– Arso Jovanović –
TUESDAY, 2 JUNE 1942
The Montenegrin people have always cultivated a profound affinity with the Russian people. When the Soviet-German war broke out, our people were not intimidated; rather, they were enthused, for in it they discerned the prospect of their own liberation. The Communist Party exercised the strongest influence over the popular masses in Montenegro. In contrast to the previously discredited parties and regimes, the people placed complete trust in the Party. Although the Party in Montenegro did not openly present itself before the Montenegrin people — a capital error — as the leader of the National Liberation War against the occupier, the entire population nevertheless entered the struggle on 13 July 1941. Organisational preparations for partisan warfare had not been completed. Preparations for a general uprising had been undertaken, yet even these had not been brought to fruition, as responsible comrades interpreted the directive literally — that actions should commence as soon as possible. Without any formal structure, organisation or command, the armed masses advanced courageously into battle. It was an avalanche that descended upon the occupier and inflicted enormous losses. Particularly fierce fighting occurred at Cetinje, Crmnica, Velje Brdo, Danilovgrad, north of Lijeva Rijeka and at Šavnik. Within a few days, all towns were liberated except Cetinje, Podgorica and Nikšić. These towns, too, might have been liberated without any casualties, yet no preparations had been made for their capture. Between 4,000 and 5,000 Italians were taken prisoner and vast quantities of war matériel seized. This matériel, however, proved of no benefit; the masses captured it and carried it off. Even at that stage, a considerable amount of weaponry fell into the hands of fifth columnists. The uprising confounded the occupier, who had assumed that Montenegro could be pacified and satisfied through Sekula Drljević. Units of the “Messina” Division were halved near Rvaši-Rijeka Crnojevića.
The enemy hastily transferred an army corps comprising three divisions from Albania. An entire division was deployed in the direction of Cetinje, where the fiercest fighting took place and where the Italian governor for Montenegro was encircled. After bloody engagements, our front there was breached. Following the breakthrough at Cetinje, the enemy turned to Kolašin and finally to the Šavnik district. Thus, the enemy advanced gradually, breaking our fronts one by one. Our leadership lacked formed units with which to intervene across various directions and disperse the enemy’s attention along a broad front. Instead, it followed the masses, who were eager for combat, as the occupier was committing unspeakable atrocities.
After the collapse of the fronts, the morale of the population began to decline, while reactionary elements gained a measure of momentum. Fighting virtually ceased. Had we possessed militarily organised and politically consolidated partisan units, the situation might have developed differently. The struggle against the occupier would have intensified and the population would have been protected. A transitional period of one to one and a half months ensued before our leadership began forming partisan units. However, this was carried out on a territorial basis — partisans remained at home, necessitating the gathering of personnel from one action to the next. This prevented the partisan units from achieving military and political consolidation. The lull in the uprising, together with the immobility of our units, was exploited by the enemy, who fortified towns and lines of communication and established links with fifth-column elements, with the result that our partisan units were unable to secure any significant military successes.
In order to revitalise the struggle, it was necessary to establish a stronghold for further operations. The idea emerged to seize Pljevlja for the following reasons:
1. To establish a connection with the liberated territory of the Serbian partisans and to secure the transport of ammunition and food into the Montenegrin karst.
2. To activate the Sandžak, where there existed considerable human resources, and to enable the transfer of provisions into the Šavnik district.
3. Following the capture of Pljevlja — to create prospects for the seizure of other Sandžak towns, as well as Berane and Andrijevica. In this manner, a solid partisan stronghold would be established almost at the centre of the Balkans — intersected by canyon rivers and mountains, and therefore well suited for defence.
4. By capturing Pljevlja, it was intended to grasp the problem at its core, as the headquarters of the “Pusteria” Alpine Division was located there, so that the remaining garrisons would fall swiftly.
5. Pljevlja was not heavily fortified, and from a military standpoint it was feasible to capture it.
6. By taking Pljevlja, a vast quantity of war matériel would be secured, thereby enabling the continuation of successful operations.
For this action, 3,500 men were mobilised in Montenegro (500 of whom were unarmed). This force had, in the strict sense, been hastily assembled, lacking formation and military-political consolidation, yet it was eager for combat and responded readily to the call.
On 20 November, the march-manoeuvre of these forces commenced from all parts of Montenegro. The principal axes of advance for individual detachments were: Kolašin, Mojkovac, Mioče, Upper and Lower Morača, Boan, Đurđevića Tara, Nikšić, Šavnik, Žabljak-Đurđevića Tara. Upon entering the Sandžak, these forces, through night marches, encircled Pljevlja from all directions. During the march, not a single combat incident occurred, and thus everything was carried out according to the predetermined plan. Supply and accommodation of the troops posed considerable difficulties. These had not been prepared in advance, as the element of surprise was prioritised.
The plan for the attack was to seize the surrounding fortifications and simultaneously enter the town. The assault was scheduled for the night between 30 November and 1 December. The movement commenced as early as 10 o’clock in the evening, while the main attack was expected around 3 o’clock in the morning. Despite all measures undertaken to preserve secrecy, the enemy learned of the attack through fifth columnists. Even the precise timing of the assault did not go unnoticed. Nevertheless, the units proceeded to carry out their task. A fierce nocturnal battle unfolded around the fortified town and within it. The enemy possessed overwhelming fire superiority, with weapons emplaced even on the roofs of houses. Fire was directed using previously established coordinates and two searchlights. The impression was of being within a volcanic crater, as Pljevlja lies in a deep valley.
This was one of the greatest battles in the history of the Montenegrin people. It is difficult to believe that the Montenegrins had ever displayed greater courage than in this engagement. On this occasion, they were poorly armed and entered a veritable inferno of fire, grappling directly with the hated occupier. They understood the true significance of Pljevlja. The fighting intensified, and our forces penetrated into the town centre, capturing three fortifications. Only a little more effort was required for the battle to be decided in our favour. However, owing to the enemy’s overwhelming firepower, the imminent dawn and the inability of the command to respond effectively at decisive moments, we were compelled to withdraw from the town. Concurrently with the attack on Pljevlja, security operations had been planned along the lines of communication leading to the town.
There, too, fierce fighting developed, in which we achieved success. In all these engagements, Italian losses amounted to 1,000 killed and wounded, with the officer corps suffering particularly heavy casualties. Our losses were 253 killed and 193 wounded.
The causes of the failure were as follows:
1. The entire force lacked proper military organisation and military-political cohesion.
2. Our young command cadre failed to respond effectively at decisive moments, when our units stood on the threshold of success.
3. Our units were unfamiliar both with the terrain surrounding the town and with the town itself, yet were tasked during the night with executing a demanding operation.
4. It would have been preferable to bring units gradually closer to the town through successive engagements along the lines of communication, to conduct reconnaissance, and only then to launch the attack. (In such a case, however, the enemy would have become aware of our intentions, fortified its positions more effectively, brought in reinforcements and might have obstructed our efforts.)
5. We possessed not a single piece of artillery with which to threaten the enemy in its barracks and fortified positions.
6. The units were exhausted from prolonged marches.
7. The assault on the town should have commenced much earlier in order to make full use of the entire night for the operation.
8. We gravely underestimated the enemy, its armament and its fortifications, proceeding with complete confidence in success. We failed to appreciate that, for reasons of prestige, the enemy would defend a divisional headquarters. When our fighters encountered fierce resistance, they were taken by surprise. The operation was undertaken with great optimism, to the extent that the military difficulties inherent in the undertaking were disregarded. More attention was devoted to the evacuation of spoils than to the capture of the town itself.
Our units and individuals fought heroically. Particular distinction, however, is attached to the Lovćen Battalion, which fully accomplished the most demanding task. It engaged in combat within the town for two nights and one day. The “Bijeli Pavle” Battalion captured the heavily fortified position of Bogiševac. The Uskok-Drobnjak and Jezero-Šaran battalions partially penetrated the town, and some of their platoons remained there for two nights and one day. The Kuči-Piperi Battalion executed with distinction the securing of the Prijepolje-Pljevlja axis, where it achieved considerable success. The remaining battalions — Kom, “Bajo Pivljanin,” “Peko Pavlović” and Zeta-Lješ — fulfilled their tasks only in part. Had all these efforts been coordinated into a unified whole, Pljevlja would have been taken.
9. The lack of synchronised engagement of units resulted in the enemy confronting our battalions individually.
The significance of this operation:
a) the hated occupier was confronted directly, and the Montenegrin people demonstrated their resolve;
b) substantial enemy losses were inflicted;
c) the engagement further stimulated the Montenegrins in their struggle against the occupier;
d) the combativeness of the Sandžak population was intensified;
e) an additional, albeit bloody, experience in warfare was gained;
f) as a consequence of the attack on Pljevlja, the enemy evacuated Foča, Goražde, Čajniče, Rudo and Nova Varoš, thereby facilitating operations in that region.
Adverse consequences:
Following this apparent military setback, reactionary elements began to foment discord within our ranks on account of the losses, while the enemy, sensing a mortal threat, began to assemble fifth-column elements in order to undermine our struggle.
(Translated from: Dedijer, V., Novi prilozi biografiji Josipa Broza Tita, Vol. 2. — Rijeka : Liburnija, 1981. — pp. 411–413. — Latin script.)