Record of the conversation between Comrade Stalin and the head of the delegation of the Yugoslav National Committee, A. Hebrang, January 9, 1945.
On the Soviet side, present were Comrades J.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, A.F. Kiselev and V.M. Sakharov.
On the Yugoslav side, present was the head of the delegation, A. Hebrang, and the Chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army, A.R. Jovanović.
After the members of the delegation exchanged greetings with Comrades Stalin and Molotov, Comrade Stalin asked how the delegation’s journey had been. Hebrang replied in Russian, “Very good.” Hebrang delivered a verbal greeting from Marshal Tito to Comrade Stalin.
Comrade Stalin asked what issues the delegation had come to discuss.
Hebrang replied that there were three groups of issues: 1. Questions of economic assistance to Yugoslavia; 2. Yugoslav foreign policy demands; and 3. Questions concerning the arming and organization of the Yugoslav Army.
Speaking about the need for economic assistance from the Soviet Union, Hebrang said that food aid was especially needed. In addition to food, Yugoslavia would also like to receive from the Soviet Union raw materials for a number of its factories and plants, clothing and footwear for the army and the population, medical supplies, equipment for schools and universities, and materials to support propaganda (paper for newspapers and books, ink and so on).
Comrade Stalin asked whether Yugoslavia had received anything from UNRRA. Hebrang replied in the negative and added that some aid had been received from the Allies under lend-lease. Comrade Stalin noted the importance of receiving assistance from UNRRA as well, and then asked whether the Yugoslavs expected to receive anything from Hungary in the form of reparations.
Hebrang replied that the Hungarians had caused great material damage to Yugoslavia, amounting to approximately $900 million, and that Yugoslavia was seeking compensation for these damages.
Comrade Stalin also asked whether the Yugoslavs expected to receive anything from Germany in reparations.
Hebrang replied in the affirmative and added that they also intended to take part in the occupation of certain German regions.
Comrade Stalin stated that negotiations were currently under way with the Americans and the British regarding the terms of the armistice with Hungary. The amount of reparations for Hungary would apparently be set at $300 million — the same amount being paid by Romania and Finland. The Americans and the British were opposed to a large reparations sum, as they believed that high reparations would weaken the country and reduce its purchasing power.
Hebrang noted that the reparations amount was very small and said it was clear why the Americans and British were against increasing it — they feared that Hungary would become too weak.
Comrade Stalin asked about the situation with coal in Yugoslavia.
Hebrang replied that coal had previously been mined in Yugoslavia, but in very small amounts, and now even less was being extracted — capacity had decreased. The Yugoslav leadership hoped to receive coal from Hungary and was counting on help from the Soviet Union.
Comrade Stalin, speaking about general economic assistance to Yugoslavia, said that the Soviet Union could not provide substantial economic aid to Yugoslavia at the moment, as the war was still ongoing. Assistance would be provided as far as possible, but as long as the war continued, large-scale aid was not possible.
Then Comrade Stalin asked whether the Yugoslavs had received bread, to which Hebrang replied affirmatively, but added that the bread from Russia also included food supplies from Romania and from the northern part of Yugoslavia. According to Hebrang, this was not Russian bread.
Comrade Stalin explained that part of the bread could naturally have come from trophies seized by the Red Army. He then added that the Yugoslavs, including Tito, generally had a mistaken understanding of the matter of trophies. The Yugoslav leaders believed that the Red Army should leave all trophies captured in Yugoslavia to the Yugoslavs — this, he said, was incorrect. Trophies belong to the army that captures them. If the army knows that anything it captures must be handed over, it will not strive to capture anything at all. An army wants to distinguish itself not only by destroying enemy forces in battle, but also by seizing enemy property and trophies. To demand that the Red Army hand over all trophies is wrong.
Hebrang noted that many Yugoslavs misunderstood the removal of seized foodstuffs from Yugoslavia to Hungary, and that this left a poor impression on the population.
Comrade Stalin replied that the food was being transported for the Red Army and it made no difference where the army was located. The food was being taken to Hungary for the Red Army, which cannot fight without consistent food supplies. The army fights, sheds blood, and to imply that it is stealing is offensive to the Red Army. Comrade Stalin recalled a statement by Đilas in which he claimed that the moral and political character of Soviet officers was lower than that of British officers. Comrade Stalin stressed that this was completely untrue and offensive. One cannot judge an army by isolated incidents — the whole Red Army cannot be insulted because of a single degenerate. One must understand the soul of the soldier who has fought his way 3,000 kilometres from Stalingrad to Budapest. The soldier thinks: he is a hero, he can do anything, today he is alive, tomorrow he may be killed — he will be forgiven for everything. The soldiers are tired and worn down from a long and gruelling war. It is wrong to approach them from the standpoint of a “proper intellectual.” British officers, Stalin said, showed their moral character best of all in Greece. Yes, there are isolated cases that bring shame to our soldiers. We execute people for that. But we must remember that these men are exhausted, emotionally strained and believe they are heroes who are allowed to do anything. Comrade Stalin told a recent story about a pilot — a good one — who got drunk with a group somewhere and killed someone. He was imprisoned and was supposed to be executed. There was a long investigation. It turned out he had been completely drunk and remembered nothing. Comrade Stalin said he vouched for the pilot, as he was a skilled one. The man has since been released and sent back to the front. One must remember that a soldier, especially a pilot, is always in danger — not only in combat, but every time he is in the air. It is not easy to strike the enemy and then pursue him. Nerves wear thin. People lose their balance. One cannot judge them by ordinary standards.
Then Comrade Stalin summed up the discussion on material aid to Yugoslavia and said that everything possible would be given — assistance would be provided.
Turning to military matters, Hebrang said the Yugoslavs expected two kinds of assistance from the Soviet Union: arms and personnel (instructors and advisors), and help in building a modern, well-organized army.
Jovanović, in addition to Hebrang’s remarks, emphasized that the core and foundation of such an army already existed in Yugoslavia. What was needed was to organize the army’s central command — the general staff, army headquarters and other major command structures.
Comrade Stalin asked how many divisions the Yugoslav Army currently had.
Jovanović responded that there were 50 divisions, comprising 518,000 people. With the full liberation of Yugoslav territory, another 300,000 people would be mobilized. Among the current divisions there were small partisan divisions that would need to be reorganized — reducing the total number of divisions to 40. The plan was to create three army groups, along with 12 corps. Each army group would have five divisions, and each corps would have two or three divisions.
Comrade Stalin asked how many artillery pieces a Yugoslav division had. General Kiselev replied that currently each division had 72 pieces, including mortars, but the Yugoslavs aimed to increase that number to 84, with each division comprising 12,500 men.
Comrade Stalin said that such a large number of full-scale divisions was unrealistic — there would not be enough officer personnel. He cited the example of Poland, where 20 divisions had been mobilized, but there were not enough officers, so the number of divisions had to be reduced to 10 — five of which were currently at the front, with the other five to be sent soon. But, Stalin added, these would be good divisions. The personnel strength of those divisions was 8,000 to 9,000 men. If Yugoslavia had 20 solid divisions, that would be very good. The issue was not quantity. There could be many divisions, but they would be of little value. Officers must be trained — that is critical. Even 20 divisions, Stalin said, is a large number — one should not get carried away. In China, resistance had continued for eight years, but they had failed to train their officers. They created 400 divisions, but without training, their officer corps remained poor. Recently, the Japanese launched an offensive from the north in which eight Japanese divisions defeated 46 Chinese ones. Taking into account the shortage of officers in Yugoslavia, Comrade Stalin suggested that several partisan divisions should be kept in the rear, equipped with lighter artillery. The size of each division should be less than 13,000. Twenty good divisions, in Stalin’s words, would be sufficient for Yugoslavia — that would be very good. Each division could later be expanded into a corps, yielding three divisions from one. Feeding too many divisions is difficult and they would be unstable in battle. Comrade Stalin emphasized the difficulty of the task, saying that while the goal should be set, it could not be achieved immediately — such divisions would exist only on paper for now.
Comrade Stalin asked how the Yugoslav army would be structured: would there be a unified command, or would there be separate Serbian, Croatian and other national armies?
Jovanović replied that there would be a unified command.
Comrade Stalin asked about the language — which language would be used?
Jovanović responded that the language would be Serbo-Croatian, and only in Slovenia and Macedonia would Slovene and Macedonian be used, since those languages differ from Serbo-Croatian.
Comrade Stalin said that the Soviets would assist with organizing the headquarters: they would provide personnel and military regulations, but Yugoslavia needed to have its own officer corps, and good company and battalion commanders. Yugoslavia had such officer cadres in the past, as it had once had a good army, and Yugoslavs had primarily studied with the French.
Jovanović stated that the combat effectiveness of Yugoslav soldiers remained high. General Kiselev added, however, that the army was still unstable, citing an example where the 21st Yugoslav Division retreated under light enemy pressure and lost part of its artillery.
Comrade Stalin interjected that such incidents happen everywhere — with the Germans and with the Soviets as well.
Comrade Stalin inquired about the future organization of the Yugoslav Army. General Kiselev replied that two organizational models were being considered. Under the first model, each division would be a full-strength division of standard size. Under the second, some divisions would be of reduced size. The headquarters structures for these divisions had been developed.
Comrade Stalin suggested adopting a brigade system, citing Red Army experience in 1942, when it had 100 to 120 brigades, each with 4,500 to 5,000 personnel. These brigades fought well and were later transformed into divisions. Such brigades are much easier to manage, and once commanders gain experience, they can lead full divisions. Perhaps Yugoslavia, Stalin said, should have seven to 10 divisions with 10,000 men each, and the rest should be converted into brigades to allow young officers to gain command experience. These brigades could even be called divisions, then later transformed into proper, modern divisions — once officer cadres had matured. This was the same approach the Red Army had taken in 1942. Partisans, Stalin said, must be trained — they are not suited for a modern army. When the Red Army linked up with partisan regions, the partisans were sent to the rear. Some were kept in the army or sent for training, but most were disbanded. They were effective in the rear, but not fit for open battle: they were reluctant to engage in direct combat and were unaccustomed to army discipline.
Jovanović claimed that Yugoslavia had enough personnel for 40 divisions. Comrade Stalin responded that these divisions would need to be commanded. Expanding on this point, Stalin said that the Germans were skilled militarily — they understood that there could be no army without officers. In every country they entered, they seized and deported all officers to Germany. They hunted officers in Poland, Yugoslavia and France. De Gaulle, in a conversation with Stalin, had complained about the shortage of officers in France.
Returning to the composition of future Yugoslav divisions, Comrade Stalin suggested that it might be better to create divisions of 7,000 to 8,000 men. He emphasized that partisans needed to be reoriented — “reworked” — to fit into a modern army. Often, they resisted this, but they needed to be prepared for modern military service.
Comrade Stalin asked whether the Germans were leaving Yugoslavia. Jovanović confirmed this and emphasized that they were simultaneously building fortifications in several directions. Comrade Stalin noted that the Germans would fight for Zagreb and Ljubljana, as they knew these points covered the flank of the German force group in Italy. He then asked which parts of Yugoslavia had been liberated.
Jovanović responded that Serbia, Macedonia and almost all of Montenegro and Vojvodina had been liberated. The Germans were particularly resisting stubbornly in Lika and the Croatian Littoral.
Returning again to the question of army structure, Comrade Stalin said that it was necessary to decide — after consultation with Soviet experts — what types of divisions to create and how many. Large divisions were not advisable. The Japanese had divisions of 20,000 men but were now reducing them to 17,000 or fewer. A normal division size, Stalin said, was 12,000 to 13,000 men. The hardest problem was forming a proper officer corps — commanders must be trained over years.
Comrade Stalin asked how much of the weaponry previously planned for Yugoslavia had actually been delivered.
General Kiselev replied that enough weapons had been received for nearly 10 divisions.
Comrade Stalin ordered a review of what had been delivered and what was still missing.
Jovanović requested that arms be supplied for at least 20 more divisions.
Comrade Stalin responded that the structure of the divisions needed to be defined first. All such matters, he said, would be discussed with Comrade Bulganin and General Antonov.
Jovanović requested that instructors be assigned to the Yugoslav Army, noting that certain rights and responsibilities had been set for them. They would hold the authority of deputy commanders of various units and would be allowed to report their observations to higher command. It was also planned for Soviet instructors to wear Yugoslav uniforms.
Comrade Stalin stated that in order to wear the uniform, an instructor must know the language — otherwise, the uniform serves no purpose. Experience in Poland showed that when Soviet officers wore Polish uniforms without speaking the language, the effort backfired. It looked like a masquerade. An instructor should simply be an advisor. He has no right to override or impose decisions on the commander. Comrade Stalin said that instructors would be provided on a temporary basis. He believed that a weakness among the Yugoslavs was their reliance on advisors. Once they knew the advisors would leave, they would be forced to learn.
Comrade Stalin noted some recent changes in the Soviet artillery structure due to the production of a new, lighter type of gun, and asked how many artillery pieces of at least 72 mm calibre each Yugoslav division would have.
General Kiselev replied that each division would have 36 such guns.
Comrade Stalin asked whether the Yugoslav army needed captured (trophy) weapons.
Jovanović replied affirmatively, adding that ammunition was also needed, to which Comrade Stalin remarked — “of course.”
Comrade Stalin said that Soviet troops were currently not present in Yugoslavia.
General Kiselev said that it was proposed to create army-level assets (artillery, tank units, engineering units), which would also require weapons and other material support. For the Yugoslav Army, it would also be necessary to establish three army-level commands with supply services, administrative bodies and rear services.
Jovanović particularly emphasized the acute need for transport, stating that due to its absence, the entire army apparatus and logistics services could not function properly. The transport infrastructure and vehicles previously available had been destroyed; horses in the country were very scarce.
To this, Comrade Stalin noted that the issue of motor transport was difficult not only because a certain number of vehicles would need to be supplied, but primarily because a large amount of gasoline would be required — and this was a significantly more difficult issue. Nevertheless, a certain number of vehicles for the heavier types of artillery would be provided. As for light artillery, it would need to be moved using horse-drawn transport.
Comrade Stalin inquired about the specific tank and engineering units that were proposed for creation.
To this, Jovanović responded that it was proposed to create four tank brigades, nine engineering battalions and two anti-aircraft regiments. Additionally, over the next three years, it was planned to train Yugoslav personnel and receive equipment from the Soviet Union (around 1,000 aircraft) to form eight to ten aviation divisions.
Comrade Stalin asked how the training was going for the two air divisions being transferred to the Yugoslavs.
Jovanović replied that the training was hampered by a lack of sufficient training aircraft.
Comrade Stalin asked how officer training for the army was proceeding overall — whether there was a military academy.
Jovanović responded that there were separate officer schools training artillerymen, machine gunners and signal troops. The best progress was being made in the training of artillery personnel. Yugoslavia did not yet have a military academy, but plans were in place to create a unified officer school that would train junior officers, mid-level command staff and have specialized groups for the advanced training of senior command personnel.
Comrade Stalin emphasized the need to prepare not only officers for specific service branches — machine gunners, tank troops, artillery — but also general military commanders. He pointed out the importance of developing a national tradition of training and educating military specialists.
Comrade Stalin asked whether the delegation had any further military-related questions.
Jovanović replied that the main questions had been covered, and that there was only one request — to provide equipment for a military topographical institute. The equipment that had been located in Belgrade had been removed by the Germans and part of it had been handed over to the Bulgarians.
With that, the discussion of military issues concluded, and Comrade Stalin asked the delegation to present the essence of the political questions.
Hebrang began by outlining Yugoslavia’s claims against Hungary. He said that for the Yugoslav economy it was extremely important to have access to coal, which was found in the Hungarian region adjacent to Yugoslavia, centred around the city of Pécs. This region is mostly inhabited by Hungarians, but also has a significant Slovene population. This region, along with the Pécs mines, should be annexed to Yugoslavia. In addition, Yugoslav territorial claims against Hungary included the annexation of the so-called Baja Triangle, a Hungarian region centred on the city of Baja. This area, which was part of the historical province of Baranya, contained a large Slavic population.
Comrade Stalin interjected: “And the Hungarians agree?”
Hebrang replied that the Hungarians, of course, would not agree, but it was extremely important for Yugoslavia to have these territories, and perhaps it would at least be possible to occupy them.
Comrade Stalin replied that the Yugoslavs were a bit late with the occupation, and while he felt no sympathy for Hungary, the Americans and British would strongly oppose this. They mostly followed the ethnographic principle in resolving territorial questions. According to Comrade Stalin, the Yugoslavs living in these areas should themselves raise the issue of joining Yugoslavia — resolutions should be passed, noise made. One has to scratch and claw for annexation.
Comrade Stalin then asked whether the Yugoslavs were aware that the Germans were extracting oil in the area around the city of Lenti in the amount of 5,000 tonnes annually.
Hebrang and Jovanović replied in the negative, after which Stalin pointed out the oil-bearing site to them on a map.
Hebrang requested the inclusion of a Yugoslav representative in the Allied Control Commission on armistice matters with Hungary.
Comrade Stalin said this should be pursued and that there would be no objections on the Soviet side.
Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov then exchanged views on the inclusion of Czechoslovak and Yugoslav representatives in the Commission.
Hebrang moved on to present Yugoslav claims regarding Austria and Italy. The Yugoslavs were demanding the annexation to Yugoslavia of part of the Carinthian region (the Austrian province of Kärnten), inhabited by Slovenes. This region had belonged to Yugoslavia after the First World War, but after a plebiscite held there, it had been transferred to Austria.
Hebrang said that Istria, currently belonging to Italy, should also be annexed to Yugoslavia, along with the ports of Trieste, Pola and Rijeka (Fiume). Istria was populated by Croats and Slovenes, and only the port cities had a noticeable percentage of Italians. Hebrang showed an ethnographic map of the area and a map with the border the Yugoslavs were demanding.
Comrade Stalin said it was necessary that the regions themselves demand to be annexed to Yugoslavia.
Hebrang reported that last year the anti-fascist councils of Croatia and Slovenia, responding to the demands of the local populations for unification with Yugoslavia, passed resolutions in favour of annexation. These decisions were later ratified by the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia.
Hebrang then said that from the beginning of the war until the present, there had been a widespread Yugoslav partisan movement in these territories.
Jovanović added that two Yugoslav corps, one division and several partisan detachments were currently operating in these areas. These territories were completely in Yugoslav hands.
Continuing, Hebrang said that in Trieste and Rijeka here were only small groups of autonomists who were demanding autonomy for the region under British protection.
Comrade Stalin asked how large these groups were, and when it became clear that they were quite insignificant, he half-jokingly suggested drowning them. Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov then recalled an unofficial conversation with Churchill in which he had proposed turning Istria into an autonomous region that would allow the future Austria to have access to the Adriatic Sea.
Hebrang, turning to the matter of Romania, outlined Yugoslav territorial claims against it — namely, the annexation of Romanian territory around Timisoara, including the city itself. Hebrang justified this by saying that in this region there was one district inhabited exclusively by Serbs. The city of Timisoara itself had been predominantly German and could now also be transferred to Yugoslavia.
Comrade Stalin asked whether anything on this issue had appeared in the press, and, upon receiving a negative answer, remarked that the population of that area — the Serbs — must themselves raise the question of joining Yugoslavia. In general, this is a matter for the future Peace Conference, but in order to raise it there, certain arguments are needed.
Hebrang also requested a revision of the border with Romania in the area of the city of Resita, since that city, located on Romanian territory 20 kilometres from the Yugoslav border, contained ironworks that were extremely important for Yugoslavia. If annexing Resita to Yugoslavia was impossible, it would be extremely important for Yugoslavia to ensure access to the iron produced at those plants by some other means.
Then Hebrang said he would like to inform Comrade Stalin about relations with Bulgaria. According to Hebrang, things were going extremely poorly and this was Bulgaria’s fault. The Yugoslav proposal for a federation treaty had been rejected by the Bulgarians.
Comrade Stalin said that he had read the draft treaty and that it was unsuitable. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were two states that could enter into a confederation with the prospect of full unification in the future, based on the principle of dualism. In the current Yugoslav proposal for a federation, which would grant Bulgaria equal rights with the individual Yugoslav peoples — the Serbs, Croats, Macedonians and Slovenes — the Bulgarians would see this as an attempt to swallow them. The goal must be full unification — this would be an epochal event in European history. But this must be approached step by step: begin with a union, with a treaty of mutual assistance, and then gradually move toward unification. This would not be a temporary union, but a permanent one. It would be a free, organic union, in which two states would voluntarily unite into a confederation. It must not appear that the Bulgarians are being swallowed.
Hebrang said that the Yugoslav leadership saw in Bulgaria’s desire to sign a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance an attempt to make it easier for Bulgaria to resolve the Macedonian question and a way to escape the isolation Bulgaria had fallen into due to its participation in the war on Germany’s side. The treaty would allow the Bulgarians to avoid responsibility for crimes committed during the war. On the other hand, Bulgaria would retain its status as a sovereign state. The Bulgarian leadership rejected the proposal to sign a mutual assistance treaty and, in early January, presented a new draft of a federation treaty — once again, not based on the principle of dualism, but on Bulgaria entering the federation with the same rights as the individual Yugoslav peoples: Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, etc. The Yugoslav leadership believed that in this case the future federation could internally exert the correct influence on Bulgaria. The treaty of federation would be much more favourably received in Yugoslavia. It was foreseen that the treaty would be ratified by the supreme governing bodies of the individual federal parts of Yugoslavia — Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia and the others. When proposing the first draft of the federation treaty, the Yugoslav government had intended for the treaty to be signed on December 11, 1944, and for it to be announced on January 1, 1944. January 1 had been set aside as the day to ceremoniously mark the signing of the treaty. Everything had been planned down to the smallest detail: halls had been allocated for the celebrations, speakers selected, etc. But the Yugoslav draft was rejected and Bulgarian comrades reported that they had been advised by telegram from Moscow by Comrade Dimitrov to propose a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance. The Yugoslav leadership considered this incorrect and, in early January, proposed another draft of a federation treaty.
Comrade Stalin once again stressed that the path to unification must be gradual, and it was very good that the Bulgarians were open to an alliance, that they were willing to form a dual-state. It would be good to sign a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance for 20 or even 10 years. The principle of dualism should now serve as the foundation of unification — the creation of a dual-state modelled on Austria-Hungary, but without the many negative aspects of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire.
If the matter is pushed too forcefully, the Bulgarians could veer toward America and Britain, or even toward Turkey. Preparations must be made for federal unification based on the principle of dualism.
Comrade Molotov emphasized that even a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance would alarm the Turks and Greeks, frighten the Romanians and stir unrest in Europe. It would be a major event in Europe. Everyone would be alarmed — everyone but the Soviet Union.
Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov exchanged views on what the reaction from Czechoslovakia would be. The Czechs should not be frightened, since they support the principle of Slavic solidarity, but they might be alarmed that this would be a Left-Slavic unification. Additionally, it could influence internal dynamics in Czechoslovakia — the Slovaks might demand a similar arrangement within Czechoslovakia itself.
Comrade Stalin asked about the situation with Greece.
Hebrang replied that Yugoslavia hoped to receive Greek Macedonia and Salonika from Greece. These demands had not been raised earlier so as not to cause difficulties for the Greek ELAS, as that would have weakened and complicated ELAS’s position within the country. Now, this demand would be made.
Comrade Molotov noted that this issue could be raised by the Greek Macedonians themselves.
Comrade Stalin said that the situation being created would leave Yugoslavia in hostile relations with Romania, Hungary and Greece — that it appeared they were planning to fight the whole world; there was no point in creating such a situation.
Comrade Stalin asked for an opinion on the Greek communists.
Hebrang replied that during the occupation, the opinion of them had been much worse, but recently they had performed well.
Comrade Stalin asked whether Hebrang thought it was correct for the EAM representatives to leave Papandreou’s government.
After Hebrang gave an uncertain reply, Comrade Stalin said that it had been a wrong step, taken without consulting the Soviets.
Comrade Stalin asked about relations with Albania.
Hebrang replied that the Albanians were Yugoslavia’s best friends. In the Albanian national liberation movement, according to Hebrang, representatives of all parties were involved, but the decisive role was played by the Communist Party. King Zogu had no support in the country. There were small reactionary groups in Albania, but they posed no threat to the national liberation movement.
Hebrang went on to say that during a recent visit of the Albanian government delegation to Belgrade, a Yugoslav-Albanian treaty of friendship and mutual assistance was signed, along with a trade agreement.
Comrade Stalin said that since Yugoslavia had taken on obligations under the treaty, it would have to fulfil them. In the event of complications, it would have to go to war — and whether it could fight against Britain, whether it had enough strength — that was still in question. As for Albania, it required careful consideration. The British only recognize strength. It was very good that Belgrade had been liberated — it gave new opportunities. The British had been afraid the Red Army would go into Greece, and if it had, the situation there would have been very different — but in Greece, without a navy, nothing could be done. The British were surprised when the Red Army did not go into Greece. They could not understand a strategy that avoided diverging lines of advance. The strategy of the Red Army was based on movement along converging lines.
Comrade Stalin asked about the Albanian army.
Jovanović replied that Albania had three corps consisting of three divisions.
Comrade Stalin said that it was not worth going to war with England. It was necessary to wait and think carefully about the issue of relations with Albania. The fact that the treaty of mutual assistance had not yet been ratified or announced — that was good. He advised not to publish the treaty until February.
Comrade Stalin then asked what Albania had — a National Committee or a Provisional Government?
Hebrang replied that a Provisional Government had been established not long ago in Albania, which had appealed to the Allied governments for recognition. However, to this day the Albanian Provisional Government had not been recognized.
Comrade Stalin asked whether the Yugoslavs had recognized the Albanian Provisional Government.
Hebrang replied in the negative, saying that there was only a Yugoslav military mission in Tirana.
Comrade Stalin asked whether Yugoslavia had recognized the Bulgarian government and whether the Bulgarian government had recognized the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia.
Hebrang replied that the Bulgarians had their envoy, Minister Todorov, in Belgrade, and that Yugoslavia had military and trade missions in Sofia.
Comrade Stalin, turning to Comrade Molotov, remarked that according to the norms of international relations, diplomatic relations are usually established first — and only then are treaties and agreements signed.
Comrade Stalin then asked Hebrang how the formation of the Yugoslav government was progressing.
Hebrang replied that after Šubašić arrived in London, a telegram was received from Churchill, in which he approved the agreement concluded by Šubašić and Tito — with subsequent amendments — and expressed hope for the speedy formation of the Yugoslav government. However, it was clear that the British were deliberately delaying the formation of a unified government (Šubašić had been given a deadline until December 31), and this was having a very negative effect on the situation in Yugoslavia.
Recently, a telegram was sent to Šubašić in London from Belgrade, stating that the formation of the new government could not be postponed until the second half of January.
According to Hebrang, the Yugoslav leadership, headed by Tito, had taken the position that if a unified government was not formed by January 15, then the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia would be declared the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia.
Comrade Stalin said that the National Committee should not yet be proclaimed a Provisional Government. A provisional government must be recognized, and the British and Americans likely would not recognize it. The Soviet government could recognize it, but at the moment it was still tied up with the Polish question. In Poland’s case, the Soviet government had acted simply — it recognized the Provisional Government without regard to Britain or America. Churchill swallowed the pill, Roosevelt lowered his head and is still sulking.
Comrade Stalin advised to wait until February to proclaim a government, until many questions became clearer.
Comrade Stalin suggested that Churchill, encouraged by his successes in Greece, was looking for an excuse to carry out a similar action in Yugoslavia. Churchill should not be helped in this. The defeat of ELAS, of course, was a bad thing for Yugoslavia. The Greek opposition had no sufficient strength to withstand an armed assault. The representatives of EAM had acted wrongly by withdrawing from Papandreou’s government. They didn’t consult us. They made things easier for Churchill. In Yugoslavia, one should not make things easier for Churchill, should not start a fight. No reason should be given — and Churchill is looking for a reason. Churchill got burned badly in Greece and cannot easily repeat such an action — and he is afraid of us.
Comrade Stalin then expressed doubt about the advisability of starting a fight with Romania and Hungary. First it was necessary to finalize the composition of the government. Churchill believed that the Tito-Šubašić government would not meet the expectations of the population since both Tito and Šubašić were Croats. However, the British had miscalculated — that was now clear.
Comrade Stalin expressed the wish that it would be good to consult with the Soviets before taking important decisions — otherwise, the Soviets would find themselves in an awkward position.
Comrade Stalin remarked that the Albanians were also Slavs by origin. For the Yugoslav leadership to feel confident, it was necessary to have strength. The well-known rule is: if you cannot go on the offensive — defend yourself, if you have gathered strength — attack. In dealing with bourgeois politicians, one must be careful. They — the bourgeois figures — are very sensitive and vengeful. One must keep one’s emotions in check; if emotions are in control — you will lose. In his time, Lenin never dreamed of the kind of balance of forces that had been achieved in this war. Lenin expected that everyone would attack us and it would be fortunate if some distant country — like America — remained neutral. But it turned out that one part of the bourgeoisie sided against us, and another — with us. Lenin never imagined it would be possible to remain in alliance with one wing of the bourgeoisie and fight the other. We succeeded in that; we are guided not by emotion, but by reason, analysis and calculation.
At the end of the conversation, Comrade Molotov proposed discussing the issues raised by the Yugoslav delegation in groups and promised to assign competent people for that purpose.
Upon parting, Hebrang conveyed the request of the entire Yugoslav delegation to meet with Comrade Stalin again before departure — to which Comrade Stalin agreed.
The conversation lasted 3 hours and 15 minutes.
The conversation was recorded by Major General Kiselev and Major Zakharov.
АВП РФ. Ф. 06. Оп 7. П. 53. Д. 872. Л. 8-28.
Подлинник.
(Translated from the Russian original at docs.historyrussia.org)