilities of the units, both the operational structuring and combat formations were varied.
For example, in Montenegro, the 6th Assault Division advanced against an enemy defence based on isolated garrisons, across a relatively wide front and with a shallow depth of objective. In this case, the division used a single-line operational formation. In contrast, the same division acted differently in southern Bosnia, where the enemy had established strong, layered defences in two successive lines over a depth of 10 to 15 kilometres. The terrain was mountainous and forested, with extremely harsh weather conditions — snow depths exceeding one metre. These factors required the division to adopt a two-line operational formation. Under similar conditions, the 5th Assault Division in the Sandžak also used a two-line formation, deploying two brigades in the front line and one in reserve.
As a result of the specific conditions and the operational structure, the offensive front of the divisions varied — from around 15 kilometres in southern Bosnia to 30-40 kilometres in the Sandžak and Montenegro. The logistics units (intendancies) were positioned 10 to 15 kilometres behind the front, hospitals 30 to 40 kilometres away, while forward medical aid points were located 3 to 5 kilometres from the front line.
Depending on the divisions’ offensive fronts, brigade combat formations also varied. In the offensive operations in Montenegro and the Sandžak, brigades formed in a single line with one battalion held in reserve. In contrast, in southern Bosnia, brigades adopted a two-line formation, with three to four battalions in the front line and one to two in reserve. The brigades’ assault front extended to 5 kilometres in primary directions and up to 15 kilometres in secondary ones, while the depth of their objectives ranged from 3 to 5 kilometres. Brigade logistics were typically located alongside brigade headquarters and reserves.
The combat operations were directed by the division and brigade staffs from their command posts. In general, these were positioned near the front line — about 3 to 5 kilometres behind and centrally located. This standard was maintained in the offensive operations in the Sandžak and Montenegro, but not in southern Bosnia. There, the staff of the 6th Assault Division was positioned in Rudo, about 15 kilometres away from the front line. This created difficulties in directing and coordinating the brigades’ combat operations. “Nevertheless, the brigade staffs operating on the front (6th, 7th and 22nd Assault Brigades), acting with initiative and creativity, reported to the division staff that, in order to coordinate their combat actions, they had formed a joint operational staff.”9 Joint operational command was also implemented in Montenegro, where — to coordinate the actions of the 6th and 8th Assault Brigades operating on the division’s right flank and separated from the main force — an operational staff was created by order of the division command, composed of personnel from both brigade staffs.
The orders and instructions from the division staffs were transmitted via radio and messengers, while those from the brigades were delivered solely by messengers. It should be noted that the command of ANLA units in Yugoslavia was maintained continuously throughout operations.
Strategic command over these divisions was centralised by the General Command, which on December 14, 1944 removed both divisions from the authority of the 3rd Corps and placed them under its direct control. To retransmit its orders, the General Command used the 3rd Corps staff based in Shkodra.
All three operations aimed to carry out flanking and rear manoeuvres in order to encircle and destroy the enemy. Regarding the destruction of German forces concentrated in and around Višegrad, the operation order of the 6th Assault Division staff emphasized: “…his forces must be separated from each other, the highway must be cut on both sides — Dobrun-Višegrad and Višegrad-Međeđa — and by carrying out a pincer manoeuvre at lightning speed, they must close in north of Mirilovići-Okrugla.”10 In general, these objectives were not achieved because the partisan units lacked the strength and means to break through the enemy’s powerful defences. Even when units managed to reach their assigned objectives — as happened during the offensive in Montenegro, where the German retreat routes were cut at several points — they were unable to hold those positions due to the intensity of enemy counter-attacks and their inability to withstand the concentrated artillery and aerial bombardment.
The combat actions of the Albanian divisions in these regions also provide important lessons on the logistical support of units and detachments with ammunition, food and clothing, as well as the provision of medical assistance to the wounded and sick. Supplies of food and clothing were managed by the logistics units (intendancies) of the divisions and brigades from their respective locations. These relied on reserves built up during earlier operations. To feed the troops, units used their own monetary funds to purchase food supplies in the regions where they operated. In addition, the local population willingly provided food to the partisans, free of charge. For severely wounded and sick soldiers, the divisions made use of their own hospitals and field medical facilities, while lightly wounded troops received first aid directly on the front lines using brigade medical personnel and equipment. In the Montenegro offensive, a divisional medical point was also organized to support these efforts.
A persistent issue that remained at the centre of the division staffs’ attention was the supply of ammunition. To equip the troops with ammunition, captured enemy stockpiles were used. However, these reserves were always limited — to the extent that, during combat operations, first-echelon battalions often relied on ammunition taken from second-echelon units. In specific cases, to obtain ammunition, partisan assault groups were organized to carry out surprise raids deep into enemy rear areas. These groups attacked German garrisons, seized ammunition and quickly returned to their units. “During the fighting,” reported the staff of the 6th Assault Brigade, “we ran out of cartridges… we formed several small assault groups and sent them into the enemy’s rear with the sole task of obtaining cartridges for us.”11
These operations also provided experience in conducting offensive combat in mountainous terrain, during winter and against fortified enemy positions. Generally, the attacks were carried out under poor visibility and severe weather conditions. Enemy fire points were attacked with hand grenades in surprise assaults from close range and from directions where the terrain was difficult and the enemy had not established strong defences. Partisan companies and squads would approach enemy positions from the flanks, throw hand grenades and then launch rapid assaults.
The Germans’ pre-prepared defences, combined with snow depths of up to one metre in some places and extremely low temperatures, meant that combat operations were prolonged and concentrated along stable front lines. As a result, brigade and battalion commands were frequently forced to rotate front-line troops with reserve units, or to pull forces back to nearby villages during the night, while leaving small observation patrols in place to monitor enemy movements.
Due to the freezing temperatures, automatic weapons and machine guns either failed to operate or functioned with difficulty. This, in combination with the severe shortage of ammunition, significantly reduced the volume of fire and fortified positions could only be taken after several successive assaults. All of this contributed to a slower pace of the offensive, with units requiring extended periods to complete their objectives.
Partisan forces also placed great emphasis on camouflage. Deployment to attack positions was carried out at night, using terrain features for concealment. In certain cases, white clothing — seized from the enemy during combat — was used for better concealment in snowy conditions.
Enemy losses in these operations were significant: over 4,000 killed, nearly twice as many wounded, and 651 captured. A large quantity of military equipment was seized, including 96 artillery pieces and mortars, 101 machine guns, 8,000 rifles and submachine guns, 4,000 pistols, 86 trucks loaded with ammunition and more.12
Coordination between Albanian and Yugoslav units during these operations was not properly organized because the command of the 2nd Corps of the YNLA, the highest authority operating in these regions, failed to fulfil that duty. It limited itself to simply withdrawing its own forces from the front to make way for the units of the ANLA, assigning them to the sectors with the strongest enemy defences. Furthermore, the combat actions of the Yugoslav units did not support those of the Albanian divisions, leaving the latter to bear the heaviest burden of the fighting. Had the Yugoslav 22nd and 37th Divisions cut off the Germans’ only retreat routes — Prijepolje-Priboj and Kolašin-Pljevlja — those forces could have been encircled and destroyed, greatly easing the operations of the Albanian divisions in Montenegro and the Sandžak. The staff of the 6th Assault Division reported to the General Command of the ANLA: “…the regions of Brodar, Rudo, Dobrun and Višegrad were liberated from the claws of the occupiers and Chetniks by the forces of the 6th Assault Division. The Yugoslav forces are arriving in these regions only after the battle and behind us.”13 The staffs of the Albanian divisions and brigades made every effort to coordinate with Yugoslav forces. They had been instructed that upon arrival in their operational areas, “…they must immediately seek contact with the YNLA staffs present in the region. Operations,” it was emphasized to our units, “are to be joint and the plans should be studied together.”14 Additionally, the operational orders of the Albanian divisions were also sent to the command of the Yugoslav 2nd Corps.
To avoid publicizing the contribution of the ANLA to the liberation of the Yugoslav peoples, YNLA units would often enter cities simultaneously with Albanian units to give the impression that they had played the leading role in the liberation. At times, they even obstructed the successful completion of Albanian operations. For instance, while the 6th Assault Division was fighting in the outskirts of Višegrad to complete its liberation, the command of the Yugoslav 2nd Corps issued an order stating: “The Albanian 6th Division is to break contact with the enemy and move to Plav and Gusinje, heading towards northern Albania.”15
As part of this anti-Albanian activity, the Yugoslav side also attempted to minimize the contribution of the Albanian divisions. In the book The History of Yugoslavia 1918-1978, the liberation of Montenegro, the Sandžak and Bosnia is described as follows: “The 2nd Assault Corps of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army in Montenegro blocked the withdrawal of the German 22nd Mountain Corps… Together with YNLA units, the 5th Division of ANLA fought in the Sandžak region. After liberating Boka Kotorska, the Primorje, Cetinje and Podgorica, the 2nd Corps units continued to pursue the retreating Germans and Chetniks through Kolašin and Prijepolje towards Višegrad.”16 This narrative not only denies the two and a half months of continuous combat by the 6th Division of the ANLA — which pursued the enemy from Montenegro to southern Bosnia, liberating the region including Podgorica and Višegrad — but also contradicts the official communiqués of the Supreme Headquarters of the YNLA. These communiqués specifically recognized the contributions of the 6th Division, stating: “In Montenegro, our units and the Albanian ones continue their attacks on German groupings in the mountainous zone of Tara… the fiercest battles have taken place near Mataševo…”17 Later, it was reported: “Fierce fighting continues in the Lim valley. The ANLA units have particularly distinguished themselves in these battles.”18
Sources
List of sources used for written and illustrative material:
The History of the Military Art of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation War of the Albanian People, Tirana 1989. (Ministry of People’s Defence, Military Academy). Authors: Avni Hajro, Kadri Cenolli, Maksim Ilirjani, Mustafa Novi, Proletar Hasani, Refik Kucaj, Shahin Leka, Vangjel Kasapi.
Notes
1 AQU, “6th Assault Division Fund,” box 2, file 48.
2 It is unclear where this figure originates. It may be somewhat exaggerated.
3 Chetniks — Serbian paramilitary units that collaborated with German forces during the Second World War, similar in role to the Albanian Balli Kombëtar.
4 Draža Mihailović — the collaborationist leader of the Serbian Chetnik forces.
5 AQU, “6th Assault Division Fund,” box 4, file 46.
6 AQU, “5th Assault Brigade Fund,” box 2, file 7.
7 AQU, “6th Assault Division Fund,” box 2, file 35.
8 AQU, “6th Assault Division Fund,” box 2, file 35.
9 AQU, “6th Assault Division Fund,” box 2, file 46.
10 AQU, “6th Assault Division Fund,” box 2, file 46.
11 AQU, “6th Assault Division Fund,” box 2, file 35.
12 AQU, “General Staff of the Albanian National Liberation Army (ANLA) Fund,” box 4, file 192.
13 AQU, “General Staff of ANLA Fund,” box 14/1, file 373.
14 AQU, “General Staff of ANLA Fund,” box 3.
15 AQU, “General Staff of ANLA Fund,” box 14/1, file 373.
16 Branko Petranović, History of Yugoslavia 1918-1978, Belgrade, 1981, p. 364.
17 Newspaper Borba, December 26, 1944, p. 1.
18 Newspaper Bashkimi, Tirana, January 6, 1954, no. 13, p. 4.