Overview of the National Liberation War

— Arso Jovanović —

The operations of the National Liberation Army, by virtue of their scale, considerable significance and the difficulty of the military-political circumstances in which they were conducted, constitute a subject for profound study by historians of the art of war. What is offered here is merely an outline, a general survey limited to those operations that exerted a substantial influence on the development of the national liberation war. Furthermore, this account will not engage in an evaluation of certain political events, such as the First Session of AVNOJ in Bihać, the Second Session in Jajce, and so forth, which were the consequence of the successful conclusion of particular phases of the war and are closely connected with these operations.

When discussing operations, it is necessary also to address the army that executes them. An army is created by the politics of a given country in order to secure the vital interests of its people. This has been confirmed by our own experience. The former reactionary rulers of Yugoslavia, who pursued a treacherous policy, cast their peoples into the most shameful and dreadful subjugation known in our history. Their army, undermined by internal reaction, lacking a coherent military doctrine and any conception of modern warfare, suffered collapse and complete disintegration.

However, when the liberationist and patriotic forces of our peoples, under the leadership of the Communist Party, began to wage war and to raise uprisings, they created an army which fought against the occupiers for four years, thereby joining the broader anti-fascist bloc of democratic nations. In the course of this struggle, all those moral values of our peoples that had been suppressed for centuries came to the fore. The people came to recognise their own strength; new political horizons opened before them; they experienced freedom and were prepared to defend it through all the trials of this war. Numerous offensives by superior enemy forces, supported by all the traitors of our country, proved unable to shake or break the ranks of our units. From engagement to engagement, the army was tempered and continually grew, until it was ultimately transformed into a great force, a firm guarantor of the freedom and independence of our homeland and the guardian of the achievements of this magnificent struggle for which our peoples shed much blood.

The great war of liberation saved our peoples from Nazi annihilation. That struggle cast off the shame of betrayal imposed upon us by traitors and removed the danger that the Ustaše and Chetniks would hold a bloodied knife to the nation’s throat. Viewed narrowly from the perspective of 1941, it might have seemed that our peoples would destroy one another through mutual strife. However, through our long and arduous struggle, the brotherhood of our peoples was realised — the greatest achievement of this struggle. Through bold and heroic resistance, we attained an international standing such as we had never possessed in our history. This struggle granted us not only the right to determine the organisation of our internal affairs, but also to participate, alongside our great allies, in shaping the future order of Europe.

Our struggle and the very existence of our army within “Fortress Europe” constituted a significant strategic factor of the anti-Hitler coalition. Yugoslavia did not become a base, but rather a graveyard for numerous fascist divisions. Our struggle exposed the fissures and weaknesses of fascist Germany and marked the path that all freedom-loving peoples of occupied Europe ought to follow. In this way, our struggle acquired considerable international significance.

During the course of the liberation war, the enemies of our cause spoke of a so-called “Draža’s army.” Draža’s army was never truly an army. It consisted of sharply differentiated forces, founded upon national chauvinism, the division of power, speculation, the incitement of internal conflicts and civil war. These were poorly organised and internally disunited groups which, lacking a firm political foundation, were bound to disintegrate under sustained pressure.

Let us consider the National Liberation Army. Through heroic struggle, it endured the most difficult period in the history of our peoples — the period of fascist occupation. The soldiers of our army carried the banner of freedom, brotherhood and unity across our land through harsh and bloody battles. Brotherhood and unity were first forged within our army; this gave substance to the liberation struggle. All our peoples embarked upon the struggle for their freedom, forming their own national fighting units, which then merged into a unified National Liberation Army. Within it were manifested not only fraternal solidarity and the unity in combat of our peoples, but also the revival of their great martial traditions, their courage, self-sacrifice and devotion to freedom and independence.

Comrade Tito consistently kept before him the liberation of our country and the securing of the democratic rights of the people. He remained steadfastly committed to the course of uncompromising armed struggle against the invader. He was firmly convinced that our struggle, within the broader development of wartime events and with the assistance of our allies, would lead to victory and the liberation of our country. He was not mistaken. We achieved major and decisive successes.

The foundation of every military undertaking lies in firm organisation. An army does not tolerate improvisation, particularly not under such arduous conditions of life and work as those that characterised our liberation struggle. Considerable system and discipline were required to organise the resistance of a people oppressed beneath the fascist boot. This task was rendered all the more difficult by the fact that the occupier, to a greater or lesser extent, inherited and harnessed the entire state apparatus of the former Yugoslavia.

The former political parties disintegrated completely. Their leaders either fled abroad, from where they continued to act against their own people, entered into the service of the occupier, or remained passive observers on the margins of events. The Communist Party, however, exerted every effort to unite all patriotic elements into a single front for the struggle against the occupier. Our people did not accept betrayal, nor did they recognise the capitulation desired by the former ruling authorities. The popular masses responded to the Party’s call and resolutely entered the struggle. The consolidation of democratic forces within the liberation front grew in proportion to the increasingly open alignment of various enemies of the people with the occupier in opposition to their own nation. Thus, with the intensification of the struggle, the democratic forces established a firm military organisation under the leadership of the Supreme Headquarters of the National Liberation Army. The Supreme Headquarters served not only as a military command, but, for an extended period, also as the political leadership of the liberation struggle.

Despite brutal persecution and significant losses, the Communist Party maintained throughout the country a connected clandestine organisational apparatus, politically well oriented and tempered in struggle during the period of the former Yugoslavia. Consequently, the decision to embark upon armed resistance could be rapidly communicated across the entire country, and the broad strategy of a general national liberation struggle effectively implemented. The Party had already established a Military Committee (as early as 1940), headed by Comrade Tito. Within less than three months after the April catastrophe, at the beginning of July 1941, organised military headquarters commenced combat operations across the whole country.

A favourable military-political moment had arisen for the uprising, as the principal fascist forces were engaged on the Soviet front, leaving the occupied territories with only minimal forces. Moreover, with the entry of the USSR into the war, the anti-Hitler coalition assumed its full form.

It should also be borne in mind that, since the time of Peter the Great, the firing of a Russian rifle has never occurred without our rising in revolt. That we never fully reaped the fruits of those great struggles must be attributed to the Tsarist order of the time, as well as to the selfishness and backwardness of our monarchies. The circumstances are now different. The very fact that the Soviet Union — a state founded upon brotherhood, unity and democratic freedoms — stood at the head of the anti-Hitler coalition offered smaller nations the prospect of securing their freedom and independence through this struggle. Thus, once again, after 23 years of the former Yugoslavia during which even the mention of Russia was forbidden, we aligned ourselves with the great Slavic mother, Russia, trusting in her strength and ultimate victory.

The Soviet Union was the first to extend a hand to us after 27 March through the conclusion of the Pact of Friendship. It is unnecessary to emphasise why that pact could not immediately come into effect; nevertheless, it provided us with substantial moral support and demonstrated the concern of our Slavic brethren for our cause.

In order to hinder the formation of a unified front against the occupier, traitors slandered the Communist Party by claiming that it entered the struggle only after Germany’s attack on the USSR. They sought to conceal the following facts: the immense efforts undertaken by the Party to establish a united front for the defence of the country’s threatened independence; the organisation of mass demonstrations throughout the country against anti-popular regimes and acts of betrayal; and its leadership in the popular movement of 27 March against the treacherous Maček-Cvetković clique. To the Party’s credit may also be attributed the resolute resistance of the 41st regiment near Skadar against the Italian fascists, as well as the resistance of the reserve officers’ school in Maribor against the German fascists. At the moment of betrayal, many soldiers, following the Party’s call, did not surrender their weapons to the enemy, but concealed them for later use in the struggle against fascism. All Party members, regardless of whether they were subject to military obligation, were instructed to report to military units; however, these units often refused to accept them. Even during that brief war of betrayal, many Party members gave their lives in the front ranks on the battlefield. They made every effort to prevent panic and demoralisation, yet the betrayal was so profound that little could be achieved. To have launched a general armed uprising in Yugoslavia before the main German forces had been engaged against the Soviet Union would have meant knowingly courting disaster, risking the destruction of the popular uprising and, with it, the entire liberation struggle. It is evident that such a course of action would have served the enemy rather than the broader struggle against fascism.

The uprising developed in some areas gradually, and in others with sudden momentum.

By August 1941, the uprising in Serbia had not only consolidated itself, but had also achieved significant results. The arms factory in Užice fell into our hands. Extensive areas in Western Serbia, Šumadija and Eastern Serbia were liberated. Montenegro was almost entirely freed. The uprising advanced steadily in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the mountainous regions of Lika, Banija, Kordun and Northern Dalmatia. In Slovenia and Macedonia, however, the uprising was only in its initial stages.

As can be seen, the fighting developed rapidly and assumed wide proportions, particularly in the eastern regions of our country — Serbia, Montenegro and Eastern Bosnia. In this way, we threatened all those strategic and political-economic advantages that the Germans had acquired on the Balkans through their predatory expansion. In other words, the German order and domination in the Balkans were called into question.

This posed a considerable danger for the Germans, as the Balkans secured the flank of their forces on the Soviet-German front and protected the southern approaches to the German Reich. It is well known, moreover, that the Germans regarded the occupation of the Balkans as a prerequisite for their expansionist ambitions, both towards the USSR and towards the Middle East. It was along this route that their path to world domination was envisaged. This explains the large number of major occupation offensives directed against our National Liberation Army, which posed a serious threat to that “living space” of Nazi Germany.

By the summer of 1941, it had already become evident that the German “blitzkrieg” in the East had failed and had assumed the character of a protracted war. At the same time, on their southern and vulnerable flank — in Yugoslavia — a highly dangerous conflict had begun, a war in the rear. Determined to suppress our struggle, the Germans launched an offensive against our units in Serbia as early as the end of October 1941. For this operation, they deployed four divisions and a portion of Pavelić’s Ustaša-Home Guard forces. The starting bases for the final phase of the offensive were the towns of Šabac, Valjevo, Kragujevac and Kraljevo, advancing concentrically towards Užice, the most important military-political centre, where the leadership of the liberation struggle and the arms factories were located, and the topographically strongest sector of Western Serbia, held by our forces.

It is necessary here to emphasise the treacherous role of Draža Mihailović. No agreement could be reached with him. His fundamental policy consisted of the following:

a) To preserve the old state apparatus under German occupation, so that, following a German collapse, power might be seized — an arrangement he had reached with Nedić. Hence his passive stance towards the occupier, permitting the exploitation of all the country’s resources;

b) To prevent the mobilisation of the popular masses into the ranks of the Partisans, employing all means, including terror, armed conflict and collaboration with the occupiers;

c) To wage a fratricidal war aimed at the extermination of Muslims, Croats, Macedonians, and others.

We waged an uncompromising and resolute struggle against the occupier, and our ranks expanded rapidly. Draža’s “units,” which remained concealed in the forests under the slogan that the time was not yet ripe, not only failed to grow beyond their initial numbers but were in constant decline. As a result of our struggle, Draža was compelled either to enter into combat against the occupier himself — as some of his detachments did, most of which subsequently joined our side — or to align himself with the occupier in opposition to us.

He chose the latter course. At that time, however, our forces in Serbia numbered 15,000 Partisans, whereas Draža commanded up to 5,000 men, many of whom had been forcibly mobilised. The enemy had suffered considerable losses and had been confined to larger garrisons. Thus, both the Chetniks and the occupier were relatively weak, and Draža did not yet dare to attack us, although his bands were already killing our couriers, smaller groups and individuals emerging from Belgrade. Nevertheless, he did not allow this interval before a general assault upon us to pass unused. He established contact with Ljotić and Nedić and, in Valjevo, concluded an agreement with the Germans.

In order to weaken us prior to the launch of a general offensive, the Germans compelled Draža to attack us in Užice. As a consequence, we were forced to divert part of our forces to its defence, thereby weakening our fronts against the Germans. At Karan, near Užice, we defeated Draža and, in pursuit, encircled him on Ravna Gora. He proposed an agreement, which we accepted in the interests of the people and of continuing the struggle against the occupier. This agreement, however, was never realised. A German offensive followed, in which the Chetniks fought alongside the Germans in fierce combat against us. After two months of difficult fighting, the bulk of our forces withdrew from Serbia and moved into the Sandžak, from where they continued the struggle throughout Yugoslavia. Smaller Partisan units remained in Serbia — in Mačva, in the Kosmaj sector, in Eastern Serbia, in Toplica, Jablanica and Vlasina. Many of these groups operated clandestinely for extended periods. Yet, despite all persecutions and terror inflicted by the occupiers and traitors, the insurgent rifle in Serbia never fell silent. Numerous offensives against Crna Trava, Toplica and Jablanica, in Eastern Serbia and on Kosmaj, failed to destroy the liberation forces of Serbia. With the favourable development of military-political circumstances, the National Liberation Army of Serbia was reconstituted and played a significant role in the liberation of Serbia.

Draža Mihailović, together with Nedić and Ljotić, divided authority in Serbia among themselves. Draža, as a “mountain ruler,” as he was styled abroad, received from the Germans predominantly mountainous districts and villages, where he organised his administration in coordination with Nedić under the supervision of the occupier. Many reactionary elements, both within the country and abroad, placed considerable hopes in this authority.

Turning to Montenegro, a mass uprising broke out there on 13 July 1941. All who were capable of bearing arms rose in revolt — both old and young alike. Among other factors, this clearly demonstrated the profound affection of the Montenegrin people for the Russian nation. These popular masses surged forward like a torrent against the Italian fascists, and by the end of July almost the entirety of Montenegro had been liberated, with the exception of the towns of Cetinje, Podgorica and Nikšić.

With the liberation of Montenegro, the Italian occupation zone along the Adriatic coast was severed to a depth of up to 200 kilometres. In this way, a major rupture was created, cutting through the enemy’s system of communications along this important maritime littoral. The breach thus formed was all the more dangerous for the enemy as it lay within formidable mountainous terrain, well suited to partisan warfare and its further expansion.

For all these reasons, the Italians reacted swiftly and forcefully in order to suppress the popular uprising in Montenegro and to prevent its spread. The absence of resistance in other sectors of the Balkans under their occupation enabled the Italians to direct considerable forces against Montenegro — an entire corps of four divisions, supported by substantial air power. As the communications leading from the Neretva region eastwards towards Montenegro had been severed, the Italians brought in troops from Greece and Albania. A smaller contingent was dispatched from the Metohija region, via Peć and the Plav basin along the Lim valley, with the task of preventing the expansion and linkage of the uprising through the Sandžak with Serbia. The main body of forces advanced along the Skadar-Podgorica axis with the objective of destroying the partisan forces in the Zeta valley and the Montenegrin littoral.

After one and a half months of fierce fighting, the enemy succeeded, by the end of August 1941, in regaining control of the garrisons in Montenegro and pushing our forces away from the lines of communication. Following the breakthrough of the front, the uprising began to lose momentum. A portion of the population fell away, while reactionary elements began to establish ties with the occupier and to participate actively against the liberation movement. Another segment of the population, however, closed ranks more firmly within the military formations. Thus, a respite of one month emerged, throughout September, which the military leadership utilised to reorganise the armed units.

While the uprising in Montenegro was subsiding, the uprising in Serbia had not only consolidated itself but had intensified and achieved notable results, particularly in Western Serbia. This development, together with the organisational measures undertaken, provided impetus for the more rapid revival and renewed strengthening of the uprising in Montenegro. In the important Serbian-Montenegrin area, our forces were on an upward trajectory.

The fighting in Montenegro during September and October assumed a more dynamic character. Communications were once again severed, and the small towns of Šavnik, Žabljak, Goranjsko, Belimlje, Grahovo, Čevo and Mojkovac were liberated. The enemy was confined to larger garrisons, which were heavily fortified. We lacked the heavy weaponry required to strike them effectively. Consequently, the fighting assumed a more static character, and our substantial forces remained underutilised. It was therefore necessary to free these forces, to grant them a more manoeuvrable role and broader military and political horizons. In this context, Montenegrin shock battalions, under the legendary commander Sava Kovačević, advanced deep into Herzegovina as far as Nevesinje, where they engaged in fierce fighting to protect the Serbian population from Ustaša massacres. This exerted a powerful influence in encouraging the people of Herzegovina to rise in revolt.

Other substantial Montenegrin forces moved northwards at the end of November 1941 with the aim of linking up with Serbian and Bosnian forces and establishing a suitable base for the development of offensive operations. This gave rise to the battle for the Sandžak. The attack on Pljevlja was unsuccessful; however, during December Montenegrin units captured Čajniče, Foča, Goražde, Rudo and a series of other enemy strongholds, and subsequently effected a junction on the Lim with Serbian Partisan detachments that had been pushed back to this sector following the First Enemy Offensive in Serbia.

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The expulsion of Partisan forces from Serbia had an adverse effect on the entire operational area east of the rivers Bosna and Neretva (Eastern Bosnia, the Sandžak, Montenegro and Herzegovina). This area formed a unified whole with Serbia, as the forces of both areas relied upon the mountainous massifs of the Drina basin, from its headwaters in Montenegro to its confluence with the Sava. Arms, ammunition and material support had been supplied from Serbia.

Following the withdrawal of our forces from Serbia, Chetnik betrayal, terror and massacres of the Muslim population and, more generally, of patriotic inhabitants, generated insecurity and confusion not only among the people but also within certain Partisan units, all the more so as many failed to comprehend the depth of this treachery. Under the influence of Chetnik betrayal and their destructive propaganda, unrest arose in a number of Partisan detachments in Eastern Bosnia and the Sandžak, accompanied by the desertion of groups of wavering elements from the Partisan ranks.

Montenegrin forces failed to capture the town of Pljevlja in their attack and suffered losses. This, in conjunction with developments in Serbia, was particularly exploited by reactionary elements in Montenegro for their treacherous propaganda and plans.

Unprecedented cold, villages reduced to ashes, masses of refugees fleeing from massacres, and shortages of ammunition, food, clothing and footwear — all of this further aggravated our position.

Thus, both the occupier and domestic traitors had undertaken every measure to suppress the uprising at its very centre. Partisan detachments, as the initial, cumbersome and inert organisational formations of the popular uprising, proved unable to sustain the tempo of modern warfare and, under mounting difficulties and enemy pressure, began to disintegrate. Our forces were in decline. The popular uprising and its organisational military-political forms had not yet been consolidated and were in danger. Only a fighter of high political consciousness, great moral resilience and unwavering loyalty to his people could resolutely confront and overcome these difficulties. A new military organisation was required, new not only in form but also in its internal substance. Such fighters and such units were found in the Proletarian Brigades.

In response to this extremely difficult situation, Comrade Tito formed the 1st Proletarian Brigade on 22 December 1941 in Rudo from Serbian and Montenegrin Partisan detachments. From Serbian Partisan units assembled in Nova Varoš, the 2nd Proletarian Brigade was formed somewhat later.

The newly formed 1st Proletarian Brigade defeated the combined occupier-Chetnik forces that were advancing concentrically on Rudo. However, the Lim region was constricted and lay within the immediate reach of a German offensive group from Serbia. A prolonged stay there was not advantageous. It was necessary to stabilise the already unsettled situation and to establish a suitable base not only for rest, regrouping and consolidation of our forces, but also for the resumption of the initiative.

The Bosnian mining region and the Upper Neretva area, in conjunction with Montenegro, offered more favourable military-political prospects. Strong mountainous terrain, forests, canyons and rivers facilitated a more tenacious defence. The central position of this area allowed rapid linkage with other parts of the country. The mining basin promised the mobilisation of new forces, while its destruction would deprive the enemy of important industrial resources. For this reason, at the end of December the 1st Proletarian Brigade advanced into the Jahorina-Romanija-Vareš sector. The 2nd Brigade was left to secure the base in the Nova Varoš sector. In addition, it was tasked with maintaining contact with the remaining forces in Serbia and with establishing links with our forces in the Sandžak.

Through its energetic advance, the 1st Proletarian Brigade altered the situation in the Eastern Bosnian sector. Strong support was provided to the Partisan forces. The brigade became active along all principal directions, gathered Partisan detachments around itself and prevented their further decline. Units of the brigade also occupied positions abandoned by the Chetniks. Chetnik massacres were prevented. Many Chetnik units, which had fallen into disarray owing to Chetnik betrayal, were received and reorganised into volunteer detachments for resistance against the occupier.

Following the transfer of operations and the renewed impetus given to the fighting in this sector, the enemy launched the Second Offensive along two axes: one from the valley of the Bosna river towards the east and south-east, and the other from the valleys of the Drina and Lim towards the west. The intention, therefore, was to encircle our forces.

Fighting developed around Sarajevo, on Jahorina and Romanija, in the Krivaja valley near Olovo, and around Vlasenica and Rogatica on the one hand, and around Nova Varoš, Prijepolje and Pljevlja on the other. After determined resistance and bitter engagements in January and February 1942, this hastily organised offensive — undertaken on the assumption that we could be easily destroyed — was repelled.

Among these engagements was the renowned breakthrough of the 1st Proletarian Brigade from Vareš via Rajlovac, Igman and Bjelašnica to Trnovo. This stands as one of the most celebrated feats of the unit. The march lasted continuously for 18 hours under severe winter conditions. Mount Igman will remain a monumental symbol of the struggle and endurance of our proletarians. As they climbed the frozen slopes, no comrade abandoned another. There, 160 proletarians suffered severe frostbite. Those who survived proudly bear the name “Igmanci.”

From this offensive also derives the breakthrough of the 2nd Proletarian Brigade, which, under continuous combat, advanced from Nova Varoš to Čajniče across Mount Zlatar and the Lim river, which the fighters forded in January, carrying all their wounded with them.

Thus, by the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942, following two enemy offensives, our forces succeeded in consolidating themselves and in securing control over an important territorial stronghold in the region where Montenegro, Herzegovina and Bosnia converge. Within this area, we succeeded in breaking the occupier’s defensive system and confining the enemy to the towns.

The liberated territory was considerable in extent and permitted freedom of manoeuvre. The emergence of solid proletarian formations, together with their victories and endurance during these most difficult days, created a sense of security and imparted renewed momentum to the struggle. Through their movement, the proletarian units succeeded in linking and supporting the Partisan forces of Montenegro, Herzegovina and Eastern Bosnia, thereby giving fresh impetus to the uprising, particularly in Herzegovina, where it was still in its infancy.

By the end of the spring of 1942, in this area, forces drawn from Serbia, Montenegro, Eastern Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Sandžak were organised into four proletarian brigades (the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th) and three shock brigades (the 3rd, 6th and 10th). These brigades represented the culmination and the principal achievement of the popular uprising in the eastern part of our country. Despite all the offensives undertaken by the occupiers, Chetniks and Ustaše, the uprising was not suppressed. It produced firm military formations capable of sustaining the continuation of the struggle.

In these difficult operations at the outset of the war, the great moral qualities of our fighters became evident. Political consciousness and a sense of strength led them into the struggle against fascism far from their homes. Upon this foundation, our military and political leadership based its decisions and formulated further plans. At the same time, the proper resolution of the many problems that arose during the war instilled confidence in the leadership among the fighters, who followed it with unwavering commitment. In this territory, through the unification of Serbian, Montenegrin, Herzegovinian and Eastern Bosnian Partisan forces, unity in combat was realised in practice. There assembled those who had been tempered through severe trials, those who represented the most conscious and combative elements of the Serbian people, ready to continue bearing the heavy burden of war throughout our entire country for the freedom of all our peoples.

Thus, before the onset of the major Third Enemy Offensive, which in the spring of 1942 was launched against the principal Partisan strongholds in Yugoslavia (Montenegro-Herzegovina-Eastern Bosnia; Bosanska Krajina-Lika; Slovenia), the determined efforts of our forces afforded sufficient time to reorganise all our forces in the tri-border sector along brigade lines. The previous practice of large Partisan detachments, tied to their localities and regions, was in principle abandoned. All our prior operational experience was applied to these brigades, which proved suited to the new conditions of warfare: rapid and flexible movement, the transfer of operations to distant areas, and more secure manoeuvring in the face of a superior enemy determined to destroy us. These brigades constituted the true beginnings, the fundamental core of our army — sound, resilient and hardened in combat.

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The stabilisation of the military-political situation in the tri-border area was reflected not only in the reorganisation of our forces, but also in the formulation of military plans and in the evolving conception of further partisan warfare.

Having formed a strike group of brigades, Comrade Tito intended, through it, to support and invigorate the uprisings in the western regions of our country. It was no longer advantageous for the main forces to remain in the tri-border area. The Italians had exploited the Chetniks to the fullest extent so that the struggle risked losing its fundamental purpose — the fight against the occupier. Maintaining such a strike group in difficult mountainous terrain, poor in food supplies, offered no prospect and would have entailed the loss of its striking power. The Croatian masses, which had largely remained on the sidelines of the struggle, needed to be mobilised and drawn into the National Liberation Movement. Thus, having chosen a favourable moment at the height of the Third Enemy Offensive in the tri-border region, Comrade Tito undertook that victorious offensive of the strike brigades towards the west. “From here we set out,” Comrade Tito declared, “in a new direction. We shall carry the banner of the National Liberation War — the banner of armed brotherhood and unity of our people — across new regions of Yugoslavia. We shall be sowers of brotherhood among the peoples. By your conduct and conviction, you will demonstrate that you are an army of a new kind.”

The movement commenced from the Sutjeska at the end of June 1942 and developed along two directions: the 1st and 3rd brigades advanced along the axis Lelija-Kalinovik-Konjic-Prozor-Livno, while the 2nd and 4th brigades proceeded along Foča-Trnovo-Igman-Reštelica-Kreševo-Fojnica-Bugojno-Glamoč. To secure the movement in the tri-border sector, the 5th Montenegrin and 10th Herzegovinian brigades were left in place, while the 6th Bosnian brigade, in order to preserve the Eastern Bosnian base, had earlier been dispatched from the Romanija sector towards Mojkovac.

Prior to the advance of the strike group, in April we eliminated the strong Ustaša stronghold of Borač in the Upper Neretva valley. This criminal nest, entrenched within a deep canyon, had inflicted great suffering upon our population in Herzegovina. By neutralising this position, which lay on the left flank of our line of advance, our movement across the mountainous massif of Lelija was secured. This advance culminated in the liberation of significant territory in the western part of our country, where the strike brigades linked up with the Krajina and Croatian Partisan forces. In terms of its results, this movement may be regarded as one of the most significant operations in the history of our war.

Our Partisan forces in the western regions (Bosanska Krajina-Kozara, Slovenia) had been placed in a difficult position by the Third Enemy Offensive; Chetnik and Ustaša bands had gained considerable ground. The victorious march of the strike brigades, the destruction of the Adriatic railway Sarajevo-Mostar — the first acts of sabotage on such a scale in our war — and the capture of the towns of Konjic, Prozor, Kreševo, Gornji Vakuf, Mrkonjić Grad, Duvno and Livno, resonated powerfully and infused our forces in the western regions with renewed energy. The arrival and operations of these brigades along the Vrbas, Sana, Una and Dinara stirred the popular masses.

Through the expansion of operations across the territories of Bosnia and Croatia, we dismantled Pavelić’s quisling apparatus and destroyed the core of his brutal Ustaša forces. Pavelić and his associate Maček were politically exposed in full. The Croatian masses were convinced, through direct experience, of the legitimacy of the liberation struggle. Dalmatia was engulfed in a popular uprising. The uprising spread to those Croatian regions where it had previously only smouldered (Žumberak, Slavonia, Zagorje). These developments also had repercussions in Slovenia.

The army expanded rapidly. From brigades, it advanced to a higher level of military organisation with the formation of divisions and corps. This marked the second important stage in the development of our army. We thereby acquired strong strike formations, capable of undertaking large-scale actions and resolving operational problems across the entire Yugoslav theatre of war.

With the liberation of extensive territory, the process of state formation began, along with the establishment of popular authority, which was crowned by the creation of AVNOJ in Bihać. Thus, the uprising of our peoples not only built and consolidated an armed force, but also laid firm foundations for popular government, which was of great significance both for our internal situation and for our international standing.

For the first time in history, fighters of all our peoples stood together on the same battlefield. This resulted in such major successes as could only be achieved through common effort and shared sacrifice, from which emerged the brotherhood and unity of our peoples — the greatest achievement of our struggle.

Through this movement, we established ourselves in the central position of our country, linked all our forces and secured control over the very strong terrain of the Dinaric ridge, where the enemy was unable to make effective use of modern technology. Relying on this powerful central backbone, we advanced, as from a springboard, towards the Sava basin on the one hand and the Adriatic coast on the other. From this point onward, the Dinaric ridge became a strategic lever, linking the forces in Slovenia with our forces in the eastern regions — Montenegro and Serbia.

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During 1942, the centre of gravity of our operations shifted from the eastern to the western regions. As a result, the occupiers’ bases in the western part of the country were seriously threatened. In other words, just as the Allied axis of offensive operations in Africa moved westwards towards the Italian mainland, so too did the focus of our operations shift towards the Adriatic coast. In this way, a unified coordination of actions was achieved, albeit over great distances.

The entire German system of communications leading from the east and north towards the Adriatic coast and Italy was disrupted. Our units operated in the hinterland of Adriatic ports, from which Romanian oil was intended to be transported to Africa and Italy.

In such circumstances, the Germans sought to eliminate their opponent in the Balkans and, in January 1943, they launched a major Fourth Offensive against us. This offensive involved six German and seven Italian divisions, all Ustaša units and 18,000 Chetniks under Draža Mihailović, drawn from Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The enemy’s principal plan was to encircle the liberated territory along the arc Dinara-Neretva-Sarajevo-Banja Luka-Sisak-Karlovac-Gospić-Knin and, through concentric advances, compress our forces into the area of Bosanska Krajina and destroy them.

It was extremely dangerous and risky for our forces to engage in frontal battles against a numerically and materially superior enemy, fully equipped with arms. This was all the more so given the winter conditions, under which prolonged survival in forested regions would have been impossible. Our units were not adequately equipped for winter warfare and food supplies were insufficient. Having conducted intense fighting throughout the latter half of 1942, we had more than 4,000 wounded in this area. To keep these wounded in that area would have exposed them to grave danger.

The uprising in the western regions of our country had been fully consolidated. It became possible to detach stronger offensive forces and, with them, to improve the military-political situation in other sectors.

The situation in Montenegro and Serbia was very difficult following the departure of our main forces towards the west. Aware that they enjoyed no support among the people, the Chetniks carried out brutal terror. Reactionary elements abroad supported Draža Mihailović, despite the fact that he was merely a servant of the occupier, and supplied him by air. It was necessary to restore momentum to the struggle in the eastern regions of our country and to assist the Partisan groups fighting there under very difficult conditions. At the same time, it was necessary to extend support to Albania and Bulgaria. In Albania, the uprising was still in its infancy, while in Bulgaria a strong popular movement against the treacherous ruling clique was becoming evident.

Accordingly, in Bihać, Comrade Tito adopted the following decision: with a strong offensive group of five divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th and 9th), to avoid enemy encirclement and, in the first phase, to break through into Montenegro and the Sandžak, and then, in the second phase, to continue the advance towards Metohija and Central Serbia — into the heart of the Balkans. For the implementation of this decision, the following plan was adopted:

Two manoeuvre-covering forces were assigned the task of slowing the enemy’s advance towards the east, thereby ensuring that the offensive group, together with 4,000 wounded, could cross the Neretva. The 4th Corps was tasked with conducting operations from the Kupa to the Una and, from there, to move into the enemy’s rear while remaining within its own territory. The 1st Bosnian Corps was assigned the role of a covering force on the Una sector, to accompany the operational group to the Neretva, and thereafter to move into the enemy’s rear and remain on its own territory.

In mid-January, the offensive group commenced its movement towards the east. Long operational routes, difficult terrain and adverse weather conditions, together with the large number of wounded and refugees, significantly slowed its advance.

The 4th Corps was subjected to enveloping attacks from Lika, from the Kupa, and from the Sisak-Kostajnica sector. It fought heavy engagements until mid-February, after which it launched a full-scale attack against Italian forces in the direction of Gračac, decisively defeating them, and then returned to Kordun and Banija.

On the Una and Sana, the 1st Bosnian Corps assumed the role of a covering force and engaged in intense fighting. The enemy outflanked it from the directions of Krupa, Prijedor and Banja Luka, forcing it back towards the mountainous massif of Vitorog-Srnetica, and from there towards Mount Šator. In this way, the corps was unable to fully carry out its covering role.

The offensive group, advancing towards the Neretva, captured Imotski, Prozor and Jablanica, and completely destroyed the Italian “Murge” Division, which had been closing the encirclement on the western bank of the Neretva. A vast quantity of war matériel, amassed in these garrisons from which the division was to have launched an offensive towards the west, fell into the hands of our fighters. Our offensive group, however, forestalled this plan.

In the continuation of the attack, our units assaulted Konjic in order to open a passage in the Upper Neretva valley, but the attack failed due to a Chetnik assault from the east. At that time, the Chetnik forces of Draža Mihailović were arriving at the Neretva to complete the encirclement. Italian specialists operated heavy weapons within the Chetnik ranks, while their provisioning and supply of ammunition were carried out by the Italians. The Chetnik headquarters and field hospitals were located in Mostar.

Fierce fighting ensued over the crossings on the Neretva. This slowed and complicated the transfer of the strike group. At the same time, the Germans introduced the 1st Alpine Division onto our left flank along the Sarajevo-Ivan Sedlo axis, while on our rear, advancing along the Bugojno-Prozor direction, they deployed the 92nd Grenadier Division, which the covering elements of the 1st Bosnian Corps were unable to halt.

A very difficult situation arose in the valley of the Neretva. In these circumstances, we withdrew two divisions from the frontal engagement on the Neretva and redirected them along the Prozor-Donji Vakuf-Bugojno axis. Bitter fighting continued for three days and three nights, until we finally forced back and partially destroyed the 92nd German Division, driving it in disorder beyond Bugojno. This enabled us to concentrate all our forces, force a crossing of the Neretva in mid-March and, on the Neretva, Prenj and Velež, completely defeat the Chetnik forces of Draža Mihailović.

The Battle of the Neretva lasted 37 days and was fought under extremely difficult conditions. The presence of large numbers of wounded hindered the mobility and manoeuvrability of our troops. An epidemic of typhus spread through the units, further worsening the situation. The swollen Neretva and the icy slopes of Prenj and Velež, held by treacherous bands, appeared impassable for any army. The occupiers and their collaborators were already celebrating, believing that they had trapped us in a “cauldron.”

What prevailed was the great courage and endurance of our fighters, and their deep commitment to their wounded comrades, whom they refused to abandon to the enemy. We achieved a breakthrough and avoided encirclement. In the course of the breakthrough, we decisively defeated the Chetnik forces of Draža Mihailović and continued the pursuit of the enemy across Herzegovina, Montenegro and the Sandžak, capturing Nevesinje, Ulog, Kalinovik, Gacko, Avtovac, Foča, Ustikolina, Goražde, Čajniče, Goransko, Žabljak, Šavnik and Mojkovac, reaching the Lim at Brodarevo and the Morača at Bioče. The defeat of Draža Mihailović was of great military and political significance. From that point onward, he no longer represented any meaningful force. His treacherous role was exposed before the international public, and only thereafter did Allied missions begin to arrive at our Supreme Headquarters.

* * *

The fighting during the Fourth Offensive was extremely fierce and difficult. Upon entering the territory of Montenegro and the Sandžak, we were compelled to take a brief respite. It was necessary to transport a large number of wounded across difficult terrain and to prepare for the execution of the second phase of the operation — the advance into Metohija and Central Serbia.

However, the enemy did not remain inactive. Recognising that it had failed to destroy us, it rapidly and unexpectedly prepared, in May 1943, a Fifth Offensive against our operational group. In effect, this represented a continuation of the Fourth Offensive, as the enemy regrouped and committed fresh forces to the fighting.

The Germans transferred already concentrated troops from the Sarajevo area by lorry via Višegrad into the Lim valley, occupying it entirely. The direction Nikšić-Podgorica was blocked by the Italians. From the directions of Peć and Novi Pazar, the Germans introduced two new divisions into the fighting and occupied the sector Berane-Andrijevica-Kolašin. Thus, as soon as we initiated movements towards the Morača and the Lim, we encountered extremely strong enemy resistance.

In such circumstances, a crossing over the Pešter plateau towards the Ibar Gorge would have been highly risky. We were compelled to redirect troops already oriented eastwards, but the enemy, by rapidly transferring forces from Mostar and Sarajevo, blocked the Nevesinje-Kalinovik and Gacko-Foča routes along the Sutjeska river. In this manner, the enemy achieved a complete strategic encirclement, which was progressively tightened at the tactical level.

It was impossible to remain on this terrain under the pressure of the enemy’s numerous aircraft and artillery. There were no food supplies available in the area. A renewed breakout from the encirclement was therefore necessary. The chosen direction of advance was Maglić-Zelengora-Jahorina-Eastern Bosnia, as tactically the most favourable. In Eastern Bosnia, we possessed a base and could obtain provisions for our units.

The breakout proved extremely difficult. Canyon river courses impeded the rapid movement of units and the evacuation of the wounded. The enemy adopted a highly calculated tactic, remaining largely on the defensive while occupying canyons and mountain passes, all of which we were compelled to breach. Nevertheless, two decisive factors characterised the breakthrough: first, the timely seizure of mountain passes on the Maglić axis, which secured passage across the most difficult terrain; second, the occupation of flanking positions at Velike and Male Bare on the Gacko-Foča axis. Alongside these flanking positions, deep columns of our units were able to pass. The flank was secured by the 2nd Dalmatian Brigade, which, displaying extraordinary heroism, held its positions under intense enemy fire and repeated assaults.

The breakthrough was carried out by the 1st, 2nd and 7th divisions. Along the axis of advance, there were three enemy defensive lines: on the Sutjeska, on Zelengora along the Foča-Kalinovik route, and along the Višegrad-Sarajevo communication line. Despite this, we succeeded in breaking through, defeating the enemy along the axis of advance, although we ourselves sustained significant losses, particularly from enemy aviation.

Maglić, Sutjeska and Zelengora stand as monumental testimonies, eloquently reflecting the efforts and heroic struggle of our peoples.

The 3rd Division served as the covering force of the strike group. In fulfilling this task, it was sacrificed. It did not succeed in breaking through with the main force. Divided into smaller groups, its elements made their way towards Herzegovina and Montenegro.

After the breakthrough, in June 1943, the strike group continued its offensive operations in Eastern Bosnia, capturing Han Pijesak, Vlasenica, Kladanj, Srebrenica and Zvornik. Following a brief period of rest, part of our operational group continued its movement towards the Adriatic coast, while another part advanced from the coast towards the Sandžak and Montenegro, retaining these important strongholds on the approaches to Serbia in its hands. This gave strong impetus to the renewed development of the struggle in Serbia and to the revival of the uprising in Macedonia.

As may be observed, only the operations of a relatively small part of our army are presented here, namely the strike operational group, which constituted no more than 40 per cent of our total forces. This was a manoeuvre group with the following tasks:

— to transfer operations to distant operational areas and to expand the uprising where it was weaker;

— to draw strong enemy forces onto itself, thereby enabling the development and more stable activity of Partisan forces in other sectors;

— to disrupt the enemy’s communications system and bases through sudden attacks;

— to resolve major military-strategic problems through decisive action.

In view of these tasks, it must be acknowledged that it bore a heavy burden of the liberation war.

* * *

In two years of intense fighting, we inflicted heavy losses upon the Italian occupiers. These blows, together with those delivered by the Allies, brought fascist Italy to capitulation in August 1943. This was a major event within the anti-fascist coalition.

We made full and justified use of this capitulation, liberating extensive territories from Gevgelija to the hills beyond Soča, stretching over more than 700 kilometres in length and up to 400 kilometres in depth. The Slovene Littoral, Istria and the Dalmatian islands, unjustly severed from our national body, were freed. We gained control over almost the entire Dalmatian coast.

In Serbia and Macedonia, fighting intensified, and the liberation forces secured important strongholds in the regions of the Western Morava and the Vardar, providing support to the Bulgarian liberation forces.

Alongside these military successes, this period also witnessed the Second Session of AVNOJ in Jajce, at which historic decisions were adopted and the foundations of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia were laid.

All of this imparted renewed energy and momentum to the struggle. A great influx of new fighters entered the ranks of our army, which expanded considerably. The entire country was marked by the mobilisation of new forces for the fight against hated fascism. Captured Italian weapons fell into the hands of seasoned fighters who knew how to use them effectively. As the significance of our army became increasingly evident, the Allies began supplying weapons and war matériel to us along the coast.

Our strengthened and better-armed army undertook powerful offensive operations throughout the country. The satellite regimes in Yugoslavia were brought to the brink of collapse, thereby endangering the strongest occupation strongholds and bases. All communication links leading from the Sava and Drava basins towards Italy and the Adriatic were severed, which significantly complicated the German position on the Italian front. Likewise, all Morava-Vardar communications were subjected to heavy disruption, effectively severing connections with Greece and Albania, where the liberation movement, protected from the north by our forces, was establishing firm foundations.

Our army thus constrained the German command in the Balkans, preventing it from manoeuvring its forces. Through our presence on the Adriatic, we formed a strong right flank, denying the Germans the possibility of establishing naval and air bases for operations against the Allies on the Italian front. There was a real danger that Yugoslavia would become a centre for the spread of popular uprisings into neighbouring countries. The entire German military system in south-eastern Europe was threatened and Germany’s position in the Balkans was shaken.

By the end of 1943 and during 1944, Germany was preparing to defend the Balkans in order to secure its southern flank, which lay exposed towards the Danubian plain. At the same time, having lost significant territories in the East, Germany had a strong interest in retaining control of the Balkans in order to prolong the war. The Germans also sought to preserve their diminishing prestige among their vassals in the Balkans and their collaborators in Yugoslavia. The struggle for democratic rights among the Balkan peoples, strongly supported from Yugoslavia, showed every sign of intensifying further and bringing an end to the brutal German regime in this region. For these reasons, the Germans launched two offensives against our army within a short period — the Sixth and the Seventh. These began in mid-October 1943 and concluded at the end of June 1944, when our army assumed full initiative.

The details of these offensives will not be set out here. What is characteristic of them is that the Germans altered their previous method of fighting against us. Earlier, they had persistently sought to encircle and destroy us according to the “Cannae” model, treating the uprising as a series of isolated rebellions. Eventually, however, they recognised that they were engaged in a full-scale war against us. Our army had proved impossible to destroy even when our forces were small and the liberated territory consisted of isolated pockets. By this stage, however, the Germans faced a well-armed army with extensive combat experience, deployed across three-quarters of the territory of liberated Yugoslavia.

The change in German tactics consisted in the formation of strong strike groups, largely composed of armoured and mechanised units, which were used to attack individual operational areas. In both offensives, they began by striking at the flanks — the Slovene-Istrian and Macedonian operational areas — and concluded by linking these mobile groups within the Bosnian operational area. Through rapid advances, they sought to disrupt life in our areas, to hinder the coordinated employment of our army, as required by the overall strategic situation in Europe.

The shortcomings of this German tactic were evident. They lacked sufficient forces. Across the depth of our theatre of operations, their strike groups were subjected to heavy blows so that they lost their striking power before reaching the final phase of their operations. Our units retained full freedom of manoeuvre. Forces from one sector were able to intervene in support of neighbouring sectors, attacking enemy bases in the rear.

During the final, Seventh German Offensive, the airborne attack on the Supreme Headquarters at Drvar on 25 May also took place. Through this action, the Germans sought to destroy our unified military and political leadership and to strike the most serious blow against the achievements of our struggle. Their intention was to decapitate the movement and the army, to sow chaos and panic within our command, and thus, on the eve of the opening of the second front in Europe, to eliminate one of the warring forces that was shaking the “ramparts of Fortress Europe.”

All the German plans failed. As in all previous offensives, so too in these final two, our army emerged stronger and tempered by new combat experience. We retained in our hands all the principal strongholds within our country.

The main body of our forces found itself, by the end of the spring of 1944, following the Seventh German Offensive, in the Bosnian-Montenegrin operational area. Supported by this powerful central backbone, our forces were prepared, in accordance with the development of the military-political situation, to intervene rapidly in all regions of the country.

In the summer of 1944, the military situation was characterised by the following factors:

— Allied advances in Italy had stalled and no longer promised rapid success in breaking through into the Po Valley and advancing further north. In this context, there was no operational necessity to maintain stronger forces in the western part of the country. Our forces in the Slovene-Istrian area were sufficient to continue attacking enemy communications and thereby complicating the German position on the Italian front.

— The situation on the Eastern Front presented an entirely different picture. In their summer operations, the Red Army broke through German lines along a broad front and advanced rapidly towards the west and south-west, reaching the Bug river. The concentration of stronger forces in the eastern part of our country offered considerable operational possibilities.

— In Serbia, the traitors Nedić, Ljotić and Mihailović, sensing their imminent downfall, carried out brutal terror against the patriotic Serbian population. Various opportunists, both within the country and abroad, hoped to turn Serbia and Belgrade into another Warsaw. Although the liberation movement in Serbia had gained strength, our forces there struggled with great difficulty to withstand the considerably superior German and Bulgarian occupation troops and domestic collaborationist bands. It was necessary to provide support to the Serbian forces, which had already secured solid strongholds and controlled larger liberated areas near the South Morava and in Eastern Serbia, while smaller units held certain areas in Šumadija.

— Among the Bulgarian people, there was a growing activity of the popular masses aimed at overthrowing the fascist regime. A strong blow against Bulgarian occupation troops in Serbia could accelerate this process.

All these factors necessitated the transfer of the main focus of operations towards the east and the deployment of a stronger strike group into Serbia.

Throughout the course of our war, the Germans defended Serbia with particular ferocity, as it occupied the most sensitive position in the Balkans. Through it passed crucial geographical and strategic corridors — the Morava-Nišava and Morava-Vardar routes — which gathered the communications of Central Europe and directed them towards the south-east. For the Germans, these were the “lifelines” of their projected world domination. By defending and maintaining control over Serbia, they secured to a considerable extent the strategic, economic and political advantages they had gained in the Balkans through conquest. Hence their constant efforts to create and support a large number of collaborators (Nedić, Ljotić, Mihailović, Pećanac and numerous other “voivodes“), who constituted the principal pillars of German occupation in Serbia.

During 1944, the Germans prepared to defend the Balkans in order to exploit its material resources, to stabilise the Romanian front and to guard against an attack from the south. Serbia was of particular importance to them, as it lay in close proximity to the southern wing of the Eastern Front, while the liberation movement there had assumed significant proportions. The liberation of Serbia would have jeopardised the withdrawal of German forces from the southern Balkans and opened access to the Danubian plain. For this reason, the Germans carefully defended Serbia and Belgrade, an important node in their defensive system in south-eastern Europe. At the same time, they sought through this defence to sustain their collaborators — Nedić, Ljotić and Draža Mihailović — who, in such complex circumstances, provided them with valuable assistance and served as instruments of political manoeuvre.

Anticipating the incursion of our main forces into Serbia, the Germans organised the defence of its western approaches along the river lines of the Drina, the Western Morava and the Ibar. In particular, the Western Morava front was strongly organised and defended, as it was directly exposed to attacks from the Sandžak and Montenegro. This defensive cordon did not inspire full confidence among the Germans, who therefore attempted to shift operations further westwards and to engage our main forces away from Serbia, in the sectors of Montenegro, the Sandžak and Eastern Bosnia. Hence the intense fighting that occurred in these regions in the early summer of 1944. However, all enemy attempts to dislodge us from these important strongholds failed. By the end of July, we had concentrated substantial forces on this broad base, intended to carry out a converging advance into Serbia.

The deployment of our forces was as follows: the right-wing group (the 2nd, 5th and 17th divisions) in the sector Andrijevica-Berane-Kolašin; the central group (the 1st and 12th corps — the 1st, 6th, 16th and 36th divisions) in the sector Pljevlja-Foča-Šavnik; and the left-wing group (the 11th and 28th divisions) in the sector Srebrenica-Vlasenica-Zvornik. As the first two groups were relatively distant and faced difficult terrain, in the initial phase they were to advance to the line Kopaonik-Golija-Zlatibor-Mount Tara, from which they would rapidly launch their attack.

The enemy became aware of the concentration of our forces and, at the beginning of July, assembled two divisions (the SS “Skanderbeg” and the 1st Alpine Division) along the line Peć-Kosovska Mitrovica-Raška, with the aim of obstructing our advance into Serbia and isolating the Serbian forces in the Morava region, against which a fierce offensive was underway. These forces, attacked from multiple directions, found themselves in a difficult situation.

In mid-July, the Skanderbeg Division launched an attack from Peć towards Andrijevica. Our right-wing strike group, from the Berane sector, threw itself against it with great force, defeated it decisively and drove it back towards Peć. Exploiting this success, the strike group rapidly disengaged from the front, moved across the Pešter plateau where it defeated the Albanian bands, and in fierce fighting along the Ibar broke the defensive positions of the 1st Alpine Division and Nedić-Chetnik formations. It then appeared unexpectedly on Kopaonik, in the rear of enemy forces advancing from the north towards Toplica and Jablanica against the Serbian units. With the arrival and energetic action of this strike group, the enemy offensive in the Jablanica sector was broken. Together with the then newly formed 13th and 14th Serbian corps, a firm base was secured in the area of the Ibar and South Morava.

At the end of July, the Germans once again launched an attack on the Sandžak with the aim of destroying our central group and preventing its advance into Serbia. This time, the attack came from two directions. The reorganised 1st Alpine and Skanderbeg Divisions advanced along the general axis Raška-Sjenica-Prijepolje, while the “Prinz Eugen” Division advanced along Romanija-Goražde-Čajniče. In order to prevent the central group from becoming entangled in these frontal engagements and losing valuable time, units of the 2nd Montenegrin Corps were assigned the task of engaging the enemy frontally along both axes — in the Lim valley upstream from Prijepolje and in the Drina valley upstream from Goražde — withdrawing, if necessary, towards Tara and Durmitor. Taking advantage of this, our central group, the 1st and 12th corps, disengaged, executed a rapid movement northwards, broke the screen of Nedić-Chetnik forces on the lower Lim, and on the line Ivanjica-Čajetina-Vardište defeated the screen of Bulgarian and German forces, after which it secured control over the Zlatibor-Tara sector. Thus, the German offensive came to nothing. We outmanoeuvred the enemy and positioned ourselves where we had intended according to plan.

The 2nd Montenegrin Corps, having gained time for the advance of the central group northwards through its actions on the flanks, gradually withdrew towards Durmitor and the Duga gorge. In this way, it engaged and drew three German divisions (the 1st Alpine, Skanderbeg and Prinz Eugen) into the difficult terrain of northern Montenegro, from which they later extricated themselves with considerable difficulty and moved towards Serbia.

In the second half of August, our offensive groups occupied their starting positions, prepared for decisive action. The strongest, the central group, from the Zlatibor-Tara sector, initiated the attack first, advancing along the general axis Užice-Valjevo. Its task was to draw the main enemy forces onto itself, thereby facilitating the movement of the flanking manoeuvre groups, which were to cross the Western Morava and Drina rivers. Advancing towards the north-east, this group captured Kosjerić, Bajina Bašta and Rogatica. Alarmed by this advance, the forces of Nedić, Ljotić and Mihailović, reinforced by German units, concentrated the bulk of their strength against this group (the “Serbian Volunteer Corps,” various “corps groups” — Kolubara-Posavina, Belgrade and assault formations, the “Mountain Royal Guard,” supported by elements of the German motorised Brandenburg Regiment). At that point, we initiated an enveloping manoeuvre with our flanking groups. The central group, however, being sufficiently strong, engaged the enemy directly, decisively defeated it in the Jelova Gora-Medvednik-Suvobor sector and, in pursuit, captured Ljubovija, Pecka, Osečina, Valjevo, Ljig and Lajkovac.

The right-wing strike group, breaking out from the valley of the Western Morava, where it had engaged in combat with elements of the Prinz Eugen Division being transferred into Serbia, captured, after fighting, Gornji Milanovac, Vraćevšnica, Stragari, Lazarevac and Aranđelovac.

The left-wing group, advancing in combat, forced a crossing of the Drina in the Zvornik sector, reached the mountainous massif of Sokolska Planina-Gučevo and, linking up with elements of the central group, after minor engagements liberated Krupanj, Bela Crkva, Koviljača, Loznica and Lješnica. This group also destroyed those enemy elements that had been routed and were retreating before our central group.

In this manner, all three strike groups, after prolonged movements and engagements, by the end of September gained control of the important geographical and strategic massif of Rudnik-Suvobor-Cer, together with all communication nodes within its area. Thus, the 1st Army Group was formed under the command of General Peko Dapčević, ready to advance from this important base against the remaining enemy forces in Serbia.

While the 1st Army Group advanced through Western Serbia and Šumadija towards Belgrade, the 2nd Army Group was formed under the command of General Koča Popović. This army group was tasked with securing the southern flank of the Belgrade Operation in the Western Morava-Kragujevac sector. From its composition, the 14th Serbian corps was transferred from Jastrebac to Eastern Serbia, where, after intense fighting with occupation and collaborationist forces, it established contact on 14 September with units of the Red Army on the Danube.

As can be seen, prior to the immediate battle for Belgrade, the entire satellite apparatus in Serbia had been completely dismantled. The Germans, taken by surprise by the advance of our forces into Šumadija and the rapid arrival of the Red Army at the Danube, undertook urgent defensive measures. Northern Serbia was directly threatened. Its defence, divided into three sectors, was assigned to Army Group Feldber.

The eastern Timok sector was completely open (having earlier been liberated by units of the 14th corps), and the Germans dispatched three divisions there: the 117th, arriving from Greece, to the Negotin sector; the 1st Alpine Division to the Zaječar sector; and the Prinz Eugen Division to the Knjaževac-Pirot-Niš sector. The latter two divisions were already known from the offensive in the Sandžak. Hastily sent to the Timok sector, they were committed to combat directly from marching columns. Under the pressure of these forces, the 14th corps withdrew from the Timok valley to the Carpathian ridge, from where it cooperated with Red Army troops during the crossing of the Danube and continued with them the clearing of the Morava valley. German defence in the Timok sector was supported by Chetnik formations of the Great Morava and Eastern Serbian “corps groups.”

The southern and south-western sector, Kruševac-Čačak-Aranđelovac, was defended by the 34th German Corps, whose composition included elements of the 104th, 118th and 297th German Divisions, the “Russian Volunteer Corps,” and Chetnik formations of the Rasina-Toplica and Šumadija “corps groups.”

Belgrade and the Belgrade sector, up to the line Obrenovac-Mladenovac-Smederevo, were defended by a mixed group (the 92nd Motorised Brigade, the 2nd Brandenburg Regiment, the “Belgrade” fortress regiment, the 5th police regiment, a replacement battalion of the Prinz Eugen Division, three territorial battalions, the 38th motorised anti-aircraft regiment, seven artillery battalions and smaller elements of the “Serbian Volunteer Corps”). In addition, the forces of the first two sectors were, after completing their tasks, to withdraw and assist in the defence of Belgrade.

Such was the situation prior to the launching of concentric attacks by our forces and units of the Red Army.

At the beginning of October, the 1st Army Group advanced from the line Rudnik-Cer towards the Sava and Danube. After brief engagements, it cleared Mačva and Posavina and assembled along the line Aranđelovac-Kosmaj-Obrenovac, in order to join with Red Army forces advancing from the east in the battle for Belgrade.

We have thus observed the actions of the forces of the western axis, which had been formed and had set out as early as the beginning of the summer of 1944 from the central mountainous backbone of our country. Let us now consider the actions of the forces of the eastern axis.

At the end of August (20–31), a major military-political event occurred on the southern Russian front. In the Jassy–Kishinev operation, units of the Red Army shattered the German Balkan front, removed fascist Romania and Bulgaria from the war, and continued a powerful advance towards Hungary. South of the Danube, towards Belgrade, a group composed predominantly of motorised and mechanised units was dispatched to assist us. After completing preparations, these forces began crossing the Danube in the Đerdap sector on 5 October.

While German forces were engaged in frontal fighting along the Danube and Timok rivers, a tank corps under the command of General Zhdanov advanced on 7 October from the area of Vidin. This corps progressed through very difficult terrain along the axis Zaječar-Žagubica-Palanka-Topola-Mladenovac-Belgrade. With a rapid advance, it broke through enemy defences in the eastern sector of the Serbian operational area. The 1st Alpine and 117th Light Infantry Divisions were driven northwards towards the Danube, while the Prinz Eugen Division was pushed southwards towards the Morava. In this way, the route was opened for the tank corps, which, after brief engagements along this axis of advance, captured the important communications hub of Velika Plana on 10 October, linking up with elements of the right wing of our 1st Army Group.

After brief but very intense fighting near Mladenovac and on the Ralja positions, the combined forces reached the approaches to Avala on 13 October. Advancing along its axis, the tank corps pushed the German forces northwards, towards Požarevac, Smederevo and Grocka, in order, together with our forces, which supplemented the attack as infantry units, to eliminate the defence of Belgrade as swiftly as possible.

The defence of Belgrade was organised in three lines of resistance: an outer belt at the level of Avala, an inner belt on the approaches to the city, and defences within the city itself, with a central defensive line at Kalemegdan and the railway station complex. Important flanking strongpoints within the city were Čukarica, Tašmajdan and Karaburma. In addition, all larger buildings had been prepared for defence. All defensive lines were anchored on the Sava and the Danube. The city could not be outmanoeuvred and had to be attacked frontally through the full depth of the enemy’s defences. The fundamental idea of the attack was to split the city’s defences into two parts and to seize the bridges over the Sava, thereby preventing the Germans from establishing a defensive line on the Zemun side.

The direct battle for the city began on 14 October. Under heavy artillery fire and the assault of tanks, the outer defences quickly collapsed and the units penetrated into the city. However, the defenders offered fierce resistance. Each strongpoint had to be taken individually. This created time for the German forces pushed towards the Danube (the 117th Light Infantry and 1st Alpine Divisions) to regroup around Grocka and launch an attack along the Smederevo road towards Mali Mokri Lug, with the aim of linking up with the defenders in the city. Part of our forces had to turn from the city towards the east; the attempted breakthrough was repelled. The Germans then attempted to break through south of Avala towards Obrenovac and further across the Sava into Srem. They even succeeded in cutting the Belgrade-Mladenovac communication near the village of Vrčin. There was a danger that these German groups might escape and this had to be prevented. While smaller elements were left to continue the fighting in the city, stronger forces were redirected southwards and, south of Avala, encircled and completely destroyed the German grouping, which numbered up to 15,000 troops.

Following this, fierce fighting for the city continued. In the advance through the city and the destruction of strong German positions, a decisive role was played by the tank and artillery units of the Red Army. After this powerful assault, the combined forces liberated Belgrade on 20 October and crossed the Sava into Srem, where our 1st Army, together with elements of the Red Army, was deployed. In the immediate fighting for the city of Belgrade, more than 30,000 enemy soldiers were killed, wounded or captured, and large quantities of military equipment were seized.

At the same time, units of the Red Army and our 2nd Army Group repelled all enemy attempts to break through from the Western Morava sector via Kragujevac towards Belgrade. They subsequently liberated Kragujevac, Jagodina, Kruševac and Trstenik, and stabilised the front along the Western Morava, on the line Kraljevo-Čačak.

Part of the forces of the 2nd Army Group, together with units of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front army, liberated Niš, Leskovac and Prokuplje, and continued joint operations in the Kosovo Polje area. Thereafter, units of the 2nd Army continued their advance westwards, south of the Sava.

Summarising the results of these operations, the following conclusions may be drawn.

1. By destroying the powerful German defence in Romania, the Red Army determined the outcome of the battle for the Balkans. The completion of that great victory was the Belgrade Operation.

In the Belgrade Operation, the principal artery of the Balkan Peninsula — Salonika-Belgrade-Budapest — was severed at its most sensitive point, at the very throat of the Balkans, in Belgrade. As a result, the remaining defensive system in the Balkans was completely disorganised. This led to the rapid withdrawal of German forces from the southern Balkans. However, as the main line of communication had been cut, all German forces in the Balkans were forced into the difficult mountainous terrain of Montenegro, the Sandžak and Bosnia, where they were met and ultimately destroyed in the mountain ravines by our National Liberation Army. In this way, the hopes of the German command to form from these substantial forces, numbering over 150,000 men, a compact grouping for an attack against the southern flank of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front were thwarted.

2. The liberation of Belgrade marked a turning point in our war of liberation. Our Army aligned itself with the fraternal Red Army and received substantial material assistance. As a consequence, all territories east of the estuary line Drava-Drina-Neretva were rapidly liberated. In this way, we established a strategic front and, for the first time in our war, obtained a stable strategic base, enabling us to utilise all available resources for the further conduct of the war.

In partisan warfare, when our units were primarily equipped with light weapons, the establishment of rigid fronts was disadvantageous for us, and we therefore avoided it. The enemy, on the contrary, sought to impose such rigid fronts upon us, where, being numerically superior and better equipped, it could concentrate its power against our forces. Over time, however, the balance of forces shifted: the enemy weakened while we grew stronger, until, after the Belgrade Operation, we achieved superiority. From that point onward, mountain paths became too restrictive for us and the mountains themselves unsuitable for the deployment of heavy artillery and tanks. The introduction into battle of our larger formations, equipped with modern Soviet matériel, required the use of communication routes, the organisation of rear areas and the securing of territory, which led to the establishment of a stable front as an inevitable and necessary development.

The establishment of a stable front with a secure rear gave rise to new problems in warfare. In our operations, by avoiding the blows of superior enemy forces, we had most often employed a dispersed deployment, seeking out weak points and favourable targets on the enemy’s flanks, wings and in the rear. Now, frontal engagements with breakthroughs through deeply echeloned enemy defensive systems emerged as a normal form of combat. This, in turn, required the concentration of large forces within relatively confined areas, leading to a new organisational stage — the formation of armies. From small Partisan detachments, the initial nucleus of the popular uprising, through brigades, divisions and corps, we advanced to large military formations and armies. This completed the process of reorganisation and full modernisation of our National Liberation Army, the result of which was its renaming as the Yugoslav Army — a unified formation of all the peoples of Yugoslavia.

3. In our warfare, there existed a constant tendency towards the expansion and maintenance of liberated territories, organised to ensure the most effective conduct of the liberation war. Despite all our efforts, these territories remained unstable. The occupier continually threatened them through attacks, altered their configuration and often completely overran them, destroying our strongholds. However, with the establishment of a strategic front following the Belgrade Operation, a substantial portion of state territory was fully secured and consolidated. Within this territory, the question of central authority was definitively resolved (the government of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia), and systematic efforts were undertaken to organise governance at the local level among the people (national liberation committees).

The centre of the liberated territory was Belgrade. With the arrival of Marshal Tito in the city, a stable political centre was also established for the unification of all national forces in the complete liberation of our country from fascist tyranny. Thus, Belgrade became the capital of all our peoples, the capital of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia.

4. On our front in the valleys of the Vardar and the South Morava, and in Kosovo Polje, alongside our units fought the army of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front. In this struggle, the Bulgarians achieved notable successes and made significant sacrifices. In doing so, Bulgaria effected a decisive turning point and returned to the broader community of Slavic peoples. It embarked upon the path corresponding to its vital interests — that of brotherhood and unity with the peoples of Yugoslavia. This brotherhood, forged in blood, will no longer permit our two peoples to be drawn into fratricidal wars. The brotherhood of our peoples is a prerequisite for the establishment of a stable order in this part of the world and ought to become the cornerstone of fraternity among all the peoples of the Balkans.

5. The great Russian people have always been our hope and support. This was so on this occasion as well. Faith in their strength and ultimate victory was a decisive factor in our long and arduous struggle. In addition to this immense moral support, the Red Army rendered us direct and substantial assistance by making great efforts towards the liberation of our peoples. In our liberation, it made invaluable sacrifices. With the capture of Romania, the route into the Pannonian Plain was opened, along which ran the axis of the Red Army’s decisive operations, for which it was necessary to concentrate all forces. Yet, it nevertheless detached part of its forces, and with them, in fierce fighting, forced the great river barrier of the Danube and advanced through the Balkan and Carpathian mountain chains in order to assist in our more rapid liberation. The linking of our two armies north and south of the Danube alleviated the previously extremely difficult conditions of our struggle and soon brought major successes to our army. The Red Army was well aware of the heroic struggle of our peoples and of our active theatre of war, which for four years had tied down significant enemy forces. It extended to us selfless fraternal assistance. On the sacred soil of our fatherland — in Serbia, on the streets of Belgrade and in Srem — the brotherly blood of Soviet soldiers was shed. From shared suffering and spilled blood arose an enduring brotherhood and unity between two Slavic fraternal countries. This represents the only correct foreign policy orientation, corresponding to the centuries-old aspirations, cultural development and historical experience of our peoples. It is the sole guarantee that our peoples may be spared the national catastrophes that have marked our difficult history.

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The formation of the Yugoslav Army constitutes the culmination of a distinguished historical epoch and of the military development of our armed forces. It is of particular significance that it emerged as a unified Yugoslav army at a time of general offensive against fascist Germany, when fascism stood on the brink of collapse. To it fell the task of the final liberation of our country, as well as participation, alongside other Allied armies, in the liberation of mankind from fascist tyranny. It stands as an equal factor in this great struggle of democratic nations. It fulfilled its role, as did the armies of the other Allied countries, by assuming the strategic front between the Allied Pannonian and Italian groupings. In doing so, it secured for its people all international positions. Following victory, it bears the responsibility of safeguarding the achievements of this struggle, won at the cost of blood, and of ensuring the peaceful development and reconstruction of our country on the basis of the principles that emerged from the National Liberation War.

(Translated by Sava Press from: Jovanović, A., Pregled narodnooslobodilačke borbe. Beograd : Kolarčev narodni univerzitet, 1944. — pp. 3–68. — Cyrillic.)