– Arso Jovanović –
After long and arduous fighting, our army fulfilled its task. It liberated our fatherland. Along this difficult yet glorious path, the full genius of Tito’s leadership came to the fore, bringing our peoples significant victories.
All strategists and leaders in past wars possessed armed forces with which to achieve their objectives. Tito did not. Yet he possessed a profound understanding of the laws of social development and the aspirations of his peoples. Within them, he recognised and revealed those inexhaustible forces that had been suppressed for centuries. Stimulated and inspired by Comrade Tito, these popular forces triumphed in this great war of liberation. In the history of warfare, he was the first to succeed in creating a modern army out of unarmed peoples, divided among themselves and oppressed by fascist terror. In building this army, Comrade Tito, from the very outset, set it combat objectives that were in essence the political aims of our peoples’ liberation struggle. Upon this political foundation our army was constructed and developed, from the first partisan detachments to its transformation into a unified Yugoslav Army. The manner in which this army was created represents something novel in strategy, surprising both our allies and our enemies.
From the very beginning of the fighting in 1941, small partisan detachments were dispersed across the entire country, separated by substantial occupying forces, mountain ranges and river systems. Nevertheless, Tito’s energy succeeded in establishing unity of organisation and military discipline among all these forces, directing them along a single course. With the growth and strengthening of the army, operational unity was also achieved across extensive territories. In this way, Tito secured command over the entire Yugoslav theatre of war, which resulted in significant military successes. In modern warfare, characterised by immense technical capabilities, commanders direct their armies through a variety of technical means. Tito did not possess such means, yet he succeeded in establishing unity of thought, will and action down to the smallest and most remote partisan units, even in those regions that had languished for decades under foreign domination, such as Istria, the Slovene Littoral and Carinthia.
Units of our army frequently conducted operations at great distances from one another, exposed to continuous enemy offensives, at times when it appeared that all was lost. Yet the moral spirit of our army remained steadfast, and faith in the victory of a just cause unshaken. Thus was forged a new Titoist spirit, which emerged victorious from the harsh trial of war. A monolithic army was created, resolute in its struggle against imperialist aggressors and in the defence of the democratic freedoms of its people.
Tito constantly watched over his army, strengthening and consolidating its internal structure and stability. With the conclusion of successive phases of the war, he carried out reorganisations of the army. Thus, from the form of partisan detachments, which in 1941 had enabled broad participation of the popular masses in the struggle, there was a transition to the formation of shock brigades, units more capable of tactical operations and manoeuvre. With the expansion of the army, this developed further into the formation of divisions and corps, military formations that made possible the execution of major strategic tasks and the defence of substantial territories with a view to their consolidation. Ultimately, armies were formed which assumed a strategic front alongside Allied forces and played an important role in the final phase of the defeat of German fascism and the liberation of our country. These major organisational transformations were carried out under the difficult conditions of constant enemy offensives, when the enemy exerted all its strength to prevent the growth and consolidation of our forces. The organisation and readiness of our army consistently took the enemy by surprise.
The gradual development of our forces also produced people’s officers who, through the course of struggle, rose to become genuine warriors. “Workers and peasants, students and other honest members of the intelligentsia, learned the art of war in daily and fierce battles. Slowly and steadily, the heroic cadre of our army was formed. The fighters have confidence in them, and the people have confidence in them, for they are true people’s officers and non-commissioned officers.” — (Tito). Comrade Tito devoted particular attention to the education of the officer corps through the establishment of military schools, which resulted in the advancement of military science, the strengthening of the authority of the officer cadre and the consolidation of discipline within the army.
The direction of operations in occupied Yugoslavia — where the rulers of the former Yugoslavia had fostered hatred and division among our peoples, setting them violently against one another — was extremely difficult and complex. Yet under these complicated conditions, Comrade Tito adapted his strategic approach, grounding it in a correct understanding of both the internal and external political relations of our country. Of great historical significance, therefore, was the fact that in the summer of 1941 the uprising first broke out in Serbia. In this way, the Serbian people demonstrated to all the peoples of Yugoslavia that they stood for brotherhood and unity and had no connection with Greater-Serbian hegemonists. This had far-reaching consequences for the subsequent proper development of the liberation struggle in Yugoslavia.
At the end of 1941, when the occupiers and domestic collaborators had concentrated substantial forces in Serbia, Comrade Tito withdrew his units to the tri-border region of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he reorganised them and assessed the most suitable direction for further operations. Choosing an opportune moment, he launched a general offensive in the spring of 1942 towards Bosanska Krajina and Croatia. This remarkable manoeuvre yielded significant strategic and political results: in Croatia, the uprising reached its peak. Pavelić and his Ustaša forces were dealt one of their decisive blows, which played a crucial role in their political defeat in Croatia. Our army was considerably strengthened and established itself in a central position within the country.
In order to avoid the encirclement of his forces in the western part of our country, in January 1943 Comrade Tito executed a manoeuvre towards the east with his strike group. He engaged the enemy on the Neretva and completely defeated, both militarily and politically, the Chetnik forces of Draža Mihailović, who had been carrying out unprecedented terror in the territories of Herzegovina, Montenegro and the Sandžak.
In the summer of 1943, Comrade Tito directed his main forces towards the coastal belt of Montenegro, Dalmatia, the Croatian Littoral and Slovenia, where he disarmed the shattered Italian divisions and severed all German lines of communication with Italy, towards which the Allies had launched their offensive from Africa. The material strengthening of the army and the strategic task of coordinating with Allied forces were thus fully accomplished.
During the winter and spring of 1944, the bulk of our army was located in the south-western regions of our country. However, at the beginning of the summer of 1944, the situation was characterised by the following factors:
a) The Allied front in Italy, having encountered fierce German resistance and difficult terrain, had stalled and did not promise rapid results in terms of a breakthrough into the Po Valley and further advance to the north. In this context, there was no longer an operational necessity to maintain our strong forces in the western part of the country. Our forces in the Slovene–Istrian area were conducting intense attacks on enemy communications, thereby complicating the German position on the Italian front.
b) The situation on the Eastern Front presented an entirely different picture. In their summer operations, the Red Army broke through German lines along a broad front and advanced rapidly towards the west and south-west. This required the concentration of stronger forces in the eastern part of our country, where significant operational opportunities were emerging.
c) In Serbia, the liberation movement had assumed large proportions. In central and eastern Serbia, extensive liberated territories existed, while our forces controlled certain areas of Šumadija. These Serbian forces were engaged in fierce fighting against the treacherous bands of Nedić, Ljotić and Mihailović. This situation had to be brought to an end.
d) Among the Bulgarian people, there were clear signs of mass mobilisation aimed at overthrowing the fascist regime. It was therefore necessary to maintain the closest possible contact with the Bulgarians. This required the reinforcement of our forces in the Serbian operational area.
e) In the southern Balkans, substantial German forces were stationed, whose retreat and withdrawal towards the north needed to be cut off. This, too, necessitated the strengthening of forces in the Morava–Vardar sector.
For all these reasons, Comrade Tito shifted the centre of gravity of his operations towards the east — into Serbia — a movement ultimately crowned by the brilliant victory of the liberation of Belgrade in cooperation with units of the Red Army.
Having aligned himself with the Red Army and receiving substantial material assistance, during the winter of 1944–45 Comrade Tito instituted a pause with his main forces in order to reorganise, master modern equipment and prepare for the spring offensive and the final assault on fascist Germany. In the spring offensive, the armies of our northern wing broke through the Srem Front and continued their advance towards Zagreb. The armies of the southern manoeuvre wing engaged enemy forces in Bosnia, carried out a rapid thrust towards Croatia, and elements of these forces liberated Istria, Trieste, the Slovene Littoral and Ljubljana. They then joined with the northern wing, closing the encirclement at Dravograd and capturing all German Balkan forces under Field Marshal Löhr, including the commander himself and his staff, as well as the entire 97th Corps of Field Marshal Kesselring’s Italian grouping. In this way, they once again fulfilled a strategic role in relation to the Allied front in Italy, with whose forces they linked up at the Soča.
From this brief account, the scale of Marshal Tito’s strategic conception and the depth of his military-political objectives become evident. A single glance at the map suffices to reveal that these were operations of vast manoeuvre, involving the transfer of the operational centre of gravity over distances exceeding three hundred kilometres. At the same time, one must take into account the immense internal and external difficulties faced by our country, including geographical challenges, supply of provisions and medical services, in the execution of such major tasks. Yet all these obstacles were overcome. Reality itself demonstrated the superiority of Tito’s military and political leadership over the Italian and German occupiers and their domestic collaborators.
Tito’s principal blows consistently took the enemy by surprise, as they were preceded by diversions undertaken in various directions, designed to mislead the enemy. Thus, in the spring of 1942, prior to the offensive towards Bosanska Krajina, Tito dispatched part of his forces to eastern Bosnia, while another part conducted offensive operations in the upper Drina sector. Under the cover of these actions, the strike group suddenly broke through into Bosanska Krajina.
In January 1943, during the Fourth Offensive, Tito left two corps to deceive the enemy, while with the main group he appeared unexpectedly on the Neretva. As the battle was prolonged and the enemy discerned the direction of our movement towards the east, Tito destroyed the bridges over the Neretva, thereby misleading the enemy into taking measures to block our advance towards the west. At that very moment, Tito forced a crossing of the Neretva towards the east.
Prior to directing the main forces into Serbia, Tito dispatched a diversionary group towards Valjevo, which drew upon itself the bulk of the enemy forces. Meanwhile, the strike element of our army emerged from the south and shattered the entire enemy defence along the line Rudnik—Suvobor—Cer.
All this demonstrates that Comrade Tito was the bearer of the new spirit and momentum of our army, characterised by activity and the utmost offensiveness. It is in this spirit that our entire army and the whole people must be trained and educated. This offensive spirit must permeate the entire life of the army, its military science and all its regulations. We must be conscious of the fact that passivity and waiting would never have brought freedom to our peoples. “In our army, an offensive spirit must prevail exclusively, not only when we are on the offensive but also when we are on the defensive.” — (Tito).
In the most difficult moments, our army drew strength and energy from its commander, who instilled faith in ultimate victory. The historical path of our army is the path of Comrade Tito, who shared with it both hardship and success. He consistently led the strike group which, across various sectors of Yugoslavia, ignited popular uprisings and resolved major challenges within our country. The enemy itself clearly recognised the sharpness of this force, and the Marshal was subjected to the most severe enemy attacks, culminating in the Fifth Offensive in the Montenegro sector and in the airborne assault on Drvar. At the head of our army, he secured for Yugoslavia a dignified place within the international community of nations, to whose freedom we also made a significant contribution.
Lieutenant-General
Arso R. JOVANOVIĆ
(Translated by Sava Press from the Serbo-Croatian original: “Tito – Organizator i strateg naše armije,” Borba, 26 May 1945, p. 2)