— Arso Jovanović —
— On the occasion of the third anniversary —
The Battle of Pljevlja, a small provincial town in the Sandžak, constitutes a significant moment in the liberation struggle of the Montenegrins. It was preceded by a turbulent period of six months of bloody fighting. The reverberations of these battles quickly extended beyond the borders of Montenegro and exerted no small influence on the awakening of resistance against the brutal conqueror. Yet this was not sufficient. Montenegrin arms, beyond the narrow gorges and ravines of their homeland, sought out battlefields within the vast expanse of fascist tyranny that was suffocating our subjugated country.
Many patriots, embittered by the shameful betrayal of April 1941, made their way towards Montenegro, believing that a front must exist among the Montenegrins. Betrayal was everywhere the same — profound and pervasive. Nowhere was there resistance, and fascist hordes surged through the sold-out fatherland. Yet our peoples did not betray. An elderly Montenegrin woman, following the April catastrophe, carried five light machine guns into the mountains on a frail horse. “My children gave them to me to carry; they will need them.” (She had three sons, all of whom perished in the liberation struggle.)
On 13 July 1941, the Montenegrin uprising indeed erupted, when Comrade Milovan Đilas brought from Belgrade Comrade Tito’s order for the armed struggle of the Montenegrins. On that day, Montenegro became the epicentre of a nationwide uprising, the site of major battles. Through the rifle of vengeance spoke partisan Montenegro, which future generations would celebrate and take pride in.
All who were able to bear arms rose up — both young and old. This was the natural consequence of the Montenegrins’ irreconcilability with betrayal. National honour was at stake, and it could be defended only with weapons in hand. It was also the result of hatred towards the ignoble and cowardly Italian occupier, who had dishonoured our noble people. The pride of the Montenegrins had been affronted.
It was likewise a consequence of the considerable influence of the Party and of the trust placed by the Montenegrin masses in the Party, which led them into a sacred patriotic struggle. The Montenegrins had followed our Party in the arduous struggle for national rights throughout the twenty years of the old Yugoslavia, even at moments such as Belvedere, when unarmed popular masses were compelled to confront a regime army armed to the teeth. Now the Party had secured entire stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, which Yugoslav generals, together with their assembled troops, had surrendered to German corporals.
Finally, it was the product of the profound and traditional affection of the Montenegrins for the reborn Slavic mother, Russia. Although for the preceding twenty years her name had not been permitted to be uttered, the natural instinct of our people retained faith in her strength and power. The German attack on Russia did not instil fear; the people were convinced of her victory. It was a common occurrence during the most difficult battles for peasants to ask us, “Does Russia know of this struggle of ours?,” thereby expressing the conviction that our struggle, however arduous, must be victorious with Russia’s support.
With such sentiments, the Montenegrin masses, lacking particular military form and organisation, advanced boldly into attack. Montenegro groaned under the burden of severe combat. One had the impression that it would be entirely consumed in a terrifying hurricane of fire. Popular fury descended like a torrent upon the vile fascist intruders, seized them by the throat and, by the end of July, the whole of Montenegro had been liberated (with the exception of Cetinje, Podgorica and Nikšić). We killed many Italians, captured 4,000 and seized considerable war booty.
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By the force and rapidity of our offensive, we caught the enemy by surprise and achieved significant results. The absence of resistance in other sectors of the Balkans occupied by the Italians enabled them to deploy substantial forces against us — an entire corps of four divisions, supported by considerable air power. After fierce fighting lasting a month and a half, by the end of August 1941 the enemy succeeded in regaining control of the garrisons in Montenegro, pushing our forces away from the lines of communication. During these engagements, our military leadership failed to consolidate the popular masses in military and organisational terms. These forces were unwieldy, slow to manoeuvre and incapable of delivering rapid strikes at multiple points in order to disperse the enemy across wide areas. Consequently, our large units were compelled, in an unequal struggle, to hold rigid fronts, where the numerically superior and better-armed enemy enjoyed the advantage. Following the breakthrough of these fronts, the uprising rapidly lost momentum. A respite of one month ensued (throughout September), which the military leadership used to reorganise the units. Yet this lull in the fighting was also exploited by the enemy, who transported vast quantities of ammunition and provisions into the garrisons and fortified towns and lines of communication.
Following the reorganisation of the units, fighting in Montenegro began to intensify once more towards the end of September. Lines of communication were again severed, and the towns of Šavnik, Žabljak, Goransko, Viluse, Velimlje, Grahovo, Čevo and Mojkovac were liberated. The Montenegrin shock battalion, led by the legendary hero Sava Kovačević, advanced deep into Herzegovina as far as Nevesinje, engaging in fierce fighting to protect the Serbian population of these regions from Ustaša massacres. At Vjetrenik, a strong motorised column was destroyed, 500 Italians were killed or captured and 50 lorries were destroyed. Such operations were carried out across all sectors of Montenegro, extending into the Bay of Kotor and Eastern Herzegovina. The enemy was driven into the garrisons and suffocated under the blows of our units.
Through these operations, a fighting spirit once again gripped the masses. Yet even prior to this, during the months of August and September, the uprising in Serbia had not only consolidated itself but also expanded and achieved considerable results. This provided a powerful impetus for the more rapid revival and renewed intensification of the uprising in Montenegro. In the important Serbian-Montenegrin area, our forces were in a phase of growth. This development required operational exploitation and the organisational integration of forces. For this reason, in mid-October the Supreme Commander summoned representatives of the Main Staff for Montenegro, the Bay of Kotor and the Sandžak to Užice. At that meeting, Comrade Tito advanced the operational concept of establishing a strong base and stronghold in the Sandžak region, from which operations could be projected in various directions in accordance with the evolving situation. This decision was justified by the following considerations:
1. A substantial part of Serbia and Montenegro was free. These territories needed to be connected in order to impart greater momentum and cohesion to the uprising. Such a linkage could be achieved only through the Sandžak.
2. For strategic and political reasons, the region of Serbia was of great importance to the Germans. However, the uprising there had assumed large proportions. This encouraged all our peoples towards a general armed uprising. The enemy could not observe this indifferently, and already in October introduced strong forces into Serbia against our army. Nedić, Ljotić, Pećanac and Mihailović, through their betrayal and their defection to the side of the occupier, further aggravated our position in Serbia. This situation necessitated the securing of a stronghold suitable not only as a base for Serbian forces but also for the development of offensive operations. The Sandžak was particularly well suited to this purpose. By this is meant the entire geographical area encompassing the middle and upper Drina, the Western Morava and the Ibar. Rugged mountainous terrain, forests, canyon-like river courses and spatial depth enabled firm defence and the prolonged deployment of our stronger forces. The central position of this area allowed for rapid transition to the offensive and for linkage with other regions of our country, where uprisings were gradually developing — in some places more rapidly, in others more slowly.
3. In the less productive regions of Montenegro, where the entire population had risen in struggle, it was necessary to sustain both the army and the civilian population by supplying food from the Sandžak and Serbia. In addition, the Montenegrin operational group was to be supported with arms and ammunition from our factory in Užice.
4. The occupier in Montenegro, gravely threatened, had withdrawn into and bound himself to the garrisons, from which he scarcely ventured out. We lacked heavy weaponry to strike him there. The fighting had assumed a static character and our large forces remained underutilised. It was therefore necessary to release these forces, to give them a manoeuvrable character and broader military and political perspectives. Operations in the Sandžak promised significant results. The details of these operations Comrade Tito entrusted to the Main Staff for Montenegro.
Tito’s conception of linking Serbian and Montenegrin forces and establishing an unbroken free territory aroused immense enthusiasm among our units and the population. Never had the Montenegrins felt greater affection for the Serbs than on this occasion. Admiration for the major successes of the Serbian partisans was universal, and all the greater because we were aware of the various intrigues and betrayals of Serbian “Brankovićes.”1 After our arduous fighting, the burning of homes and the waning of the uprising, the revolt in Serbia flashed like a spark, from which we in Montenegro drew renewed strength and inspiration. Our brothers came to our aid at the crucial moment. The capture of towns in Serbia was accompanied among us by dancing, volleys of fire and lively humour: “Look what the gedže2 is doing.” Such was the mood that we were ready, as it were, to fly across the Sandžak and leap into Serbia. We were proud of what we had accomplished in Montenegro, yet we recognised that what was unfolding in Serbia was of a far greater magnitude than our own efforts.
At that time, reactionaries and traitors in Montenegro were, for the most part, concealed.
For the planned operation, we were able to mobilise between 5,000 and 10,000 fighters. We deemed four thousand combatants sufficient, and these were organised into the newly formed Montenegrin detachment. A small portion of the fighters was to be armed after the capture of enemy garrisons. We selected Pljevlja as the initial objective of attack. Pljevlja was the key, the gateway to the Sandžak, after which it would not be difficult to capture the remaining towns, particularly those along the Lim, which lay on the route to Serbia. Pljevlja was an important communications hub; its fall would open the lines of communication in the Sandžak, which was of great significance for the functioning and activity of our large operational group. The headquarters of an Italian division was located there and was to be destroyed; the remaining garrisons subordinate to it would then quickly collapse. There was a substantial stock of weaponry in Pljevlja, and by seizing it we would easily overcome the remaining defences in the Sandžak. The garrison itself was situated in a hollow, making it accessible to our units. The combat experience of our fighters also played a role. The Italian fascists were such cowards that they never waited for close combat, face to face, with our units, nor did they withstand encirclement.
On 18 November, the march manoeuvre of our forces commenced from all parts of Montenegro, even from the Montenegrin littoral (Paštrovići, the Bay of Kotor, Konavle), culminating after 12 days in a final concentric assault on Pljevlja. This was a magnificent campaign, a triumph and a review of the Montenegrins’ fighting strength. The population had witnessed the heavy losses inflicted upon the occupier, and now observed its own army advancing in victory. The movement shook and stirred the entirety of Montenegro and the Sandžak. Entire tribes accompanied and welcomed their battalions.
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The Sandžak and the north-eastern part of Montenegro were held by two Italian divisions numbering 25,000 men. To this must be added the fact that the Muslim militia from the Sandžak was also hostile towards us. The entire sector was systematically interconnected, organised and fortified. In attacking Pljevlja, we were compelled to allocate a considerable portion of our forces to striking at lines of communication in order to prevent the arrival of reinforcements. The battle thus encompassed not only the town but a broad operational area. The town itself was encircled by a line of barbed wire with entrenched machine-gun positions and trenches. Buildings within the town had been prepared for defence. The immediate defence consisted of seven enclosed fortifications, mutually supporting one another by fire. In Pljevlja there was the headquarters of the “Pusteria” Division with 5,000 soldiers, 36 guns, 60 heavy mortars, 15 tanks, 340 automatic weapons and six searchlights. We attacked the town with 2,500 fighters, four guns, 36 heavy mortars and 220 automatic weapons.
The attack was carried out during the night between 30 November and 1 December 1941. The plan was that, through a simultaneous assault on the outer fortifications, a breakthrough into the town would be achieved, thereby disorganising the entire defence. The advance from the starting positions, which lay up to eight kilometres from the town, was to begin at 22:00 hours, so that entry into the town could be expected at approximately 02:00 on 1 December.
Owing to the manner in which the operation itself had been organised and the prolonged movement of the troops, the enemy had been informed of our intentions. Indeed, it had even learned the exact hour of the attack, with the result that all enemy forces were deployed in their combat positions. We ourselves could hear the shrill sound of fascist bugles sounding the alarm. Fearlessly, our fighters descended upon the town. From the ravine of the Bistrica, singing could even be heard, until it was finally replaced by the powerful assaults of our units at all positions of this fortified camp. By 02:00 on 1 December, the night battle had assumed a fierce character. It was a great struggle, fought at close quarters. One had the impression of being within a fiery volcanic crater. In this chaos of combat, the traditional virtues of the Montenegrin as a fighter came to the fore. Unarmed, he seized the heavily armed enemy by the throat and did not release him from the blood-soaked battlefield. Every soldier understood the significance of Pljevlja, the importance of the first and greatest battle of the Montenegrin detachment in the course of its great campaign.
The “Bijeli Pavle” Battalion captured the very strong fortifications of Veliki and Mali Bogiševac, which dominated the surrounding area and the town, and then entered the north-western part of the town, continuing fierce fighting throughout the day. The Lovćen Battalion was assigned one of the most difficult tasks: to break into the town and develop combat from its centre. This elite battalion, under the command of the fearless soldier Pero Ćetković, who later fell a heroic death in the Fourth Offensive at the head of the renowned Third Shock Division, fully accomplished its task. The battalion seized an entire quarter in the town centre, from which it supported the actions of other units throughout the day and the following night. The Italians launched continuous assaults on this quarter, subjecting it to intense fire, yet they failed to dislodge the Lovćen Battalion, which withdrew from the town only on the following night after sustaining heavy losses. Countless Italian soldiers met their deaths before the steadfast line of the Lovćen fighters. The Drobnjak-Uskok Battalion from the west, and the Jezero-Šaran Battalion from the east, penetrated the town, captured the power station, the church, the new grammar school, Grujić Street and the Trebovina district, and fought heavily in the town throughout the day and the following night. In these engagements, the commander and political commissar of the Jezero-Šaran Battalion, Dušan Obradović and Vuk Knežević, were killed in heroic action. The “Peko Pavlović” Kom Battalion and the Zeta-Lješ Battalion captured the fortifications of Pliješ, Golubinje and Sveta Trojica, as well as the Dolovi lodge, and advanced to the outskirts of the town, from where they continued the fighting. The Pipersko-Kuči Battalion and the “Bajo Pivljanin” Battalion withstood heavy fighting along the lines of communication and prevented the enemy from breaking through and endangering our group engaged in the Battle for Pljevlja. The Sandžak units were deployed along the lines of communication and among the Montenegrin battalions. As those familiar with the terrain and the town, they provided considerable assistance and demonstrated great fighting spirit.
The enemy within the garrison had been crushed. Of the seven principal fortifications, only three remained in its hands (Stražica, Dolovi and Moćevac), while the remaining defensive positions had likewise been captured, apart from a certain number of houses in the town. From these remaining strongpoints, the enemy defended itself desperately, fighting for survival. It subjected our ranks to intense fire, which had been prearranged and, at night, directed with the aid of searchlights. As a result of this fire, we suffered heavy losses. After bitter fighting over the course of one day and two nights, our units withdrew from the town, which was largely in our hands and on whose streets our fighters had danced the kolo. Only a little further effort was required for the battle for the town to be decided in our favour.
The causes of this lay in the following:
The Montenegrin military leadership, from the outset, tied the success of a large detachment, hastily formed and insufficiently consolidated in military terms, to a difficult battle — the assault on a town. Instead of preparing the detachment for such a major engagement through a series of actions, we relied on the courage of our soldiers, who indeed demonstrated extraordinary heroism, and placed this large detachment before a very demanding task which, despite persistent effort, it could not accomplish. This once again confirms the principle that an army is not created overnight, but only through prolonged struggle and successive operations.
After long and exhausting marches, the detachment was thrown into a night attack on the town. When the moment came to exert the final effort, strength was lacking, and we withdrew from the town of our own accord, without the enemy compelling us to do so through external action.
Our young officer corps was unable to orient itself in what was, in truth, a difficult and complex night battle, and thus failed at decisive moments to exploit the successes already achieved by the units. This led to the piecemeal commitment of forces, which the enemy exploited by meeting separate echelons with concentrated fire.
We lacked the heavy weapons and ammunition necessary to destroy the enemy in its fortifications. The limited ammunition for heavy arms was quickly expended, leaving us with grenades and bayonets, which could not penetrate concrete bunkers, although a considerable number were nonetheless overcome by these means. We greatly underestimated the enemy, its armament and its fortifications, with the result that our fighters were taken aback by the resistance encountered. The enemy was encircled and had no avenue of escape. Moreover, this was not merely a question of defending a small town, but of defending a large operational area, whose headquarters was located in Pljevlja, albeit concealed during the fighting in a dugout.
In this battle, as in the engagements around Pljevlja, we sustained 353 dead, 545 wounded and 35 missing, while the enemy suffered 1,150 dead, 1,870 wounded, 900 captured and the loss of a large quantity of war matériel.
Yet this tactical setback did not disorient us. We continued, albeit under more difficult conditions, the struggle for the Sandžak. After fierce fighting during December, the units of our detachment captured Rudo, Čajniče, Goražde, Ustikolina, Foča, Šehovići and a number of other enemy strongholds, and subsequently, along the Lim, linked up with Serbian partisan detachments that had been pushed back to this sector following the First Enemy Offensive. From elements of the Serbian and Montenegrin units, Comrade Tito formed in Rudo on 22 December 1941 the First Proletarian Brigade, the first offspring of our renowned army. Its first and second battalions were drawn precisely from the Montenegrin detachment. This represented the highest honour and recognition by Comrade Tito of Montenegrin arms.
The struggle of the Montenegrin detachment should not be viewed solely through the tactical detail of the battle for the small town of Pljevlja, which in my view is in itself glorious, but rather through the operational concept achieved; through the series of battles for the Sandžak; further, through the position of that operational group in December 1941, when the Germans and collaborators had launched a fierce offensive to destroy the Serbian partisans; and through the transfer of Comrade Tito to this important operational area — the border region of three territories. Viewed in this way, the following conclusion may be drawn:
1. In these complex and difficult operations, at the outset of our war, the great moral qualities of our fighter were clearly demonstrated. Political consciousness and a sense of strength led him, almost unarmed, into battle far from home, to engage the best fascist troops and defeat them completely. These were the facts upon which our military and political leadership built its subsequent plans and decisions. At the same time, the organisation of supply, provisioning and the care of the wounded instilled confidence in the leadership among the fighters, who followed it with exceptional dedication. Even today, after three years, we may rightly assert that the first battle fought by Montenegrin arms beyond the borders of Montenegro was victorious:
2. Our presence in the Sandžak, where the uprising was still in its early stages, had a beneficial effect. We prevented Chetnik-Ustaša bloodshed. The popular masses, convinced on the spot of the justice of our struggle, were stirred into action. New fighters joined the ranks of the National Liberation Army. From that time, the Sandžak served as a bridge between our fighting forces in Serbia and those in the southern and south-western parts of the country. Today, in this sector, which for centuries had been oppressed, we have an entire army division.
3. Although we did not liberate all the towns, we nevertheless succeeded in breaking the enemy’s defensive system in the Sandžak, securing control over important areas of terrain, disrupting the entire network of communications and confining the enemy to the towns. The free territory expanded northwards. This ensured our freedom of movement and breadth of manoeuvre. Within the area of the upper Drina, the Neretva and the Morača, a very strong territorial base was secured.
4. The people in Montenegro, accustomed to our victories, were at first unsettled by the setback at Pljevlja, but this lasted only a short time. Our losses and the failure affected them deeply and ignited a new spirit of vengeance. Not even twenty days had passed since the battle before all Montenegrin detachments were dispatching new battalions to the Sandžak.
During and especially after the Battle of Pljevlja, the role of the reactionary elements in Montenegro was exposed. The traitors, seeing that the entire population in Montenegro stood with the partisans, sought to exploit our setback at Pljevlja. The Italians, finding themselves threatened in this area, supported these elements with all their strength. Following the withdrawal of our forces from Serbia, agents of Draža Mihailović began to infiltrate Montenegro, and this activity grew stronger. From this point onward, it became a new factor in our conduct of the war in Montenegro, one to which we were obliged to give serious attention.
5. The operations of the Montenegrin detachment in the Sandžak coincided with the period during which Serbian partisan forces were retreating under extremely difficult fighting from Užice, across Zlatibor, towards the Uvac and Nova Varoš. In this way, the Montenegrin detachment engaged substantial Italian forces, which were thereby unable to move northwards to close the southern gap of the Serbian group. This undoubtedly facilitated the easier and more rapid consolidation of the Serbian units.
6. The course of events did not permit the creation and unification of a continuous Serbian-Montenegrin free territory. Nevertheless, Serbian and Montenegrin forces were linked and united, following a long and arduous period of fighting in Serbia, Montenegro and the Sandžak. There assembled those who had been hardened through severe trials, those who represented the most conscious and resolute elements of the Serbian people, ready to continue bearing the heavy burden of war across the whole of our country for the freedom of all our peoples. This formed the core of the strike force with which the Supreme Commander, Comrade Tito, gave renewed impetus to the uprising in other regions of our country. Such a connection would not have been possible, or at least would not have been achieved so swiftly, without the battles at Pljevlja and in the Sandžak.
7. With the arrival of Comrade Tito in this important operational area, stability was established in the military and political situation. This was reflected not only in the reorganisation of our units, but also in the broader conception of our military planning and in the understanding of partisan warfare. After the heavy fighting of the first year of the war, this brought renewed energy and striking power to our entire army. Instead of large and unformed units, which had been a common feature in Montenegro, a system of light assault brigades was adopted. Such brigades were better able to move across difficult terrain, in which we were predominantly engaged at that time. Operations could thus be transferred more rapidly to distant sectors, and manoeuvres against a superior enemy were conducted with greater security. From this base, and with such a reorganised army, Marshal Tito undertook the march manoeuvre of his forces towards the Bosnian Krajina.
8. Montenegro entered the struggle resolutely on 13 July 1941 and made a substantial contribution to this magnificent liberation war. Montenegrins gave their lives selflessly not only for the freedom of Montenegro but also for the freedom of the whole of Yugoslavia. It was therefore with justification that, at a Montenegrin gathering, Comrade Mitar Bakić, responding to certain ill-intentioned interpretations, declared that “Montenegro has never been broader than it is today, and never has it entered a state union with greater justification than it does now.”
Glory to the fearless fighters who fell in the Battle of Pljevlja! On their example, future generations will learn how one ought to love one’s homeland and fight for the freedom and honour of one’s people.
(“Borba”, 1944)
(Translated by Sava Press from: Jovanović, A. Beogradska operacija : bitka za Pljevlja. — Beograd : Izdanje Narodne armije, 1946. — pp. 21–35. — Cyrillic.)
Notes
1 Figurative reference to quislings, derived from Vuk Branković.
2 Colloquial term for Serbian rural fighters or peasants.