– Arso Jovanović –
…An army is worth only as much as its officers
The geographical and strategic importance of our country’s position, the length of its borders (over 3,000 km), the artificial nature of those borders and the hostile attitude of almost all neighbouring states, which laid claim to various parts of our territory, required the rapid development and strengthening of the armed forces for the defence of our peoples. As a young state endowed with natural resources and possessing a sound military nucleus in the Serbian Army, it had every prerequisite for attaining a high level of military development. Yet military affairs did not progress favourably. Just as terror was exercised over the peoples of Yugoslavia in domestic politics, so too an intolerable situation was created within the army. The same role that the Great Serbian hegemonist clique played in internal political life was played in our armed forces by the Serbian Salonika officers’ clique. On the Salonika Front these men had been lieutenants and junior captains with little or no formal education, yet in the Yugoslav Army they rapidly rose to the rank of generals. They clung desperately to these positions and trampled underfoot anything that might threaten them. They were intolerant of everything that was not Serbian. They hated Montenegrins, accusing them of being communists. There were two classes in the lower division of the Military Academy in which only two or three Montenegrins were admitted, despite the fact that many pupils from that region applied to the academy because of the limited opportunities for education elsewhere. They hated Croats because of the Croatian question and referred to them as “Frankists.” It is true that Croats largely abstained from military service, for which the Serbian hegemonist clique itself bore a considerable share of responsibility. We maintain that the conduct of Serbian officers drove large numbers of Croats into what is today the Ustaša army. Slovenes were called Germans and Macedonians Bulgarians. Only officers from Serbia were permitted to call themselves Serbs, whereas everyone else was compelled to fit into the category of “Yugoslavs.” The songs, customs and dances of all national groups other than the Serbs were suppressed within the army. The Montenegrin folk song “Serdar Jole” was subjected to ridicule. On one occasion, a Croatian officer, in a cheerful mood, instructed the military band to play a Croatian song. A Serbian officer rose, interrupted the music and ordered: “Stop that German rubbish and play me that proper Serbian one — ‘I slaughtered her son Jovan…’”1
All important positions in the army were occupied exclusively by officers from Serbia, while others were left with the crumbs. Instead of developing the organisation of the armed forces, this Serbian clique invented posts to which its own generals could be appointed, and every general had to hold a position provided for in the official establishment, together with all the accompanying privileges. Even these privileges, substantial though they were, proved insufficient for such generals. Unprecedented thefts began to occur within the army. Thus multi-storey villas belonging to generals sprang up throughout Belgrade and in various holiday resorts. As soon as a general retired, he invariably received a directorship in some economic enterprise or was appointed as a veliki župan,2 ban,3 minister and so forth. This demonstrates the extent of the clique’s influence over other areas of state administration as well. In order to acquire ever greater sums of money, generals devised numerous journeys and inspection tours. Yet not a single general ever took troops into the field in order to assess their combat readiness. Instead, they inspected latrines, refuse pits and kitchens, occupying themselves with trifles such as the alignment of soldiers’ boots and similar matters. In such corporal’s work they were true masters — but not masters of the art of war. Since generals’ positions were highly lucrative, struggles for appointments developed even within this clique. In pursuing them, they employed the most dishonourable means. Officers became liars, swindlers, sycophants and flatterers, while officers’ households and families became centres of intrigue, patronage, vice and the pursuit of appointments. In such chaos, no thought was given to the defence of the peoples of the country or to the development of the army. The sole concerns were personal pleasure, enrichment and advancement, while the army as an institution served merely as a means of attaining these ends. Among the officers there remained not the slightest trace of the old virtues of chivalry, integrity and self-sacrifice, qualities without which no military commander ought to exist.
Upon joining their units, young officers encountered the chaos of regimental and officers’ intrigues. Being young men, they were unable to resist it and typically became drawn into the very corruption that was suffocating our army. In their senior colleagues they found no sincere comrades. On the contrary, from the very first days the older officers would shift the entire burden of regimental duties onto them. Unable to endure such pressures, a large number became unfit for service at an early stage of their careers, others sought to avoid service by various means and still others fled from the units, which had become little more than a graveyard for young men.
Admission to the higher military schools was obtained through various “connections.” The sons and sons-in-law of generals were admitted as a matter of course, followed by a succession of close and distant relatives of generals. Under such conditions, these schools could not possibly produce the desired results. Within them, students became spineless conformists who dared not express an opinion different from that of their instructors. Thus, instead of cultivating strong military characters capable of leading troops, the schools produced some of the weakest officers, men who drained the lifeblood of our army in pursuit of their positions. Moreover, these institutions failed to equip their students with solid professional knowledge. It often happened that these “educated” officers knew less than those serving in the field. Consequently, they possessed no authority among the troops or among regimental officers. On the contrary, a wide gulf existed between them and the officers serving with the troops. Command became detached from the army itself and concerned itself only with positions and salaries. For these officers, service with the troops was merely a temporary assignment required to secure promotion to a higher rank. In reality, they regarded the troops with nothing but contempt.
The state sent many young officers abroad for advanced military education, selection once again being made along the lines of generals’ patronage. Little benefit was derived from this. Most of these officers led fashionable and cosmopolitan lives abroad, making no serious effort to learn the art of war. Those who returned from Italy and Germany preached fascism and, as Yugoslavia increasingly aligned itself with Germany, interpreters of Hitler and Mussolini began to appear in our higher military schools. One such figure was General Aleksandar Stanković, First Assistant to the Minister of the Army and Navy, who lectured on the subject of the “State Prepared for War.” These instructors were enthusiastic advocates of the theories of lightning war and total war, while their students had the impression of attending a great General Staff academy. All of this constituted preparation for open treason.
It would be wrong, however, to direct this criticism at the entire former officer corps. A considerable number of officers, particularly younger ones, never approved of what was taking place within our army. Yet such officers were unable to make themselves heard. As soon as an independent-minded officer appeared, he was immediately branded a “subversive element” and dispatched to the most remote garrison or removed from troop service altogether. Recognising the reality of this open betrayal, young officers, whenever the opportunity arose, joined the struggle for the defence of their peoples. A considerable number of honest officers are now held in German and Italian concentration camps. They refused to answer the calls of Nedić, Pavelić and Draža Mihailović to participate in a fratricidal war. The traitorous officers and rabble of the former Yugoslav Army now serve bloodthirsty fascism for Judas’ silver, in the various formations of Draža Mihailović, Nedić and Pavelić.
As this officers’ clique advanced and elevated itself to every military position, its corrupt spirit spread throughout our entire army, once renowned for its heroism. It was therefore entirely natural that every mother wept when sending her son into military service. The army had become the tormentor of our soldiers. These young men were subjected to mistreatment by their superiors at every turn. Almost every movement of a soldier was accompanied by insults from an officer: “peasant,” “country bumpkin,” “idiot.” Whatever instruction they received was delivered amid shouting, anger and swearing, so that the bewildered soldier could scarcely make sense of it. In order to distinguish themselves, certain officers frequently drove their men beyond all reasonable limits, subjecting them to a form of “drill” that possessed nothing genuinely military in character. They even diverted funds intended for soldiers’ rations in order to whitewash latrines, stables and refuse pits so that they would present a more favourable appearance when inspected by a commanding officer. Such disgraceful practices were rewarded with decorations and commendations. As we can see, distinctions were granted not for work and training, but for deception and theft. (One is reminded of the decorations and promotions currently bestowed by the émigré government in London for the “heroic conduct” of its knights in today’s National Liberation War.)
Training within our army stagnated. It continued to be conducted according to methods dating from the wars of 1875, 1912 and 1913–14. Meanwhile, military technology advanced at a rapid pace. Deploying into skirmish lines, running drills and parade-ground exercises constituted virtually the entirety of training. At the same time, the soldier never encountered any modern weapon of war. Ninety per cent of our soldiers had never seen a tank, yet they were sent into a war in which the tank was among the principal weapons. It is therefore hardly surprising that, when soldiers encountered this weapon for the first time, they attempted to grapple with the monstrous machine using only their bare hands.
Military service lasted eighteen months, yet actual military training occupied only six months. The remainder of the time was spent on secondary duties. Instead of learning the military skills necessary for the defence of their peoples, soldiers were extensively assigned as orderlies, valets and servants in various officers’ institutions, or employed as labourers on officers’ private estates. Thus public funds were squandered on maintaining the army, while the soldier failed to acquire even the most basic military knowledge. He did not feel that he belonged to it as to his own community or family. He served not out of conviction, but because the law required it. The army became particularly hated in the eyes of ordinary soldiers once it began to be used to suppress workers’ strikes, labour assemblies and demonstrations. Yet the greatest disgrace suffered by our army was its transformation into a network of concentration camps for the finest sons of our peoples. The soldier came to realise that our army was an institution opposed to the people. He feared it; within its ranks he was subjected to humiliation and, through the abuse inflicted by his superiors, even faced the threat of death. We all know the soldier’s ironic response to every hardship encountered in military service: “Comrade, that too is part of the regulations.”
Thus this officers’ clique succeeded in completely destroying the fighting spirit and enthusiasm of our brave army, which had distinguished itself in the Balkan Wars and First World War. It was no longer an army but a soulless machine. Following the Austrian model, they succeeded in setting certain nationalities against one another, thereby creating an even more intolerable situation within the armed forces.
As regards the war plans of our General Staff, there existed two basic types: the offensive and the defensive war plan. As a creation of Versailles, Yugoslavia was, from the very outset, dependent in its policies upon the great powers of Europe. Until approximately 1933–34, it moved largely within the orbit of French foreign policy. It was in this context that the political-military arrangement known as the Little Entente was created, within which Yugoslavia pursued expansionist ambitions. From this emerged an offensive war plan designed for the sequential destruction of neighbouring states: Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria and others. Within the framework of this policy, an offensive military doctrine ought to have been developed in our armed forces and supported by the appropriate military technology. Yet the manner in which our army was supplied with military matériel provides an even clearer illustration of the nature of military command.
In the early years we were virtually a colony of France. Every rifle cartridge fired on the Salonika Front was paid for in gold, as though that front had brought no benefit whatsoever to the Allied cause. At great expense we received from France military equipment that was already obsolete and of no practical value. Moreover, in exchange for this matériel, the French exploited the mineral wealth of our country. There were also other so-called “deliveries” of military equipment from abroad. This constitutes one of the most shameful chapters in the history of our General Staff and Ministry of War. Enormous thefts were committed in connection with these procurements, from the ministers of war down to the lowest clerks responsible for processing the relevant documents. Contracts for the supply of military matériel were awarded at card tables, a fashionable pastime among the circles of generals in Belgrade. The supplier who lost the greatest sums of money in favour of generals’ wives and daughters was the one most likely to secure the contract. On one occasion, General Marić’s daughter reportedly “won” one million dinars in a single evening. In this way ministers became entirely dependent upon suppliers and the poorest-quality equipment was delivered to the army. As a result of the inferior quality of aviation equipment, for example, between 1933 and 1936 we suffered heavy losses among our most capable flying personnel. The same situation prevailed with regard to the procurement of artillery, machine guns, rifles and other military equipment. Our country abounds in resources essential for warfare, yet the General Staff did nothing to establish a modern arms factory within Yugoslavia. Until 1937 we were incapable of manufacturing even a single rifle barrel. Vast sums were paid abroad for weapons that cost four times as much as they would have if produced domestically. At the same time, it is well known how large-scale capital penetrated the Zenica factories and numerous other enterprises. For many years even our entire supply of military clothing was obtained from abroad. Thus we purchased through foreign intermediaries our own wool, which had first been exported from the country by Valda Teokarević and Company. Naturally, all of these transactions were classified as “confidential military procurements,” and discussion of them was forbidden lest “the defence of the country suffer.” Military appropriations, already diminished by such practices, were insufficient to equip our armed forces properly. The army could field only 24 divisions, although the available manpower would have permitted the formation of 40 divisions (25,000 × 40 = 1,000,000 men, with the remainder assigned to auxiliary services). As for tanks, they were scarcely mentioned within our army at all.
Thus, our General Staff was preparing the army for offensive operations, while that same army, completely lacking adequate equipment and armament, languished perpetually around its barracks. It is true that its generals did not sit idly by; rather, they were constantly engaged in “offensive operations” of their own — pursuing appointments, allowances, inspection tours and abuses of office. These ignorant men were great megalomaniacs. With considerable self-congratulation they spoke of what they would accomplish “when we reach Budapest, Vienna and Rome.” They imagined that they would suppress other peoples as easily and swiftly as they had suppressed their own.
Our General Staff also devised a defensive war plan. The basic idea of this plan was that the main forces would meet the enemy directly on the state frontiers and then conduct a fighting withdrawal into the strategic depths of the country, all the way to the central regions of Šumadija and the Bosnian foothills, where a decisive blow would be delivered. This war plan originated in a period when Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria were prohibited from rearming under the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. However, the military and political situation of our country had changed. Austria had been absorbed by Germany, Czechoslovakia had been overrun and Hungary and Bulgaria were rearming, their alignment with Germany being a virtual certainty. Yugoslavia had become a target for Hitler and Mussolini’s hordes. It lay within their proclaimed “living space.” Fascist armies were arming themselves to the teeth with destructive modern military technology. In such circumstances, when our country could be attacked from every direction, our General Staff continued to adhere to this stereotyped war plan. Even a corporal with only rudimentary military knowledge could see that the plan was flawed:
1. Our borders were far too extensive to be adequately covered by effective combat forces. The north-western part of the country projected like a wedge between Italy and Austria-Hungary. All of our lines of communication in the Sava valley were obliquely oriented in relation to those of Italy and Hungary. Consequently, our forces deployed in this north-westward extension could easily be cut off and destroyed through an encircling manoeuvre.
2. The frontier in Vojvodina was artificial and exposed. Behind it lay major rivers — the Drava and the Danube — as well as numerous canals, while the lower courses of the Tisza, Tamiš and Begej were marshy and prone to flooding. There was a real danger that an enemy possessing tactical and technological superiority could, through a powerful advance, drive our principal forces back against these rivers and destroy them there.
3. The enemy possessed mobile formations, whereas we had only infantry. By breaking through the frontier, the enemy could rapidly penetrate into the rear, disrupt it and compel our infantry formations, deployed along the border, to surrender.
Our “strategists” were incapable of assessing the fundamental factors that should have determined the formulation of a sound war plan. They continued to operate according to old assumptions and, in the spirit of this plan, undertook the cordon fortification of the frontier sectors, spending enormous sums of money on the project. The principal military appropriations were exhausted on these fortifications, with the result that the army remained completely lacking in equipment and armament. Fortification is an expensive undertaking, but there was more to the matter than that. Fortification became one of the most profitable enterprises for our generals. First, large quantities of material had to be procured and every procurement brought with it a certain “commission.” Second, these expenditures could not easily be scrutinised, since the fortifications were “naturally concealed,” together with the vast sums spent on them. Third, a multitude of fortification commissions sprang into existence. A large number of generals and senior officers found for themselves a highly lucrative occupation. These commissions remained in the field throughout the year, drawing generous allowances. Alongside the commissions there appeared super-commissions. In order to prolong their stay in the field, one commission would accuse another of having designed the works incorrectly. Thus a third commission would also find employment, while the actual result remained unchanged, precisely as it had originally been conceived by some engineering sergeant or second lieutenant.
It must be acknowledged that our General Staff faced a difficult problem. The country was exposed to attack from all directions and the means available for its defence were weak owing to persistent abuses and mismanagement.
Yet even with the resources at hand much could have been accomplished. A glance at the map of Yugoslavia reveals that the rivers Kupa, Sava, Danube, Great Morava and South Morava enclosed the strongest mountainous region of our country. This area was broken by innumerable ridges and gorges, exceptionally well suited for defence. Here our infantry would have found the best support and protection against modern enemy technology. The rivers forming the outer boundary of this region constituted major strategic obstacles, making a sudden breakthrough by enemy mobile formations impossible. Accordingly, the military situation required the adoption of the following measures:
a) The main body of our forces should have been concentrated in the mountainous region behind the aforementioned rivers. All military depots and workshops ought to have been established there in advance, while the karst fields should have been adapted for use as airfields with substantial protective shelters.
b) Fortification efforts should have been concentrated along this mountainous belt behind the rivers. The strategic front would thereby have been considerably shorter and the mountain passes would have made it possible to construct defensive works in depth throughout the theatre of operations with relatively economical means.
c) Along the state frontier, on important operational routes, a system of light fortifications should have been established, manned by reconnaissance and security detachments. These would have provided sufficient warning to allow the timely mobilisation and concentration of the main forces behind the aforementioned rivers.
Even the greatest upheavals in Europe brought no change in the thinking of our “strategists.” Poland disappeared. A succession of Western European countries followed. Hitler entered Romania through Hungary. Our General Staff responded by patching up what had until then been regarded as a friendly front with a single infantry division and a cavalry division, thereby diluting an already inadequate war plan still further. The fortification of the frontiers continued unabated and all available funds were devoted to it. No effective defensive measures were undertaken. All military schools continued their work, where theories of total war and lightning war were enthusiastically preached. Our officers’ clique continued to appear regularly on promenades and at social gatherings. At the Officers’ Club, by order of the Minister of the Army and Navy, Bogoljub Ilić, films depicting fascist military operations in the West were shown. Ljotić’s bulletin was distributed throughout the armed forces. The descent into treason was open and unmistakable.
In the final period before the war, the General Staff resorted to the so-called activation of certain units. This activation was intended to deceive patriotic public opinion into believing that the army was preparing to defend the country. Yet, so as not to provoke Hitler’s displeasure, the activated units were stationed deep in the rear, so that in the event of an invasion they would not have reached the front in time to intervene at all. This mobilisation of selected units exposed the full extent of our military weakness and unpreparedness. Not only did we lack sufficient rifles for our soldiers, but we also lacked food, footwear and clothing. At the same time, trainloads of foodstuffs, horses and livestock continued to be exported to Germany.
Hitler had already resolved to attack the Soviet Union. For this offensive, however, his southern Balkan flank remained insecure. He knew that the people of Yugoslavia opposed fascism and the treachery of their leaders. Greece had launched a counter-offensive that had driven back the Italian army and seriously threatened it, bringing it close to disaster in Albania. Hitler’s vassal Mussolini was no longer capable of “ordering” the Balkans according to his wishes. So long as Greece retained control of its Mediterranean communications, those routes remained open to the Allies. Through Greece an Allied intervention might also occur, in which case Turkey could be induced to abandon its neutrality. In order to resolve the Balkan situation in his favour, Hitler concentrated his principal forces in Bulgaria. Our country faced mortal danger. Military considerations dictated that our General Staff should have responded with the following measures:
1. To mobilise all available forces.
2. In cooperation with the Greek army, to destroy the Italian army in Albania and thereby secure the rear by linking up with Greek forces. This would have established a reliable connection with the Allies, while the Greek army could then have been employed on the Bulgarian front in Yugoslav Macedonia.
3. To introduce fundamental changes to the war plan by transferring the principal line of defence to the area south of the Sava and Danube and west of the Great and South Morava rivers.
4. To conduct the defence progressively towards the Dinaric-Šar mountain system. Our forces, positioned on the flank of Hitler’s line of advance towards Greece, would have been ideally placed to defend Greece and, through it, maintain communications with the Allies. In these mountainous regions our army, conducting warfare according to the principles of partisan strategy — of which our General Staff had no understanding whatsoever — could have resisted for a long time. Its complete destruction would have been out of the question. Hitler was in a hurry. He needed to rapidly concentrate all his forces on the Eastern Front, where he hoped to achieve a decisive outcome during 1941. Under such circumstances, he possessed neither the time nor the resources to wage a prolonged guerrilla war in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Army therefore needed only to resist in order to gain time, after which the military-political situation would have shifted in its favour. The importance of such a development scarcely requires explanation. Instead of pursuing this course, our treacherous military and political clique signed an agreement of capitulation in Vienna. Present-day Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary provide an indication of what our country would have become under that agreement. The military provisions of this capitulation were as follows:
1. The strength of the Yugoslav Army in its barracks was not to exceed peacetime levels (80,000 men).
2. The principal Yugoslav railway lines were to be placed at the disposal of the German armed forces. Yugoslav military garrisons were required to be situated at least 5 km from the railways.
3. German troops were granted the right to use the territory of Macedonia for military purposes. (This was intended to facilitate their attack upon the courageous Greek army.)
The full significance of this military capitulation, even without its political appendage, which was no better, should be evident to everyone. Naturally, our people did not accept this shameful surrender. They rose against it almost unanimously. The great demonstrations in Belgrade and throughout the country remain vivid in our memories. These events culminated in the coup d’état of 27 March. A hesitant government came to power, and during its brief tenure it committed a series of military and political errors.
1. In military leadership, it retained all the figures associated with the fifth column. Generals Milan Nedić and Ljubomir Marić, well-known fifth-columnists and bloodsuckers, each commanded an army group.
2. Instead of ordering immediate mobilisation, it designated 3 April as the first day of mobilisation and thereby squandered six precious days. This was an unforgivable mistake stemming from the government’s indecision. This government too continued to send Hitler conciliatory messages, assuring him of its loyalty. In fact, the General Staff did not even proclaim full mobilisation, but rather the notorious “activation” of units, which was not equivalent to mobilisation. Hence the widespread confusion among reservists in the rear areas, many of whom were unable to locate their assigned units.
3. The government and General Staff did nothing to alter the war plan or to regroup the army in a rational manner. Under that plan, almost all military depots were situated north of the Sava and Danube and east of the Morava. This explains the vast movements of military supplies immediately before the outbreak of hostilities. Instead of urgently transporting troops to the front, trains were carrying straw and hay. Treason flourished on every side.
Pressed for time, Hitler attacked Yugoslavia on 6 April without a declaration of war. He selected the principal operational axis of advance: Kyustendil-Kriva Palanka-Skopje-Kosovska Mitrovica. By doing so, he sought to achieve the following objectives:
1. To separate the Yugoslav and Greek armies and defeat them individually. Had these forces linked up, they might have offered prolonged resistance, during which Allied intervention could have arrived. Hitler was determined to prevent this at all costs.
2. To outflank the Yugoslav Army from its most vulnerable southern flank, thereby preventing it from withdrawing into the mountainous regions and establishing a defensive position there.
3. To relieve the hard-pressed Italian army and, by destroying the main Greek forces deployed in Albania, prevent them from withdrawing into southern Greece, thus shortening the resistance of this heroic army. (Indeed, Yugoslav treachery placed the Greek army in an extremely difficult position. The Greek General Staff had assumed that the Yugoslavs would offer stronger resistance and therefore did not order the withdrawal of its forces from Albania. By the time it recognised the extent of the Yugoslav betrayal, it was already too late. The Greek army was attacked from the rear through Yugoslav territory.)
The Yugoslav General Staff deployed its forces strategically along the very frontiers of the state. It realised that mobilisation and strategic deployment had been delayed, yet it stubbornly continued to push the army towards the border. That army, however, was poorly equipped, inadequately armed and only partially mobilised. All of this worked to Hitler’s advantage. German forces intercepted our units while they were still on the move and captured them with ease. The war began at dawn on 6 April. By that same morning the Germans were already in Skopje, by 9 April in Kosovska Mitrovica and by 10 April in Zagreb. The Great Serbian hegemonist clique blames the Croats for the defeat. This must be rejected as a blatant falsehood. Only Great Serbian generals participated in the construction of the army, its equipment and the drafting of war plans, not the Croats. Moreover, Serbia collapsed before Croatia. Had the front in Serbia held out longer, the situation on the Croatian theatre would not have deteriorated so rapidly. There were more Serbian traitors in Belgrade than Croatian traitors in Zagreb. Pavelić and his followers were nurtured by the Germans and Italians, whereas in Belgrade our own treacherous clique was cultivated — a clique that continues its betrayal to this very day, some from Belgrade and others from their émigré refuge in London.
On 15 April at 9:25, the shameful act of capitulation was signed, surrendering the Yugoslav Army and all its military matériel to the German fascist forces. When the news arrived, one army commander reportedly exclaimed: “Oh, thank God Almighty!” Consequently, we cannot speak of military operations, for there were scarcely any. What we possess instead are simply documents of betrayal. While our units were moving towards the frontier, the Supreme Command was busy packing in Belgrade, filling officers’ trunks with various delicacies. (A river had to be crossed and no bridging equipment was available. One non-commissioned officer remarked sarcastically: “Bring the officers’ trunks — the baggage train is full of them.”) The attack by fascist bombers on the morning of 6 April forced the Supreme Command to flee Belgrade in haste. As usual, it sought refuge in the pleasant spa resort of Banja Koviljača. From that retreat it maintained contact with neither a single army nor an army group. Unfortunately for its members, they were unable to settle comfortably in this holiday resort, for they soon resumed their flight, until the remnants of the command were eventually transported by our bombers to England.
The attack on Belgrade marked the end of our army. The generals no longer concerned themselves with military affairs but with the fate of their houses in the capital. One army commander spent half a day attempting to obtain a telephone connection with Belgrade. At last he succeeded. It was expected that he would request assistance for his breached front. Instead, he asked: “Has the house at No. 22 Svetosavska Street been destroyed?”
Our regiments went to the front with empty rifles. They requested ammunition, but the storekeeper replied that he had not received orders for mobilisation and therefore could not issue it. Another storekeeper locked away the artillery ammunition and fled, while the battery commander dared not break open the depot doors and instead sought instructions from army headquarters. Border fighting began. Reports arrived from every regiment stating that their machine guns could not function because their moving parts had been coated with some kind of hardened lubricant. One divisional commander requested artillery ammunition. It was dispatched by lorry, but some fifth-columnist demolished a bridge prematurely, preventing the ammunition from arriving in time. Reports poured in from every direction and from every unit: we have no boots, no tent sheets, no rifle slings, no ammunition, no food, no pack animals. This was a madhouse rather than an army that had supposedly prepared for war over many years and for whose maintenance the people had sacrificed their last morsel of bread. German tanks advanced. A few anti-tank guns still lay in depots because there were no draught animals available to pull them into position. For all such problems, no explanations could ever be obtained from the distinguished commander, who scarcely emerged from his reinforced anti-aircraft shelter. Yet when news arrived that German tanks were advancing and that the guns could not be brought into position, the commander suddenly became intensely interested. The tanks had only just passed through Pirot when the esteemed headquarters fled from Niška Banja (once again, a spa serving as a command post) directly to Kraljevo, more than 250 km from the front held by its own units. Ilija Brašić, commander of the Southern Army Group and a celebrated “strategist,” fled from Skopje straight to Andrijevica in Montenegro, 350 km away. Such cases are virtually unparalleled in the history of warfare. While the headquarters fled, our unarmed soldiers met the German tanks with their own bodies, leaping onto them and grappling hand-to-hand with German troops. Such was the heroic conduct of the Toplica Division on the front around Pirot. There, all three infantry regiments, deprived of artillery support and anti-tank weapons, were crushed by German tanks. Not a single soldier wished to abandon his position. Even hardened fascist criminals reportedly admired the bravery of our soldiers and laid wreaths at the sites of these heroic battles. The divisional headquarters shamefully abandoned its soldiers in their positions and travelled by lorry to join army headquarters in Kraljevo. Instead of these deserters being shot (and the same treatment should have been applied to the army headquarters), they were transferred to Sarajevo. This was merely one example among many occurring on every front and in every formation. Kraljevo was in complete chaos. It had become a gathering place for fleeing officers. In one building housing the communications command of the Šumadija Division there were more than thirty General Staff officers. These very men, whose education had cost the nation the most and who were entrusted with fighting and leading their units, were among the foremost in fleeing. In a neighbouring room, a group of generals was engaged in a game of poker, while soldiers in the courtyard prepared roast piglets for them. A smartly dressed General Staff lieutenant colonel was struggling to establish a telephone connection with Belgrade. We assumed it concerned military matters. Yet, judging from fragments of his side of the conversation, he was apologising to his sweetheart for not having removed her from Belgrade before the bombing. He promised to send her a reliable car and a trustworthy driver, then added: “We shall have a long journey — all the way to the sea.” (He was referring to flight to England, a plan cut short by German tank units north of Višegrad.) Thus, while our wounded lay in pools of blood on the battlefield, officers’ mistresses were being transported by motorcar.
The flight continued. The Germans advanced without encountering meaningful resistance. Not a single road or bridge had been properly destroyed. (Of the three principal bridges near Belgrade, only two were demolished, leaving the most important one intact.) The demolitions that did occur were merely symbolic. Had the communications network been systematically destroyed, German motorised formations would not have been able to force their way through our mountain passes for at least a month. One need only recall that the Kozara Partisan Detachment, a force of modest size, later fought fierce and successful battles for months against 30,000 fascist troops. Yet the large Yugoslav Army capitulated in nine days, three of which were rainy and prevented the Germans from advancing rapidly with their mobile units. Thus ended a shameful and treacherous chapter in the history of our peoples. The heroic struggle of the National Liberation Partisan Army will avenge and liberate our suffering nation and punish the traitors.
Arso P. Jovanović
Chief of the Supreme Headquarters
National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia
Notes
1 Line from the epic folk song “Old Mountain, Ancient Mountain”:
“Old mountain, ancient mountain,
I have wandered over you for a long time,
I led bands of hajduks,
I carried the hajduk banner,
I made many mothers weep,
But one mother most of all:
I slaughtered her son Jovan,
I forced his father to roast him,
His father roasted him and wept:
‘Jovan, my St. George’s Day lamb!’
I forced his mother to eat him,
His mother ate him and wept.
I forced his brother to play music,
His brother played and wept.
I forced his sister to dance,
His sister danced and wept.”
2 Governor of an oblast (district) in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
3 Governor of a banovina (province) in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
(Translated by Sava Press from: Jovanović, A., Vojni slom Jugoslavije. Skoplje : [n.p.], 1945. — pp. 3–24. — Cyrillic.)