— Arso Jovanović —
Probably from December 1942
4. Slovenia.
The White Guard is an ordinary misery. It has no combat capability or value. If I had the 1st Proletarian Brigade, I would solve the issue of not only the White Guard but also all the small Italian garrisons according to the speed of that brigade’s movement. But even so, we will strive to resolve this issue quickly. I hope we will destroy the White Guard and force them back into the occupier’s garrisons. It has emerged due to the poor work of our comrades and units. While they were camping in the mountains, far from the people, the occupier forcibly mobilized and pushed them, through Draža Mihailović’s agents and Catholic clerics, into the White Guard. You will see the situation, numbers and political turmoil in that White Guard from the interrogation of Captain Vasiljević, which I am sending you (Captain Dobrivoje was captured, interrogated and executed, and the interrogation was not preserved — I.M.). This interrogation almost exactly outlines the entire work of the White Guard. It is most numerous around the Gorjanci area, where it has almost completely taken over. Draža intended to create a stronghold there, get English help and then act according to the circumstances. He did not choose Gorjanci by chance; he wanted to separate the Slovenes from the strong partisan movement in Croatia and, probably, strike at Zagreb at the opportune moment. However, the White Guard is politically strongest around Ljubljana. It is an instrument of Catholic reaction. It is more dangerous around Ljubljana than near Novo Mesto. We will keep that in mind. Otherwise, the White Guard has no vitality or offensive intentions. After the offensive, the Italians drove it into strongly fortified buildings in various villages, where it vegetates and secures the Italian communications. The only difficult part is that these buildings are heavily fortified, and the Slovenes have no mortars or cannons. Acquiring at least one 65 mm mountain gun (for which the Supreme Command has plenty of ammunition) would be of great importance. Blockading these buildings is difficult because the Italians respond quickly from the garrisons. But with the reorganization of our army and command, we will manage to improve the situation. Almost the entire population is with us and the partisans are welcomed with great enthusiasm. At first glance, I can say that the Slovenian partisans have not earned such love from the people. With the heroic attack of the Croatian partisans on the occupier’s stronghold of Suhor, the Slovenian people were thrilled beyond belief. The people themselves complained that their partisans carried out the action and then ran away for nine days. We will prevent this from happening in the future.
Partisan units: the lower command cadre is quite brave, but has no tactical orientation. This is the fault of the main Slovenian leadership. The enemy has been reinforcing its combat formations, while the Slovenian brigades consist of around 250 to 300 fighters. They did not take any action to mobilize the masses, but instead, allowed the occupier to mobilize them. There were also units, but these were entirely territorial units, similar to those in Montenegro and Herzegovina, without any combat value, as they did not perform any combat tasks. Everything was going along the lines of conspiratorial fighters, a completely opportunist approach. I note that the combat material is excellent, but without any combat experience. At the beginning of the uprising, the Slovenes easily took over villages without a fight. In the enemy’s offensive and after it, the Slovenian partisans did not fight. Hence the great influence of the White Guard and other difficulties. I noticed: why don’t your partisans sing, because it is known that Slovenes sing. The explanation: we sang while we had free territory, but later we didn’t dare — to avoid being detected by the enemy. Ridiculous! Or: they issued an order for the National Liberation Committees to be clandestine. In my opinion, this is also opportunism, because we are waging an open fight for life and death. Even now, we must strive to have our own government emerge from the struggle and to harden the people. Otherwise, from what I noticed among the fighters, there is conscious discipline, but less of the combat discipline and soldierly demeanour. However, this can be quickly achieved.
I still do not have a clear idea of the Liberation Front. I see that there is some non-military mixture. There are also political mistakes, in my opinion. For example: the deputy political commissar of the General Staff has behind him, again as some deputies or controllers, a Christian socialist and a falcon. They are political representatives of their parties. Why now should a representative and organizer of our party have any control over the civilian parties? I can understand that they were accepted, say, as members of the General Staff, but not as political representatives within our party and alongside our party. If they have a political agreement, then it should be outside the partisan army, outside the General Staff, and could be represented in some larger body. I will discuss this with Bevc. Besides that, I noticed that the deputy political commissar in the brigade does not have the role he has in our units. This role is taken by the secretary of Agitprop! That is why I noticed, at first glance, a different influence of the Party compared to our units. It seems to me that this is a concession to the civilian parties. Of course, I will only share this with Bevc. I regret that a comrade who would have examined all of this did not accompany me, because I fear that these people from the Liberation Front will not go far. It seems to me that the Christian socialists have their own organization in our partisan army. At a certain moment, this could be dangerous. I found here: the deputy commander (J. Avšič) and political commissar (B. Kidrič) of the main Slovenian staff together with these two civilian political representatives. I noticed their very good relationship, agreement and understanding. It seems to me that I will not allow such a combination in the General Staff. I will form the staff according to our principles and experiences. And of course, I will discuss everything with Bevc beforehand and come to an agreement. It is interesting that Bevc did not hold any position in the General Staff. He left all of that to others and buried himself in the Ljubljana “bunker,” as these comrades call their shelter in Ljubljana. For now, I cannot tell you about political work in the army. I will suggest that it be done as in our units. I noticed that there are no such songs about the Red Army, Stalin or our Supreme Commander, as we have in our units. Indeed, they did not dare to sing recently! (And in winter, they could not fight due to heavy snow — I.M.). I told you, as for party matters, I will just give Bevc a suggestion. Maybe it was a bit strange for me when I did not notice that certainty, decisiveness in the political workers here, as we have in our units. He somehow tactically dealt with all the civilians, and the Christian socialist even wrote a leaflet after our success at Suhor. I asked for the ratio of forces. The political commissar (B. Kidrič) told me: 70 communists, 25 Christian socialists and 5 falcons. I will see if our political workers are hesitant when it comes to interacting with the army because of the Liberation Front. Otherwise, our literature is well represented in the army. I will send it to you for review. The Christians also published a book about the White Guard.
The measures I took: The “Ivan Cankar” brigade, which was operating or, better to say, hiding in the Gorjanci or Kočevski Rog areas, had 260 fighters. Immediately, I withdrew the territorial forces and increased this brigade to 500-600 fighters, formed into three battalions. Due to the importance of the sector, I left, by mutual agreement and my personal conviction, Comrade Šaranović as the chief of staff and two more battalion commanders. I gave the brigade a directive for the destruction of the White Guard and actions on the railway line and smaller Italian posts. In this work, this brigade will be supported by the 13th Croatian brigade, which, with its presence and successes, revived this sector. I ordered the voluntary mobilization of all forces. This should first be politically prepared. It is interesting that the Slovenian units did not resort to such manifestations. If a large number of people were gathered, and we could not arm them, we would send them to you. How I wish that Bevc had “sent us a brigade” when they had tens of thousands of partisans. I could not conclude how many partisans the Slovenes currently have (about 2,500?), but that number will certainly increase quickly.
I have established a command with several points in the Gorjanci-Belokrajina area, leaving about 200 partisans for various sabotage actions. Since this territory is not liberated, this area has, in addition to the prescribed tasks, also actions related to the brigade located in this sector. I organized the establishment of communication via the Kupa River, in the area of Sinji Vrh, with Croatia and with you. In this way, we will be able to quickly receive all the things you intend to send us; at least one 65 mm mountain gun with several shells, etc.
Finally, forgive me for writing so untidily. I am in a hurry to leave. Now I am going via Krka, east of Novo Mesto, then through Kuma and south of Litija towards Ljubljana. On this route, I will find two more brigades. For these brigades, I will also order organizational measures. These measures are fundamental, and they must be understood by the remaining comrades from Slovenia. After that, I will visit all other units and areas in Slovenia. There is no free territory anywhere, but partisan influence is strongly felt.
Report on the action: The 13th Croatian brigade and the Slovenian “Ivan Cankar” brigade captured the Italian and White Guard stronghold of Suhor near Metlika. The attack was carried out by the 13th Croatian brigade, while the “Cankar” brigade provided security. Result: the entire enemy garrison of 176 soldiers was destroyed. There were 40 Italians and 136 White Guard members. Captured: 6 machine guns, 99 rifles, and a large quantity of food supplies and various equipment. Six heavy machine guns were stored in the barracks. The captured White Guards, who were forcibly mobilized by the Italians, were accepted into the brigade — number 51. We killed Captain Dobrišo Vasilić, the battalion commander, whose interrogation I am attaching.
After this, the Italians from Metlika launched an assault towards the village of Radković. Our forces ambushed them and killed over 50 enemy soldiers, captured 9, and seized 2 heavy machine guns and 2 submachine guns. The enemy, completely defeated, retreated in parts towards Metlika.
On the night of 29-30, both brigades carried out an attack on the Metlika-Črnomelj-Urena Vas railway. We heard intense fighting. The result is unknown, as we left for the journey. All these actions — along with their results — were announced to the people.
After these three actions, the brigades will rest and replenish, and then begin new actions in line with the directives issued.
Receive comradely greetings with “Death to fascism — Freedom to the people!” Greetings, Arso.
(Reproduced from: Matović, I. Commander with a Halo of a Martyr : The Story of General Arso R. Jovanović, Chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army and His Tragic Fate — Toronto : Sava Press, 2025. — pp. 276–280.)