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
WHITE BOOK

ON

OPPRESSIVE ACTIVITIES BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE
CZECH REPUBLIC, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, RUMANIA,
BULGARIA AND ALBANIA TOWARDS YUGOSLAVIA

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WHITE BOOK

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AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITIES BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR, POLAND,
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, RUMANIA, BULGARIA AND
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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
FEDERAL PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

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FOREWORD

The "White Book" contains official and other documents about the aggressive activities of the Governments of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe against Yugoslavia which they have been undertaking for almost three years. These documents offer an insight into the reasons and essence of the present attitude of the Governments of the USSR and the Eastern European countries towards Yugoslavia and into the intentions behind their policy directed against Yugoslavia's independence.

The documents published here also show that, since the beginning of the state of tension provoked by these activities, the Yugoslav Government has been persistent in its attempts to settle the resulting situation in an honourable and peaceful manner, in the interests of peace in the world and international cooperation. To this day, the Yugoslav Government has not succeeded in its efforts because the Governments of the USSR and the other countries of Eastern Europe have been constantly straining these relations more and more. In view of such a state of affairs, the activities which the Soviet and other Eastern European Governments are continuing against Yugoslavia should not only give its peoples cause for concern but also disturb all people and nations in the world who love peace.

This book contains only a small part of the documents from the diplomatic correspondence of the Yugoslav Government with the Governments of the USSR and the Eastern European countries. This diplomatic correspondence has, in the course of something over two years, reached the number of several hundred Notes, most of which are Notes of Protest. For this reason, too, it represents a unique case in diplomatic relations. Owing to their large number, it was not possible to publish all the documents from this diplomatic correspondence in one book. This is still more true of the other documents containing examples of subversive activities against Yugoslavia and the anti-Yugoslav propaganda in the Soviet press and radio broadcasts. Several volumes would be needed for the publication of this material alone, not including the anti-Yugoslav propaganda in the other Eastern European countries and in the press which is under the influence of Soviet propaganda outside this group of States.

For purposes of offering a better survey, the documents have been divided up into chapters according to the basic forms in which the aggressive acts are

carried out against Yugoslavia, and not in their chronological order. In the Annex to the book there are tables and surveys illustrating the intensity of this pressure on Yugoslavia in various fields.

Some of the documents have not been published in their entirety. The abridgement of the documents, which is always indicated in the text, was imperative for considerations of space. It has been done in such a way that in each document the parts essential for the given problem or disputed question have been preserved.

In its endeavours to insure peaceful internal development of the country in the way which the peoples of Yugoslavia themselves have chosen, to guarantee independence and peace on its borders and to contribute to security in the world, the Yugoslav Government considered it imperative to cooperate very closely with those Governments whose foreign policy it believed most nearly approached the democratic and peaceful principles on which the foreign policy of Yugoslavia also rests.

The Soviet Premier, Joseph Stalin, formulated the Soviet foreign policy principles, with which Yugoslavia was in full agreement and on which it based its attitude toward the USSR, in the following way in his address of November 6, 1941:

"We have not and cannot have any such war aims as that of imposing our will and our regime upon the Slavonic and other enslaved nations of Europe, who are expecting our help.

"Our aim is to help these nations in the struggle for liberation they are waging against Hitler's tyranny and then to leave it to them quite freely to arrange their lives on their lands as they think fit. There must be no interference whatsoever in the internal affairs of other nations."

Presuming that the foreign policy of the Soviet Government in practice was in conformity with these words, the Yugoslav Government proceeded with sincerity to the establishment of close relations with the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe, endeavouring to develop and consolidate the most extensive political, economic, cultural and other ties with these countries as much as possible. Such a policy by the Yugoslav Government was all the more natural in view of the fact that the leading political forces of the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia had fostered and developed close friendly relations between the peoples of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union long before the beginning of Hitler's onslaught on the USSR.

The essence of Yugoslavia's attitude toward the USSR at that time was expressed by the Yugoslav Premier, Josip Broz-Tito, in his foreign policy report to the National Assembly on March 31, 1947, when he said in part: "Yes, Yugoslavia, and the other countries of the East as well, are going together with the Soviet Union, but they are going with it precisely because they know that it does not threaten their independence... We are going with the Soviet Union because from there we constantly hear voices of peace, and that corresponds to our aspirations..."

In this spirit the Yugoslav Government, even before the end of the Second World War, signed with the Soviet Government on April 11, 1945, a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation as the first political treaty concluded by the new Yugoslavia with another State. The Yugoslav Government concluded such treaties of alliance, as well as a whole series of economic, cultural and other agreements and conventions with all the Eastern European countries with the aim of achieving extensive cooperation and the closest possible ties with these countries.

The Soviet Government, however, was not willing to establish relations with Yugoslavia which would be based on equality and mutual respect of independence and sovereignty. On the contrary, the facts show that it was precisely the persistent endeavours of the Yugoslav Government and peoples to establish such relations with all countries that became an obstacle to the Soviet Government in implementing a policy of imposition of its will on other peoples and subordinating independent socialist countries to its hegemony.

I.

POLITICAL FORMS OF AGGRESSIVE PRESSURE

From the very moment inter-State relations were established, the Soviet Government began organizing espionage against the existing socialist order in Yugoslavia and against the independence of the Yugoslav peoples. The primary aim of these actions was to create a network of secret agents which would be a tool of the Soviet Government for undermining the Yugoslav Government. By a whole series of steps and acts which it undertook even before the Cominform Resolution of June, 1948, the Soviet Government attempted to impose unequal relations on Yugoslavia and to interfere in its internal affairs. Until the dispute broke out, however, the Yugoslav Government did not lodge any formal protest against any one of these acts although it did point out, in a friendly and well-meaning way, that there were certain shortcomings in these relations. It proceeded in this way because it was convinced that all the differences which might arise between the two countries in the course of their cooperation would be settled through friendly and democratic agreement. When the Soviet Government realized that its attempts to impose its will upon Yugoslavia were in vain, it determined to undertake measures that would forestall any complaints and opposition to the imposition of unequal relations.

In that way, it came about that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) then sent its well-known letters to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the first half of 1948. Under the guise of "party criticism" these letters were to conceal the attack of the Soviet Government on Yugoslavia before its essence became known to the world public. At the same time the letters from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) were also a warning to all those who might dare to seek equal relations between the USSR and their country, that they would in such a case be proclaimed the bitterest opponents of the USSR.⁽¹⁾

¹⁾ The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) sent the first letter to the Yugoslav Communist Party's Central Committee on March 27, 1948. At the same time, copies of the letter were also forwarded to the leaderships of the Communist Parties that are members of the Cominform, although the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party was not informed of this. A short time later, the Yugoslav Communist Party's Central Committee received a letter from the Hungarian Communist Party's Central Committee, sent through the

The letters from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, although appearing to be an exchange of letters between two political parties, are not in essence documents having such a character nor can they be considered as mere mutual criticism between Parties on an equal footing. These letters must be regarded as documents in inter-State relations which are typical as an expression of the policy of imposition of a foreign will on Yugoslavia which the Soviet Government began to pursue by the arbitrary withdrawal of all Soviet specialists from Yugoslavia in March, 1948, and by the unilateral breach of the Agreement on Consultation in April, 1948. Various passages in these letters, which are particularly characteristic from the aspect of international relations, are clear illustrations of the undemocratic principles today underlying Soviet foreign policy towards Yugoslavia. For instance, the Soviet Government considers that its diplomatic and other representatives in a friendly country should have a special privileged status and that they have the right of insight into all State and Party affairs without the knowledge of the Government of that country. At the same time, the movements of the Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in the USSR were very restricted while there could be no question of any possibility of their gaining insight into the Soviet State and Party system. In implementing this "theory," according to which the Soviet Government considers itself a super-Government in another socialist country, the Soviet representatives did not hesitate to inveigle the citizens of that country into their intelligence service, taking as a point of departure the concept that Communists owe allegiance to the Soviet Government first and then to the leadership of their own socialist State. This destructive work was especially directed towards engaging certain high-ranking State and Party officials for traitorous activities aimed at disrupting the highest State and military organs and overthrowing the legal Yugoslav Government. This is a typical example of the intervention of a foreign power in the internal affairs of a sovereign State. (See Documents Nos. 9—15, 220—222, 229 and 230.)

This concept of the Soviet Government also found expression in the question of the position of Soviet military and civilian specialists in Yugoslavia. The Soviet Government is of the opinion that its specialists, sent to help another country, should enjoy a privileged position in regard to material remuneration, etc., in relation to the citizens of the country to which they are assigned. The Government of the latter has no right to make any kind of observation in regard to their number, remuneration and work, obviously because the Soviet Government does not consider the dispatching of specialists to other countries as mere technical assistance. The letters referred to above claim that the Soviet specialists in Yugoslavia were treated badly although no concrete case or act which could provide a motive for such a conclusion has ever been put forward, to say nothing of such acts having been committed with the knowledge

Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, in which agreement was expressed with the latter's stand. After that, the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party received similar letters from the other leaderships of the Communist Parties of the Eastern European countries whose governments are under the control of the Soviet Government. All these leaderships adopted the stand of the Soviet Communist Party toward Yugoslavia although they had heard no arguments whatsoever from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. On May 2 and 23, 1948, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party sent two more letters to the Yugoslav Communist Party's Central Committee. The contents of these letters were along the same lines as the first.

or approval of the Yugoslav Government. To the explicit denial of the Yugoslav Government rejecting these assertions as inaccurate, the Soviet Government, while avoiding reference to any concrete case, gave the astounding answer that it had more faith in the alleged statements of its specialists than in the Yugoslav Government. (See Document No. 8.) This indicates that the Soviet Government considers itself and its citizens to be of superior rank and that it does not respect the sovereignty of the peoples of Yugoslavia and their State.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) rejected the endeavours of the Yugoslav Government to have Yugoslavia and the USSR localize and settle the controversy without extending it artificially to the other countries and Governments with which Yugoslavia had until that time been enjoying the friendliest relations and with which it had been cooperating closely. (See Documents Nos. 17—20.) Instead of that there came another openly hostile step against Yugoslavia — the adoption of the Cominform Resolution entitled "On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia" of June, 1948, in which the citizens of Yugoslavia were openly called upon to overthrow their legal Government and to provoke a civil war. This Cominform Resolution says in part:

"It is the task of the healthy elements inside the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to compel (the Editors' italics) their present leaders to recognize their mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them... or, should the present leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party prove to be incapable of doing this, their job is to replace them and to advance a new internationalist leadership of the Party.

"The Information Bureau does not doubt (the Editors' italics) that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia will be able to fulfil this honorable task." (See Document No. 21.)

So that there would be no doubt as to how the Yugoslav citizens who are members of the Communist Party, numbering over half a million, were to understand this call to rebellion, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Ana Pauker, interpreted it this way in a article published July 20, 1948, in the newspaper "Scanteia:" "... The liquidation of this regime (i. e. the regime under the present Party and State leadership of Yugoslavia; italics by the Editors) is a life and death matter for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia."

The Cominform Resolution of June, 1948, is a unique document in international relations also because in it the highest State leaders of the USSR and the Governments under its influence, including Vice-Premiers, Foreign Ministers, and other Cabinet members, leaders of the Communist Parties of these countries as the Parties in power, appropriate for themselves the right to interfere, directly and publicly, in the internal affairs of a sovereign State. The Soviet Government needed this document in order artificially to strain the international relations of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe with Yugoslavia, and to justify in advance the policy of aggressive pressure on Yugoslavia.

The Cominform Resolution of June, 1948, had a direct effect on the deterioration of the international relations between these countries and

Yugoslavia and on the honouring of inter-State and allied treaties by these countries although Yugoslavia had not given the least cause for the deterioration of these international relations nor did it want this to ensue even after the Resolution. This proves that the Resolution was not a document having the character of inter-party criticism.

In its Note of June 29, 1948, that is, a day after the Cominform Resolution was published, the Bulgarian Government informed the Yugoslav Government that the Cominform Resolution would in no way affect and that it "in no way alters the existing friendly relations between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia." This, hence, is the way in which certain circles in the Bulgarian leadership understood the question of "party criticism." (See Document No. 23.) However, despite this, Bulgaria's foreign policy toward Yugoslavia began to deteriorate rapidly. When the Yugoslav Ambassador in Sofia sought an explanation for this change in the Bulgarian Government's attitude and brought out the discrepancy between the words in the Bulgarian Government's Note and its policy in practice, the Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Minister, Savo Ganovski, was forced to declare, only a few months after the Cominform Resolution, that it was impossible for the Bulgarian Government to separate Party from State issues. The Bulgarian Government did not maintain its original position because the Cominform Resolution had the precise purpose of increasing foreign political pressure on Yugoslavia, not only by the Soviet Government but by other Governments dependent on it as well. (See Document No. 24.)

The Cominform Resolution was in effect a signal for the launching of the unprecedented campaign against Yugoslavia, aimed at forcing the Yugoslav Government and peoples, by way of political, diplomatic, economic, propagandistic, military and other kinds of pressure and threats, to renounce their rights to sovereignty and independence, their right to be the master in their own home.

The intensity of the onslaught on the sovereignty and independence of Yugoslavia from the very beginning bears witness to the fact that those who organized it hoped to accomplish their purpose in short order. The news report which followed immediately upon the Cominform Resolution of June, 1948, in the newspapers and over the radio stations of the Eastern European countries about supposed rebellions in the Yugoslav Army, demonstrations in Zagreb, armed fighting in the Bosnian town of Banja Luka and in other places etc., are testimony to what the organizers of the attacks were secretly hoping for, and how they had imagined the realization of their aggressive plan regarding Yugoslavia.

In their attempt to bring about such developments in Yugoslavia, the Soviet and other Eastern European Governments immediately undertook the formation of terrorist centres and groups on their own territory for which they inveigled Yugoslav exiles who were to be used as tools for systematic

and forcible interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. In connection with this the Yugoslav Government sent a Note of Protest to the Soviet Government on May 23, 1949, in which it pointed to the fact that the Soviet Government was organizing and using a handful of Yugoslav traitors and exiles through whom it was developing hostile activities against Yugoslavia and its Government, that it had placed State radio stations at their disposal, that it was giving them material means such as printing presses, printing paper and other things, and that the Soviet press and radio stations were according the widest publicity to their anti-Yugoslav propaganda. In its Note the Yugoslav Government stated that this indicated outrageous interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, that such acts were in flagrant contrast to the Treaty of Alliance between Yugoslavia and the USSR and to the avowed principles of Soviet foreign policy, and it sought that the Soviet Government put a stop to such hostile activities against Yugoslavia. (See Document No. 41.) The Yugoslav Government sent similar Notes to the Governments of the Eastern European countries in which it also protested against their use of Yugoslav deserters and terrorists and the organizing of actions by them directed against the security and integrity of a sovereign State.

In a series of international documents and in the statements of its representatives before international forums, the Soviet Government expressed the view that no State had the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another State. For instance, in the Note sent to the Government of the USA by the Soviet Government on November 16, 1933, concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations, it was stated that it would be the fixed policy of the Soviet Government "to respect scrupulously the indisputable right of the United States to order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way and to refrain from interfering in any manner in the internal affairs of the United States, its territories or possessions." Furthermore, the Soviet Government undertook the obligation "not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization or group — and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organization or group, or of representatives or officials of any organization or group — which has as an aim the overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in, the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions." (See Hackworth, Digest of International Law I, pp. 304—305.)

During the Second Part of the Third Session of the UN General Assembly, Soviet Delegation Chief, Andrei Gromyko, stated that "no State is entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of other States or to exploit corrupt groups... for the purpose of undermining the very foundation of those States." (See Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part II, 201st Meeting, April 29, 1949, page 239.)

The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, regardless of their internal systems, is a democratic principle expressing respect for the sovereignty and right of peoples to self-determination, that is, to arrange their affairs themselves in their own country in the best way they know and can in the given historical conditions, and in the given stage of their development. This principle is the foundation of international cooperation and world peace. In its Note No. 124 of May 31, 1949, however, the Soviet Government, answering the Yugoslav Government's Note which requested the banning of

the hostile activities of Yugoslav deserters in the USSR, says the following: "The Soviet Government decided to receive and give shelter to the Yugoslav patriots-exiles, persecuted by the Yugoslav anti-democratic regime for their democratic and socialist convictions and gave them asylum. The Soviet Government declares that it will, in the future, extend its hospitality to the Yugoslav revolutionary exiles." (See Document No. 42.)

Such an answer contains two violations of the rules governing normal relations between States. On the one hand, in its diplomatic correspondence with a State with which it maintains diplomatic relations, the Soviet Government criticizes the internal order of that State. This not only means interfering in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia and offending its Government but is also impermissible appropriation by a foreign State of the right to prescribe the order that other States should have. On the other hand, the Soviet Government admits that it is giving "asylum" to these exiles. However, it is clear this is not a matter of the institution of asylum having a humanitarian character but of the formation of precisely that type of "corrupt groups for the purpose of undermining the very foundation of those States" to which Andrei Gromyko referred. It is self-understood that the Yugoslav Government does not deny the right of any State to offer asylum to exiles but it does protest at the fact that the Soviet Government, under the guise of offering asylum, is organizing these groups of exiles and putting at their disposal all the material means for the propagation of violent overthrow of the State order in Yugoslavia and in that way is using them in its actions against Yugoslavia. This Soviet Government Note is particularly important also because it was made public in a special way so that the Soviet Government could use it to show that it is standing behind these subversive actions, thereby encouraging and stimulating other such undertakings which international law considers as one aspect of aggression against other sovereign States.

The Governments of the Eastern European countries, using the same arguments as the Soviet Government, also openly demonstrated their intentions of continuing to make use of the subversive activities of these gangs despite numerous protests by the Yugoslav Government. The Albanian and the Bulgarian Governments have been particularly active in this respect. (See Documents Nos. 43—49.)

An even more drastic example of interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs is the well-known Note of the Soviet Government demanding that the Yugoslav Government immediately release certain arrested White Guardists, who had re-acquired Soviet citizenship, against whom legal proceedings had been instituted owing to criminal deeds committed by them in Yugoslavia against its security. It is obvious that no foreign State, except in cases of persons enjoying immunity, is entitled to dispute the right of another sovereign State in its own territory to undertake legal criminal proceedings and to arraign before the court foreigners who have been guilty of abusing its hospitality. (See Document No. 50.) The Soviet Government was not satisfied with the explanation

given by the Yugoslav Government but it did not seek any possible further elucidation in the normal diplomatic manner. Instead it sent the Yugoslav Government the kind of Note that big powers used to send to small countries whenever they sought unconditional submission to their will. In its Note, which has the character of an ultimatum and open threat, the Soviet Government demands that the arrested Soviet citizens be released immediately regardless of the stage of the criminal proceedings, that Yugoslav organs carrying on the investigation in accordance with Yugoslav laws be punished, and threatened that otherwise "...it considers it necessary to state that it will not reconcile itself to such a state of affairs and that it will be compelled to resort to other, more effective means indispensable for the protection of the rights and interests of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia and to take to task the fascist tyrants who have gone beyond all limits." (Italics by the Editors. See Document No. 51.)

The openly aggressive threats at the end of the Soviet Note that "more effective means" would be undertaken to "take to task the fascist tyrants" (meaning the legal Government of Yugoslavia) is, apart from its flagrant impropriety, a serious blow to the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes which is compulsory for all States. Instead, the Soviet Government tried to compel Yugoslavia, by threatening the use of force, to accept its unjustified demand which would be humiliating for an independent and sovereign country. The use of such methods in international relations is contradictory to the UN Charter and inadmissible from the point of view of international law. The political purpose of the open threats contained in the Soviet Government's Note was to make the tension more acute in an artificial manner, to intimidate public opinion in Yugoslavia, to worsen the international situation, to give new incentive to the general campaign against Yugoslavia and to prepare the way for more serious unpacific measures against Yugoslavia such as the organizing of anti-Yugoslav trials in Budapest, Sofia, etc., the collective renunciation and unilateral breach of treaties of alliance with Yugoslavia, etc.

The Yugoslav Government gave the following answer to the aforementioned Note from the Soviet Government: "...the Government of the FPRY considers it its duty to point out that the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is an independent and sovereign State and that its peoples and Government are under no condition willing to allow anyone whomsoever to interfere in their internal affairs. Further, the Government of the FPRY underlines that no pressure from abroad has had, nor will it have in the future, any influence on its internal policy. As regards the foreign policy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the Government of the FPRY likewise considers it necessary to emphasize that it is pursuing this policy in accordance with the independence and sovereignty of the country, in accordance with progressive principles of peace and cooperation of peoples and States on a basis of equality and mutual respect of sovereignty, in accordance with international treaties and obligations which were and still are public instruments of the Government of the FPRY. The peoples and the Government of the FPRY are not willing, under any conditions, to renounce these principles under pressure from abroad." Further: "The Government of the FPRY and its most responsible representatives have always expressed their readiness to settle with the Government of the USSR all the disputed issues between the two countries by way of agreement. On this occasion the Government of the FPRY reiterates its determination, and states its readiness, to approach the settlement of all

disputed questions with the Government of the USSR in accordance with, and in the spirit of, the international obligations assumed by both Governments."

In the same Note, the Yugoslav Government proposed to the Soviet Government, despite the fact that there was irrefutable evidence attesting to the guilt of the arrested Soviet citizens, that it would, in the shortest possible period, turn over to the Soviet Government all the arrested persons and also that it would make it immediately possible for all the other Soviet citizens permanently residing in Yugoslavia to leave Yugoslavia if they expressed the wish to do so. (See Document No. 52.)

To this day, the Soviet Government has not answered this proposal of the Yugoslav Government, nor has it agreed to the repatriation of the arrested or of the other Russian émigrés who are Soviet citizens. Obviously, this was not at all a question of the protection of the rights and interests of the Russian émigrés who had re-acquired Soviet citizenship. According to international law, or more precisely, according to the Resolution adopted at the London Session of the UN General Assembly at the proposal of the Delegation from the Byelorussian SSR, all States must make it possible for displaced persons to repatriate to the country of their origin. The Russian émigrés in Yugoslavia, by the very fact that they again acquired Soviet citizenship, manifested the desire to return to their homeland. The Soviet Government, whose representatives at international conferences had been accusing the Governments of other States of rendering impossible the repatriation of Soviet citizens, itself refused to accept its own citizens from Yugoslavia, in connection with whom the Yugoslav Government had made the repatriation offer. It is evident, therefore, that the so-called question of refugees — Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia — was not posed in order to solve that problem but in order that the Soviet Government could take advantage of this to interfere in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. The fact that the Soviet Government gave no answer at all to the Yugoslav Government's proposal proves that it wishes to have the question of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia remain an open one in order to have the opportunity, in some other situation, of posing it again and of continuing to use these former White Guard émigrés, who now have Soviet citizenship, as tools in its anti-Yugoslav policy and for undermining the security of the country which gave them hospitality.

On the other hand, the Soviet Government refuses to repatriate the Yugoslav children who were sent from Yugoslavia to attend school in the Soviet Union although the parents of these children have, through the Yugoslav Government, persistently demanded that they return home. The Soviet Government has still not answered any of the Notes of the Yugoslav Government and the appeals of the parents nor did it make any statement when this question was submitted for discussion in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The increasing pressure from the Governments of the Eastern bloc on Yugoslavia has led to more and more serious violations of Peace Treaties on their part. Thus the Governments of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria are violating the military provisions of these Treaties. They are not adhering to restrictions on the size of their armies and armaments or to other obligations which are supposed to guarantee security to the peoples of Yugoslavia. The Governments of these countries have begun the forcible resettlement of the Yugoslav national minority in their territories which is a flagrant violation of human rights and of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Peace Treaties. By resettling members of the Yugoslav national minority simply because they are of Yugoslav nationality, the Governments of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria have also violated the provisions of the Peace Treaty prohibiting discrimination on the basis of nationality and language. Apart from this, the Governments of Bulgaria and Hungary under the Armistice Agreements undertook the obligation to annul laws imposing their citizenship on Yugoslavs born in territories occupied by Bulgaria and Hungary during the war. Violating these obligations, the Governments of Hungary and Bulgaria have reintroduced laws dating from the time when the Bulgarian and Hungarian fascist armies were occupying parts of Yugoslav territory.

Under the Peace Treaty, Hungary undertook to return to the United Nations in good condition all objects plundered from occupied territories. Apart from that, Hungary assumed the obligation to pay Yugoslavia partial compensation for property plundered and destroyed during the war and occupation. However, in 1948, Hungary simply stopped the payment of reparations and the service of restitution of economic and cultural property. It expelled the Yugoslav Restitution Commission from Hungary, retaining for itself Yugoslav property which had been carried away by force from occupied Yugoslavia by the Hungarian fascist authorities. Similarly, the Bulgarian Government which had assumed like obligations under the Peace Treaty, put a stop to the service of restitution of cultural objects plundered during the war in Yugoslavia. (See Document No. 38.) The Hungarian and Bulgarian Governments thereby trampled underfoot their Peace Treaty obligations. In spite of all its endeavours to have the disputed questions solved by way of direct negotiations, the Yugoslav Government was forced to make use of the procedure provided for by the Peace Treaty and to submit the case of cessation of restitution and reparations by the Hungarian Government to the consideration of the Chiefs of the Diplomatic Missions of the USA, USSR and the United Kingdom in Budapest. (See Document No. 39.) The Soviet Government, however, made consideration of this matter before the Mission Chiefs impossible, thereby extending support to the Hungarian Government in the non-fulfilment of its Peace Treaty obligations. The Yugoslav Government, continuing to act in accordance with the procedure outlined in the Peace Treaty, invited the Hungarian Government to appoint its representative to the Commission provided for by the Treaty. But the latter refused to do so. These Governments behaved in such a manner being conscious that the acceptance of the arbitration mechanism, provided for by the Peace Treaties, would inevitably lead to a series of decisions which would attest before an international forum to their violations of the Peace Treaty.

Later, when the necessity arose to give new impetus to the campaign against Yugoslavia and to make it even more vehement, to construe new "proofs" against Yugoslavia especially during the course of the Fourth Session of the UN General Assembly, at which the Soviet Government could rightly expect that there would be discussion of its aggressive activities against Yugoslavia — the anti-Yugoslav "trials" were organized in the countries of Eastern Europe, with the so-called Rajk "trial" in Budapest as the focal point.

The Laszlo Rajk "trial," which served as a model for similar "trials" in all the countries of Eastern Europe, was an attempt to fabricate the most fantastic accusations against Yugoslavia through abuse of justice, and with the help of mercenaries and victims of police terror. The purpose of these trials was to try to shift upon Yugoslavia and its Government the blame for everything the Governments of the Eastern European countries were doing or intended to do against Yugoslavia. (See Document No. 53.)

The entire course of events which followed Rajk's "trial" revealed the place that had been assigned to this "trial" in the further implementation of aggressive activities against Yugoslavia. The Rajk "trial," at which the Yugoslav Government was calumniated by false accusations, was to serve as the reason for the formal and unilateral breach of the Treaties of Alliance of the USSR and other Eastern European countries with Yugoslavia. A short time afterwards, another Cominform Resolution against Yugoslavia was adopted in Hungary in November, 1949; there were movements by Soviet and other troops on Yugoslav borders and at the Fourth Session of the UN General Assembly, in the fall of 1949, the Soviet Delegation bent all its efforts toward preventing the election of Yugoslavia to the Security Council. This entire premeditated action was accompanied by an unprecedented propaganda campaign which, in some countries such as Hungary, for instance, took up 20 per cent of the space in the most important newspapers.

It should be emphasized, however, that although Yugoslavia was falsely accused at the Rajk "trial" in Budapest of having hostile intentions, primarily against Hungary, the Hungarian Government was not the first one to break off unilaterally the Treaty of Alliance with Yugoslavia. On the contrary, the Soviet Government took the initiative in this faithless act. This clearly shows who primarily considered the Rajk "trial" necessary and for what purpose. The fact that the Soviet Government was the first to cancel the Treaty of Alliance before the other Governments of Eastern Europe did so, was to exert special pressure on Yugoslavia. By this breach and in this flagrant manner, Yugoslavia was informed that the Soviet Government was breaking off the Treaty in which it had undertaken the obligation to respect and guarantee the security and independence of Yugoslavia and that therefore Yugoslavia need no longer count on the Soviet Government's continuing to extend it such guarantees. The Governments of Hungary, Rumania, Poland, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia unilaterally cancelled the Treaties of Alliance with Yugoslavia within only five

days after this had been done by the Soviet Government, stating the same reasons for their breach that the Soviet Government had put forth.

The honouring of international treaties represents the basis of international law and peaceful cooperation among States. This point of view has been supported and is still being supported today in the declarations of the Soviet Government and its representatives and by Soviet law experts. In the book "International Law," published in 1947, by the Law Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in Moscow, among whose authors and editors are Mr. S. B. Krilov, a Judge of the International Court of Justice, and Mr. Durdenievski, Legal Expert and Consultant of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, it is said: "Any treaty, and therefore any international treaty as well, makes it binding upon the parties which concluded it to implement it... In International Law this principle is usually regarded as something which is self-understood, as an axiom, i. e. as a precept which it is not necessary to prove... The mentioned principle *pacta sunt servanda* represents the foundation of all international relations and derives from the very nature of the international community of States. It should be considered that without recognition of this principle there would be no community of nations or International Law at all, for otherwise the door would be open to arbitrary acts and the mastery of sheer force... In effect, the idea of the compulsory honouring of international treaties was not foreign nor was it alien even to the oldest peoples in ancient history and with time it has entered into the framework of the fundamental general principles of contemporary civilization... On the other hand, however, the significance of this idea in the practice of contemporary international relations should not be overestimated. The principle *pacta sunt servanda* has often been violated in the most flagrant manner and in fact almost only by aggressive States. In practice, however, in the foreign policy of Hitler's Germany and its collaborators, the flagrant and sudden violation of international obligations appeared as some sort of definite system." (Page 293.) Further: "The annulment of international treaties is sometimes conditioned, in the opinion of a few representatives of the science of International Law, by a change in the order of things which existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, if it was precisely the unaltered existence of these situations that was taken into consideration (the clause *rebus sic stantibus*)... However, it should be kept in mind that the mentioned clause on unchanged circumstances is often interpreted very broadly, namely in the sense that every change in international circumstances grants the right to the annulment of treaties... Such an interpretation of this clause is used by aggressive countries for the justification of their rapacious foreign policy... International Law prohibits the unilateral and arbitrary breach of international treaties..." (Ibid. page 407.)

The Government of the USSR and the Governments under its influence have, in the short period of two years, unilaterally broken off 46 various kinds of political, economic, cultural and other treaties, agreements and conventions with Yugoslavia. (See Annexes Nos. 2—8.) Such unilateral, arbitrary and sudden breach of all international treaties with Yugoslavia shows that the Governments of the Eastern bloc countries, headed by the Soviet Government, have made a system of the policy of violation of international law and that they employ the policy of the accomplished fact for putting pressure

on and blackmailing Yugoslavia. This is all the more so because neither the Soviet, nor any other Government of the Eastern European countries, has tried in any other way customary in international relations to settle international controversies with Yugoslavia in a peaceful manner. They have rather always adopted unilateral and sudden decisions which is characteristic only of those States which attempt to place themselves above the international community.

Characteristic of this entire campaign against Yugoslavia by the Soviet and other Governments dependent on it have been the endeavours, attempts and intrigues to supplement the total isolation and blockade of Yugoslavia, organized by those Governments in the East, with isolation and blockade of Yugoslavia which would be undertaken by the rest of the world in order to force it, under the weight of such a situation and left entirely to itself, to comply with the orders of a big power. The attempt to achieve this was especially obvious at the Fourth Session of the UN General Assembly when the Soviet Government attempted to prevent and render impossible the election of Yugoslavia to membership in the Security Council by which it not only wished to isolate Yugoslavia but also to lead the UN into silently approving its policy towards Yugoslavia.

On that occasion, the Soviet Delegation committed a series of new violations of international law and the fundamental principles of the UN Charter. The public statements against Yugoslavia's election to the Security Council, made by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky, Head of the Soviet Delegation, at a press conference in this connection, was the first and a unique case in the experience of the United Nations of one country agitating publicly against the candidacy of another specific country. The argument of Andrei Vishinsky that the election of Yugoslavia to the Security Council would be a violation of Article 23 of the UN Charter, which refers to an equitable geographic distribution of seats in the Security Council, is absurd. The election of Yugoslavia to membership in that body filled the seat reserved in the Council for the Eastern European countries since Yugoslavia, as it is well known, is located precisely in that geographical region and not in any other. The assertion that in such an election the temporary member of the Security Council from Eastern Europe must also have the approval of the Soviet Government and the Governments depending on it, is an infringement of the principle of the sovereign equality of States. The adoption of such a point of view would reduce the elections in the General Assembly for the temporary members of the Security Council to nil and would make it impossible for an Eastern European country, which found itself out of grace with the Soviet Government, ever to be elected to the Security Council and to cooperate actively in the UN as a completely equal member of the international community. (See Documents Nos. 61 and 62.)

There was another meeting of the Cominform in November, 1949, in Hungary at which the question of the "situation in Yugoslavia" was again brought up. At this session, which was attended by Prime Ministers, Cabinet Ministers and other of the most responsible State officials of the USSR and the countries of the Eastern bloc, a Resolution was adopted which is a document of open international terrorism. The highest-ranking State functionaries of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania again stated openly in the Resolution adopted at that session, that they would do everything to organize struggle against the internal state of affairs in Yugoslavia, that they would not relent until it had changed and that they would help all those who wanted to take part in these activities, inside or outside Yugoslavia. The Resolution says in part: "The Information Bureau considers that the struggle against the Tito clique of hired spies and murderers" (Editors' note: the legal Government of Yugoslavia with which all the mentioned States have diplomatic relations) "is the international duty of all Communist and Workers' Parties. It is the duty of Communist and Workers' Parties to give all possible aid to the Yugoslav working class and working peasantry who are fighting for the return of Yugoslavia to the camp of democracy and socialism." (Editors' note: to a position of subordination to the Soviet Government.) (See Document No. 60.)

No screen of a "party" document can conceal this open call to terrorist action against Yugoslavia, to rebellion and to the launching of civil war in the country. The fact, however, that there is no difference between the so-called "Party"-Cominform line and the foreign policy line of the Soviet Government and the other Governments mentioned above, can best be seen from the statements made against Yugoslavia by the most responsible Soviet and other State and military leaders who are at the same time the highest-ranking Party leaders in their countries. Vice-Premiers of the Soviet Government, V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov, N. Bulganin and G. M. Malenkov made statements in which, as the representatives of the Government of a big power, they declared in essence the same things said in both Cominform Resolutions against Yugoslavia, viz. they publicly threatened the peoples of Yugoslavia and incited them to forcibly overthrow the legal and internationally recognized Government of a sovereign State. It would not be amiss to mention that some of the foregoing high State representatives of the USSR are at the same time the most responsible military leaders of that country, and that they did not make their statements against Yugoslavia only in Soviet territory but also in the capitals of countries neighbouring on Yugoslavia, that is, in Sofia, in Bucharest and in Budapest. (See Documents Nos. 89—92, and 94—98.)

Statements similar to those against Yugoslavia made by the Soviet leaders were also issued by the most responsible State and military leaders of the other countries of Eastern Europe, like the President of the Polish Republic, Boleslaw Bierut; President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Klement Gottwald; Premier of the Polish Republic, Josef Cyrankiewicz; Premier of the Czechoslo-

vak Republic, Antonin Zapotocky; Premier of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Vlko Chervenkov; Premier of the People's Republic of Albania, Enver Hoxha; the Vice-Premiers of those countries: Roman Zambrowsky, Ililary Minc, Rakosi Matyas, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Vladimir Poptomov; by the Foreign Ministers and the Ministers of National Defence in the afore-mentioned Governments and by a series of other high-ranking State and military officials. It should be mentioned that many of these statements were made while treaties of alliance between Yugoslavia and these countries were still in force. The statements by the State and military leaders of the countries of Eastern Europe, which are identical with those of the Soviet leaders, represent interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign country, the negation of the sovereign rights of the peoples of Yugoslavia, the complete disparagement of their democratic will and gross violation of international law and the fundamental principles of the UN Charter. (See Documents Nos. 102--136.)

The exact reproduction and "elaboration" of the foreign policy of the Soviet Government and the Governments under its influence towards Yugoslavia represent a propaganda campaign organized in these countries against Yugoslavia. This propaganda campaign is being carried out in proportions, with means and in forms that have been utterly unknown in international relations since the end of the Second World War. Ignoring the actual internal situation in Yugoslavia and the existence of a socialist order in it, and distorting to the extent of the most absurd historical falsification the pacific foreign policy of Yugoslavia, the organizers of the aggressive action have in this propaganda set themselves the goal of compromising Yugoslavia in the eyes of international public opinion, of justifying their anti-Yugoslav policy, of abetting the manouvres to isolate Yugoslavia completely and thus to worsen its international position, to poison its international relations with other countries and especially with its neighbours, and to give the masses particularly in their countries the impression that peaceful settlement in relations with Yugoslavia is impossible. This campaign against Yugoslavia, led by the Soviet propaganda which also sets its tone, is sometimes pursued more intensively in this, sometimes in that country of Eastern Europe, in accordance with various internal and foreign requirements. It goes on every day with the greatest intensity and exploits all possible means and forms of verbal agitation, cartoons, films and, first and foremost, the completely controlled press and State radio stations in those countries, as well as the propaganda over which the Soviet Government has succeeded in gaining control in the rest of the world.

In 1941, immediately after occupation by the enemy, Yugoslavia was the only country in occupied Europe which began organizing armed resistance. After June 22, 1941, this resistance broadened into a general people's insurrection under the leadership of those political forces which today stand at the helm of the State. This insurrection, in which the peoples of Yugoslavia suffered over 1,700,000 losses, amazed all freedom-loving mankind and was tendered

the greatest recognition by the highest leaders of the States fighting together in the anti-Hitler coalition. Foremost among them were the highest leaders of the USSR and other countries of Eastern Europe. In spite of these facts, Soviet propaganda and other propaganda subordinated to it has not stopped disseminating the most improbable falsehoods about this struggle which the peoples of Yugoslavia waged not only in their own direct interest but also for reasons of international solidarity and in the interest of all nations. This propaganda claims that the armed uprising of the peoples of Yugoslavia and their socialist revolution were the work of the Gestapo, Hitler's Germany and its agents, (see Documents Nos. 139—142) and that Yugoslavia, in which a socialist order is being developed, supposedly has an "anti-democratic and anti-communist" and even a "fascist régime." (See Documents Nos. 143—147.)

Yugoslavia is a free and independent country outside of all political, military and economic blocs and pacts, a country in which there are no foreign military bases or foreign armies, or even foreign military specialists, which cannot be said of the countries of Eastern Europe which accuse Yugoslavia of aggressive intentions. Although the most responsible leaders of Yugoslavia have often offered formal assurances to the effect that Yugoslavia, as a socialist country, has not and cannot have any kind of aggressive imperialist intentions towards other peoples and countries, statements the like of which have not been made by the most responsible leaders of these countries in relation to Yugoslavia, Soviet propaganda and the rest of the propaganda under its control, have not ceased disseminating offensive falsehoods to the effect that Yugoslavia is a military base for certain big powers and that it is getting ready to attack Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the USSR, Italy, Greece and Austria. (See Documents Nos. 148—161.)

Although there is in Yugoslavia a legal Government elected by the great majority of the people of Yugoslavia, supported by these people during the period of war and during the period of peaceful development, in a time of extensive aggressive pressure from abroad such as no small country has ever been subjected to in modern history by a big power, Soviet propaganda and the propaganda under its control have not ceased calling upon the citizens of Yugoslavia over the State radio stations and by other means to commit the most revolting crimes against their homeland and legal Government, ranging from disobedience to their authorities, strikes and sabotage, desertion, betrayal of the country and breaking oaths of allegiance, to rebellion, civil war, and the overthrow of the legal socialist order in their country. (See Documents Nos. 162—173.)

The anti-Yugoslav campaign in the Soviet press and over the State radio stations, together with the press and State radio stations in the other countries of Eastern Europe, bears witness to the tremendous efforts being exerted by those countries through the propaganda directed especially at the peoples of Yugoslavia, to make them waver in their firmness and unity in the defence of the most vital interests of their country. For instance, the State radio stations of the USSR and the other countries of Eastern Europe broadcast 37 programs a day in the languages of the Yugoslav peoples lasting a total of 15.05 hours a day (and 17.05 hours on Sundays). The duration of these broadcasts

amounts to 19 days, 4 hours and 30 minutes each month. The most important newspapers in the USSR and in the other countries mentioned above published 834 anti-Yugoslav articles from August 1949 to October of the same year, which accounted for an average of 6.5 per cent of the total space of these newspapers. (See Annexes Nos. 21 and 22.)

In trying to justify their aggressive policy towards Yugoslavia, the leading circles in the Eastern European countries and their propaganda persistently repeat the phrases that, supposedly, a "clique" is governing Yugoslavia, that the Yugoslav Government "is not supported by the people" etc., and that the Government policy of these countries is not directed against the peoples of Yugoslavia but "only against the minority," which is presumably "holding the State power against the will of the people."

Consideration will not be given here to the question of whether those who say these things have the political qualifications to do so. This is also not the place for a discussion of whether the Yugoslav Government enjoys the confidence of the people because this is a purely internal matter of the peoples of Yugoslavia who have, through long years of liberation war, proven that they have sufficient political consciousness and experience to determine their attitude towards their own State and Government themselves. But if anything is to be said about this, it is sufficient to point out the complete failure of the anti-Yugoslav policy of the Soviet Government and the Governments of the other Eastern European countries in Yugoslavia. This fact is the best proof that the peoples of Yugoslavia uphold their Government and that this pressure has only consolidated the unity of the people throughout the country and increased their support of the Government which is consistently defending the independence and progress of Yugoslavia.

As far as inter-State relations are concerned, however, the following question should be posed: Does the Soviet Government consider that it is in conformity with the principles of peaceful international cooperation, with the fundamental principles of the UN Charter, and with the principles which the Soviet Government itself formally proclaims in its declarations — for the Government of one State to call the legal Government of another sovereign State, over which it wishes to achieve hegemony, a "minority," "political group" or "clique." In other words, does the Soviet Government consider its having called it such names as sufficient justification for the ruthless violation of all its fixed international obligations and for undertaking and implementing a policy of threats and aggressive pressure against that State? It is obvious that such a conception would mean that the Soviet Government could simply proclaim that its own wishes as to what the Yugoslav Government and its policy should be like are the same thing as the will of the peoples of Yugoslavia. This would mean that the Government of one State appropriates for itself the right to replace and to set up Governments in other smaller States as it sees fit as soon as it meets resistance to its hegemonistic tendencies, and that it can simply make up the assertion that a Government which is defending the freedom and independence of its country does not enjoy the support of its people. Such a policy means destruction of the principle of the sovereign equality of States, one of the fundamental principles on which equal relations in international cooperation are based. This is a road leading to further straining of the international situation and to the danger of new wars.

Referring to the necessity of suppressing warmongering propaganda, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky said: "Tolerating such propaganda means violating the obligations assumed by the member States under Art. 1 of the Charter 'to develop friendly relations among the nations...' Why not prohibit the publication of material serving to instigate war, incite hatred and hostility toward other peoples? Such propaganda is a serious crime against the public interest." (See the Minutes of the Seventy-ninth Meeting of the First Commission, Second Session.) These and similar fine words by Soviet propaganda and Soviet diplomats should in the first place be compared with the propaganda of the Governments of the USSR and countries of Eastern Europe against Yugoslavia, the aim of which is to increase international tension, thereby directly causing the danger of war to grow. Then it may be seen to what extent these words are mere words and to what degree they are contradictory to the foreign policy of the Soviet Government. The war-incitement propaganda against Yugoslavia is contradictory to the foundations of international law and the United Nations Charter and deals a serious blow to peaceful cooperation in the world. It is calculated at artificially causing the international situation to deteriorate and at "intimidating the little man," as Soviet propaganda likes to put it.

Yugoslavia has not been exposed to pressure and attempts to isolate it from international life merely as a person of international law. The same pressure was brought to bear on the largest mass, non-governmental organizations of Yugoslavia. This pressure was exercised not only by the Governments of the USSR and countries of Eastern Europe, but also by the international organizations under their influence, like the World Congress for the Defence of Peace, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the World Federation of Democratic Youth and others. In its action against Yugoslavia, the Soviet Government misused its influence on these international organizations and led them into slandering the large-scale Yugoslav organizations and expelling the leaderships of the latter from these international bodies. All this is a proof that these international organizations are no longer free and that they have become a mere tool for the implementation of the undemocratic policy of one big power. Hence the identical stands of these international organizations in their attitude towards the Yugoslav National Committee for the Defence of Peace, the Yugoslav Trade Union Confederation numbering nearly two million workers and office employees, the Women's Anti-Fascist Front of Yugoslavia with over two million members, the Yugoslav People's Youth Organization also having over two million members, the Yugoslav Journalists' Federation, various sports federations, etc. In a way similar to that in which the Soviet Government is trying to turn the Yugoslav peoples against their legal Government, these expulsions were to turn the members of the Yugoslav organizations against their leaders. The purpose of such acts against the mass social organizations of Yugoslavia was to bring severe pressure to bear on their members, to intimidate them so that they would feel isolated and to render impossible any contact between

the Yugoslav organizations and the peoples of other countries in order to prevent them from becoming acquainted with the real state of affairs in Yugoslavia. (See Documents Nos. 86 and 87.)

A special form of political pressure by the Governments of the USSR and countries of Eastern Europe has been the assault on diplomatic relations, that is, the only kind of relations which actually still exist between Yugoslavia and these countries. The diplomatic Notes and other documents sent by these Governments to the Yugoslav Government have almost entirely the character of pure propaganda which is not at all customary in diplomatic communications among States. The Notes sent by these Governments to the Yugoslav Government contain untrue assertions and imaginary accusations, without citing facts, without putting forward any proposals for the joint solution of the controversial questions. It should be emphasized that all these Governments withdrew their Ambassadors or Envoys by which they also wished to emphasize their hostile attitude towards Yugoslavia and its highest State organs to which they had been accredited. The Governments of these countries, under unfounded pretexts, also asked that Yugoslav Ambassadors in Moscow, Prague and Sofia leave those countries, and similarly proceeded in relation to a large number of the 147 Yugoslav diplomatic and other representatives there, attempting in this way to discredit the Yugoslav diplomatic corps in the eyes of the public of their own countries and of the world. The discrimination against Yugoslav diplomatic missions in these countries and the flagrant forms in which it is effected is without precedent in international relations. Such discrimination not only obstructs the normal work but also threatens the very existence of Yugoslav diplomatic missions in the various countries. As a result of this the Yugoslav Government was forced temporarily to withdraw the entire staff from its Mission in Albania until the Albanian Government should show the willingness to offer the Yugoslav Mission in Albania the elementary possibilities for its work. (See Document No. 71.)

"... The persistent continuation of such measures with respect to our diplomatic representatives in some countries can be interpreted in no other way than as a tendency by the Governments of those countries de facto to break diplomatic relations with our country and to shift upon Yugoslavia the responsibility for such unpacific acts," stated the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Edvard Kardelj, in the Foreign Policy Committee of the Yugoslav National Assembly. "I leave it to the organizers of the Cominform blockade against our country to judge to what extent this policy is an instrument of aggressive pressure and intimidation and to what extent it is the consequence of fear of the mere presence in those countries of the representatives of an independent and free socialist State, such as Yugoslavia. The fact remains, however, that the so-called 'diplomatic relations' of the Eastern European Governments with our country have fallen to the level of mere personal ill-treatment and persecution of our diplomatic personnel." (See Document No. 76.)

Although the matter at hand is a premeditated and uniform plan against Yugoslavia, it should be mentioned that the roles of the various Governments of Eastern European countries in it change from time to time. One moment one country has the "leading role," or takes the "initiative" in some current assignment or hostile act against Yugoslavia, and the next minute this is taken up by another country. The Governments which have most often taken the "initiative" and have had special tasks are those of Bulgaria, Hungary and Albania.

The political forms of aggressive pressure aimed at threatening the political independence of Yugoslavia and interfering in its internal affairs such as, for example, the organizing of terrorist groups of Yugoslav deserters in the above-mentioned countries and their infiltration into Yugoslavia; the Soviet demand, having the nature of an ultimatum, that White Russian émigrés who had re-acquired Soviet citizenship and who were accused of subversive activities against Yugoslavia, be released immediately; the violations of the Peace Treaties; the staging of trials for the fabrication of proofs of Yugoslavia's faithlessness; the unilateral violation and breach of all allied and other treaties, agreements and conventions with Yugoslavia; the attempt to prevent Yugoslavia from being elected to the Security Council and from cooperating in the United Nations on an equal footing; the impeding and destruction of formal diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia; the persecution of Yugoslav citizens; the denial of Yugoslavia's right to equality in the Danube Commission; the attempt to isolate Yugoslav mass and technical organizations from international life; the closing of the borders; the obstruction of traffic by the closing of the frontiers to owners of property on both sides of the boundary line; the hostile statements made by the most responsible State, military and Party leaders of the USSR and Eastern European countries against Yugoslavia; the war-incitement propaganda over the State radio stations and in the press against Yugoslavia, etc. — all these hostile and aggressive activities have been used by the Governments of the USSR and Eastern European countries for bringing pressure to bear on the peoples of Yugoslavia with the aim of confusing and intimidating them, of forcibly changing the existing state of affairs and achieving the hegemony of one foreign power over Yugoslavia.

II.

ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

The aggressive actions undertaken by the Governments of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe against Yugoslavia have encompassed practically all fields of inter-State relations, especially economic relations. The Yugoslav Government has always considered that economic relations among States, regardless of their various social systems, are a firm basis for pacific international cooperation and for its further development.

Obstructing, and, in the final analysis, rendering impossible the economic development of Yugoslavia, was from the very beginning one of the fundamental aims of the pressure on Yugoslavia. This action in the economic field found full expression in the organization of a total economic blockade which, by its scope and ruthless method of implementation, assumed the character of economic aggression in the real sense of the word. At the same time and from the same source, as mentioned above, attempts were made to supplement the economic aggression from the East with blockade from the West in order to put Yugoslavia in a completely hopeless position and to make it impossible for it to continue an independent existence. The initiators of this action wanted to prove their "theory" in practice, a theory to the effect that no small country can win and preserve its independence under contemporary international conditions, that it cannot maintain an independent State existence and build socialism unless it bows down to the USSR, that if it does not do so it will be forced to yield to the other "camp," meaning that it must accept the hegemony of one or the other of the big powers.

The idea, however, of using economic aggression to achieve political purposes in relation to Yugoslavia did not bring about the results which the Governments of the USSR and the other countries of Eastern Europe were aiming for.

The Governments of the USSR and the Eastern European countries are continually emphasizing, especially through their representatives in international forums, that the faithful implementation of trade contracts and agree-

ments concluded abroad by the USSR and the other countries mentioned above issues from the principle that trade in international relations must not be and should not be dependent on the differences which exist in the internal organization and in the systems of the various States and that when two countries conduct trade, both find a mutual interest in doing so. That is the reason for the endeavours by the Soviet Government and the Eastern European Governments to increase their economic relations with all other countries, regardless of their different social systems and regardless of the fact that, at the same time, the political relations between these Governments and some of those countries were extremely strained. In his address on September 27, 1950, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Antonin Zapotocky, said the following: "We have declared and emphasized countless times that we want to maintain peaceful trade relations with other countries regardless of their internal systems."¹) The economic aggression, however, which found expression in the total economic blockade, in the violation and the sudden and unilateral breach of all economic treaties and relations with Yugoslavia, demonstrates that the Soviet and the other Governments mentioned above, did not adhere to the principle supported by their declarations. This is illustrated by the following facts. Soviet Vice-Premier, A. J. Mikoyan, then Minister of Foreign Trade, in answering a direct question put to him at the end of December, 1948, by Yugoslav Foreign Trade Minister, Milentije Popović, in his capacity as Chief of the Yugoslav Trade Delegation, as to whether the Soviet Government would carry out the Agreement on the Delivery of Industrial Installations to Yugoslavia, said the following: "The implementation of the Agreement has been stopped because conditions have changed." Even before the publication of the Cominform Resolution in June, 1948, Soviet Assistant Foreign Trade Minister, Mr. Krutikov, made a similar statement to the effect that trade between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union would decrease for political reasons. (See Document No. 179.) Although Mr. Krutikov's statement was denied by the Soviet side, a communique published in the Soviet press on December 31, 1948, on Yugoslav-Soviet trade, completely confirmed the stand set forth in the statements of Mr. Mikoyan and Mr. Krutikov. The communique read as follows: "As a result of the hostile policy of the Yugoslav Government towards the Soviet Union, owing to which it impossible to maintain broad economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the Protocol provides for eight times less trade between the USSR and Yugoslavia in 1949 than in 1948." In other words it would be necessary for "political conditions" to change in Yugoslavia, meaning that the Yugoslav Government should effect the change in policy wanted by the Soviet Government, that Yugoslavia should be transformed into an economic appendage of the Soviet economy in order to have trade, or rather economic relations, between Yugoslavia and the USSR return to "normal." (See Document No. 181.)

Following are the words uttered by Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Antonin Zapotocky, in the afore-mentioned address on the policy of economic blockade, a policy being implemented against Yugoslavia by the Soviet Government and the Governments of Eastern Europe: "Economic blockade is an old trick of the imperialist capitalists which they use against those who

¹) Address delivered at the session of the Enlarged Presidium of the Central Action Council of the People's Front of Czechoslovakia. Quoted from a news report of the ČTK Agency of September 28, 1950.

do not wish to yield blindly to their will. This weapon was also used against the Soviet Union in the initial stage of socialist development but it proved to be powerless."

The principle of economic cooperation with all countries, regardless of their internal systems, which the Governments of the USSR and the Eastern European countries support in words, has actually been transformed into an economic war which the Governments of those countries are waging against Yugoslavia in the most varied forms, including cancellation of regularly concluded contracts; the circumvention, violation and breach of trade agreements; the complete cessation and breaking off of all economic exchanges; the stoppage of reparations payments, issuing from the Peace Treaty, by Hungary; the obstruction and cessation even of transport and postal connections; the impeding of free navigation on the Danube, etc., etc.

In what manner, however, did the Soviet representatives appraise some far milder forms of economic discrimination in international relations? Following are the words pronounced by the Soviet representative in the League of Nations on November 4, 1931, at the Session of the Special Committee for the Study of the Pact on Economic Non-Aggression:

"It is necessary to say openly that discrimination, taken as a collection of measures aimed against one specific country, can in no case be a means of defence or preservation; it will always be a method of attack ..."

"Sudden and simultaneous cessation of credit to a country and analogous measures in the field of financial policy, if undertaken in an aggressive spirit, are obvious forms of economic aggression ..."

"The first country to introduce measures of economic discrimination should be considered as the aggressor."

An obvious example of such one-sided economic warfare is the cancellation of contracts for purchases already paid for by Yugoslavia which can be seen from the correspondence between the Yugoslav Commercial Attaché in Vienna and the Director of Soviet Enterprises in Austria. Contracts were cancelled, the advances were kept and so far no explanation has been given. (See Documents Nos. 176 and 177.) The other countries of Eastern Europe behaved in a similar manner towards Yugoslavia. Especially typical in this respect was the behaviour of the Rumanian Government, which, even before the Cominform Resolution, began in the first half of 1948 to stop deliveries to Yugoslavia of oil and petrol from wells and refineries which were in the hands of Soviet-Rumanian mixed companies, obviously calculating that the sudden scarcity of liquid fuel would cause serious disorders in Yugoslav economic life. (See Document No. 178.)

Apart from this, some of the Governments of the Eastern European countries also broke off economic treaties and agreements with Yugoslavia formally and unilaterally. Only two days after the publication of the Cominform Resolution of June, 1948, the Albanian Government, flagrantly violating the provisions of international law, unilaterally broke off all economic agreements, conventions and protocols which existed between Yugoslavia and Albania. In this manner the Albanian Government unjustly retained a balance of over three billion dinars from the resources which the Yugoslav Government had given to Albania on credit for the development of Albanian economy. All the endeavours of the Yugoslav Government to settle by agreement the question of debts and credits issuing from economic relations have been futile. (See Documents Nos. 188, 190 and 192.) A year later the Hungarian Government acted in the same manner. It unilaterally broke off the Agreement on Long-Term Deliveries and Yugoslav Counter-Deliveries, retained advances without authorization and simultaneously cancelled all contracts connected with these deliveries although Yugoslavia had, by way of its dollar advances, made it possible for Hungary to purchase from abroad the necessary equipment and raw materials for these deliveries. These unilateral breaches of economic agreements with Yugoslavia, effected in such a manner by the Governments of the Eastern European countries, are practically without precedent, for cases of breach of economic agreements, without a final balancing of accounts and refunds, have been rare in international relations. (See Document No. 194.)

The Governments of the USSR and the Eastern European countries directly or indirectly circumvented, actually violated or broke off all trade agreements they had concluded with Yugoslavia. Since they considered it embarrassing to break off trade agreements with Yugoslavia publicly and formally because of international public opinion, they resorted to methods of circumvention, to actual cancellation of these agreements by the refusal to fix new short-term quota lists within the designated period, quota lists which represented a component part of the trade agreements. In this manner, the Soviet Government, followed by the other Governments of Eastern Europe, first reduced all trade and economic relations with Yugoslavia to a minimum and then broke them off altogether so that today these countries do not have even the slightest economic ties with Yugoslavia. (See Annexes Nos. 23 and 24.)

The economic blockade of Yugoslavia was even implemented by such drastic measures as the complete and permanent cessation of all railway and postal communications with Yugoslavia by the Rumanian Government, contrary to its international obligations. Such a procedure is unprecedented in relations among civilized nations in peace time. (See Documents Nos. 209 and 210.) By various discriminatory measures, the Soviet occupation authorities in Austria obstructed the navigation of Yugoslav craft on the Upper Danube, contrary to the Convention on Navigation on the Danube of 1948, guaranteeing free navigation on that river, without any discrimination whatsoever, to ships flying all flags, which must not be obstructed by the riparian States. (See Documents Nos. 211—214.)

In their ruthless employment of various measures against Yugoslavia, some of these countries even went so far as to refuse economic cooperation with Yugoslavia in cases where it would have a humanitarian character, such as,

for instance, cooperation in the regulation of watercourses for the prevention of floods and for the reclamation of land in the Danube basin and around the Lake of Skadar, which would be in the interests not only of the Yugoslav population in the frontier area, but also of the population on the other side of the Yugoslav borders. (See Documents Nos. 215—218.)

The mixed Yugoslav-Soviet companies known as JUSTA (Yugoslav-Soviet Stock Company for Civil Air Transport) and JUSPAD (Yugoslav-Soviet Danube Shipping Stock Company), had a special place and role in the economic relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

These mixed companies were founded in 1946 with the avowed purpose of serving the acceleration of, and facilitating, the economic development of Yugoslavia. This form of economic cooperation with the USSR was to have secured capital goods and the necessary technical assistance for Yugoslavia, and thereby to have helped its backward economy to develop as rapidly as possible. It should be emphasized, and this was confirmed by the experience of running these companies, that mixed companies are not and cannot be a form of economic cooperation guaranteeing equal relations between their partners. The formal parity (paid-up capital on a 50—50 basis, parity distribution of profits, etc.) was only a screen to conceal direct exploitation and appropriation of profits by the utilization of Yugoslavia's natural resources and of the value created by the labour of the Yugoslav working people. For this reason, in 1947, when the question arose of founding new mixed companies, the Yugoslav representatives said in Moscow that no more such companies should be founded. However, even after the complete breaking off of all economic relations with Yugoslavia, the Soviet Government undertook no measures for the liquidation of the existing mixed companies through which it was reaping economic benefits and attempting to gain control over Yugoslav river shipping and civil air transport. On the contrary, it described the Yugoslav demand for their liquidation as a hostile gesture. These companies became a brake to the economic development of Yugoslavia; they were not a means of assistance but of exploitation and economic subjugation.

Faithful to its contracted obligations and despite such a state of affairs, Yugoslavia did not undertake the unilateral liquidation of these mixed companies. The Yugoslav Government proposed to the Soviet Government that the liquidation of these companies be carried out by way of agreement. This was done by the middle of 1949, with Yugoslavia assuming all the business losses plus considerable material losses issuing from their operation. As one of the conditions for the liquidation, the Soviet Government made an unlawful and unjust request to the effect that Yugoslavia should pay for the amortization of all invested equipment and bear all the losses incurred in the operation of these companies whereas the Soviet Union was to take back from Yugoslavia all that it had invested, and even to receive a compensation for the dismantling, packing and freight expenses involved in the transport of its machines and equipment back to the USSR. The two following examples are sufficient to reveal the way these companies were operated to the detriment of Yugoslavia. The JUSPAD company transported Soviet cargo at the price of 12—18 para for one kilometre-ton, while the price was 42 para for Yugoslav cargo. The JUSTA company took over complete control of civil air navigation in Yugoslavia even refusing to give the Yugoslav State air trans-

port authorities the data needed for their control work. The operation of these mixed transport companies at the expense of the Yugoslav economy is but a pale picture of the degree of exploitation that would have resulted from the establishment of a number of mixed manufacturing companies, which the Soviet Government had been proposing to Yugoslavia. In such companies, undoubtedly, the exploiting tendencies would have been even greater. (See Documents Nos. 195—208.)

All these acts of economic aggression against Yugoslavia undertaken by the Soviet Government and other Governments under its influence reveal the profound discrepancy between the proclaimed principles and the actual practice of the Soviet Government in the economic field in relation to Yugoslavia. Accordingly the Soviet draft resolution proposed at the Fifth Session of the European Economic Commission in 1950, to the effect that the "Economic Commission for Europe advises the Committee for the Development of Trade to elaborate recommendations for the development and promotion of trade among European countries and particularly between the Western and the Eastern European countries, bearing in mind the elimination of discriminatory measures applied by the USA and some European countries in the field of commerce," is simply a propaganda move which cannot conceal the economic discrimination and even less the open economic aggression of the Soviet and other Governments of the Eastern European countries against Yugoslavia.

III.

DIRECT ESPIONAGE AND TERRORIST ACTION BY THE SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA

The organizing of espionage, subversive and terrorist actions against the existing order and the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia has been an especially characteristic form of interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia by the Governments of the USSR and the other Eastern European countries. Such activities prove that the threats and demands having the nature of an ultimatum, the anti-Yugoslav slogans in the Cominform Resolutions, the war-incitement propaganda against Yugoslavia, etc., do not remain mere words but that the Governments of these countries have gone further and organized direct terrorist actions against Yugoslavia. The Soviet Government has often stated that it recognizes as a general rule of conduct in international relations that neither the diplomatic nor the other representatives of the USSR will undertake any subversive actions in other countries. Such a stand by the Soviet Government has been expressed in a series of international documents which it has signed and it has been emphasized as one of the fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy. Long before the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Government became strained, or the Cominform Resolution of June, 1948, was published, however, official Soviet representatives inveigled Yugoslav citizens, the citizens of an allied country, for the Soviet intelligence service, for subversive activities against their country and their legal Government. The Soviet Government thereby violated grossly not only one of the fundamental principles of international intercourse but also its duty as an ally toward a country to which it was bound by a Treaty of Friendship. It thereby simultaneously violated the rules of hospitality which its representatives in Yugoslavia have enjoyed to the greatest possible degree.

In various ways the Soviet authorities attempted to draw Yugoslav officers, who had been sent to academies in the USSR, into the Soviet intelligence service. These attempts increased especially after the publication of the Cominform Resolution of June, 1948, when Soviet military and intelligence officers began openly threatening and blackmailing Yugoslav officers and cadets in the Soviet military academies. (See Documents Nos. 220—223.)

The same kind of attempts to establish connections between the Soviet intelligence service and members of the Yugoslav army were made by the Soviet military representatives in Yugoslavia, for instance, by the Military Attaché in Beograd, Major General Georgi Stefanovich Sidorovich, and his aides, Colonel Zenkovich and Lietunant Colonel Kildishev. Many of the published documents show that they personally inveigled Yugoslav army officers for espionage activities and that they supported and gave assistance in Yugoslavia even to those Yugoslav citizens who had already been exposed as Soviet agents. (See Documents Nos. 224—228.)

The Soviet intelligence service tried to extend its network of agents to other Yugoslav citizens, too, attempting in this impermissible manner to penetrate into various fields of State and social life in Yugoslavia. (See Documents Nos. 229—233.)

Apart from trying to recruit Yugoslav citizens, the Soviet representatives also made use of the Russian White Guard émigrés for the organizing of their intelligence service in Yugoslavia. It should be mentioned that pre-war Yugoslavia was one of the centres of Russian émigrés who were carrying on from Yugoslavia the most intensive kind of anti-Soviet activities. In this they enjoyed the support of the then Yugoslav ruling circles and of certain foreign ones. Many of these people fought in the ranks of the enemies of the October Revolution in Russia and even after its victory they remained irreconcilably hostile to the Soviet Union. In conformity with their stand, and organized in the so-called Russian Protective Corps in Yugoslavia, they collaborated with the invaders during the Second World War. After the termination of hostilities, the Soviet authorities called upon the Russian émigrés to re-acquire Soviet citizenship. Many of them did so but the Soviet Government did not make it possible for them to repatriate to the USSR. Under the guise of the Soviet Repatriation Commissions which rarely repatriated anybody, Soviet organs in Yugoslavia established contact with many émigrés who were reinstated into Soviet citizenship under the condition that they remain in Yugoslavia and work for the Soviet intelligence service. Enjoying the protection of the Soviet Government, such persons were made use of for espionage against the interests of Yugoslavia. (See Documents Nos. 234—237.)

It is clear from the foregoing that the diplomatic and other Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia, abusing its hospitality, their diplomatic immunity and the trust of the peoples of Yugoslavia, of the Yugoslav Government and its State organs, were actually engaged in an underground action against the independence, security and internal order of an allied State since the very establishment of inter-State relations.

After the Cominform Resolution, the diplomatic and other representatives of the Eastern European countries in Yugoslavia also launched the same kind of activities in the second half of 1948. This may be seen from the documents published on the activities of the representatives of Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, Rumania and Czechoslovakia in Yugoslavia. (See Documents Nos. 238—249.) This undermining of the State security of Yugoslavia was not, however, limited merely to the organizing of intelligence networks. The character of the inimical policy towards Yugoslavia is revealed especially by the smuggling of spies, diversionists and terrorists into Yugoslavia. The manner in which these terrorist groups are smuggled into Yugoslavia — even with the help of military units; the way in which they are supplied with false identity papers, machine guns, pistols, hand-grenades, ammunition, tents, binoculars, maps, money, food, propaganda material, etc., and the assignments given to them; the fact that these actions are carried through simultaneously from the countries belonging to one bloc of States from over 20 centres concerned exclusively with the organizing of subversive activities against Yugoslavia, all this bears witness to the existence of one uniform and premeditated plan against Yugoslavia. One

of the purposes behind the smuggling of terrorist groups from Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary and Rumania is to prepare the way for forcible detachment of various parts of its territory from Yugoslavia, which entirely coincides with the plans appearing openly in the propaganda of those countries against Yugoslavia. (See Documents Nos. 250—265.)

The Bulgarian Government has been especially active in this respect. Armed terrorists, recruited from the ranks of Yugoslav deserters and Bulgarian citizens, including professional criminals and even former collaborationists, have on several occasions been smuggled into Yugoslavia from Bulgarian territory with the assistance of Bulgarian State and Party officials and military units along the border. Many of these persons had taken special courses in Bulgaria for terrorist actions under the tutelage of high-ranking Bulgarian officials and were under the administration of the Bulgarian intelligence service centre. The activities of these terrorist groups smuggled from Bulgaria into Yugoslavia has been reflected not only in their espionage and diversionary activities but also in attempts to break the ground for the forcible detachment of the People's Republic of Macedonia from Yugoslavia, which is an expression of the Greater-Bulgarian policy of the present Bulgarian State and Party leaders. The latter will not and do not want to reconcile themselves to the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Macedonian people won their national liberation on the basis of the right of self-determination, through the foundation of the People's Republic of Macedonia within the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

The trials at Niš and Skoplje of terrorists smuggled from Bulgaria who had been apprehended, completely revealed the identity of those organizing these aggressive actions against Yugoslavia as well as the purposes behind these terrorist activities. (See Documents Nos. 254—260.)

The Albanian Government, aiming at the forcible detachment of the regions of Kosovo and Metohija from Yugoslavia, has also been systematically executing similar actions by smuggling groups of terrorists into Yugoslavia. Groups of armed criminals have been smuggled into Yugoslavia for the purpose of carrying out assassinations and other acts of terrorism. They come from special Albanian intelligence service centres which are clearing houses of Yugoslav deserters and various Albanian citizens including members of former quisling and fascist organizations, dating from the time of the occupation, who receive instruction under the guidance of the highest Albanian officials. The trials in the towns of Skoplje and Titograd of apprehended groups of terrorists smuggled from Albania brought to light the hostile intentions of the Albanian Government which considers and hopes that it will be able to achieve them within the scope of an aggressive action against Yugoslavia. (See Documents Nos. 250—253.)

The Hungarian Government also organized similar actions against Yugoslavia, planned on Hungarian territory in the anti-Yugoslav intelligence centre of Szegedin and others. The purpose behind the smuggling of these groups of spies and terrorists, who received instructions for their work also from the Hungarian diplomatic representatives in Beograd, was the same as that of similar groups from Bulgaria and Albania and especially had the aim of provoking dissatisfaction among members of the Hungarian national minority living in Yugoslavia along the border touching upon Hungary. The Novi Sad

trials of members of apprehended terrorist groups who had been infiltrated into Yugoslavia from Hungary have proven the responsibility of the Hungarian Government for participation in this simultaneous aggressive action undertaken by the neighbouring States of the Eastern bloc against Yugoslavia. (See Documents Nos. 261—265.)

Although the Yugoslav Government has often called attention to, and protested against these hostile activities by the Governments of Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary and Rumania and demanded that they be stopped, and although the series of trials proved the responsibility of these Governments, they nevertheless continued these activities and even increased their scope.

In the afore-mentioned Soviet Government Note to the US Government of November 16, 1933, it was underlined that the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States was one of the fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy. Such a stand also found expression in a series of agreements concluded by the USSR with its neighbours Latvia and Lithuania, Poland and Turkey, as well as in Article 2 of the Convention for the Definition of Aggression adopted at the proposal of the Soviet Government and signed on July 4, 1933, by Afghanistan, Estonia, Lithuania, Iran, Poland, Rumania, the USSR, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Article 2 of the Convention for the Definition of Aggression emphasized that: "... the aggressor... shall... be considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions... provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection." This point of view was also confirmed by the Soviet Union after the termination of World War II in the Commission of International Law of the UN when Soviet Representative and Academician Koretski voted for Articles 3 and 4 of the Commission's proposal of the Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, and also when the Head of the Soviet Delegation, Andrei Gromyko, spoke at the Second Part of the Third Regular Session of the UN General Assembly (address referred to above).

The organizing of espionage, subversive and terrorist actions by the Governments of the USSR and of the Eastern European countries against Yugoslavia testifies that these Governments have been trying, by violating the most elementary international obligations, to provoke internal disorders in Yugoslavia by way of direct aggressive actions, to prepare the way for the detachment of various parts of its territory and, in the final analysis, to help one big power achieve domination over Yugoslavia.

These activities against Yugoslavia are serious violations of international law and of the principles contained in the UN Charter. They artificially render international tension more acute and increase the threat to peace. It is not necessary to emphasize that these acts have nothing in common with the spirit and the letter of the "Convention on the Definition of Aggression," the "Pacts on Non-Aggression," the "indivisibility of peace," etc, and with all the other democratic principles of foreign policy which the Soviet Government and its diplomats supported when there was danger of foreign intervention in the USSR, principles which the Soviet Government and its representatives are today supporting in words alone.

IV.

THE USE OF MILITARY POWER ON THE YUGOSLAV FRONTIERS AS A MEANS IN THE POLICY OF AGGRESSIVE PRESSURE

The total "cold war" being waged against Yugoslavia by the Governments of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe has been reflected especially in the military pressure which they have been bringing to bear in the most varied forms on the borders of Yugoslavia. Military pressure is actually the most aggressive form of "cold war." The use of military power as a means of pressure on a State proves that democratic principles in international relations have become alien to the organizers of such acts, and that they have gone so far in this respect as to consider the use of sheer force as a lawful means for achieving their foreign political aims.

The use of military power as a means of pressure has been reflected in the first place in the systematic provocation of incidents by Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania on the Yugoslav borders. It is well known that even in peace time certain cases of unprovoked incidents can occur along the boundaries of States. The reasons for them are easy to investigate and the consequences can be eliminated rapidly, given the existence of good will. This is not, however, the character of the incidents provoked by the Eastern European States on the Yugoslav borders. On the contrary, the large number and the daily occurrence of border incidents, their simultaneous and their identical nature, bear witness to the fact that this is not a question of incidental matters but of planned provocation of disorders and tension on the Yugoslav borders organized in advance. It may be said without exaggeration that there are no boundaries in Europe today where there has been such systematic and planned military pressure as has been applied along Yugoslavia's borders with its neighbours, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania.

The "Survey of Frontier Incidents" (see Annexes Nos. 16—19) reveals that the aforesaid Governments inaugurated their provocation of incidents on the Yugoslav borders in the second half of 1948 after the publication of the Cominform Resolution and that the number of such cases rose from month to month. The peak in the provocation of incidents was reached in the spring and early summer of 1950. For instance, the number of incidents and violations of Yugoslav territory and airspace on the Yugoslav—Bulgarian border was 145 in the entire course of 1949, while it had already risen to 100 in the first half of

1950. The case of incidents provoked by the other neighbouring countries, Albania, Hungary and Rumania, is similar. The total number of all these incidents from the time pressure began to be exerted on Yugoslavia up to the end of December, 1950, is 1,453. This figure alone is sufficient testimony to the intensity of military pressure being exerted by systematic provocation of daily frontier incidents on the Yugoslav borders.

It is not only the number of the incidents but the manner in which they are provoked and effected that reveals their aggressive nature. The documents on frontier incidents published in this book fall far short of exhausting all the forms and manners in which these are executed, although they do point out some of the especially typical ones among them. The provocation of incidents on the Yugoslav borders by Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania consists of frequent opening of fire on Yugoslav border patrols and posts; the crossing of the Yugoslav boundary line by armed soldiers, individually or collectively, and the preparing of ambushes on Yugoslav territory in order to take Yugoslav sentries by surprise and capture them; violations of airspace; the smuggling into Yugoslavia of groups of diversionists, spies, etc., abetted by military units. (See Documents Nos. 266—275.)

On each occasion, the Yugoslav Government has called this to the attention of the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, and warned them about the undesirable consequences of such a state of affairs along the borders. It also protested and sought that the respective Governments undertake measures to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents and provocations on the Yugoslav borders. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Missions of Yugoslavia in these countries sent the afore-said Governments over 90 Notes of Protest to this effect in the course of two years. To these Notes the Yugoslav Government did not receive the kind of answers which are customary in such cases in the relations between neighbouring States. All the Governments of these countries persisted in refusing to recognize the actual state of affairs or at least to agree to joint investigation and ascertainment of facts which the Yugoslav Government brought out in its Notes, such as the killing or wounding of Yugoslav border patrolmen, or the killing or wounding on Yugoslav territory of soldiers from those countries who had participated in provocations against Yugoslavia. Such a stand by these Governments is the reason why the situation on the boundaries not only failed to improve, but, on the contrary, even deteriorated. In view of the above, it is not possible to presume even for a moment that these were irresponsible acts by the frontier organs themselves, for that would mean that the respective Governments were not able to introduce order into their units on the Yugoslav borders in the course of two years, which is obviously to be excluded altogether. It is clear, therefore, that the incidents would cease immediately if the foregoing Governments would show even a little good will in regard to the normalization of the situation on their borders with Yugoslavia.

For the purpose of preventing further incidents and bringing about a normal state of affairs on the Yugoslav borders, the Yugoslav Government proposed to all these Governments the conclusion of agreements for the investigation of frontier incidents and the formation of mixed commissions. The latter would examine on the spot the reasons for each incident, even the smallest

one, and propose measures to the respective Governments for the liquidation of the consequences arising from each one. (See Documents Nos. 278—280.)

However, these Governments are still persistently and publicly refusing to proceed to the liquidation of frontier incidents in the peaceful manner customary among States, which was proposed by the Yugoslav Government. The Rumanian Government openly rejected this proposal under the pretext that it was a "hypocritical manoeuvre" (see Document No. 280), while the Albanian Government indirectly rejected a similar proposal by the Yugoslav Government of September 5, 1949, giving the same reason as the Rumanian Government. It should also be mentioned that relatively large sections of the Yugoslav—Albanian boundary are not demarcated in the prescribed manner. The boundary posts were removed from the frontier line by the Albanian quisling governments during the occupation. The Albanian Government did not answer the proposal of the Yugoslav Government to have boundary marks placed on all sectors of the Yugoslav—Albanian border under the supervision of a mixed commission, although such a state of affairs offers possibilities for constant incidents and conflicts on the frontier. The Hungarian Government broke off the Agreement on Investigation and Ascertainment of Frontier Incidents with Yugoslavia only three months after its conclusion. With the Bulgarian Government there is an arrangement made through exchange of Notes No. 4325 of April 4, 1950, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY, and Note No. 33216 of July 20, 1950, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, for joint investigation of border incidents. This arrangement was made at the initiative of the Yugoslav Government, but the situation on the Yugoslav—Bulgarian border did not change even after its conclusion. This might lead one to believe that the Bulgarian Government, in concluding this arrangement, was not guided by the wish to see an actual improvement in, and normalization of, the situation on the Yugoslav—Bulgarian border, but that it agreed to this step for momentarily opportune political reasons while circumventing it in practice.

It is obvious, however, that no arguments are sufficiently convincing to conceal the unpacific character of the rejection of the Yugoslav Government's proposal. This rejection can only be interpreted as an intention to get a free hand for further provocation of frontier incidents and for attempts to evade the responsibility for such unpeaceable and aggressive acts. In a request addressed to the UN Secretary General on July 10, 1947, (UN Document S/411), the Rumanian Government explicitly stated that it was guided by the principle that requires that "all nations... live side by side, applying conciliatory methods and by practicing the respect of Law," that it "is willing to adhere entirely and without delay to the principles of the United Nations Charter" and that Rumania "accepts all the obligations provided in the United Nations Charter." Similar statements were made by the other three Governments. The Charter, however, explicitly lays down the principle that States should "live together in peace with one another as good neighbors" (Preamble) and the principle of peaceful settlement of all disputes (Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter). Therefore, the aggressive acts of the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania against Yugoslavia are in flagrant contradiction with the United Nations Charter.

The military pressure being brought to bear on Yugoslavia by the Eastern European countries does not find expression only in the provocation of frontier incidents but also in a series of far-reaching and serious military measures which are not customary on the borders of States in peace time. Such measures are, for instance: the erection of barbed wire fences and the planting of field mines along the frontiers, the digging of trenches, the construction of machinegun nests and emplacements for mortars and artillery, the building of observation posts and the play of searchlights on Yugoslav territory. Apart from this, special administrative measures are being introduced and freedom of movement is being restricted in the frontier area between these countries and Yugoslavia. The civilian population in these regions is being resettled, army barracks and camps are being set up along the borders facing Yugoslavia, apartment and public buildings are being requisitioned for military use and a large number of permanent garrisons are being established along the border where there were none earlier. The border regions are being made capable of use for military purposes by the intensive construction of new roads, by the maintenance of those roads already existing and the building of networks of operational airports. Military units are being brought to the same regions for training in tactics in larger numbers than before. Large-scale manoeuvres are being carried out, all of them having the same underlying idea — attack operations in the direction of Yugoslavia. All this is accompanied by intense anti-Yugoslav propaganda in the armies of these States.

Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary are not honouring the provisions of the Peace Treaties in respect to the number of men under arms or the type of armaments. The armed forces of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary surpass by far already today the number established by the Peace Treaties. The armies of these countries are continuing to grow by the calling up of new reserves. In arming, these countries are introducing bombers and tanks over the specifications on weight and number contained in the Peace Treaties. The mobilization preparations are being brought to a close with the aim of shortening as much as possible the time it takes to mobilize. These mobilization measures consist of registration of reservists, means of transportation and livestock and the determination of their assignments in case of war in numbers exceeding the needs of protection of the boundaries, which should be the only aim of these armies according to the Peace Treaties.

In these countries, the production of armaments of the type and calibre used by the Soviet Union is increasing. The armaments stocks in these armies are also growing with the help of deliveries direct from the Soviet Union. It should be mentioned here that the Soviet Union, as the country making the deliveries and, at the same time, as a signatory of the Peace Treaties, knows very well that the armaments thus delivered are not in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania either as to type or quantity.

Apart from this it should be stated that the armies of all the Eastern European countries, and especially those neighbouring on Yugoslavia, have as military advisers and instructors Soviet generals, officers and military experts in all levels of command and military institutions while, at the same time,

marshals of the the Soviet Union hold public anti-Yugoslav speeches in these countries.

The military pressure on Yugoslavia is considerably increased by the presence of Soviet troops and the movements which they carried out along the Yugoslav borders at the end of 1949 and at the beginning of the summer of 1950. The Soviet troops stationed in Rumania and Hungary in the areas bordering on Yugoslavia do not have the character of transient troops or troops to guard the roads and railways leading to Austria as provided in the Peace Treaty. Their presence rather represents direct military pressure on Yugoslavia. Otherwise, there could be no explanation for the unjustified stationing of considerable contingents of Soviet troops in the immediate vicinity of the Yugoslav border, that is, in the region of Timisoara in Rumania and Szegedin—Baja in Hungary.

These facts, to which the Yugoslav Government has officially called attention and which have been noted by the world press, have still not been denied, either officially or formally, by the Soviet Government or by the Governments of the States where these measures are being carried out although it has also been emphasized that the absence of such denials is characteristic.

The purpose of this rattling of arms and the deliberate abstention from the issuance of any sort of denial of the reports on troop movements along the Yugoslav borders and about military preparations against Yugoslavia is, apart from other things, to frighten and confuse the Yugoslav public and to discourage the Yugoslav working people in their great task of the socialist development of their country. Its aim is also to force Yugoslavia to undertake security measures which will obstruct and render impossible the economic development of the country, the raising of the living standard and the achievement of the Five Year Plan. The exertion of military pressure on Yugoslavia by the creation of a tense situation on the Yugoslav borders is intended to make the international position of Yugoslavia more difficult and to have a negative effect on the development of economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and those countries that are not dependent on the USSR.

Matters, however, did not stop there. The Government of the USSR and the Governments of the other countries under its influence go still further and accuse Yugoslavia of aggressive intentions towards the USSR and all the other countries in the Soviet sphere of influence and of all the intentions, aims and acts which they themselves are already executing or planning against Yugoslavia.

Through newspapers and over radio stations, the official propaganda of the USSR and the Eastern European countries is, for instance, accusing Yugoslavia of having permitted the establishment of an American naval base on the Island of Korčula in the Adriatic Sea; they say that all the more important railways and highways, built by voluntary youth labour after the war in Yugoslavia have a military-strategic character and were constructed as part of aggressive preparations by Yugoslavia against the USSR and the other Eastern European countries. They claim that foreign military missions visit Yugoslavia with the aim of organizing these aggressive preparations, that Yu-

Yugoslavia has been transformed into a military base of the USA and Great Britain, etc. Many prominent personalities from various groups, and representatives of peace movements throughout the whole world have visited Yugoslavia and all the places mentioned. The Yugoslav Government permitted the visits of these people and groups who came for the sole purpose of investigating on the spot the accusations made against Yugoslavia by the Governments of the USSR and the other countries of Eastern Europe. Despite the fact that all of them were convinced of the falsity of these and similar accusations and informed world public opinion of this, while they were at the same time prevented from visiting Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, the propaganda of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe and that propaganda under their influence in other places in the world unscrupulously continue to broadcast such falsehoods and fabrications.

The accusations about the aggressiveness of a peace-loving country such as Yugoslavia would be ludicrous were it not for the fact that they simultaneously reveal the purposes behind the aggressive policy of a big country towards this small one. By these unheard-of accusations about the aggressiveness of Yugoslavia, attempts are being made to artificially provoke not only hostility but a bellicose disposition towards Yugoslavia among the people in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe and to try to justify this aggressive policy before the public in the rest of the world.

Even if all these accusations against Yugoslavia had not been formally and solemnly denied by the highest representatives of Yugoslavia on many occasions, it would be foolish to imagine that a small country which has devoted itself entirely to constructive work, which needs peace for the accomplishment of a great internal renaissance, which is not a member of any military bloc or alliance, which has no political or military pacts with any other country and no foreign military bases, no foreign troops and no foreign military instructors and advisers on its territory which is pursuing a consistently peace-loving foreign policy — that this small country was getting ready for a great conquest. In his address on the occasion of the termination of Yugoslav army manoeuvres on October 3, 1949, the Yugoslav Premier, Josip Broz-Tito, said: "... Since the end of the war and since we began the peaceful development of our country, we have not even contemplated taking anything by force of arms or threatening anybody. I am saying this because in the present phase of attacks on our country, the USSR and the other Eastern countries want to portray it as a country of aggression ..."

"... No one, regardless of who he might be, can threaten such a country with war simply because the people of that country do not wish to bear silently all kinds of insults and slanders but defend themselves from them with true facts." (See Document No. 285.)

Owing to their diplomatic nature and to the peace-loving endeavours of the Yugoslav Government, the documents published in this book give only an approximate picture of all the forms and methods of pressure and threats which the seven Governments listed use in their extensive, coordinated, aggressive activities against Yugoslavia.

In summarizing everything that has been said so far on the basis of these documents, it can be observed unequivocally that the fabrications of the supposed political and ideological deviations of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was actually to serve the deception of public opinion in the world in order to justify the subordination of the Yugoslav State, the Yugoslav economy and the Yugoslav peoples. This was a premeditated step to draw into the struggle against Yugoslavia other Governments and movements in the world which are under the influence of the Soviet Union. This further shows that the Soviet leaders do not allow ideological struggle, disagreement of ideas and political differences to serve as a democratic form of struggle of ideas and that they are attempting to take advantage of imaginary and artificially provoked disagreements and differences to impose their will on other States.

After the Second World War the peoples of Yugoslavia expected the establishment of mutual relations among the countries of Eastern Europe that would be based on the free will of their peoples and States and would create closer ties between the countries, peoples and economies involved. They expected that these relations would be an example to the rest of the world of genuinely peace-loving and democratic cooperation among peoples, and that they would represent the inauguration of an era of lasting peace in which there would be no more wars since free and equal peoples do not have and cannot have any conflicting interests. Such relations were to have been a great example to a war-weary mankind and to offer the perspective of a better future. Unfortunately, the entire development of relations among these countries unfolded in the opposite direction owing to the hegemonistic policy of a big power which, as the "leading force," the "leading nation," the "leading State," the "leading culture" etc., and so forth, has pretensions to imposing its will on other free and independent peoples and forcing them to accept relations of inequality. Such a policy, like any policy of forcible imposition of foreign hegemony on free peoples and independent States, is a blow to the desire for peace and one more source of danger of new wars. That is why Yugoslavia, in resisting the imposition of foreign hegemony, is simultaneously defending not only democratic principles in international relations but also the general interests of peace and peaceful international cooperation. By this whole aggressive action against small socialist Yugoslavia, the Soviet Government has simply revealed the nature of the real intentions of its policy in international affairs.

Finally, the documents published here show that in its attitude towards Yugoslavia the Soviet Government has, in contradiction with all the proclaimed principles of its foreign policy, violated and trampled underfoot the fundamental principles of international law and the UN Charter as well as solemnly undertaken obligations.

V.

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS FOR HONOURABLE AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE

Since the termination of World War II, the peoples of Yugoslavia, led by their Government, have devoted themselves to peaceful and constructive work for the economic and cultural development of their country. That is why they are vitally interested in the maintenance of peace along their borders. Yugoslavia and its Government respect the right of every people to self-determination which includes the right to establish and maintain its own national sovereign State. The Yugoslav Government is of the opinion that every State has the right to existence, full independence and sovereign equality with other States and also to protect and to guard its rights, its existence and its territorial integrity. The new Yugoslavia cannot have any aggressive intentions towards other countries and that is why its peoples and Government continue to have sincere friendly feelings for all the peoples of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe, despite the policy the Governments of these States are pursuing in regard to Yugoslavia. The peoples of Yugoslavia and its Government are determined and resolute in their opposition to any effort to threaten their own independence or that of any other nation or to interfere in the internal affairs not only of their own State but other States, too, be they great or small.

It is precisely because of its consistent defence of democratic and progressive principles in international relations, of its struggle for real equality among nations and States and the free internal and national development of all peoples, that Yugoslavia has become the target of the hostile policy of the Government of a big power which considers it a part of its sphere of influence. However, Yugoslavia and the real situation in it have proven to be mightier than all propaganda falsehoods and the attempts to destroy Yugoslavia's independence by subversive actions from within and pressure from outside. This has demonstrated in an obvious manner that no kind of pressure, regardless of its source, its intensity or its aggressiveness, has been able to destroy Yugoslavia's independence from within.

In numerous Notes sent to the Governments of the USSR and Eastern European countries and in a series of statements made by the most responsible State leaders inside the country, in various international forums and in the

UN General Assembly, the Yugoslav Government has been constantly proposing and expressing its readiness for an honourable and peaceable solution of this dispute. From the very moment that the controversy flared up to the Fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Yugoslav Government has not ceased investing its efforts in the pacific settlement of this situation by way of agreement. (See Documents Nos. 282—291.)

In the statement made on May 25, 1950, to the Association of United Nations Correspondents, the Yugoslav Premier, Josip Broz-Tito, said the following:

"These elements in the relations between States which constantly lead to increasing mutual tension should be removed immediately. Foremost among these elements are the unequal relations between big powers and small nations, interference in the internal affairs of small countries, the tendency towards political and economic subjugation of economically weaker and less developed countries, the hindrance of the independent development of peoples who for one reason or another did not have their own State in the past." (See Document No. 289.)

These are the foundations of international cooperation which no Government claiming that it is pursuing a democratic and pacific foreign policy can reject. It is on this basis that the Yugoslav Government is endeavouring to maintain relations with all countries and also to establish normal and proper relations with the Governments of the USSR and the Eastern European countries. In this connection, it desires to solve by way of agreement all the questions which those Governments consider to be disputed ones, in a manner which would neither infringe upon the prestige of those countries nor upon the sovereignty and equality of Yugoslavia.

It should, however, be especially emphasized that all these sincere and consistent endeavours and efforts on the part of the Yugoslav Government have so far brought no results. It is generally typical that, since the well-known letters were sent by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), the Soviet Government had never proposed to the Yugoslav Government joint consideration and solution of even one single question it considered controversial, even the least important, whether by way of direct diplomatic negotiations or by any other method customary in international relations. Instead, the Soviet Government, as the documents published show, has been consistent in its pursuance of a policy of the accomplished fact towards Yugoslavia. According to the UN Charter, all member-States are under the obligation to settle by peaceful means all their differences and the situations that may arise. They are not only under the obligation not to resort to force, but also not to use the threat of force as a method of solving international disputes. If a State seeks satisfaction and does not get it, it must try to solve that controversy in a peaceful manner, either through the UN or outside of it, by diplomatic negotiations, by the mediation of a third party, by arbitration, etc. In its relations with Yugoslavia, however, the Soviet Government has so far systematically avoided all these pacific methods of solving disputed issues, contrary to all the official statements made by the Soviet Government and its spokesmen. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, for instance,

made a statement in connection with the peace drive to the effect that "the Soviet Government, which has consistently supported peace and cooperation among the nations, will continue persistently to pursue this policy of peaceful and friendly relations among peoples and undertake the necessary measures through the UN, while also making use of all other ways, to ensure peace and international security." In the UN General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Vishinsky, has at UN Sessions often sharply condemned war-mongering and the policy of war threats, emphasizing that the Soviet Government has always remained an adherent of equality among States. It was in this spirit that he proposed a resolution to the Fourth General Assembly Session in which the Soviet Government particularly emphasized its devotion to the policy of solving all disputes by peaceful means. In the general debate at the Fifth General Assembly Session on September 20, 1950, Andrei Vishinsky said the following: "As regards foreign political relations, the USSR has taken and is taking a stand for the strengthening of friendly relations and cooperation with all nations which aspire to that goal."

Can the exercise of political, economic, military and other kinds of pressure on Yugoslavia be brought into harmony with such a proclamation of the policy of friendly relations and international cooperation? Does economic aggression against Yugoslavia represent a means of democratic and pacific cooperation among peoples? Can the provoking, organizing and inciting of terrorist actions for the creation of disorders in Yugoslav territory and for the detachment of various of its parts coincide with the policy of respect for the sovereignty and independence of other peoples and States? Can the war-mongering anti-Yugoslav propaganda broadcasts by the Soviet and other State radio stations, also being used by a handful of Yugoslav exiles who are paid foreign agents, concur with the interests of the maintenance of peace in the world which the Soviet Government has proclaimed as the fundamental postulate of its entire foreign policy and diplomacy? What explanation can be offered for the constant rejection by the Soviet Government of all the Yugoslav Government's proposals for the honourable and peaceful settlement, by way of agreement, of the situation that has arisen, despite the solemnly proclaimed principles of Soviet foreign policy to the effect that all international disputes should be settled by peaceful methods.

In spite of all the unsuccessful attempts, the organizers of these aggressive actions are not showing any signs of stopping the use of means impermissible in international relations to impose their will on Yugoslavia. On the contrary, the pressure on Yugoslavia is growing constantly and therefore represents one of the most serious and dangerous sources of the undermining and threatening of the peace in the Balkans and thereby in the world. The aggressive action against the sovereignty and independence of Yugoslavia is not and cannot be a matter of the peoples of Yugoslavia alone and their relations with this or that specific country. It is rather a part of the general question of maintenance of peace in the world and international security, a part which it is impossible to consider separately from these problems. No person, desiring peace in the world, no movement fighting for peace, no Government sincerely pursuing a peaceful policy can or should shut their eyes to the situation existing today in the relations between Yugoslavia and the Governments of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe, for the actions of these countries towards

Yugoslavia are a constant source of unrest and uncertainty in the world, increasing international tension and representing a serious threat to peace.

By its entire policy, by its active participation and constructive cooperation in international forums and in the UN, the Yugoslav Government is proving every day that it desires to establish truly peaceful and friendly cooperation with all forces fighting sincerely for peace and with all countries wishing to have such relations with it. The Yugoslav Government reiterates that it wishes to establish such relations also with the Governments of the USSR and the Eastern European countries on the basis of equality and mutual respect of independence and sovereignty, in the interests of peace and pacific international cooperation. The Yugoslav Government is, however, forced to observe that, owing to the persistent rejection of all its proposals so far by the Soviet and other Eastern European Governments for a peaceful solution of the dispute, it has not been in a position to improve these relations and therefore does not bear any responsibility whatsoever for their present state.

"The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia notes with regret," stated Premier Josip Broz-Tito, in his report to the National Assembly on April 27, 1950, "that owing to the persistently hostile attitude of the USSR and the countries of of people's democracy towards the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia it is not, on its part, in a position to influence the improvement of relations with these countries. This regret is all the greater since both the Government and the peoples of the new Yugoslavia continue to have friendly feelings for the peoples of those countries and have a strong desire to maintain relations with those countries, that are at least to some extent more tolerable, normal relations."

The Yugoslav Government has not so far brought this question before the United Nations because it has attempted to settle it by direct diplomatic negotiations between the directly interested parties. However, unless the Governments of the USSR and the other Eastern European countries show their readiness to find a way to settle this question peacefully, a question which represents a danger to peace, the Yugoslav Government will be forced to pose it before the United Nations.

The Government and the peoples of Yugoslavia state once again that they have denied no one the right to criticize Yugoslavia, its policy and conditions in it according to his own conceptions. The Government and the peoples of Yugoslavia, of course, realize that they, too, have this right to an equal extent. When, however, it is a matter of the behaviour of the Governments of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe towards Yugoslavia, then it is not a question of the right to criticize but of aggressive pressure on a sovereign State accompanied by war-incitement propaganda, economic blockade, aggressive threats, and so on. That is why the peoples and the Government of Yugoslavia would like to hear the answer of the Governments of the USSR and the Eastern European countries to the following questions:

1. Will the Governments of the USSR and the Eastern European countries stop aggressively threatening Yugoslavia?
2. Will these Governments renounce interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia?
3. Will they stop the economic blockade against Yugoslavia?
4. Will they stop straining their relations further with Yugoslavia?
5. Do these Governments want to maintain peaceful and proper relations with Yugoslavia at all?

The peoples of Yugoslavia would like to hear the answers to these question from those who so frequently emphasize the peaceful character of their foreign policy.

The most vital interests of the liberty and independence of a small socialist country, the most vital interests of peace and security in the Balkans and in the whole world, urge that the Governments of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania put an end to their aggressive activities against Yugoslavia and that they take into account the question of international peace and security in this part of the world.

I

POLITICAL FORMS OF AGGRESSIVE
PRESSURE

1. ATTEMPT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO REPRESENT THE POLICY OF PRESSURE AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA AS "PARTY CRITICISM" — OPEN CALLS TO THE PEOPLES OF YUGOSLAVIA TO OVERTHROW THEIR LEGAL GOVERNMENT

ARBITRARY WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS FROM YUGOSLAVIA

DOCUMENT No. 1

FROM A LETTER BY THE YUGOSLAV PREMIER, J. B. TITO, TO SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER, V. M. MOLOTOV, OF MARCH 20, 1948

"On March 18, General Barskov⁽¹⁾ advised us of the receipt of a telegram from Marshal Bulganin, Minister of National Defense of the USSR, informing us that the Government of the USSR had decided to withdraw immediately all military advisers and instructors with the motivation that they were 'surrounded by an uncomradely attitude,' namely, that they were not treated in a friendly way in Yugoslavia.

"Of course, the Government of the USSR may recall its military specialists whenever it chooses to do so, but the reasons stated by the Government of the USSR for this decision amazed us. After examining, on the basis of this charge, the attitude of lower officials in our country towards the Soviet military advisers and instructors, we were completely convinced that such an explanation of their withdrawal was out of place, that throughout their stay in Yugoslavia the attitude towards them was not only good but brotherly and most hospitable, as is customary with regard to Soviet people in the new Yugoslavia. This is, therefore, strange and incomprehensible to us and affects us deeply, since we do not know the real cause of this decision of the Government of the USSR."

⁽¹⁾ General Alexey Nikolayevich Barskov, Chief of the Soviet military advisers in Yugoslavia.

FROM A LETTER BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS) TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA, OF MARCH 27, 1948

"With respect to the matter of the recall of military advisers, the sources of our information are statements made by the officials of the Ministry of the Armed Forces and communications from the advisers themselves. It is a known fact that military advisers were sent to Yugoslavia, after repeated requests by the Yugoslav Government, in a considerably smaller number than requested by the Yugoslav Government. Consequently, the Soviet Government had no intention to impose its advisers upon Yugoslavia.

"Later, however, the Yugoslav military leaders, including Koča Popović,⁽¹⁾ ventured to state that it was necessary to reduce the number of Soviet military advisers by 60 per cent. Different reasons were given for this statement: some said that the Soviet military advisers were very expensive for Yugoslavia; others contended that the Yugoslav Army did not need to adopt the experience of the Soviet Army; others again declared that the regulations of the Soviet Army were stereotyped and inflexible and that they were of no value to the Yugoslav Army; others, finally, made very plain allusions to the effect that the Soviet military advisers were being paid for nothing, since they were of no use..."

"As the Yugoslav Government did not check these attempts to discredit the Soviet Army, it bears the responsibility for the situation that was created."

FROM A LETTER BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS) TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA, OF MAY 4, 1948

"Concerning the recall of Soviet military advisers from Yugoslavia. In its letter of March 27, 1948, the CC of the CPSU(B)⁽²⁾ stated the reasons for the recall of the Soviet military advisers declaring that the information of the CC of the CPSU(B) was based on the complaints of these advisers against the hostile attitude of the Yugoslav officials towards the Soviet Army and its representatives in Yugoslavia. Comrades Tito and Kardelj completely deny the justifiability of these complaints. The question arises: why should the CC of the CPSU(B) have more faith in the mere words of Comrades Tito and Kardelj than in the repeated

⁽¹⁾ Koča Popović, Colonel General, Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army.

⁽²⁾ Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks).

complaints of the military advisers of the USSR? On what grounds? The USSR has military advisers in almost all the countries of people's democracy. We cannot but stress that so far we have not had any complaints from our military advisers in these countries. This accounts for the fact that we have had no disagreements in these countries in connection with the work of the Soviet military advisers there. We have had complaints and disagreements of this nature only in Yugoslavia. Is it not clear that this circumstance is to be explained only by the particular and hostile regime to which the Soviet military advisers are subjected in Yugoslavia?

"Comrades Tito and Kardelj refer to heavy expenditures in connection with the maintenance of Soviet military advisers in Yugoslavia, and point out that Soviet Generals in Yugoslavia receive, in dinars, three to four times as much as Yugoslav Generals and that, in their opinion, this fact might have given rise to objections on the part of the Yugoslav military personnel. But, firstly, the Yugoslav Generals, in addition to dinars, also receive other allowances in kind: lodging, supplies, food and the like. Secondly, the salary received by the Soviet Generals in Yugoslavia fully corresponds to the amount of money received by the Soviet Generals in the USSR. Naturally, the Soviet Government could not consent to a reduction of the salary of Soviet Generals sent to Yugoslavia.

"It is possible that expenditures for the Soviet Generals in Yugoslavia were heavy for the Yugoslav budget, but, if this were the case, the Yugoslav Government should have addressed a timely proposal to the Soviet Government to take a part of the expenditures upon itself. The Soviet Government would certainly have consented to this. However, the Yugoslavs took another course: instead of solving the situation in a friendly manner, they began to slander our military advisers, to call them parasites, to discredit the Soviet Army, and the Yugoslav Government addressed itself to the Soviet Government only after a hostile atmosphere had been created around the Soviet military advisers.

"It is easy to understand that the Soviet Government could not reconcile itself to such a situation."

DOCUMENT No. 4

FROM A LETTER BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA TO J. V. STALIN AND V. M. MOLOTOV, OF APRIL 13, 1948

"It was clearly expressed and established at the plenum of the CC of the CPY(*) that S. Žujović and A. Hebrang, members of the CC of the CPY, were chiefly to blame for giving incorrect and slanderous information to Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia both regarding alleged statements made by certain leading people, and our Party in general. By giving such inaccurate and slanderous information they wanted to conceal their anti-Party activities and the tendencies and attempts on their part,

(*) Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

which had been manifested much earlier, to disrupt the unity of the leadership and the unity of the Party in general. Besides, information given by such people can be neither impartial, nor well-intentioned, nor accurate, and it usually has definite purpose. In this case the information has the aim of doing harm to the leadership of our Party, i. e. the new Yugoslavia; of aggravating the already hard task of developing the country, of preventing the fulfilment of the Five Year Plan and, by this token, the realization of Socialism in our country. We cannot understand why the Mission of the USSR has to this day not attempted to verify such information — first by contacting responsible people in our country, or by trying to obtain an explanation either from the CC of the CPY or from the Government. We consider the giving of such information as anti-Party as well as anti-State activity, because it has a negative effect on the relations between our two countries.

"No matter how deeply one might love the country of Socialism, the USSR, one should under no circumstances feel less love for his own country, which is also building Socialism, in this case the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, for which hundreds of thousands of its most progressive men have given their lives. We know very well that this opinion prevails in the Soviet Union as well.

"We are extremely surprised that this matter was not brought up while Kardelj, Djilas and Bakarić were in Moscow as delegates of our Party and Government.^(*) Your letter shows that your Government was in possession of this, and similar, information before our delegation came to Moscow. We think that both the question of the treatment of military and civilian specialists and other ones as well could have been put to our delegation then.

"We consider that our Government should have been informed through this delegation, or even earlier in some way, that the Soviet Government was not satisfied with the attitude of our people towards the Soviet specialists and that this matter should be settled in one way or another. Thus it came to pass that the Government of the USSR, by its decision to withdraw military and civilian specialists, placed us before an accomplished fact and in doing so caused us unnecessary difficulties.

"As regards the withdrawal of Soviet military specialists, we do not see any other reason which might have induced the Government of the USSR to do this, except our decision to reduce their number to the minimum owing to financial difficulties. As early as 1946 the Yugoslav Premier, Tito, officially informed the Ambassador of the Soviet Government, Lavrentiyev,^(*) that for several reasons it was almost impossible for us to pay such high salaries to Soviet military specialists and he asked

(*) The Delegation of the Government of the FPRY and of the CPY visited Moscow in the second half of February, 1948, at the invitation of the leadership of the USSR in order to consider questions regarding relations between Balkan and Danubian countries. During these talks the Soviet leadership expressed dissatisfaction because of rapprochement among Balkan and Danubian countries outside the scope determined by the Soviet leadership and consented to by it.

Vladimir Bakarić, President of the Government of the People's Republic of Croatia.

(*) Anatoly Iosifovich Lavrentiyev, from April 16, 1946, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR to the FPRY. Now Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR. The USSR Government has still not informed the Government of the FPRY of the recall of Lavrentiyev from his post of Ambassador in Beograd.

him to notify the Government of the USSR of this and of our wish that it should alleviate the conditions relative to the salaries of specialists. Ambassador Lavrentiyev transmitted the reply of the Soviet Government that the salaries could not be reduced and that we were free to act as we thought proper. Tito immediately told Lavrentiyev that we should, therefore, have to reduce the number of the above-mentioned specialists as soon as it would be possible to do so without great detriment to the training of our Army. The salaries of the Soviet specialists were four times as high as the salaries of our army corps commanders and three times as high as the salaries of our Federal Ministers. The commander of an army corps, with the rank of Lieutenant General or Colonel General, at the time received from 9—11,000 dinars a month, while a Soviet military specialist with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel or General received 30—40,000 dinars. At the same time our Federal Ministers received a salary of 12,000 dinars a month. Naturally, we felt this was not only financially burdensome, but also politically incorrect, because it gave rise to misunderstanding among our people. Consequently our decision to reduce the number of Soviet military specialists results only from the reason we have stated and from no other reasons. On the other hand, we do not exclude the possibility that some of our people made some inappropriate remarks. In such cases we should have been forwarded verified evidence and then we would undoubtedly have taken steps to prevent this happening in the future. We should also mention here that certain Soviet specialists did not always behave as they should and that this caused dissatisfaction among our people. Such behaviour probably provoked, against our wishes and orders, various remarks which were later distorted and in such distorted form forwarded to the Command of the Soviet Army. We, however, consider these to be matters of such slight significance that they ought not to impair our State relationships."

ARBITRARY WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET CIVILIAN SPECIALISTS FROM YUGOSLAVIA BEFORE SCHEDULED TERMS

DOCUMENT No. 8

**FROM A LETTER BY THE YUGOSLAV PREMIER, J. B. TITO, TO SOVIET
FOREIGN MINISTER, V. M. MOLOTOV, OF MARCH 20, 1948**

"Furthermore, on March 19, 1948, I received a visit from the Chargé d'Affaires Armaninov⁽¹⁾ who informed me of the contents of a telegram in which the Government of the USSR ordered the withdrawal from Yugoslavia of all civilian specialists as well. The reasons stated for this decision are incomprehensible to us and astonish us."

⁽¹⁾ Dimitriy Mihallovich Armaninov, then Counselor of the USSR Embassy and USSR Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

FROM A LETTER BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS) TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA, OF MARCH 27, 1948

"Lavrentiyev's statement, furthermore, shows something contrary to what you allege — viz. that the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia are under surveillance by the Yugoslav security organs.

"It is not superfluous to mention that we meet with a similar practice of surveillance over Soviet representatives only in bourgeois countries, and not in all of them at that.

"We must also note that the Yugoslav security organs shadow not only the representatives of the Soviet Government but also the representative of the CPSU(B) in the Cominform, Comrade Yudin.^(*)

"It would be ridiculous to imagine that the Soviet Government can agree to keep its civilian specialists in Yugoslavia under such conditions as have been created for them.

"Evidently, here again the responsibility for the conditions created lies with the Yugoslav Government.

"These are the reasons which compelled the Soviet Government to recall its military and civilian specialists from Yugoslavia."

FROM A LETTER BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA TO J. V. STALIN AND V. M. MOLOTOV, OF APRIL 13, 1948

"The assertions in your letter that our state security organs shadow the Soviet specialists and other Soviet people do not correspond to facts. No one has ever brought decisions of such a nature nor is it true that Soviet representatives are shadowed. This is somebody's arbitrary information. It is even less true that officials of the Soviet Government and Comrade Yudin of the Cominform were subjected to such surveillance.

"We cannot understand who found such slanders necessary, slanders which misled the Government of the USSR. We should like to be given concrete facts on this case as well."^(*)

(*) Pavel F. Yudin, member of the CC of the CPSU(B), and its representative in the Information Bureau of some Communist Parties.

(*) The Government of the USSR, neither before nor after the delivery of the above-mentioned letters, ever offered any concrete facts to the Government of the FPRY in confirmation of its assertions.

FROM A LETTER BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS) TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA, OF MAY 4, 1948

"Concerning the Soviet civilian specialists in Yugoslavia. — In its letter of March, 27, 1948, the CC of the CPSU(B) communicated the reasons for the withdrawal of civilian specialists from Yugoslavia. In this case, the CC of the CPSU(B) relied on the complaints of the Soviet civilian specialists and on the reports of the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia. These reports show that both the Soviet civilian specialists and the representative of the CPSU(B) in the Information Bureau, Comrade Yudin, had really been placed under the surveillance of the State security organs of Yugoslavia. Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny in their letter the justifiability of these complaints and communications, contending that the Yugoslav state security organs do not watch Soviet people in Yugoslavia. But, why should the CC of the CPSU(B) believe the mere words of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, and not the complaints of Soviet people, among them Comrade Yudin? The Soviet Government has many civilian specialists in all the countries of people's democracy and yet it receives no complaints from its specialists, nor has it any disagreements with the Governments of those countries. The question arises: why did these disagreements and conflicts break out in Yugoslavia only? It is not because the Yugoslav Government introduced a special regime for the Soviet people in Yugoslavia, including Comrade Yudin?

"It is easy to understand that the Soviet Government could not reconcile itself to such a situation, and was therefore compelled to recall its civilian specialists from Yugoslavia."

SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT ITS AMBASSADOR IS ENTITLED TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOCIALIST STATE TO WHICH HE IS ACCREDITED

FROM A LETTER BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA TO J. V. STALIN AND V. M. MOLOTOV, OF APRIL 13, 1948

"On what grounds is it contended in the letter that there is no democracy in our Party? Perhaps on the basis of information from Lavrentiyev? Where did he get such information? We consider that he, as Ambassador, is not entitled to seek information from anyone on the work of our Party, — this is not his business. Such information can be obtained by the CC of the CPSU(B) from the CC of the CPY."

FROM A LETTER BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS) TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA,
OF MAY 4, 1948

"Concerning the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia and the Soviet State. — In their letter of April 13, 1948, Comrades Tito and Kardelj write: 'We consider that he (the Soviet Ambassador), as Ambassador, is not entitled to seek information from anyone on the work of our Party. This is not his business.'

"We consider that this statement of Comrades Tito and Kardelj is fundamentally incorrect, anti-Soviet. As can be seen, they place the Soviet Ambassador, a responsible Communist who represents, in Yugoslavia, the Communist Government of the USSR before the Yugoslav Communist Government, on an equal footing with an ordinary bourgeois Envoy, with an ordinary official of a bourgeois State, whose duty is to undermine the foundations of the Yugoslav State. It is hard to conceive that Comrades Tito and Kardelj could have come to such an absurd notion. Do they realize that such an attitude towards the Soviet Ambassador means the denial of friendly relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia? Do they realize that the Soviet Ambassador, a responsible Communist, the representative of a friendly country which liberated Yugoslavia from the German occupation, has not only the right but also the duty to discuss from time to time with the Communists of Yugoslavia all the questions they might be interested in? How can these simple and elementary things be subjected to doubts, if, of course, the position of friendly relations with the Soviet Union is still adhered to?

"For the information of Comrades Tito and Kardelj we should say that, contrary to the Yugoslav model, we do not consider the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow as a simple official; we do not place him on an equal footing with bourgeois envoys and we do not deny him the right to seek information from anyone on the work of our Party'. On becoming Ambassador, he did not cease to be a Communist. And we treat him as a comrade and a Communist worker. He has acquaintances and friends among the Soviet people. Does he 'collect' data on the work of our Party? Probably he does. Well, let him 'collect.' We have no reason to conceal the shortcomings in our work from comrades. We ourselves reveal them in order to eliminate them.

"We consider that such an attitude by the Yugoslav comrades towards the Soviet Ambassador cannot be considered accidental. It derives from the general attitude of the Yugoslav Government owing to which the Yugoslav leaders often do not see the difference between the foreign policy of the USSR and the foreign policy of the Anglo-Americans; they identify Soviet foreign policy with the foreign policy of the English and Americans and consider that Yugoslavia should pursue the same policy towards the Soviet Union as towards the imperialist countries, Great Britain and the U. S. A."

SOVIET GOVERNMENT CLAIMS THE RIGHT FOR ITS REPRESENTATIVES TO HAVE ACCESS TO YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S STATE SECRETS EVEN WITHOUT THE LATTER'S KNOWLEDGE

DOCUMENT No. 11

FROM A LETTER BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS) TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA, OF MARCH 27, 1948

"The source of our information in respect to the recall of Soviet civilian specialists are mainly the reports of the Soviet Ambassador in Beograd, Lavrentiyev, and the statements of the specialists themselves. Your statement to the effect that Srzentić⁽¹⁰⁾ allegedly told our Commercial Representative Lebedev⁽¹¹⁾ that the Soviet people should apply to the Central Committee of the CPY and to the Yugoslav Government for economic information, in no way corresponds to reality. Here is Lavrentiyev's communication of March 9th:

"Srzentić, Kidrič's assistant in the Economic Council, declared to the Commercial Representative Lebedev that there was a Government decision prohibiting State officials and institutions from giving any economic data to anyone whomsoever. Therefore, regardless of the earlier agreement, he could not give Lebedev the data concerned. The State security organs have been ordered to implement control in this matter. Srzentić also said that Kidrič himself intended to speak of this with Lebedev."

"From Lavrentiyev's statement it appears, first that Srzentić did not even mention the possibility of obtaining economic information from the CC or the Yugoslav Government. And in general, it would be ridiculous to imagine that it is possible to apply to the CC or the Government for every item of economic information. There are regular economic bodies in Yugoslavia from which Soviet people used to obtain the necessary economic information."

DOCUMENT No. 12

FROM A LETTER BY THE YUGOSLAV PREMIER, J. B. TITO, TO SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER, V. M. MOLOTOV, OF MARCH 20, 1948

"It is true that Minister Kidrič's assistant, Srzentić, declared to your Commercial Representative, Lebedev, that by decision of the Government of the FPRY, they were not authorized to give important economic information to anyone and that Soviet people should apply for such in-

⁽¹⁰⁾ Vojislav Srzentić, Assistant of the President of the Economic Council of the FPRY.

⁽¹¹⁾ Ivan Mihallovich Lebedev, Commercial Representative of the USSR in Beograd.

formation to higher levels, i. e. to the CC of the CPY or to the Government. Srzentić also told Lebedev to apply for the information he was interested in to Minister Kidrič. Your people were told long ago that official representatives of the Soviet Government could get all important necessary information directly from the leaders of our country.

"Such a decision was made by us because of the fact that the officials in our Ministries were giving necessary and unnecessary information to anyone whomsoever. Consequently, various people disclosed State and economic secrets which could, and some did, reach the hands of our common enemies.

"We have no special agreement, as stated in the telegram, respecting the right of our people to give various kinds of information of an economic nature without the authorization of our Government or the CC to the Soviet people engaged in economic matters, with the exception, however, of the information the latter might need in performing duties assigned to them.

"Whenever the Ambassador of the Government of USSR, Comrade Lavrentiyev, requested necessary information from me personally, I always gave it to him without reserve and so did the other responsible leaders. We would be very surprised if the Soviet Government did not approve of such an attitude on our part from the point of view of State interests."

SOVIET GOVERNMENT DEFENDS THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN ANOTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRY

DOCUMENT No. 13

FROM A LETTER BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA TO J. V. STALIN AND V. M. MOLOTOV, OF APRIL 13, 1948

"If you were to ask us if there is anything causing dissatisfaction with you, we would openly have to say that there are several reasons for which we are dissatisfied. What are these reasons? It is impossible to enumerate all these reasons in this letter, but we shall mention several of them. First, we consider it improper for organs of the Soviet intelligence to recruit citizens in our country, which is heading for Socialism, into their intelligence service. This we can look upon only as being aimed against the interests of our country. This is being done despite the fact that our leading men and State security organs protested against it and brought it to your knowledge that we could not allow this. Our army officers, various officials and those who have a hostile attitude towards the new Yugoslavia are inveigled in this way.

"We have proofs that certain organs of the Soviet intelligence service, while thus inveigling our Party members, cast suspicion upon our leaders, undermine their authority, make them appear incompetent and untrustworthy. For example, Colonel Stepanov did not hesitate,

as early as 1945, while inveigling one of our good comrades attached to the Central Code Department in our State Security apparatus, to defame, and express suspicion of, all our leading men — admitting that 'for the present Marshal Tito was working correctly'. Such instances have continued to the present day.⁽¹²⁾ This also means that such inveigling is not being conducted with the purpose of fighting against some capitalist country and so we must inevitably come to the conclusion that this inveigling is destroying our internal unity, undermining confidence in our leadership, demoralizing our men, compromising our leading men and becoming a source of daily false information. Such a manner of proceeding on the part of the organs of the Soviet intelligence service cannot be termed loyal and friendly towards our country which is heading for Socialism and is the most faithful ally of the USSR.

"We cannot agree to have the Soviet intelligence service create its intelligence network in Yugoslavia. We have our State security and our intelligence service for fighting against various foreign capitalist elements and the class enemy within the country, and if the Soviet intelligence organs need information or aid of this nature, they may get it whenever they want it, just as they have been getting it from us so far.

"There are more such and similar matters with which we are not satisfied. But ought this to be a reason for the deterioration of our mutual relations? No. These are matters which can be eliminated or explained."

DOCUMENT No. 14

FROM A LETTER BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS) TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA, OF
MAY 4, 1948

"Comrades Tito and Kardelj accuse Soviet men of allegedly recruiting Yugoslav citizens into their intelligence service. They write:

"We consider it improper for organs of the Soviet intelligence to recruit citizens in our country, which is heading for Socialism, into their intelligence service. This we can look upon only as being aimed against the interests of our country. This is being done despite the fact that our leading men and state security organs protested against it and brought it to your knowledge that we could not allow this. Our army officers, various officials and those who have a hostile attitude towards the new Yugoslavia are inveigled in this way."

"We declare that this assertion of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, which is full of hostile offenses against the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia, does not at all correspond to reality.

"It would be odd to request that the Soviet people who work in Yugoslavia fill their mouths with water and neither talk nor chat with anyone. The Soviet representatives are politically advanced people and

⁽¹²⁾ On the inveigling of citizens of the FPRY by organs of the Soviet intelligence service see Documents 229 to 233.

not simply employees hired to work for pay without the right to take an interest in what is being done in Yugoslavia. It is natural that they address Yugoslav citizens, ask questions, desire to obtain explanations and the like. Only an incorrigible Sovietophobe could consider these talks as attempts to inveigle people, even people who 'have a hostile attitude' towards the new Yugoslavia, into the intelligence service. Only anti-Soviets can imagine that the leaders of the Soviet Union are less concerned with the integrity and inviolability of the new Yugoslavia than is the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY.

"It is typical that we meet with such absurd charges against Soviet people in Yugoslavia only.

"It appears to us that these ugly charges against Soviet people have been fabricated in order to justify the activity of the state security organs of Yugoslavia who are exercising surveillance over the Soviet people in Yugoslavia."

DOCUMENT No. 18

FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA FOLLOWING THE COMINFORM RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE CPY, OF JUNE 29, 1948⁽¹⁾

"On the contrary, our contention is correct, as stated in the letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) of April 13, 1948; it is based on numerous statements by members of the CPY given to their Party organizations as well as on statements by other citizens of our country, from the liberation up to the present day, to the effect that they have been recklessly inveigled by the organs of the Soviet intelligence service. The CC of the CPY considered and still considers as impermissible such an attitude towards a country where the Communists are the ruling party, a country which is advancing towards Socialism, and it considers that this leads to the demoralization of the citizens of the FPRY and to the weakening and undermining of the State and Party leadership. The CC of the CPY considered and still considers that the attitude of Yugoslavia towards the USSR must be based exclusively on confidence and sincerity and, acting on this principle, it never occurred to the Yugoslav state organs to shadow or in any way check on the citizens of the Soviet Union in Yugoslavia."

⁽¹⁾ The Session of the Information Bureau of some Communist Parties at which the Resolution "Concerning the Situation in the CPY" was adopted, was held in the second half of June, 1948, in Rumania.

SOVIET GOVERNMENT ARBITRARILY ANNULS THE AGREEMENT ON CONSULTATION BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE USSR

DOCUMENT No. 16

TELEGRAM FROM THE YUGOSLAV MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN MOSCOW

Beograd, April 24, 1948.
No. 305.

Personally for the Ambassador. This morning the Soviet Ambassador here informed the Deputy Foreign Minister, Bebler, that his request regarding the attitude of the Soviet Government towards the question of Carinthia, could not be answered because he (the Soviet Ambassador) considered that we had violated the Agreement on Consultation⁽¹⁴⁾ by answering, on our own, the proposal of the Western Powers for the revision of the Peace Treaty with Italy. They will bring forward their standpoint regarding the frontiers of Austria in the Council of Deputy Foreign Ministers in London.

This evening I called the Soviet Ambassador and told him the following:

The Yugoslav Government had informed the Soviet Government, through the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Beograd, twenty-four hours in advance, of its intended answer to the Western Powers concerning their proposal for the revision of the Peace Treaty, viz. the appurtenance of the Free Territory of Trieste to Italy. The Yugoslav Government expected that the Soviet Government would give its opinion on such an urgent and important question.

Since the Soviet Government offered no opinion, the Yugoslav Government gave the answer it considered necessary and useful for the democratic forces of Italy.

The Yugoslav Government considers that this occurrence could not be the reason for the annulment of the Agreement on Consultation.

Simit

⁽¹⁴⁾ The Agreement on Consultation, concluded between the Government of the FPRY and the Government of the USSR in February, 1948, provided that both Governments were to consult each other on all questions of foreign policy. In practice, considering the principle of consultation on foreign policy between allied Governments as a unilateral obligation of the Government of the FPRY alone, the Soviet Government, even before the signing of the agreement, attempted to determine the foreign policy of Yugoslavia. The Government of the USSR endeavoured to have the Government of the FPRY take no step in foreign policy, even an unimportant one, without previous agreement from the Government of the USSR, whereas on the contrary, the Government of the USSR took steps in foreign policy regarding Yugoslavia and her immediate interests, not only without consultation with the Yugoslav Government, but even without informing the Government of the FPRY of the intention to take this or that step. So, for instance, the Delegation of the USSR in the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four big powers, held in Paris in April, 1946, accepted the so-called French Line of delimitation between Yugoslavia and Italy without informing the Government of the FPRY, not to speak of consulting the Delegation of the FPRY which at that time was in Paris and in daily contact with the Soviet Dele-

**REJECTION OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL THAT
A DELEGATION OF THE CC OF THE CPSU(B) COME TO YUGOSLA-
VIA FOR JOINT EXAMINATION OF DISPUTED QUESTIONS ON
THE SPOT**

DOCUMENT No. 17

**FROM A LETTER BY THE YUGOSLAV PREMIER, J. B. TITO, TO SOVIET
FOREIGN MINISTER, V. M. MOLOTOV, OF MARCH 20, 1948**

"We consider that these developments are detrimental to both countries and that sooner or later everything that hampers the friendly relations between our countries will have to be removed."

DOCUMENT No. 18

**FROM A LETTER BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA TO J. V. STALIN AND V. M. MOLOTOV, OF
APRIL 13, 1948**

"It is obvious that the closest mutual ties are of vital importance to the USSR and Yugoslavia but this demands absolute mutual confidence without which there can be no lasting and firm relations between our two countries. The Soviet people, the leaders in the first place, must believe that the new Yugoslavia, under its present leadership, is resolutely advancing towards socialism..."

"We are convinced that this disagreement can be settled only by comprehensive mutual discussions between our two Central Committees on the spot, i. e. here in our country.

"We therefore propose that the CC of the CPSU(B) send one or more of its members here and they will be offered every opportunity to examine all questions fully."

gation. In spite of such a practice by the Government of the USSR, the Government of the FPRY observed the obligations assumed under the Agreement on Consultation, consulting with the USSR Government and informing it of the steps in foreign policy it intended to take. Such was the manner in which the Government of the FPRY proceeded in the case referred to in the above-mentioned telegram. The answer of the Government of the FPRY to the Western Powers, which is mentioned in the telegram, is the Note of the Government of the FPRY handed over on March 22, 1948, to the Ambassadors of the USA, Great Britain and France on the occasion of the so-called "Tripartite Declaration" of the Governments of these countries on the revision of the Treaty of Peace with Italy and on the incorporation of the Free Territory of Trieste into Italy. As can be seen from the telegram itself, the text of the Note was transmitted to the USSR Chargé d'Affaires in Beograd 24 hours before it was handed over, but the Government of the USSR did not make any remarks in this interval although the question was important and urgent. The Government of the FPRY pointed out in that Note that the proposal of the Western Powers in regard to the solution of the question of the Free Territory of Trieste referred only to the necessity of Italy's agreement and did not mention a word about getting the agreement of the most directly interested allied country: Yugoslavia. It was further pointed out in the Note that the purpose of the proposal of the Western Powers had

FROM A LETTER BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS) TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA, OF
MAY 4, 1948

"Comrades Tito and Kardelj proposed in their letter that a representative of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union be sent to Yugoslavia for the purpose of studying the question of Soviet-Yugoslav misunderstanding. We consider this way incorrect because this is not a matter of checking up on certain facts but of differences of principle."

FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA OF JUNE 20, 1948, SENT TO THE SESSION OF THE COMINFORM⁽¹⁵⁾

"The CC of the CPY calls attention to the fact that it proposed to the CPSU(B) that it send representatives to Yugoslavia for a joint investigation of disputed questions on the spot. The CC of the CPSU(B) did not accept this procedure which is, in our opinion, the only correct one. Even before receiving our answer it brought our disagreements to the attention of the other Parties of the Cominform, i. e. it sent them the text of the letter at the same time as it sent it to us, upon which the leaderships of all the Parties, with the exception of the French and the Italian, sent us written statements containing their judgment of our Party.

"Such procedure is not in a spirit of understanding and departs from the principle of voluntariness upon which the Cominform is based.⁽¹⁶⁾

"The CC of CPY still adheres to its conviction that a joint discussion of disputed questions in direct contact between the CC of the CPSU(B) and the CC of the CPY in Yugoslavia itself is the only correct

not been to find a better solution for the Trieste issue and to normalize relations between the peoples of Southern Europe, that the proposal had the character of propaganda and did not contribute to the strengthening of peace, as its submission at the time of the election campaign in Italy could serve only to incite chauvinist hatred for the Yugoslav peoples and to increase the tension of the internal political relationships in Italy.

⁽¹⁵⁾ The Information Bureau of some Communist Parties, until the Session in Rumania in June, 1948, was composed of the following Parties: the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists), the Rumanian Workers' Party, the Hungarian Workers' Party, the Polish Workers' Party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), the Communist Party of France, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Communist Party of Italy.

⁽¹⁶⁾ Point 2 of the Resolution on Exchange of Experiences and Coordination of Activities of the Parties represented at the Consultation, adopted at the first inaugural meeting of the Information Bureau towards the end of September, 1947, in Poland, read as follows: "The Information Bureau shall be entrusted with the task of organizing the exchange of experiences and, if needed, the coordination of the activities of Communist Parties on the basis of mutual agreement."

way to settle the existing disagreements. The CC of the CPY expresses its deep regret that the CC of the CPSU(B) should have given such a form to the disagreements and it again appeals both to the CC of CPSU(B) and to the Cominform to accept our opinion of the necessity for direct contact between the CC of the CPSU(B) and the CC of the CPY for the settlement of disagreements and — realizing the incorrectness of such a discussion without our consent — to remove from the agenda the discussion on the situation in our Party."

DOCUMENT No. 21

FROM THE RESOLUTION "CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA," PASSED AT THE COMINFORM SESSION OF JUNE 1948 IN RUMANIA, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE MOST RESPONSIBLE STATE AND PARTY LEADERS OF THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, OPENLY CALLING UPON THE PEOPLES OF YUGOSLAVIA TO REBEL AGAINST, AND OVERTHROW, THEIR LEGAL GOVERNMENT⁽¹⁷⁾

"The Information Bureau, composed of the representatives of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists), Rumanian Workers' Party, Hungarian Workers' Party, Polish Workers' Party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Communist Party of France, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Communist Party of Italy, upon discussing the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and announcing that the representatives of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had refused to attend the meeting of the Information Bureau, unanimously reached the following conclusions:

"The Information Bureau notes that recently the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has pursued an incorrect line on the main questions of home and foreign policy, a line which represents a departure from Marxism-Leninism. In this connection the Information Bureau approves the action of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), which took the initiative in exposing this incorrect policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, particularly the incorrect policy of Comrades Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Ranković.

"The Information Bureau declares that the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party is pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union and the CPSU(B). An undignified policy of defaming Soviet military experts and discrediting the Soviet Union, has been carried out in Yugoslavia. A special regime was instituted for Soviet civilian experts in Yugoslavia, whereby they were under surveillance of Yugoslav state security organs and were continually followed. The repre-

(17) The Yugoslav daily papers published the mentioned Resolution of the Information Bureau of some Communist Parties "Concerning the Situation in the CPY" together with the declaration of the CC of the CPY regarding this Resolution. In the USSR and in the Eastern European countries, however, not a single paper published either the Declaration of the CC of the CPY or any other document of the CC of the CPY published after the Resolution of the Information Bureau.

representative of the CPSU(B) in the Information Bureau, Comrade Yudin, and a number of official representatives of the Soviet Union in Yugoslavia were followed and kept under observation by Yugoslav state security organs.

"All these and similar facts show that the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have taken a stand unworthy of Communists, and have begun to identify the foreign policy of the Soviet Union with the foreign policy of the imperialist powers, behaving toward the Soviet Union in the same manner as they behave toward the bourgeois states. Precisely because of this anti-Soviet stand, slanderous propaganda about the 'degeneration' of the CPSU(B), about the 'degeneration' of the USSR, and so on, borrowed from the arsenal of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, is current within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

"The Information Bureau denounces this anti-Soviet attitude of the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as being incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and only appropriate to nationalists..."

"It is a completely intolerable state of affairs when the most elementary rights of members in the Yugoslav Communist Party are suppressed, when the slightest criticism of incorrect measures in the Party is brutally repressed.

"The Information Bureau regards as disgraceful such actions as the expulsion from the Party and the arrest of the Central Committee members, Comrades Žujović and Hebrang, because they dared to criticize the anti-Soviet attitude of the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party, and called for friendship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

"The Information Bureau considers that such a disgraceful, purely Turkish, terrorist regime cannot be tolerated in the Communist Party. The interest of the very existence and development of the Yugoslav Communist Party demands that an end be put to this regime..."

"Unable to face the criticism of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) and the Central Committees of the other fraternal Parties, the Yugoslav leaders took the path of outrightly deceiving their Party and people by concealing from the Yugoslav Communist Party the criticism of the Central Committee's incorrect policy and also by concealing from the Party and the people the real reasons for the brutal measures against Comrades Žujović and Hebrang..."

"In view of this, the Information Bureau expresses complete agreement with the estimation of the situation in the Yugoslav Communist Party, with the criticism of the mistakes of the Central Committee of the Party, and with the political analysis of these mistakes contained in letters from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia between March and May, 1948.

"The Information Bureau unanimously concludes that by their anti-Party and anti-Soviet views, incompatible with Marxism-Leninism, by their whole attitude and their refusal to attend the meeting of the Information Bureau, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have placed themselves in opposition to the Communist Parties affiliated to the Information Bureau, have taken the path of seceding from the united socialist front against imperialism, have taken the path of betraying the

cause of international solidarity of the working people, and have taken up a position of nationalism.

"The Information Bureau condemns this anti-Party policy and attitude of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

"The Information Bureau considers that in view of all this, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has placed itself and the Yugoslav Party outside the family of the fraternal Communist Parties, outside the united Communist front and consequently outside the ranks of the Information Bureau.

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"The Information Bureau considers that the basis of these mistakes made by the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia lies in the undoubted fact that nationalist elements, which previously existed in a disguised form, managed in the course of the past five or six months to reach a dominant position in the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and that, consequently, the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party has broken with the international traditions of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and has taken the road of nationalism.

"Considerably overestimating the internal, national forces of Yugoslavia and their influence, the Yugoslav leaders think that they can maintain Yugoslavia's independence and build socialism without the support of the Communist Parties of other countries, without the support of the people's democracies, without the support of the Soviet Union. They think that the new Yugoslavia can do without the help of these revolutionary forces.

"Showing their poor understanding of the international situation and their intimidation by the blackmailing threats of the imperialists, the Yugoslav leaders think that by making concessions they can curry favour with the Imperialist states. They think they will be able to bargain with them for Yugoslavia's independence and gradually get the people of Yugoslavia orientated on these states, that is, on capitalism. In this they proceed tacitly from the well-known bourgeois-nationalist thesis that 'capitalist states are a lesser danger to the independence of Yugoslavia than the Soviet Union.'

"The Yugoslav leaders evidently do not understand or, probably, pretend they do not understand, that such a nationalist line can only lead to Yugoslavia's degeneration into an ordinary bourgeois republic, to the loss of its independence and to its transformation into a colony of the imperialist countries.

"The Information Bureau does not doubt that inside the Communist Party of Yugoslavia there are sufficient healthy elements, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the international traditions of the Yugoslav Communist Party and to the united socialist front.

"Their task is to compel their present leaders to recognise their mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them; to break with nationalism, return to internationalism; and in every way to consolidate the united socialist front against imperialism.

"Should the present leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party prove to be incapable of doing this, their job is to replace them and to advance a new internationalist leadership of the Party.

"The Information Bureau does not doubt that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia will be able to fulfil this honourable task."⁽¹⁸⁾

DOCUMENT No. 22

FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA OF JUNE 29, 1948, FOLLOWING THE COMINFORM RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE CPY

"The Resolution of the Information Bureau 'Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia' has a background as is obvious from its contents.

"Its basis is formed by the letters of the CC of the CPSU(B) addressed to the CC of the CPY. The first of these letters, dated March 27 of this year, in which the CC of the CPSU(B) brought forth its accusations against the CC of the CPY, was simultaneously dispatched by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) to all the other member Parties of the Cominform without the CC of the CPY being informed thereof. After

⁽¹⁸⁾ The Cominform Resolution "Concerning the Situation in the CPY," in which the peoples of Yugoslavia are called to rebellion and to civil war, was signed by:

Traicho Kostov, then Vice-Premier of the PR of Bulgaria, President of the Committee for Economic and Financial Questions and Secretary of the CC of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists);

Vlko Chervenkov, then President of the Committee for Science, Culture and Art of the Government of the PR of Bulgaria, First Secretary of the CC of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists) and Chief Secretary of the National Council of the Fatherland Front; now Premier of the PR of Bulgaria and Secretary General of the Bulgarian Communist Party;

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Vice-Premier of the Rumanian People's Republic, President of the Supreme Economic Council and Secretary General of the Rumanian Workers' Party;

Ana Pauker, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Rumanian People's Republic, Secretary of the CC of the Rumanian Workers' Party;

Vasile Luca, Minister of Finance of the Rumanian People's Republic and Secretary of the CC of the Rumanian Workers' Party;

Matyas Rakosi, Vice-Premier of the PR of Hungary and Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Hungary (now Hungarian Workers' Party);

Mihaly Farkas, then member of the Politbureau of the CC of the Communist Party of Hungary; now Minister of National Defense of Hungary and First Secretary of the CC of the Hungarian Workers' Party;

Ernö Gerö, then Minister of Communications and member of the Politbureau of the CC of the Communist Party of Hungary; now Deputy Secretary-General of the Hungarian Workers' Party;

Jakub Berman, Secretary-General of the Government of the Republic of Poland and member of the Politbureau of the CC of the Polish Workers' Party (now United Polish Workers' Party);

Alexander Zawadzsky, Wojwode of the Silesian-Dombrowsky Wojwodship and member of the Politbureau of the CC of the Polish Workers' Party; now Vice-Premier of the Polish Republic and Secretary of the Politbureau of the United Polish Workers' Party;

Andrei Alexandrovich Zhdanov, then member of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPSU(B), Organizational Secretary of the CC of the CPSU(B), Secretary of the Leningrad Regional and Town Committee of the CPSU(B);

this, a letter from the CC of the CP of Hungary was received through the CC of the CPSU(B) which supported the attitude of the CC of the CPSU(B) on all points. The letter of the Hungarian CC was also sent to the other Parties. After this, similar letters were received by the CC of the CPY from the other member Parties of the Cominform as well, with the exception of the Italian and French. The CC of the CPY points out that those Parties adopted the basic standpoint of the CC of the CPSU(B) without hearing the opinion or any counter-argument on the part of the CC of the CPY. After this letter from the CC of the CPSU(B) and the above-mentioned letters from the other Central Committees, as well as after the reply of the CC of the CPY to the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) dated April 13 of this year, the CC of the CPY received other letters from the CC of the CPSU(B) (of May 4th and 22nd), which took more or less the same line as the first letter. The Resolution of the Cominform 'Concerning the Situation in the CPY' is essentially a recapitulation of these letters from the CC of the CPSU(B)..."

"As can be seen from the statement addressed by the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY to the session of the Cominform annexed herewith, the CC of the CPY could not agree to a discussion on the basis of such accusations on the part of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) founded on slanders, fabrications and ignorance of the situation in Yugoslavia, until the actual state of affairs was established and falsities were separated from actual objections on principle, whether on the part of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) or on the part of any other Central Committee of the member Parties of the Cominform.

"In connection with the publication of the above-mentioned Resolution of the Cominform, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia states the following:

"The criticism contained in the Resolution is based on inaccurate and unfounded assertions and represents an attempt to destroy the prestige of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, both abroad and in the country; to create confusion among the masses in the country and in the international workers' movement; to weaken the unity of the CPY and its leading role. It is therefore even more surprising that the CC of the CPSU(B) refused to investigate on the spot the validity of its assertions as proposed in the letter of the CC of the CPY dated April 13, 1948..."

Gheorghiy Maximilianovich Malenkov, Vice-Premier of the USSR, Secretary of the CC of the CPSU(B);

Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov, Secretary of the CC of the CPSU(B);

Jacques Duclos, member of the Politbureau of the CC of the Communist Party of France, Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of France;

Etienne Fajon, member of the Politbureau of the CC of the Communist Party of France;

Villiam Siroky, Vice-Premier of the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, member of the Slovak People's Council, member of the Presidency of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; now Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic;

Gustav Bareš, member of the CC of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia;

Rudolf Slansky, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia;

Bedrich Geminder, representative of the CP of Czechoslovakia in the Information Bureau of some Communist Parties;

Palmiro Togliatti, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Italy; and

Pietro Secchia, Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Italy.

"The CC of the CPY asserts that none of the leaders consider that Yugoslavia, in the struggle for the building of Socialism and the preservation of independence, does not need the help of the countries of people's democracy and of the USSR. Only people who have lost all contact with reality could assert anything of this kind. The CC of the CPY must in this connection emphasize that the extension of this aid and cooperation does not depend on it alone, but also on the countries of the people's democracy and the USSR. The CC of the CPY considers that this aid must be linked up with the internal and foreign policy of Yugoslavia and in no case with the fact that the CC of the CPY could not accept unfounded charges based on untruth.

"The assertions that the Yugoslav leaders are preparing to make concessions to imperialists and to bargain with them about the independence of Yugoslavia — are a complete invention and belong among the grossest slanders against the new Yugoslavia.

"The CC of the CPY must, however, point out that, in certain countries of people's democracy, a whole series of unprovoked acts have been committed by Party and State organs, acts which are insulting to the peoples of Yugoslavia, their State and State representatives, and which lead to a weakening of cooperation, and deterioration of relations with Yugoslavia. The CC of the CPY does not consider itself bound to pass in silence over similar acts in the future.

"The CC of the CPY does not consider that it has in any way impaired the unity of the Communist front by refusing to discuss mistakes for which it is not responsible. The unity of this front is not based on the admission of invented or fabricated errors and slanders, but on the fact of whether or not the policy of a party is actually internationalist. One cannot, however, ignore the fact that the Cominform departed from the principles on which it was based and which provide for the voluntary adoption of its conclusions by every Party. The Cominform, however, not only compels the leaders of the CPY to admit errors which they have not committed, but even calls the members of the CPY to rebellion within the Party, to shatter the unity of the Party. The CC of the CPY can never agree to a discussion about its policy on the basis of inventions and in an uncomradely spirit, without mutual confidence. Such a basis is unprincipled and in this and only in this sense the CC of the CPY considered that it was not on an equal footing in the discussion and that it could not accept a discussion on this basis. Further, in connection with the above, the CC of the CPY resolutely rejects the accusation that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had become nationalistic. By its entire internal and foreign policy, by its struggle in the course of the War of National Liberation especially, and by the just solution of the national question in Yugoslavia, the CPY has given proofs of the exact opposite.

"The greatest historical injustice has been done by the above-mentioned unjust charges against our Party, our working class and working masses, the peoples of Yugoslavia in general, and their unselfish and heroic struggle.

"The Central Committee of the CPY is aware of the fact that the charges of the CC of the CPSU(B) against the CC of the CPY will be seized upon by enemy propaganda for the purpose of slandering the

Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and other democratic countries. The CC of the CPY, however, declares that it bears no responsibility for all these happenings because it did not give rise to them by any of its acts.

"The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia call upon the party membership to close its ranks the struggle for the realization of the Party line and for even greater Party unity, and it calls upon the working class and other working people in the People's Front, to continue even more persistently their work in building our Socialist homeland. This is the only way to prove in practice that the mentioned charges are unjustified."

DOCUMENT No. 23

BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 6266-I OF JUNE 29, 1948, STATING THAT THE COMINFORM RESOLUTION IN NO WAY ALTERS THE EXISTING FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN BULGARIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and has the honour to communicate that the decision of the consultation of eight Communist Parties, published on June 29 this year, in no way alters the existing friendly relations between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Relying upon full reciprocity, the Bulgarian Government will continue honestly and sincerely to collaborate with the Yugoslav Government on the basis of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance which binds the two brotherly countries and which corresponds to the unshakeable will and vital interests of their peoples.

The Bulgarian Government will continue, as it did in the past, to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, considering this the elementary obligation of both friendly countries.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to express to the Honourable Embassy its high consideration.⁽¹⁹⁾

Sofia, June 29, 1948.

DOCUMENT No. 24

STATEMENT BY BULGARIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER SAVA GANOVSKI ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SEPARATING PARTY QUESTIONS FROM STATE QUESTIONS, MADE TO THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR IN SOFIA DURING A MEETING ON OCTOBER 7, 1948⁽²⁰⁾

"On October 7 this year, at 11 a. m., I was received by Ganovski on whom I called in connection with instructions received by cable to lodge

(¹⁹) The Embassy of the FPRY in Sofia, in its Note No. 258-I of July 5, 1948, acknowledged the receipt of this Bulgarian Note and declared, on behalf of the Government of the FPRY, that it did not consider that the Cominform Resolution could influence the relations between the two countries bound by treaties concluded in the spirit of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance and aimed at further strengthening of friendly relations between the peoples of both countries.

(²⁰) From the report of the Ambassador of the FPRY in Sofia, J. Gjergja, No. 92 of October 7, 1948.

a verbal protest against the decision of the Bulgarian Government on the dissolution and the banning of the 'Front of Yugoslavs in Bulgaria.'⁽²¹⁾

"After that he broached the following subject:

"It should be known that on this question as well as on other questions we must take a clear position. It is impossible that we, Bulgaria, set ourselves off from the front of the USSR and the other people's democracies by a special attitude on our part, by a policy of half measures towards the FPRY, for it is impossible to separate Party policy questions from State questions, because this would isolate Bulgaria. — Thus, for instance, we signed the Plan on Cultural Cooperation with the FPRY after the publication of the Resolution of the Information Bureau⁽²²⁾ and there was criticism on this account. Likewise, your delegation of experts for agriculture and forestry⁽²³⁾ was here a few days ago — and again there was criticism on this account. Likewise, your delegation of experts continue and we must wait until fundamental political questions are cleared up — and only then might something be done regarding questions of cooperation, etc., in other fields.'

"I told him that this was rather new to me, because it was precisely they, he himself, Kolarov⁽²⁴⁾ and others, and even the Government, who emphasized an attitude that was quite the opposite on many occasions. I asked him — what was new, whence the criticism, etc. — stating that we had not altered our attitude at all."

DOCUMENT No. 25

NOTE OF THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN MOSCOW No. 213/I OF JULY 6, 1948, STATING THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO CALL ALL YUGOSLAV CITIZENS IN THE USSR TO RETURN TO YUGOSLAVIA

The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honour, under instructions from its Government, to inform it of the following:

(²¹) "The People's Front of Yugoslavs in Bulgaria" was created in the course of 1945, at places where a considerable number of Yugoslavs resided, for instance, at Sofia, Plovdiv, Vidin, Ruse, Mihailov Grad, Sliven, Petrich and others, with a view to rallying Yugoslav citizens in Bulgaria into an organization with the task of strengthening brotherhood and friendship between the Bulgarian and Yugoslav peoples.

On October 3, 1948, a decision by the Bulgarian Government was published in the Bulgarian press on the banning of the organization of the "People's Front of Yugoslavs in Bulgaria." The Embassy of the FPRY in Sofia was never officially informed thereof. The property and the premises of the organization were handed over to a group of Yugoslav traitors and deserters in Bulgaria.

(²²) The plan on cultural cooperation between the FPRY and the PR of Bulgaria for the period of July, 1948 to July, 1949, was signed on July 5, 1948 in Beograd.

(²³) From September 25 to October 4, 1948, two meetings of agricultural and forestry experts of Eastern European countries were held in Sofia, to wit: the Commission for Peasants' Work Cooperatives and the Commission for Forestry in which Yugoslav experts participated.

(²⁴) It is Vasil Kolarov that is being referred to here. At that time he was Vice-Premier of the PR of Bulgaria and Minister of Foreign Affairs. After the death of Georgi Dimitrov, Kolarov became Premier which post he held until his death (January 23, 1950).

The Government of the FPRY learned that in the Soviet Union, and especially in civilian and military schools, in which the citizens of the FPRY are studying, as well as in other Soviet institutions, where citizens of the FPRY are at work, Soviet organs were acting unfairly and slandering the political leaders and statesmen of the FPRY, particularly the Premier of the FPRY and Marshal of Yugoslavia, J. B. Tito.

The Government of the FPRY also learned of cases of certain persons and groups of Yugoslav citizens whom Soviet organs compelled to change their attitude towards the leaders of the FPRY or misled them into doing so, without allowing them to defend their viewpoint.

The Government of the FPRY mentions a few of the numerous cases:

On June 29, at the Lenin Military Political Academy in Moscow, Lieutenant Colonel Busehin requested every student, who was a citizen of the FPRY, separately to declare himself for the Cominform Resolution.

On the same day Lieutenant Colonel Boroda in the same Academy told the Yugoslav students of the Academy that the behaviour of Marshal Tito was Napoleonic, that it was Trotskyist and Bukharinist.

On June 30th, a lecturer on Marxism-Leninism at the Leningrad Chemical and Technological Institute, Ostrovski, requested a student of this Institute, a citizen of the FPRY, Ivan Dešković, to make a written declaration with regard to the Cominform Resolution.

On July 1st, a lecturer on Marxism-Leninism of the Leningrad Institute of Transport, Ivan Dikov, told a Yugoslav student, Bogdan Veljan, that Mussolini, Chiang Kai-shek and Tito were one and the same thing.

On July 1st, the Director of the Lenin Military and Political Academy in Moscow, Major General Kovalevski, told the Yugoslav students of the Academy that if the present leaders were not removed there might be barricades and peasant risings in Yugoslavia.

On July 1st, the Director of the Balkan Department of the Radio Committee in Moscow, Ovcharov, resorting to deceit, called to the Radio Committee a student of the Moscow Institute of Energetics, a citizen of the FPRY, Milo Stojanovski, and, again using deception, attempted to compel him to translate the text of the Cominform Resolution into Macedonian and broadcast it over the Moscow radio.

On July 4th, the Deputy-Director of the Political Department of the Frunze Military Academy, Major General Belik, called a Lieutenant Colonel of the Yugoslav Army, student of the Academy, Uroš Krunić, and requested him to declare himself for the Cominform Resolution, deceiving him by telling him that all the other students in other academies in the USSR had already declared themselves for the said Resolution.

On July 4th, the Secretary of the Party Organization of the Special Faculty of the Frunze Military Academy, Colonel Konyagin, in a conversation with the Yugoslav students of the Academy reproached them by saying that they were for Tito because he had given them their ranks.

On July 5th, Director of the Lenin Military Political Academy, Major General Kovalevski, told a Major of the Yugoslav Army, Kosanović, who had declared that he did not agree with the Resolution of the Cominform, that the heads of the Academy would endeavour to see

that no student, who was a citizen of the FPRY, should leave the Academy before agreeing to the Cominform Resolution.

The above-mentioned cases, as well as a whole series of similar cases, clearly show that a situation is being created deliberately and systematically for the citizens of the FPRY that makes their further stay in the USSR impossible. The Government of the FPRY, therefore, decided to recall to Yugoslavia all its citizens in the USSR. The Government of the FPRY has in mind students, undergraduates, all those attending courses at military academies and schools, including students of the Suvorov Academy, the wounded and invalids, and citizens of the FPRY at work in the Radio Committee in Moscow, as well as in other Soviet institutions.

The Government of the FPRY expresses its readiness to settle in the shortest possible time all financial questions left outstanding in connection with the agreement on the training of Yugoslav citizens in the USSR.⁽²⁵⁾

The Government of the FPRY expresses its deep brotherly gratitude to the Government of the USSR for the help extended in the training and medical treatment of the citizens of the FPRY.

The Embassy of the FPRY has the honour to request the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to notify the Government of the USSR of the above stated decision of the Government of the FPRY. At the same time the Embassy asks the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to request the Soviet Government to have the Soviet organs undertake the necessary measures and to give the Embassy the necessary help for the speedy transport of the citizens of the FPRY to Yugoslavia.

The Embassy of the FPRY in advance expresses its gratitude to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR for the kind fulfilment of this request and would highly appreciate it if the Ministry would inform the Embassy of the measures taken with regard to the above stated.

Moscow, July 6, 1948.

DOCUMENT No. 28

NOTE OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS No. 20 OF JULY 10, 1948, RETURNING WITHOUT ANSWER THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY'S NOTE OF JULY 6, 1948

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR returns to the Yugoslav Embassy its Note of July 6, this year, because of its improper, slanderous nature.

Moscow, July 10, 1948.

⁽²⁵⁾ An Agreement for the training and maintenance of citizens of the FPRY in higher civilian schools of the USSR was concluded between the FPRY and the USSR, and signed on December 15, 1947 in Moscow.

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF PROTEST No. 422618 OF AUGUST 25, 1948, AGAINST THE HOSTILE POLICY OF THE RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE COMINFORM RESOLUTION

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has the honour to inform the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic of the following:

During recent months, Rumanian statesmen, the press, radio, etc., have been waging against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, its Government and the Yugoslav peoples a campaign which is completely in contradiction to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Rumanian People's Republic,⁽⁶⁶⁾ and impermissible both from the standpoint of customary international relations not to speak of normal good neighbourly relations between the two countries.

In this connection the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic to the following flagrant violations in the relations between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Rumanian People's Republic:

First: Responsible Rumanian statesmen, in their speeches and articles published by the press, call upon the citizens of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to rebel against, and overthrow the legal Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Thus, for instance, Madame Ana Pauker, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Rumanian People's Republic, openly calls for the liquidation of the present State leadership in Yugoslavia.⁽⁶⁷⁾ Although the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Rumanian People's Republic issues calls to rebellion against the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, this appeal obviously refers to the leadership of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, since it is well known that the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia are at the same time the most responsible members of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

Second: Responsible Rumanian statesmen, the press, radio, etc., during the last few months, have attempted to represent the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the Rumanian people as a country which had allegedly deserted the anti-imperialist front, which was allegedly degenerating into a bourgeois State, which allegedly did not have a democratic order, in which anti-Soviet propaganda was being carried on.

⁽⁶⁶⁾ Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the FPRY and the Rumanian People's Republic, signed in Bucharest on December 19, 1947.

⁽⁶⁷⁾ "Scantela" No. 1175 of July 20, 1948, published an article by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Rumanian People's Republic, Ana Pauker, entitled: "The Sectarian and Bureaucratic Regime in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia." This article, reprinted from the paper "For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy," No. 17 of July 15, 1948, says in part: "The sectarian and bureaucratic regime which means abandonment of the principle of Marxism-Leninism by the leadership of the CPY, became at the same time one of the main obstacles which hinder the correction of mistakes of this leadership. Accordingly, the liquidation of this regime is a question of life and death for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia."

These untruths, which are in contradiction with the internal and foreign policy of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, are actively supported even by such high State officials as the Vice-Premier of the Rumanian People's Republic, Monsieur Gheorghiu-Dej, and Vasile Luca, Minister of Finance, and are daily served up to the Rumanian public in the central and provincial press.

All these attacks against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and its Government contain no material based on facts; they are corroborated by such dishonourable methods of spreading lies as, for instance, the contention of the paper "Romania Libera," in its issue of July 26 of this year, that the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was concluding a financial agreement with the U. S. Secretary of State, Mr. G. Marshall. In the same way, the Rumanian press published, and the radio transmitted, an alleged report from Beograd signed by a fictitious V. Mićunović, directed against the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia;^(*) this report abounds in the most shameless fabrications which we thought until very recently could appear only in the columns of the corrupted bourgeois press.

Third: While responsible Rumanian statesmen attempt to represent the foreign policy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the situation in our country in the above way and by using the above mentioned means, on the other hand they endeavour to keep out of the Rumanian press any news on the real situation in our country, because they fear that the Rumanian people might doubt the justifiability of the campaign which is being waged against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and its leaders. Thus, for instance, the Rumanian press and the broadcasts of the Rumanian radio stations pass in silence over the attitude of the Yugoslav Delegation at the International Danube Conference in Beograd. The Rumanian press and radio did not publish any excerpts from the speeches of the head of the Yugoslav Delegation, whereas the speeches of the other representatives of democratic countries were given wide publicity.

Likewise, the Rumanian press did not publish one single word on the trial of the Ustashi criminals at Zagreb and their ties with the imperialist powers and the Vatican, although this trial gave abundant material for the unmasking of the imperialist powers and their intentions to enslave the countries of the people's democracy. Another example: since the publication of the well-known Resolution of the Cominform, there has been no news on the fulfilment of the Five Year Plan of Economic Development, or on the results of the building of Socialism in Yugoslavia, on the labour victories of our working class and all the working people of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, published by the Rumanian press or broadcast over the radio. On the contrary, the Rumanian press published articles which were intended grossly to insult the Yugoslav people, to ridicule the zeal for work of the masses of people of Yugoslavia and especially of the working class and youth, and to underrate the results achieved in the building of socialism, in the struggle for the fulfilment of the Five Year Plan. Thus, for instance, the chief organ of the Rumanian Worker's Party, "Scanteia," on July 8, 1948,

(*) The Fifth Congress of the CPY was held from July 21 to 28, 1948, in Beograd, attended by 2,344 delegates with the right to vote.

published an article by Virgile Trofim, member of the Central Committee of the Union of Rumanian Youth, who ruthlessly insulted and entirely denied the profoundly progressive zeal of our youth in the building of Socialism, so strongly manifested at the Samac—Sarajevo Youth Railway,⁽¹⁹⁾ maintaining that the railway was built by means of "barrack-room" methods. Regarding the educational work at the Samac—Sarajevo Youth Railway, Virgile Trofim asserted that it consisted in the application of "Fuehrer-like methods which the fascists had applied everywhere."

In such and similar writing about the enthusiasm of the Yugoslav masses in their work, "Scanteia" only reiterates the assertions of the imperialist press and encourages reactionary bourgeois elements in Yugoslavia, who make use of the same slogan in their struggle against the Five Year Plan.

It is significant to note that in this respect the Rumanian press has recently given twice as much space to attacks on democratic Yugoslavia, as it has to the struggle against imperialists and warmongers, thus creating the impression that the enemies of the Rumanian people are the people of Yugoslavia, who are fighting with unparalleled heroism for Socialism, and not the imperialists.

Fourth: Responsible Rumanian officials, the press, radio, etc., have been levelling a series of gross insults at the State leadership of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the Premier of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito, and other members of the Government. The proportions of this campaign by responsible Rumanian statesmen against the Government of a country to which the Rumanian People's Republic is bound by the Treaty of Friendship, can be seen from the outrageous terms that are used with regard to the person of the Premier of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito, and other State leaders, and with regard to the vast majority of our people, in the speeches and articles of Rumanian leaders in the Rumanian press, radio, and especially in the broadcasts in Serbian.

The insults in the Rumanian press against the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and its members, reached their climax in the course of the last few days in connection with the attempted flight to Rumania and death of Colonel General Arso Jovanović.⁽²⁰⁾ As it has been mentioned above, responsible Rumanian statesmen have been issuing appeals for weeks trying to influence elements alien to the working class and Socialism, namely, over-ambitious, declassed and demoralized elements in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, with the aim of provoking such incidents as the attempted flight and death of Colonel General Arso Jovanović. However, it is precisely the initiators of this pressure on the afore-mentioned elements — and the latter can in no sense serve as an indication of the disposition and aspirations of the Yugoslav working masses — who are now utilizing the consequences

⁽¹⁹⁾ The Samac—Sarajevo Youth Railway, 242 km long, was built by the voluntary labour of the Yugoslav and foreign youth from April 1 to November 15, 1947. In the building of the railway, 211,317 Yugoslav and 5,842 foreign young people from 42 countries took part.

⁽²⁰⁾ Arso Jovanović was killed the night of August 11—12, 1948, while trying to escape across the Yugoslav-Rumanian frontier. (See document No. 228.)

of their anti-Yugoslav campaign for even more reckless slanders and insults against the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, contending that the death of Arso Jovanović was an organized and base assassination, that such methods were used by the Hitlerites, etc.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia most strongly protests against this monstrous anti-Yugoslav campaign and draws the attention of the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic to the fact that such hostile attacks against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, against the peoples of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, can only weaken the friendly relations between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Rumanian People's Republic, as well as the democratic front in general, and are, accordingly, opposed to the interests of the peoples of both countries and of all other democratic countries.

Fifth: The Rumanian authorities have recently carried out a series of acts which are glaring violations of the existing treaties and conventions between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Rumanian People's Republic, obstructing the development and consolidation of friendly relations between the people of Rumania and Yugoslavia. This is proved, apart from other things, by the following facts:

Violating the Cultural Convention, concluded on July 26, 1947, between the FPRY and the Rumanian People's Republic, under which a branch of the "Jugoslovenska Knjiga"⁽²¹⁾ was opened in Timisoara, the Rumanian authorities, on July 20, fell upon this bookshop and, without any written order, closed it down and sealed it. This action was preceded by a series of attacks, threats and provocations including attempts to remove by force the picture of the Premier of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito, to prohibit the sale of books written by Yugoslav leaders, and cover the entire shop with posters defaming the State leaders of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the peoples of Yugoslavia. The Rumanian State Security organs refused the request of the assistant director of "Jugoslovenska Knjiga" to intervene and prevent such actions which are not only contradictory to the existing treaties and conventions between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Rumanian People's Republic, but are also overt inimical acts against our country.

Contrary to the Cultural Convention between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Rumanian People's Republic,⁽²²⁾ all

(21) "Jugoslovenska Knjiga" is an enterprise for the export and import of publications, music scores, records. Under the Cultural Convention this enterprise founded branch offices in the Rumanian People's Republic, the PR of Albania and in Czechoslovakia. By decisions of the Rumanian and Albanian authorities the branch offices of the "Jugoslovenska Knjiga" were closed during 1948 at Timisoara and Tirana and, by a decision of the Czechoslovak authorities, the book shop in Prague was closed in 1949.

(22) The Convention on Cultural Cooperation between the FPRY and the Rumanian People's Republic, concluded and signed at Bucharest on June 26, 1947.

activities of the Rumania-Yugoslavia Association (ARJUG)⁽³³⁾ were suppressed and the Secretary of the Society, Mr. Adorian, dismissed all the employees of the Society.

Likewise, contrary to the existing treaties on frontier regulations, Rumanian authorities are making difficulties for Yugoslav owners of property cut by the frontier line, preventing them from free access to their property in Rumanian territory.

Sixth: Since June of this year responsible leaders of the Rumanian People's Republic, through the local authorities, have been systematically bringing police pressure to bear on the members of the Yugoslav minority in violation of their fundamental minority rights. This pressure is being exercised through personal participation of the members of the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic, as well as of subordinate Rumanian authorities, in regions where the Yugoslav minority is living. Thus the Minister of the Interior, Teohari Georgescu, after arriving in Timisoara, personally took part in putting pressure on the leaders of the Union of Slav Cultural Democratic Associations in Rumania.⁽³⁴⁾ In the night between the 2nd and 3rd of July the leaders of the Union were forcibly taken by car to a place where they were subjected to cross-examination. They were asked to sign a resolution prepared in advance against the State leadership of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. When they refused to do so, Minister Teohari Georgescu called them bandits and Yugoslav spies, threatening them with the secret police of the State Security. The leaders of the Union were placed under the surveillance of police agents who frequently broke into their lodgings and kept a check on their movements.

Pressure is brought to bear not only on the prominent representatives of the Yugoslav minority but also on the Yugoslav minority itself. Minister Teohari Georgescu visited the villages of Dinjas, Ivanda and San Marton, inhabited by Yugoslavs, and called upon the people to declare themselves against the leadership of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. A member of the Central Committee of the Worker's Party of Rumania, named Bogdan, visited Dinjas and other villages and ordered the removal of pictures of the Premier of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito, and the confiscation of books written by Yugoslav leaders. He also forbade the inhabitants to listen to the Beograd broadcasting station. All villages inhabited by members of the Yugoslav minority in the Rumanian People's Republic were placed

⁽³³⁾ The Rumania-Yugoslavia Association (ARJUG) was founded in October, 1947, in Bucharest with the purpose of developing friendly ties between the two countries. After the Resolution of the Cominform of June, 1948, the Association ceased to function and its premises were closed.

⁽³⁴⁾ The Union of Slav Cultural Democratic Associations in Rumania (SSKDUR) was founded towards the end of January, 1946. It was created through the reorganization of the "Anti-fascist Front of Slavs in Rumania." The seat of the Association was at Timisoara. The main aims of the Union were: the rallying of Slavs residing in Rumania and promotion and development of Slav solidarity and culture in the spirit of democratic tendencies. The Union also had the task of carrying out large-scale cultural and educational work and the propagation of progressive democratic ideas. After the Resolution of the Cominform of June, 1948, the elected leadership of the Union was changed by a decree and a new one was forced upon it with the task of directing the activities of the organization against the interests of the FPRY.

under the surveillance and control of specially organized groups. These groups were being augmented daily by others dispatched in trucks from Timisoara. Members of these groups insulted the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and its leaders in a most outrageous manner.

All these and similar actions by responsible Rumanian officials, as well as the forcible change of the editorial staff of "Pravda," official organ of the Union of Slav Cultural Democratic Associations of Rumania, are violent attacks on the most elementary rights of the members of the Yugoslav minority in Rumania and mean the suppression of their national and democratic liberties. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia cautions that such acts by State leaders and organs of the Rumanian People's Republic against the Yugoslav minority in Rumania are not in accord with friendly relations between the two countries, which are also bound by the Pact of Mutual Assistance — and even less so with a just kind of policy in respect to the national question which should be pursued in a country of people's democracy heading for Socialism.

Seventh: Certain demoralized persons recruited from among citizens of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, who reside in the Rumanian People's Republic are used in the campaign against the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. They are given time on the Rumanian radio, and especially in the Serbian broadcasts, to carry on hostile propaganda against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia along the same lines as imperialist propaganda coming from the West. The Rumanian press attempts to mislead the Rumanian people and the international and progressive democratic workers' movement, by describing persons like Radonja Golubović,^(*) former Ambassador of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Rumania, as "one of the best partisan fighters in Yugoslavia," although in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia every partisan fighter, who ever came in contact with Radonja Golubović, is acquainted with the notorious fact that Radonja Golubović was far from being one of the best partisan fighters, and that, owing to his faint-hearted and cowardly behaviour in the course of the National Liberation Struggle, he was punished and relieved of duties assigned to him on several occasions.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia most energetically protests against all the above-mentioned and similar acts resorted to by organs of the Rumanian People's Republic, the Rumanian press, radio, etc., and draws the attention of the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic to the fact that the above stated and other acts are in complete contradiction not only with the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Rumanian People's Republic, but also with the normal relations between the two countries. Such an attitude towards a country in which the people and their legal representatives are working with all their might for the realization of the most progressive socialist order in it, towards a country which has never given cause for anything that might trouble the friendship between the Yugoslav peoples

(*) Radonja Golubović, chief editor of the newspaper of Yugoslav deserters "Za Socijalističku Jugoslaviju" (For a Socialist Yugoslavia), published in the USSR.

and the Rumanian people, cannot be considered correct between two countries of people's democracy which are building socialism. Such an attitude cannot be interpreted in any way but as an attempt to impose the will of one people's democracy on another. Such an attempt has nothing in common with brotherly cooperation and friendly understanding and goodwill on possible disputed questions. Such methods supply the imperialists with material for slandering the countries of people's democracy, for aggravating disagreements between them. They stimulate their campaign against the principle of national sovereignty and independence of States.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia underlines that it considers the hostile campaign being waged in Rumania against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia as unprincipled, and as a method of pressure which should be entirely alien to relations between countries of people's democracy and socialism, i. e. relations which should develop on the basis of equal rights and mutual confidence, respect for the opinion of the other country and brotherly, international assistance, all the more so since the opinions of all these countries coincide on all fundamental questions.

If the relations between our two countries should develop in a different direction along the path of organization and implementation of hostile campaigns against our country, which did nothing to cause this, then we would adopt methods which should in no way be typical of relations between countries advancing toward Socialism.

The campaign which has been in progress for the last few months in the Rumanian People's Republic, against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, against its State leadership and the creative efforts of its working masses, does not in any way — either in tone or falsity — lag behind the methods used by bourgeois propaganda against those countries which have wrenched themselves free from the control of international imperialism.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia deems it necessary to draw the attention of the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic to the fact that the other similar acts on the part of responsible Rumanian statesmen, the Rumanian press, radio, etc., mentioned above, really mean the undermining of the power of defence and the independence of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in relation to the imperialist powers, and favour the intensification of imperialist pressure on the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. To illustrate this state of affairs, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia again underlines that the campaign in the Rumanian People's Republic, directed against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia which is building Socialism and with which Rumania has signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, has for the last few months been more violent and bitter towards Yugoslavia than has the campaign against the imperialist warmongers.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia also considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic to the fact that the campaign being carried on in Rumania — with the participation of the most responsible State officials — against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, its Government and its peoples, in practice means the destruction of every-

thing which could justly be considered as the most important achievement of the social change that took place in the Balkans after World War II, as well as the destruction of the confidence and ever-increasing friendship between the neighbouring Balkan countries. This campaign creates a situation which can only serve the plans of enslavement of the Balkans by the imperialist forces.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic to the fact that the anti-Yugoslav actions, carried out with the knowledge and participation of certain members of the Rumanian Government, are really directed against the efforts of the Yugoslav working people who — after overthrowing the yoke of capitalists and landlords — are with unparalleled efforts building a better socialist future for themselves, without hampering in the least the endeavours of the working masses in neighbouring countries directed towards the same goal. Anti-Yugoslav actions undertaken in the Rumanian People's Republic incite the former exploiters in Yugoslavia to resist measures of the People's Government aimed at raising the general well-being of the working masses in town and village. Such acts mean attempts to undermine the People's Government and the new Yugoslavia for which its peoples made tremendous sacrifices.

Acts against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia taking place every day in the Rumanian People's Republic cannot be justified by one single corresponding hostile act on the part of the Government and the people of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia against Rumania and the Rumanian people, and therefore the moral and historical responsibility for the situation created rests solely with the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic.

Drawing the attention of the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic to the above facts, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia expresses the demand of the peoples and the working masses of Yugoslavia, that the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic put an end to the above-mentioned campaign which is provoking the indignation and resistance of the masses of peoples of Yugoslavia and essentially affecting the relations between the peoples of both countries. It can only serve the enemies of the countries of people's democracy and socialism.

Beograd, August 25, 1948.

DOCUMENT No. 28

RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 100537/C. B. OF SEPTEMBER 9, 1948, ANSWERING THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF PROTEST OF AUGUST 25, 1948, IN WHICH ATTEMPTS ARE MADE TO PRESENT HOSTILE ACTIVITIES AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA AS PARTY CRITICISM

"The Rumanian Government declares that the Yugoslav Government, in its Note of August 25, 1948, referring without any grounds to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between

Rumania and Yugoslavia, and to international usage, tries to deny the politicians of the Rumanian People's Republic the right freely to express their opinions in order to shield itself from criticism aimed at the present leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

"In its Note of August 25, 1948, the Yugoslav Government reproaches the Rumanian Government for the political attitude of 'certain responsible State officials in the Rumanian People's Republic towards the present leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia' on the pretext that 'they are at the same time the most responsible members of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.'

"Clearly, the Rumanian Government cannot agree to such unfounded and undemocratic demands. The Rumanian Government cannot prohibit its members from participating in the work of Party organizations to which they belong, just as it cannot forbid them to make political statements which they are authorized to do by these organizations.

"The Rumanian Government categorically rejects such demands by the Yugoslav Government..."

"In conformity with the principles on which the regime of people's democracy in the Rumanian People's Republic is based, the Rumanian Government considers that it is not only the right but also the duty of the press, radio and other media of information to publish data and take positions in the spirit of democratic convictions in respect to the work of political forces in the country and abroad, and to disseminate documents intended to strengthen the front of democracy and peace, documents like the Resolution of the Cominform to which this Note of the Yugoslav Government refers."⁽³⁶⁾

DOCUMENT No. 29

CIRCULAR LETTER ISSUED BY THE CENTRAL BULGARIAN-YUGOSLAV SOCIETY FOR CULTURAL COOPERATION ORDERING BRANCH ORGANIZATIONS TO ADAPT THEIR ACTIVITIES TO THE COMINFORM RESOLUTION

No. 530

Sofia, August 9, 1948.

BULGARIAN—YUGOSLAV SOCIETY^(*)

Circular Letter

Dear Comrades,

The present leaders of the CPY, headed by Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Ranković, have betrayed international socialism of the united democratic front, headed by the great Soviet Union; they have switched over to a nationalistic position and have betrayed the cause of South-Slav brotherhood in the name of which the Bulgarian—Yugoslav Society has been working.

^(*) Note given in excerpts.

^(*) The central Bulgarian-Yugoslav Society in Sofia united the work of all Bulgarian-Yugoslav societies created after the war with the aim of strengthening the friendly ties between the peoples of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

In view of the new situation, the central leadership of the Bulgarian—Yugoslav Societies in Bulgaria recommends the following:

1. The Societies should continue their work for the brotherhood and unity of Bulgarian and Yugoslav peoples in the spirit of the Resolution of the Cominform and the decisions of the Sixteenth Plenum of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communist).

2. In view of the new situation in Yugoslavia, by the end of August all the Societies should convene meetings of their Administration Boards at which outlines for the future cultural and educational work of the Society should be submitted, underlining that the nationalistic policy of the present leaders of Yugoslavia — Tito, Kardelj, Djilas, Ranković and others — is the chief obstacle to the realization of the federation of South-Slavs which the Yugoslav and Bulgarian peoples sincerely desire and for which all their healthy forces will continue working.

3. That members and societies should continue submitting declarations regarding the Central Society in Sofia. No new societies should be created for the time being until instructions on the future work of the Bulgarian—Yugoslav Societies are received.

4. That the work of the Sofia Society, and that of the other Societies in Bulgaria, should be pointed out as a contrast to the extremely poor work of the Yugoslav—Bulgarian Society in Beograd, the leaders of which have been stating that there was no need for such societies. These statements, which are alien to us, clearly appear as nationalistic statements now, in the light of the treason of the Yugoslav leaders.

5. The Macedonian question should be interpreted in the spirit of the Resolution of the Sixteenth Plenum of the CC of the BWP(C) and the report of Comrade Vladimir Poptomov,^(*) published in "Rabotničko Delo" No. 181 of August 3, 1948.

6. Generally, the material for the future work of the Society should be taken from the Resolution of the Sixteenth Plenum of the CC of the BWP(C), from Nos. 6 and 7 of "New Times," "For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy" and special articles on these questions in "Rabotničko Delo."

Long Live the Brotherhood and Unity of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Peoples!

Chairman
(Sgd) Vlko Chervenkov

For the Secretary General
(Sgd) D. Znapolski

Certified true copy

Seal

For the Secretary General
D. Znapolski

(*) Bulgarian hegemonistic tendencies which, in substance, mean denying the Macedonian people of Pirin Macedonia the right to self-determination, were expressed in the Resolution of the Sixteenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists) held July 12 and 13, 1948, in Sofia, and in the speech of Vladimir Poptomov held on August 2, 1948. (Pirin Macedonia is that part of Macedonia located in Bulgaria.)

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT OF THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR IN BULGARIA, No. 73 OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1948, REGARDING THE CIRCULAR LETTER OF THE BULGARIAN-YUGOSLAV SOCIETY FOR CULTURAL COOPERATION IN SOFIA

"On our part we should simply like to add that, only a few days before this circular letter, the Bulgarian representatives, working together with us in Beograd, had elaborated and signed the Plan of Cultural Cooperation for 1948-1949. One of the most important points in this Plan is the activity of these Societies aiming at closer cultural-political relations between our peoples. In the above-mentioned Plan the tasks for all the Societies are defined precisely — so that you will be able to see the relationship between this confidential circular letter sent out by the Society and the public obligation undertaken by the Bulgarian authorities in the adopted Plan."

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF PROTEST No. 423470 OF SEPTEMBER 7, 1948, AGAINST THE INSULTING AND RUDE TONE USED IN THE ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT'S NOTES

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, on behalf of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, has the honour to communicate the following to the Government of the People's Republic of Albania.

The Government of the FPRY has lately been compelled to disregard and return a number of Notes from the Government of the PR of Albania and the Legation of the PR of Albania in Beograd, owing to the flagrant insults and vile slanders expressed against the Yugoslav authorities and the inimical tone of these Notes, which are in complete contradiction with the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the FPRY and the PR of Albania. This is impermissible even from the standpoint of customary international relations to say nothing of normal good-neighbourly relations between the two countries.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY has already on one occasion, in its Note No. 422590 of August 26, 1948, addressed to the Legation of the PR of Albania in Beograd, drawn the attention of the Government of the PR of Albania to the above-mentioned impermissible and unacceptable practice in international relations and pointed out that "it neither can nor will in the future accept notes written in a rude, insulting manner, uncommon in diplomatic practice." The same reasons have also been communicated verbally whenever a note has been returned.

The Government of the PR of Albania, however, has continued sending notes containing vile insults and slanders against Yugoslav authorities which in no way differ from the notes returned by the Government of the FPRY.

For the reasons stated above, the Government of the FPRY most energetically protests again and notes that such acts by the Government

of the PR of Albania obstruct the settlement of current problems between both countries in which the PR of Albania is primarily interested. The Government of the FPRY considers that this entirely unprovoked and persistent repetition of insults and slanders against the Yugoslav authorities, contained in the Notes of the Government of the PR of Albania and the Legation of the PR of Albania in Beograd, has accordingly no other purpose but to weaken and render impossible normal relations between the FPRY and the PR of Albania. The Government of the FPRY notes that the responsibility for such a situation rests solely with the Government of the PR of Albania.

The Government of the FPRY again draws the attention of the Government of the PR of Albania to the fact that it neither can nor will in the future accept Notes written in a rude and insulting manner uncommon in diplomatic practice.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to express its consideration to the Legation of the PR of Albania.

Beograd, September 7, 1948

SOME EXAMPLES OF THE INSULTS AND THREATS AIMED AT A SMALL SOCIALIST COUNTRY BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS THE GOVERNMENT OF A BIG POWER⁽⁴⁰⁾

DOCUMENT No. 32

FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 197 OF AUGUST 11, 1949

"Let the peoples of Yugoslavia know that the Soviet Government does not consider the present Government of Yugoslavia as a friend and ally but as an enemy and opponent of the Soviet Union."⁽⁴⁰⁾

⁽⁴⁰⁾ The Notes from which the quotations are taken, were sent by the USSR Government to the Government of the FPRY in the former's attempts to free itself from the responsibility for the decision made by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four big powers of June 19, 1949, regarding the Treaty with Austria in which the request of the Government of the FPRY for the incorporation of Slovene Carinthia into Yugoslavia was rejected together with the request that Austria be bound by the Treaty to pay reparations to Yugoslavia. By this decision the right of the Slovene people of Carinthia to self-determination was not recognized. Austria was also freed from the obligation to compensate, at least partially, for the damage done to the peoples of Yugoslavia by Austro-German aggression against, and occupation of, Yugoslavia. This decision by the Council of Foreign Ministers was rendered possible by the Government of the USSR, which bargained at closed meetings with the representatives of the three big powers, without consulting the Government of the FPRY, at the expense of the national interests of the Yugoslav peoples. It thereby reached an agreement with the three Governments to the effect that the Soviet economic claims towards Austria should be satisfied more completely. As the Government of the FPRY could not reconcile itself to the decision of the four big powers, which took no account of justified Yugoslav interests, it submitted a separate request to all the above-mentioned Governments for a revision of the decision. In order to misinform world public opinion and to conceal from it the true essence of its unprincipled action, the Government of the USSR wrote a number of Notes formally addressed to the Government of the FPRY, in which, in the absence of proofs, and distorting historical facts, it poured out a whole torrent of abuse, slanders and threats against the Government of the FPRY.

⁽⁴⁰⁾ Note given in excerpts.

FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 235 OF AUGUST 29, 1949

"The Soviet Government considers it necessary to make the following remarks not in order to convince the Yugoslav Government, which has been without convictions for a long time and has been acting only under directives from its western masters, but in order to tear off its mask and help the peoples of Yugoslavia to see the true face of the present Yugoslav Government..."

"We never thought that the Yugoslav Government could fall so low as to have such a hideous and sordid opinion of the Soviet Union. There can be no doubt that only people who have betrayed socialism and democracy and have become callous fascists can blab so recklessly and impudently about the Soviet Union and its Government. In the assertions of the Yugoslav Government, every word is a lie..."

"The Yugoslav Government has invented and fabricated all this..."

"The Yugoslav Government cannot escape from this treacherous document just as it cannot escape from its own shadow..."

"Naturally, the Soviet Government could not agree to this pretentious machination to deceive the Yugoslav peoples..."

"Everybody knows that the Yugoslav Government has deserted the camp of socialism and democracy and gone over to the camp of imperialism and fascism. It should be emphasized that the Soviet people and the Soviet public have no respect for deserters. Therefore, they cannot have any feeling for deserters. What is more, it is well-known to everybody that the Soviet people and the Soviet public despise deserters.

"There are, of course, various kinds of deserters. There are casual deserters who have deserted out of fear, hoping to save their skins. There are other kinds — malicious deserters. These are people who desert not only to save their skins but also to inflict damage to the camp from which they deserted. No matter how sad this might be we cannot but state that the Soviet people and the Soviet public place the Yugoslav Government in the category of malicious and not casual deserters.

"We must further underline that malicious deserters are not all alike. There are those who, aware of their guilt, suffer under the burden of their shame and endeavour to pass unnoticed, try not to attract attention and behave almost modestly. But there are malicious deserters who make their shame a source of revenue; they boast loudly of their desertion as a kind of heroism, jump on the stage every minute to bark at the camp from which they deserted, brag that they can always bark at this camp, for which reasons they are allegedly not common deserters but heroes. Like in Krylov's fable: 'But the poodle must be strong since it is barking at the elephant.'

"No matter how sad this might be, it must be stated that the Soviet people and the Soviet public place the Yugoslav Government in the category of such bragging, malicious deserters.

"This is the social climate in which the Soviet Government must act.

"We hope that the Yugoslav Government will understand that it cannot expect kindness and even less respect from the Soviet Government."⁽⁴¹⁾

DOCUMENT No. 34

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 415160 OF AUGUST 20, 1949, IN ANSWER TO THE THREATENING AND INSULTING TONE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S NOTES

"As regards the tone in which the Note of the Soviet Government of August 11, of this year, is written, and the insults and slanders against the Government of the FPRY contained both in the above-mentioned Note and in the earlier correspondence, all this is one more proof of the distorted conception of the Soviet Government of relations which should exist between the USSR and other socialist countries. The Government of the FPRY, however, is, and has been, passing over this and leaves it to democratic public opinion to judge both such a tone and these and similar insulting acts towards an independent and democratic country."⁽⁴²⁾

⁽⁴¹⁾ Note given in excerpts.

⁽⁴²⁾ Note given in excerpts.

2. VIOLATIONS OF PEACE TREATIES, ALLIED DECLARATIONS AND AGREEMENTS BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR, HUNGARY, BULGARIA, AND RUMANIA TO THE DETRIMENT OF YUGOSLAVIA AND YUGOSLAV MINORITIES

DOCUMENT No. 35

INSTRUCTION SENT BY THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT TO THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN MOSCOW, IN LETTER No. 748 OF OCTOBER 13, 1948, TO INTERCEDE WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT FOR REMOVAL OF OBSTACLES BEING PUT IN THE WAY OF THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY MISSION IN BERLIN BY THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES

Our Military Mission in Berlin has, in its activities lately, been encountering ever increasing difficulties on the part of certain organs and institutions of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. These difficulties were specially manifested in the following concrete cases:

1. On August 4, this year, the Military Mission submitted to the Consular Department of the SMA⁽¹⁾ an application for a "propusk"⁽²⁾ for the transportation of 79 repatriates, our citizens, from the Soviet Zone, and, on August 28, for another 35 Yugoslav repatriates. Despite numerous inquiries (there were more than ten) the matter was settled only at the end of September.

Besides, entry visas for the Soviet Zone of Occupation can hardly be obtained at all, exception being made for those persons who go there for a short visit on trade missions. Therefore, changes and appointments in the staff of the Military Mission are made practically impossible for us.

2. Through the IARA,⁽³⁾ in the French sector of Berlin we received 182 machines as reparations from the well-known Borsig factory which is being dismantled. These machines have been waiting for two months to be transported to our country, since, despite repeated interventions, we did not receive a Soviet permit for transit through the Soviet Zone which means that, owing to the latest developments with respect to dismantling and reparations, these machines might be lost for us.

3. We encounter difficulties regarding the restitution of our property as well.

(1) Soviet Military Administration in the Soviet Zone of Occupation of Germany.

(2) "Propusk," Russian word for Laissez-Passer.

(3) IARA — Inter-Allied Reparation Agency.

In general there are great delays in bringing decisions for the restitution of property discovered and identified long ago, which fact is being exploited by the Germans who alienate the property, process it and use it, so that, when the Soviet authorities finally bring a decision, there is nothing left to be restituted.

Railway cars for restitution are not placed at our disposal and the cars we are compelled to send to Germany often disappear.

For instance, we requested that the Müller firm in Leipzig turn over to us 3,370 cubic metres of oak lumber (our request S-8), which quantity was confiscated during the war in Yugoslavia and "sold" to this firm. No written decision has yet been made in this respect because the Soviet authorities maintain that this lumber had been sold to Müller — but they do not take into consideration that it was sold by an Ustashi commissioner and not by its real owners, who were then held in a concentration camp. There have also been difficulties in similar cases; thus, for instance, with regard to our requests S-13 and S-78 for the restitution of about 3 carloads of textiles looted in Yugoslavia, two-thirds of which have already been sold in the black market or stolen, etc.

4. Several months ago our Military Mission addressed a request to the Commander of the Soviet Sector in Berlin, asking to be allocated premises for the "Yugoslavia in War and Reconstruction" exhibition. In spite of numerous interventions, nothing was settled in this respect either, although it was specially pointed out that, owing to its character, this exhibition should make a considerable contribution to the struggle of the progressive forces of Germany against imperialism.⁽⁴⁾

5. Particularly great difficulties were encountered in connection with the Bulletin which our Military Mission, like all the other Military Missions, is issuing in Berlin. The Soviet side went so far as to threaten our Military Mission with expulsion from the Soviet Zone unless we stopped publishing our Bulletin, i. e. stopped "any propaganda whatsoever in connection with the Resolution."⁽⁵⁾

All the inquiries made and steps taken by the Military Mission to settle the above-mentioned concrete questions and remove all unnecessary difficulties, in most cases were not even answered. The same happened in a conversation between the Deputy-Chief of the Military Mission, Colonel Hotić, and the Political Counselor of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, Semenov, which took place on September 17, in connection with these and similar difficulties. Political Counselor Semenov did not answer a single question addressed to him and gave only a vague promise that he would discuss these questions with the competent people and that for the present he could not give any answer.

(4) The Military Mission of the FPRY in Berlin negotiated with the Soviet Military Administration in Germany about the opening of the exhibition "Yugoslavia in War and Reconstruction," in the first half of 1948, and an agreement in principle was reached for the opening of this exhibition. On the basis of this agreement the Military Mission of the FPRY in its letter of July 28, 1948, No. S-267, asked the Commandant of the Soviet Sector of Berlin to put at its disposal the necessary exhibition premises. Only after a repeated written inquiry of October 1, 1948, by the Military Mission, did the Soviet Military Administration in Germany answer that the requested premises were occupied, and when the Military Mission of the FPRY proposed new premises no answer was received.

(5) This refers to the Cominform Resolution of June, 1948.

On the other hand, he did not hesitate, while trying to convince Comrade Hotić of the incorrectness of the position of our CC, to repeat the well-known untruth and slander about a meeting between Comrade Tito and Americans on Brioni Islands,⁽⁶⁾ and the like.

With respect to all the above, the Embassy should, in conversation, in an unofficial way, draw the attention of the Soviet Government to these examples of obstruction of the activity of our Military Mission in Berlin, requesting the Government for the necessary intervention so that unjustified difficulties do not occur in the future even with regard to such questions as the repatriation of our citizens, reparations and restitutions.

DOCUMENT No. 36

NOTE OF THE RUMANIAN EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD No. 1927/12 OF
OCTOBER 14, 1948, ANNOUNCING THE EXPULSION OF YUGOSLAV
TEACHERS FROM RUMANIA

"The Rumanian Government is no longer inclined to tolerate the nationalist and chauvinistic manner in which these teachers are educating the younger generation. They are not taking into account the efforts which are being made by the competent authorities of the Rumanian People's Republic to democratize education, by removing the remains of the fascism of the past and spreading understanding and peaceful cooperation between national minorities.

"The nationalist attitude and activities of the Yugoslav teaching staff in the Rumanian People's Republic, similar to that of the reactionary and fascist regimes of the past, are an incitement against the democratic order and have caused justified indignation among the Serbo-Croat population against the teaching staff.

"Consequently, the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic calls upon the Government of the FPRY to take the necessary measures for the urgent recall of all Yugoslav teachers residing in the territory of the Rumanian People's Republic."⁽⁷⁾⁽⁸⁾

⁽⁶⁾ Brioni, a group of small islands in the North Adriatic Sea.

⁽⁷⁾ Note given in excerpts.

⁽⁸⁾ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY answered this note with an exhaustive and documented Note, No. 427931 of October 30, 1948, which rejects in its entirety the absolutely unfounded and insulting Note of the Rumanian Embassy. The Note describes the historical development of the status of schools of the Yugoslav national minority in Rumania which were organized on the basis of the Convention of March 10, 1933. Many examples presented in the Note point out the undemocratic policy of the Rumanian Government toward the Yugoslav national minority. This policy violated its fundamental right to national development. The educational policy of the Rumanian Government neglects minority schools, the number of which is insufficient for the 70,000 members of the Yugoslav minority. The small number of existing minority schools does not even receive the most necessary material means for normal functioning, such as buildings, textbooks, etc. The Rumanian authorities bring pressure to bear on the Yugoslav minority to take up a hostile stand toward the FPRY, and persecute, intern and arrest prominent representatives of the minority, etc.

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF PROTEST TO THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT No. 414672 OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1950, AGAINST FORCED RESETTLEMENT OF THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL MINORITY IN HUNGARY

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia informs the Legation of the People's Republic of Hungary of the following:

According to the Budapest newspaper, "Szabad Nep," organ of the Hungarian Workers' Party, the Yugoslav national minority living along the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier has been moved away under the pretext, as "Szabad Nep" puts it, that they are "fascists, kulaks, and that they assist in Tito's provocations."

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia considers that the resettlement of the Yugoslav national minority being carried out by responsible organs of the Hungarian Government is a most flagrant violation of the fundamental rights of the Yugoslav national minority living in Hungary. This act bears all the earmarks of collective punishment without any foundation whatsoever, which is absolutely inadmissible under international law. All civilized peoples condemned such a procedure and such methods when they were used by Nazi Germany against national minorities in the course of the Second World War.

Apart from this, the resettlement of the Yugoslav national minority is also a direct violation of international obligations undertaken by Hungary in the Peace Treaty which was concluded in Paris on February 10, 1947, between the Allied and Associated Powers, on the one hand, and Hungary on the other. Article 2 of the Peace Treaty makes it binding upon Hungary to undertake all measures to secure for all persons under Hungarian jurisdiction, regardless of race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of the human rights and the fundamental freedoms. According to Paragraph 2 of the same Article, Hungary is also under the obligation to see to it that the laws in force in Hungary will not, either in substance or application, make or cause any discrimination against Hungarian citizens on the basis of race, sex, language, or religion. Accordingly, not only the laws, but administrative measures, too, which in all civilized states must be based on the law, must not violate these obligations which Hungary undertook under the Peace Treaty.

The Note goes on to describe the position of the Rumanian national minority in Yugoslavia which enjoys all the rights guaranteeing it full national, political and cultural development. It cites examples of the participation of the Rumanian national minority in all the organs of the People's Government in Yugoslavia, the number of Rumanian schools, minority cultural-educational societies, the number of Rumanian newspapers, etc. The Note mentions the statement made by the Rumanian Ambassador to Beograd, T. Rudenco, on the position of the Rumanian national minority in Yugoslavia. At the Congress of the Cultural Union of Rumanians in the FPRY held in January, 1948, he said in part:

"The entire agenda of your Congress is proof of the full freedom and equality for all nationalities within the borders of the same state, the freedom and equality which is offered to you by the new Yugoslavia of Tito." The Note ends by saying that "the teachers who are Yugoslav citizens will return to their country owing to the insults and maltreatment they suffer at the hands of the Rumanian authorities."

The resettlement of people belonging to the Yugoslav national minority in Hungary not only violates their fundamental rights and freedom but is also obviously aimed at their denationalization. That is why the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has cause for anxiety about the fate of the Yugoslav minority as a whole, and especially about the fate of those who have been deported. Owing to the procedure followed by the Hungarian authorities, it is not known where they have been deported and under what conditions they are living.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia cannot but consider this resettlement of members of the Yugoslav minority from the frontier zone, where they have been living for centuries, as a new act in the series of undertakings in the inimical and aggressive policy which the Government of the People's Republic of Hungary is pursuing against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

For this reason, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia protests most energetically against the resettlement of the Yugoslav national minority in Hungary and requests the Hungarian authorities to cease further resettlement immediately and to undertake measures to return the deported members of the Yugoslav national minority to their homes.^(*)^(1*)

Beograd, September 1st, 1950.

DOCUMENT No. 33

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM OF MAY 23, 1949, REQUESTING BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT TO MAKE POSSIBLE RESTITUTION OF CULTURAL OBJECTS WHICH ARE THE PROPERTY OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLES

During the occupation of parts of the territory of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia from 1941 to 1944, the Bulgarian military and civilian occupation authorities looted and removed to Bulgaria many Yugoslav cultural, artistic and historical objects. For the restitution of these objects the Government of the FPRY in its Note No. 115-I of March 11, 1948, through its Embassy in Sofia, transmitted a list of all the removed cultural, artistic and historical items with all the necessary details: by whom and when they were removed, indicating the institutions and places where, or the persons with whom, the same are to be found now. The Government of the FPRY requested the Government of the PR of Bulgaria to find and restitute to the FPRY the above-mentioned property through its competent organs. The Government of the FPRY submitted its request on the basis of Art. 22 of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, signed on February 10, 1947, regulat-

(*) The Hungarian Government has still not answered this note.

(1*) The Rumanian Government is resettling the Yugoslav national minority in the Rumanian People's Republic. The Bulgarian Government is taking similar measures against the population in the regions bordering on Yugoslavia. All these measures have a military character as well as a political one.

ing the question of restitution of cultural objects removed from the territory of the FPRY. The restitution claims for the Yugoslav cultural, artistic and historical objects, removed by Bulgarian military and civilian occupation authorities to the PR of Bulgaria, consist of the following:

1. 78 restitution claims from the PR of Serbia;
2. 32 restitution claims from the PR of Macedonia;
3. 21 restitution claims from the Yugoslav Army.

From the time the restitution claims were made until the present day, the competent Bulgarian organs through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Bulgaria have given negative answers to the greater part of the restitution claims from the PR of Serbia, with the explanation that the objects were not to be found in the indicated places or that they had not been transported to the PR of Bulgaria.

So far, no answer whatsoever has been received to the greater part of the restitution claims from the PR of Macedonia. However, the restitution claims of the PR of Macedonia cover precisely the most valuable cultural items looted and removed from the territory of the FPRY to the territory of Bulgaria.

Regarding the restitution of the archives of units of the Yugoslav Army, which operated in the territory of the FPRY occupied by Bulgaria, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Bulgaria answered that the archives could not be found.

For the sake of a more efficient realization of the restitution claims, the Government of the FPRY decided to send to the PR of Bulgaria two specialists who would help the competent Bulgarian organs in tracing the objects and identifying them on the spot. As the Government of the PR of Bulgaria knows, the Yugoslav specialists — Professors Jovan Kukić and Koče Dimče — were sent to Bulgaria for this purpose. They spent more than 20 days in Sofia but could not get in touch with the competent Bulgarian authorities, although the Embassy of the FPRY in Sofia intervened several times at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Bulgaria requesting that the Yugoslav specialists be enabled to cooperate with the competent Bulgarian authorities. After more than 20 days, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Bulgaria notified the Embassy of the FPRY that it was unnecessary for the Yugoslav specialists to remain any longer, because, in case there were any cultural, artistic and historical items to be restituted, the Bulgarian organs themselves would take care of the matter of restitution. Accordingly, the Government of the PR of Bulgaria rejected the cooperation of the Yugoslav organs in tracing the cultural items, although Article 22, Paragraph 5 of the Peace Treaty provided that the Government of Bulgaria will cooperate in the tracing and restitution of property with the authorities of the countries from which the objects were removed.

From the aforesaid the following can be established:

(a) According to Article 22 of the Peace Treaty, signed by Bulgaria on February 10, 1947, the Government of the PR of Bulgaria is under obligation to restitute all cultural objects removed from the territory of the FPRY during the occupation of the territory of the FPRY by the Bulgarian fascist army.

(b) Not a single object of cultural, artistic or historical value has been returned to the FPRY from the PR of Bulgaria up to the present day.

(c) The Government of the PR of Bulgaria has so far not shown any goodwill in regard to the fulfilment of its obligations towards the FPRY deriving from the Peace Treaty, which can be concluded not only from the fact that the Bulgarian Government did not restitute one single object, but also from the fact that the Bulgarian Government refused the cooperation of the Yugoslav specialists in tracing and identifying cultural items. This it did in spite of the fact that, according to the above-mentioned Article 22 of the Peace Treaty, the Government of the PR of Bulgaria is under the obligation to cooperate with the FPRY in regard to the question of restitutions.

(d) The competent Bulgarian authorities often based their negative answers regarding restitution, such as, for instance, that the objects could not be traced, or that they had not been taken to Bulgaria at all, on the statements of former military and civilian officials of the occupation apparatus of fascist Bulgaria, who had ordered and carried out this looting of cultural objects.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY informs the Government of the PR of Bulgaria that the Government of the FPRY can no longer tolerate such a negative attitude on the part of the Bulgarian authorities regarding the obligation to restitute looted cultural objects from the territory of the FPR of Yugoslavia. It considers that such an attitude by the Bulgarian authorities is a flagrant violation of the Peace Treaty signed by the PR of Bulgaria, and that this really means an attempt to conceal the activity of Bulgarian occupation authorities.

The Government of the FPRY requests the Government of the PR of Bulgaria to take the necessary measures to enable the tracing and restitution of cultural objects owned by the peoples of Yugoslavia and looted by the Bulgarian invaders in the period from 1941 to 1944. The Government of the FPRY further requests the Government of the PR of Bulgaria to authorize the Yugoslav specialists to visit Bulgaria, and to order the competent Bulgarian authorities to cooperate closely with the Yugoslav specialists in tracing and identifying these objects.⁽¹¹⁾

Beograd, May 23, 1949.

⁽¹¹⁾ The Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs returned this Memorandum on June 21, 1949, with the motivation that it was written in an insulting tone. The request brought forth in the Memorandum was reiterated orally to the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 18, 1949. This step, however, also brought no results.

LETTER FROM THE YUGOSLAV MINISTER IN HUNGARY, OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1949, TO THE CHIEFS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS OF THE USSR, UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM, REQUESTING THE CONSIDERATION OF THE REPARATIONS DISPUTE BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND HUNGARY

Your Excellency,

Upon instructions from my Government and in accordance with Article 40 of the Peace Treaty with Hungary, I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency the following dispute for consideration jointly with the Heads of the Diplomatic Missions of the United Kingdom and of the United States of America.

By occupying Yugoslav territories between 1941 and 1944 Hungary has caused to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia damage amounting to 1,281,161,612 dollars.

According to the Armistice Agreement with Hungary of January 20, 1945, Hungary was bound to pay to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and to Czechoslovakia reparations in the amount of 100 million dollars for the war damage inflicted. The Treaty of Peace with Hungary in Article 23, too, obliged Hungary to pay to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and to Czechoslovakia 100 million dollars for reparations.

Pursuant to the Agreement concluded on November 22, 1945, between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, 70 million dollars out of the mentioned total of 100 million dollars belonged to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The Agreement on the reparation deliveries concluded on August 12, 1946, between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and Hungary provided the modality of payment of the sum of 70 million dollars. Desirous of meeting the requirements of the Hungarian Government, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia agreed that the term of 6 years, due to take effect according to the Armistice Agreement as of January 20, 1948, be extended to 8 years.

Thus on the grounds of Article 23 of the Peace Treaty and of the other aforesaid complementary agreements, Hungary was bound to pay to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 70 million dollars in reparations for the war damage caused, in the term and modality as provided by the Agreement on the reparation deliveries of August 12, 1946.

In the course of September 1948 Hungary discontinued the reparation deliveries to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The intervention of the Yugoslav representatives in Hungary was not answered by the Hungarian authorities. M. Alfred Offner, the President of the Hungarian Reparations Institution, stated the following to the representatives of the Yugoslav Reparations Delegation, MM. Milosavljević and Grečel:

"No more deliveries will be effected against reparations. Hungary in this situation and under her present conditions will not and cannot pay any reparations. The payment of reparations in this situation does not depend even on Rakosi. Reparations are dependent on the further development of relations between our two countries. In question, of course, are not only the relations between my country and yours."

By its note of September 16, 1948, handed over to the Legation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia on September 17, 1948, the Hungarian Government made the proposition that the delegations of the two Governments should meet to conclude an agreement on the regulation of the remainder of the Hungarian reparations obligations.

M. Zoltan Vas, President of the Hungarian Economic Council, declared on October 13, 1948, to the Chief of the Yugoslav Reparations Delegation, Sinanović, that the Hungarian Government took the decision to discontinue all reparation deliveries because the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia did not agree that the Hungarian reparations debt be reduced by 50%.

In its Memorandum of October 30, 1948, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia informed the Hungarian Government that it did not exclude the possibility of facilitating the Hungarian reparation obligations and by its Note of November 27, 1948, it also formally accepted the Hungarian proposal to begin negotiations to regulate the balance of the Hungarian reparation obligations, and invited the Hungarian Government to send its delegation to Beograd.

Instead of entering into the negotiations for which the Hungarian Government itself took the initiative, it in fact refused to negotiate, laying down the following conditions:

1. That the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia should withdraw the statement of its Minister in Budapest, M. Karlo Mrazović, to the effect that the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia would be compelled to refer the matter to the competent international forum, in the event of Hungary's failure to fulfil her obligations deriving from the Treaty of Peace;

2. That the Yugoslav Government should withdraw its decree on the transfer of Hungarian assets in the territory of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the ownership of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which was published on August 1, 1948, on the basis of the Peace Treaty with Hungary.

By its Note of December 16, 1948, the Yugoslav Government again invited the Hungarian Government to enter into negotiations on the regulation of the Hungarian reparation obligations and stated that it did not exclude the possibility of also regulating the question of the Hungarian assets in Yugoslavia by means of negotiations.

The Hungarian Government was compelled to admit in its note No. 02140/48 that the Yugoslav Government "showed its willingness to regulate these questions by means of negotiations," but it continued making the commencement of the negotiations conditional upon the explicit withdrawal by the Yugoslav Government of the mentioned declaration made by Minister Karlo Mrazović and of the Decree of August 1, 1948.

The Hungarian Government gave no reply whatsoever to the note of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia of February 7, 1949, in which the latter again proposed negotiations.

When the Legation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia at Budapest, in its note of May 19, 1949, requested from the Hungarian Government a clear answer as to whether it desired to enter into negotiations to regulate the Hungarian reparation obligations and to regulate the question of the liquidation of Hungarian assets in Yugoslavia under the Peace Treaty — the Hungarian Government by its note of May 25, 1949, refused further stay to the Yugoslav Reparation and Restitution Delegation asserting, as a reason, that its activity in Hungarian territory "had become unnecessary."

The Yugoslav Government notes that this dispute relating to the implementation of Article 23 of the Peace Treaty could not be settled by direct negotiations between the two Governments because of the ill-will of the Hungarian Government.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia finds that the Government of the People's Republic of Hungary has, by discontinuing the reparations deliveries and expelling the Yugoslav Reparations Delegation from Hungary, violated the Peace Treaty and that it is bound to carry out its reparation deliveries in full, within the period and in the manner provided by the Agreement on reparation deliveries, concluded on August 12, 1946, between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Hungarian Republic.

Therefore I have the honour to request Your Excellency to take action, in concert with the heads of the Diplomatic Missions of the USA and the United Kingdom, according to Article 40 of the Peace Treaty with Hungary.

Similar letters have been sent to the Chiefs of the Missions of the United Kingdom and the USA in Budapest, to Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United Kingdom, Mr. G. A. Wallinger, and the Chargé d'Affaires of the Legation of the USA, Mr. W. P. Cochran.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurance of my high consideration.

(Sgd) Djura Jovanović

DOCUMENT No. 40

**AIDE-MEMOIRE OF THE YUGOSLAV MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD, OF APRIL 22, 1950, REGARDING
THE CONFISCATION OF YUGOSLAV PRINTING MACHINES SCHEDULED
FOR RESTITUTION FROM GERMANY**

The Military Mission of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Berlin, in its Note No. 1833 of October 1, 1949, requested the Soviet Military Administration in Germany to grant a permit for the transport of two printing machines from the British Zone in Berlin, through the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany, to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. These machines were taken from

Yugoslavia in 1943 by the German invaders and restitution was effected by the Yugoslav organs from the United States Zone in Berlin.

The Soviet Military Administration, on December 8, 1949, granted permit No. 209 for the transport of the afore-mentioned printing machines valid until January 7, 1950.

The German frontier authorities, however, on December 17, 1949, at the Marienborn frontier post, confiscated the printing machines under the pretext that the export documents of the Soviet Military Administration were forged, and they took the machines to Magdeburg.

Regarding this illegal act by the German frontier organs, the representatives of the Military Mission of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia have, on several occasions, orally and otherwise, requested the Soviet Military Administration in Germany to intervene in this matter to have the German frontier authorities deliver the confiscated restituted material. The Soviet Military Administration in Germany has not yet answered the requests of the Military Mission of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.⁽¹²⁾

Beograd, April 22, 1950.

⁽¹²⁾ The Government of the FPRY received no answer to this Aide-Mémoire.

3. ORGANIZATION OF GROUPS OF YUGOSLAV DESERTERS AND TERRORISTS IN THE USSR AND IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITH THE AIM OF INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND UNDERMINING THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF YUGOSLAVIA

DOCUMENT No. 41

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF PROTEST No. 49023 OF MAY 23, 1949, AGAINST HELP EXTENDED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO A GROUP OF YUGOSLAV TRAITORS AND DESERTERS

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has the honour to inform the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the following:

In Moscow, on April 11, 1945, the Government of the FPRY and the Government of the USSR signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation for a period of twenty years. On not one single occasion has the Government of the FPRY violated its provisions, and it has remained faithful to this Treaty, as the Government of the USSR knows well, despite various hostile and discriminatory acts by the Government of the USSR against the FPRY.

The incomprehensible actions of the Government of the USSR, however, and its attitude towards the FPRY, are in fact transforming the above-mentioned Treaty into a dead letter.

New proof that a contrary policy is being pursued by the Government of the USSR towards the FPRY is the activity of certain Yugoslav traitors who have gathered in Moscow. In spite of the fact that their personal qualities are well known to the USSR Government, they are conducting hostile activity against the FPRY in Moscow with the full support of the USSR Government. At the beginning of April, 1949, a committee was created in Moscow which launched an anti-Yugoslav paper towards the end of April. The Soviet press and radio give a great deal of publicity to this anti-Yugoslav activity.

The support offered by the Soviet Government to these few traitors to their socialist homeland is in contradiction with the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other sovereign countries, a principle which should especially be observed in the relations between socialist States. This support is also in complete contradiction with the proclaimed principle of Soviet foreign policy repeated in the state-

ment of the Head of the Soviet delegation⁽¹⁾ during the second part of the Third Session of the UN General Assembly, namely that "no State has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another State, utilizing for this purpose various mercenary groups in order to undermine the foundations of another State."

By enabling the traitors of a friendly, allied socialist country to gather and organize in Moscow, and by offering them help in their work aimed at combatting the FPRY and at the forcible destruction of the socialist order in Yugoslavia — the Government of the USSR is proving in practice that it is the one that is not pursuing a friendly policy towards the FPRY.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY protests most energetically against the help being offered by the Soviet authorities to the few persons who have a hostile attitude towards the building of socialism in Yugoslavia. This is an inadmissible and flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the FPRY. The Government of the USSR is requested to prohibit such hostile activities and the further publication of the paper, because the support of such anti-Yugoslav work is in complete contradiction with the spirit and letter of the existing Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation between the FPRY and the USSR.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia avails itself of this opportunity to express its consideration to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Beograd, May 23, 1949.

DOCUMENT No. 42

SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 124 OF MAY 31, 1949, IN REPLY TO THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF PROTEST OF MAY 23, 1949, AGAINST THE HELP GIVEN TO A GROUP OF YUGOSLAV TRAITORS AND DESERTERS BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

"The attitude of the Soviet Government towards the present Yugoslav Government should not be confused with its attitude towards Yugoslavia, its attitude towards the peoples of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government deprived itself of the right to expect a friendly attitude on the part of the Soviet Government inasmuch as the Yugoslav Government pursued a hostile policy towards the Soviet Union, inasmuch as it established an anti-communist and undemocratic regime of terror in Yugoslavia, inasmuch as, waging a struggle against the Soviet Union, and owing to the logic of events, it fell so low as to join the camp of enemies of the Soviet Union, inasmuch as it transformed the Yugoslav press into a loudspeaker for the furious anti-Soviet propaganda being disseminated by the fascist agents of imperialism..."

"The Soviet Government decided to receive and give shelter to the Yugoslav patriots-exiles, persecuted by the Yugoslav anti-democratic

(1) Andrei A. Gromyko, USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

regime for their democratic and socialist convictions, and gave them asylum. The Soviet Government declares that it will, in the future, extend its hospitality to the Yugoslav revolutionary exiles. This, however, does not mean — as incorrectly maintained in the Yugoslav Note — that the Soviet Government or its State organs are allegedly offering 'full support' to the Yugoslav revolutionary exiles. Such dissimilar matters, as the right of revolutionary exiles to be offered shelter, cannot be confused with the full support' of their activity without the risk of creating a legal absurdity...."

"The Yugoslav revolutionary exiles in the USSR are described in the Yugoslav Note as 'traitors to their homeland.' The Soviet Government holds a different opinion. It considers that the Yugoslav revolutionary exiles are true socialists and democrats, faithful sons of Yugoslavia, resolute fighters for the independence of Yugoslavia, builders of friendship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. If one is looking for traitors to Yugoslavia, one should not look for them among the revolutionary Yugoslav exiles, but among those gentlemen who are trying to undermine the friendship between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, weaken Yugoslavia and thus lead her to the same fate that befell those countries which became the slaves of imperialism and lost their independence."(*)

DOCUMENT No. 43

PROTEST NOTE FROM THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN PRAGUE No. 522/8
OF OCTOBER 12, 1948, AGAINST THE HELP GIVEN BY THE CZECHOSLO-
VAK GOVERNMENT TO A GROUP OF YUGOSLAV TRAITORS AND
DESERTERS

The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Prague has the honour to communicate the following to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Czechoslovakia.

In the campaign being carried on of late in the Republic of Czechoslovakia against the peoples, State and Government of the FPRY, a particular place is held by the reckless campaign of the Czechoslovak press and radio. Besides, the Czechoslovak Government, despite allied and friendly relations between the two countries, agreed to allow the newspaper of the Yugoslav traitors "Nova Borba" to be printed, circulated and publicized in its territory through the Czechoslovak press and radio. "Nova Borba" publishes the most infamous inventions, insults and slanders against the peoples, the State and the Government of the FPRY and is financed by a political party in the Czechoslovak Republic.

The traitors of the FPRY are not only enabled, by all possible means, freely to slander their homeland, but also are taken into the service of the Czechoslovak Republic and assigned special functions. On the other hand, the paper "Nova Borba" itself is advertized and given widespread publicity by Czechoslovakia in spite of the fact that

(*) Note given in excerpts.

the circulation of this paper is prohibited in Yugoslavia, which should be taken into consideration by the Czechoslovak Government in view of the existing relations between the two countries. Prague is thereby becoming more and more a centre for the anti-Yugoslav campaign which is fighting against the existing political system in the FPR of Yugoslavia, to which Czechoslovakia is bound both by the Treaty of Alliance and by agreements on economic and cultural cooperation.

In view of the above-mentioned facts the Embassy of the FPRY in Prague notes that the Government of the FPRY will be compelled to draw the necessary conclusions from the above-mentioned acts of the Czechoslovak Government.

The Embassy of the FPRY in Prague, under instructions from its Government, at the same time protests most resolutely against the above-stated acts of the Czechoslovak Government, which violate both the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and the Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between the FPRY and the Czechoslovak Republic.

Bringing the foregoing to the notice of the Ministry, the Embassy of the FPRY in Prague avails itself of this opportunity to express its high consideration to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Prague, October 12, 1948.

DOCUMENT No. 44

CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 211705/II-2/48 OF OCTOBER 22, 1948, IN REPLY TO THE PROTEST NOTE FROM THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN PRAGUE OF OCTOBER 12, 1948, CONCERNING HELP GIVEN BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT TO A GROUP OF YUGOSLAV TRAITORS AND DESERTERS

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Note No. 522 of October 12, 1948, of the Honourable Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Prague, and to communicate the following:

The publication of the periodical "Nova Borba" was authorized in the Czechoslovak Republic by virtue of the Czechoslovak Press Law in complete conformity with the principle of freedom of the press in the Czechoslovak Republic.

The Czechoslovak authorities are not aware that the periodical "Nova Borba" could in any way affect the peoples, the State and Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

In the Czechoslovak Republic the periodical "Nova Borba" is considered a democratic, anti-fascist periodical which is fighting for the realization of the principle of people's democracy.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs most resolutely rejects the way in which the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Prague unjustly accuses the Czechoslovak Government of an act which, in the opinion of the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of

Yugoslavia, "violated both the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, and the Convention on Cultural Cooperation between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Czechoslovak Republic."

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague avails itself of this opportunity to reiterate the expression of its high consideration to the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Prague.

DOCUMENT No. 45

NOTE OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS No. 122976/49-A/I-3 OF JUNE 22, 1949, ASSERTING THAT THE ACTIVITY AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA OF YUGOSLAV DESERTERS IN PRAGUE IS NOT IN CONTRADICTION WITH CZECHOSLOVAK LAWS

In answer to the Note No. 16/69 of April 2, 1949,⁽²⁾ the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honour to communicate to the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia that the cases mentioned in the Note have been examined by the competent Czechoslovak organs. The examination proved that the activity of the Yugoslav political exiles was not in contradiction with the Czechoslovak laws in force and that, accordingly, the assertions stated in the Note were devoid of any grounds.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to reiterate the expression of its high consideration to the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

Prague, June 22, 1949.

DOCUMENT No. 46

BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 28944-38-I OF JUNE 11, 1949, ANSWERING THE PROTEST NOTES FROM THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN SOFIA AGAINST THE ASSISTANCE GIVEN BY THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT TO A GROUP OF YUGOSLAV TRAITORS AND DESERTERS

With reference to Verbal Notes No. 225-I of May 27, No. 209-I of May 23, and No. 245-I of June 7, 1949, of the Embassy of the FPR of Yugoslavia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honour to communicate to the Embassy the following answer of the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria:

First of all, the Ministry considers it its duty to express its surprise at the impermissible tone in which the above-mentioned Notes were written, as well as at the manifest distortions of facts stated in them. Thus, for instance, the Embassy contends that, after the Cominform

⁽²⁾ In the above-mentioned Note the Embassy of the FPRY in Prague protested against the support and help the Czechoslovak authorities are extending to Yugoslav deserters in their subversive activity against the FPRY.

Resolution, a certain number of persons escaped from Yugoslavia to Bulgaria, "persons, who, under the mask of loyalty to socialism and internationalism, but really for certain sinister motives, deserted the front of the building of socialism in the FPRY, betraying their people and their socialist homeland."

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot agree to the above appraisal of the Embassy for it is in direct contradiction with the facts. It is no secret that, after the Cominform Resolution and the secession of Yugoslavia from the anti-imperialist front, the present Yugoslav Government introduced an anti-Communist and anti-democratic regime in Yugoslavia and went over to the camp of imperialism, the camp of the enemies of the Soviet Union and of the countries of people's democracy. It is obvious that under such circumstances the Government of the FPR of Yugoslavia has no grounds for pretending that it is building socialism in its country. If it called things by their proper names it would hardly have the courage to maintain this. Consequently, the Government of the PR of Bulgaria has every reason to consider that the persons who escaped from Yugoslavia indeed did so out of loyalty to socialism and internationalism, and not under the guise of such loyalty, as the Embassy thinks.

For this reason, the Government of the PR of Bulgaria considers that these persons have not betrayed their "socialist" homeland, but on the contrary, that they are true socialists and democrats, faithful sons of Yugoslavia, consistent fighters for its independence and brotherly understanding and cooperation between the Bulgarian people and the peoples of Yugoslavia.

Keeping this in mind, the Government of the PR of Bulgaria considers it entirely natural that the Bulgarian people, who are building socialism in their country and who are faithful to their friendship with the peoples of the FPR of Yugoslavia, offered their hospitality to the Yugoslav revolutionary exiles. This right of Bulgarian citizens is guaranteed in Article 84 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government has no intention to restrict it in the future.

The Government of the PR of Bulgaria likewise considers it natural that the Yugoslav exiles are given the opportunity to express — openly and freely, orally and in the press — their disagreement with the policy of the present Yugoslav leadership because this policy has proved to be openly anti-democratic and anti-socialist.

As to the protest of the Embassy with regard to certain articles in the Bulgarian press and certain statements by responsible leaders, especially the statement of Dr. Vlko Chervenkov, member of the Politbureau of the BWP, quoted in the Embassy's Note No. 209-I of May 23 this year, the Ministry draws the attention of the Embassy to the fact that these articles and statements are entirely in the spirit of the well-known Cominform Resolution on the situation in the Yugoslav Communist Party. The appraisal made in this Resolution of the role played by the Yugoslav leaders in the struggle against the front of peace, socialism and democracy is based on the principles of socialism and proletarian internationalism and coincides entirely with the standpoint of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Fatherland Front, and the whole

of public opinion in the PR of Bulgaria. The same appraisal has been made by the press and public opinion in the Soviet Union and the other countries of people's democracy. A similar appraisal has been made by Communist Parties, the progressive press and democratic public opinion in all other countries.

The Government of the PR of Bulgaria does not consider it superfluous to draw the attention of the Embassy to the impermissible way it is confounding Bulgarian citizens and Bulgarian public opinion on the one hand, with the official Bulgarian authorities on the other. The Bulgarian Government most categorically rejects the Embassy's untrue contention that the Bulgarian official authorities tolerated and supported the activity of the Yugoslav exiles in this country. The Yugoslav patriots, persecuted in Yugoslavia as fighters against the anti-communist and anti-democratic terrorist regime introduced there, have been received hospitably, and given support, by Bulgarian citizens and Bulgarian public opinion who consider them their intimate comrades and brothers. They need no support from the Bulgarian Government and State organs.

The Government of the PR of Bulgaria rejects most categorically and with a feeling of deep emotion the Embassy's unproved and unfounded assertion that there was an organization of Yugoslav exiles in Sofia which made plans and organized terrorist activity and espionage against the FPR of Yugoslavia, as well as provocations of, and attacks on, certain members of the Mission of the FPR of Yugoslavia in Sofia and the like. The Bulgarian Government rightly wonders if the Embassy is aware of the consequences which might arise from similar slanderous accusations.

The Bulgarian Government likewise considers as unproved and unfounded the Embassy's assertion that the support offered to the Yugoslav exiles on Bulgarian territory by Bulgarian citizens and Bulgarian public opinion is in contradiction with the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the PR of Bulgaria and the FPR of Yugoslavia.

Finally, the Bulgarian Government feels compelled most strongly to protest against the tone and certain expressions used in the Embassy's Notes. Thus, for instance, the Embassy "requests" that the Government of the PR of Bulgaria prohibit and prevent the activity of the Yugoslav exiles, that it prohibit the publication of their newspaper and cease "offering them help."

On this occasion the Ministry wishes to ask the Embassy whether it considers that this tone and this manner of address are proper in relations between two sovereign states. As regards the subject of the "request" itself, the Bulgarian Government, in the light of the above-stated explanation and in the spirit of its conceptions, considers it unnecessary to take this request into consideration at all.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to express to the Embassy the assurance of its high consideration.

Sofia, June 11, 1949.

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 410870 OF JULY 14, 1949, PROTESTING AGAINST THE HELP EXTENDED BY THE ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT TO A GROUP OF YUGOSLAV TRAITORS AND DESERTERS

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia informs the Legation of the People's Republic of Albania of the following:

The Government of the PR of Albania, attempting to aggravate as much as possible the neighbourly relations between the FPRY and the PR of Albania, has given shelter to several deserters who, after having committed criminal acts, escaped to Albania from the FPR of Yugoslavia and attempted to disguise their escape from the Yugoslav police and judicial authorities under the cloak of political reasons.

The Albanian authorities make use of these criminal offenders not only in the propaganda campaign against the FPRY, misconstruing the reasons for their escape from the FPRY, but have also been giving them encouragement lately and sending them to the FPRY to carry out armed and terrorist actions.

One such group of traitors, organized and armed on Albanian territory, attempted to enter the Yugoslav territory in the night between May 30 and 31, 1949, with the purpose of executing an armed action. The group was headed by Kolja Arapović from Rudin village, PR of Montenegro, who had murdered his own sister and, because of this serious crime, on March 26, 1949, escaped to the PR of Albania in order to avoid his well-deserved punishment. Among the traitors in this group of attackers were: Ljubo Ivanović, Mujo Ivanović and Belo Perković from Vuksan Lekić village, PR of Montenegro; further, Leka Margilić from Zatrijebac, PR of Montenegro, and Preljec Margilić from Tuzi village, PR of Montenegro. On May 31, at 0015 hrs., the above-mentioned persons crossed the Yugoslav border near the hamlet of Mužečka, local People's Committee Zatrijebac, Titograd district. Meeting a Yugoslav frontier patrol, the traitors attacked it, opening fire from automatic weapons and throwing hand grenades. After an hour's struggle the attackers withdrew to the Albanian territory, leaving behind a wounded member of the group, Ljubo Ivanović, who had with him a German rifle with one hundred rounds of ammunition, an automatic pistol, a pair of field glasses, a compass, a map of Albania with the frontier area and anti-Yugoslav propaganda material.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly protests to the Government of the PR of Albania against the organization and arming of terrorist groups of Yugoslav deserters to carry out armed actions in the territory of the FPRY, and resolutely requests the Government of the PR of Albania to take the necessary measures to prevent such and similar activities being attempted by these traitors with the knowledge, and at the instigation, of the Albanian authorities.

Beograd, July 14, 1949.

ANSWER OF THE ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT OF JULY 16, 1949, TO THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF JULY 14, 1949, ON HELP GIVEN BY THE ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT TO A GROUP OF YUGOSLAV TRAITORS AND DESERTERS

The Legation of the People's Republic of Albania in Beograd, on behalf of its Government, categorically rejects the Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, No. 410870 of July 14, 1949, as its contents do not at all correspond to reality. The note is insulting, slanderous and written with deliberate, tendentious aims in view. Its contents have an obviously provocative purpose and are a continuation of numerous provocations which have been and still are being made by Yugoslav organs against the territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Albania.

The Legation of the People's Republic of Albania expresses its consideration to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Beograd, July 16, 1949.

PROTEST NOTE FROM THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN WARSAW No. 358 OF SEPTEMBER 16, 1949, CONCERNING THE HELP GIVEN BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT TO A GROUP OF YUGOSLAV TRAITORS AND DESERTERS⁽⁴⁾

The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Warsaw informs the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland of the following:

For over a year there has been a group of Yugoslav traitors in Poland. Polish official and semi-official circles offer them hospitality and moral and even material help.

This group has lately intensified its destructive activity with the ever increasing help of the ruling party, the PZPR.⁽⁵⁾

In connection with the above, the Embassy of the FPR of Yugoslavia in Warsaw considers it its duty to draw the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland to the following:

According to the written and oral statements of several of its members, the aim of this group is forcibly to destroy the present socialist order in Yugoslavia and liquidate the Yugoslav Government.

In Bulletin No. 1 of this group, in an article entitled "Appeal of Political Exiles in Poland," it is said that this paper will "serve the most rapid possible liquidation of Tito's Trotskyist gang." In the paper "Za Pobedu," July issue, page 24, appears the following: "... which cannot be

⁽⁴⁾ The Polish Government did not answer this Note.

⁽⁵⁾ "Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza" — United Polish Workers' Party.

achieved without first overthrowing the capitalist-imperialist agents of Tito's clique..."

"The chief task of our struggle, therefore, is... to overthrow the anti-communist and anti-democratic terrorist regime..." ("Za Pobedu," July issue, page 26.)

"Our task... is to help with all our might the struggle which is growing stronger and stronger in the country..." ("Za Pobedu," July issue, page 27.)

"... the fulfilment of the honourable and historical task: to overthrow the Trotskyist and imperialist spies." ("Za Pobedu," July issue, page 28.)

"We promise that we shall invest all our efforts in the quickest possible liquidation of Tito and his gang." ("Tribuna Ludu" of September 4, 1949.)

That this little group really has violence in mind and not change of leadership in some legal, constitutional manner is proved by the enumeration of the following actions in the August issue of the newspaper "Za Pobedu": "... rebellions and sabotage in production and export... formation of armed workers' and peasants' groups... formation of partisan detachments," etc.

In order to achieve all this, this small group of traitors on July 20 and 21, 1949, held a conference in Warsaw attended even by a representative of the CC of the Polish United Workers' Party(*) ("Za Pobedu," July issue, page 1). It was stated at this conference that it was necessary to form a party which would "lead the working class and peoples of Yugoslavia into a struggle to remove the traitors to the people from power." ("Za Pobedu," July issue, page 1.)

From this conference a telegram of greeting was sent to the President of the Republic of Poland, M. Boleslaw Bierut. The telegram contained the following: "We also express our deep gratitude for the hospitality and moral help of the brotherly Polish people." ("Za Pobedu," July issue, page 2.)

In the same number there is mention of a certain tribute "... paid by the great Soviet Union and its Government as well as by the Governments and Parties of the countries of the people's democracy." ("Za Pobedu," July issue, page 14.)

In consideration of the above, and of the fact that this small group of Yugoslav traitors in Poland is making preparations to destroy the present social order in Yugoslavia and to obstruct the building of socialism in it, to overthrow the legal leadership of Yugoslavia with the help of armed groups — the Embassy of the FPR of Yugoslavia in Warsaw registers a strong protest, viz.:

1. Against the fact that "hospitality and moral help," and, as the Embassy knows, material help as well, are extended to this treacherous group of Yugoslavs by official and semi-official circles (publication of the newspaper "Za Pobedu," circulation of this newspaper, reproduction in the Polish press of articles appearing in this paper, invitations to repre-

(*) At the conference of Yugoslav traitors and deserters held on July 20—21, 1949, in Warsaw, Wladyslaw Matwin, member of the CC of the United Polish Workers' Party and Secretary of the Committee for the Wojwodship of Wroclaw, was present as representative of the United Polish Workers' Party.

representatives of this traitorous group to attend semi-official parties, opportunities for this group to speak on the radio, etc.).

2. Against the fact that the afore-mentioned conference of July 20 and 21 was attended by the representative of the CC of the United Polish Workers' Party as the ruling party in Poland.

3. Against the fact that publicity is given to statements and articles of this traitorous group in the press of the ruling party, the United Polish Workers' Party, as well as in the press of other Parties of the Democratic Bloc.

The Embassy also expresses its great surprise at the fact that representatives of this traitorous, subversive, counter-revolutionary group were enabled to take part in the Congress of Fighters⁽¹⁾ attended by State leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr. Jozef Cyrankiewicz.

The Embassy requests that this small treacherous group in the Republic of Poland be prohibited from carrying on its destructive activities against Yugoslavia.

The Embassy notes that, by enabling this group of plotters and traitors to do their work, the Government is violating all the treaties existing between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Poland. What is more, this is an attempt to interfere openly in the internal affairs of the Yugoslav State, and an endeavour to destroy its socialist order, the foundations of which were laid by the peoples of Yugoslavia in the heroic four-year National Liberation Struggle which served as an example to all the subjected peoples of Europe.⁽²⁾

Warsaw, September 16, 1949.

(1) It is the Congress of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy that is being referred to here. The Congress was held in Warsaw. The Polish Government did not permit representatives of the Union of Fighters of the National Liberation War of Yugoslavia to participate in the Congress but it enabled Yugoslav traitors and deserters to attend as alleged representatives from Yugoslavia.

(2) The Government of the FPRY addressed 14 Notes of protest to the Governments of the USSR and countries of Eastern Europe in regard to the help these Governments are giving to terrorist organizations of deserters from the FPRY.

In its Note No. 16, of April 2, 1949, the Embassy of the FPRY in Prague protested against the help the Czechoslovak authorities are extending to deserters from Yugoslavia and against their anti-Yugoslav activities. To this, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs answered by its Note No. 122970/49-A-I-3 of June 22, 1949. (See Document No 45.) In its Note No. 139 of May 5, 1949, the Embassy of the FPRY in Prague protested against the fact that the organization of Yugoslav traitors in Prague was officially invited to participate, on behalf of the FPRY, in the work of the Peace Congress held in Prague. In its answer the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic, in Note No. 117251/49-A/I-3 of May 18, 1949, attempted to shift the responsibility for this action upon the Organizational Committee of the Peace Congress in Paris. In its Note No. 140 of May 5, 1949, the Embassy of the FPRY in Prague protested against the participation of a terrorist group of Yugoslav traitors in Prague in the May Day parade in which it carried banners hostile to the FPRY. In its answer, in Note No. 117250/49-A/I-3 of May 18, 1949, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic used the excuse that the May Day parade had been organized by the Central Committee of the People's Front in Czechoslovakia and not by the Czechoslovak Government. It would, however, be impossible for a group of foreign deserters to march past the highest representatives of the Czechoslovak Government without its authorization.

The Embassy of the FPRY in Sofia, in its Note No. 225-I of May 27, 1949, protested against the help the Bulgarian Government was offering to a terrorist group of deserters from Yugoslavia and to their anti-Yugoslav activity in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government answered this Note by Note No. 28944-38-I of June 11, 1949.

4. ATTEMPT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR TO SECURE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL STATUS IN YUGOSLAVIA FOR WHITE GUARD EMIGRES — REINSTATED SOVIET CITIZENS — WITH THE AIM OF INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF YUGOSLAVIA AND BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR UPON IT

DOCUMENT No. 50

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 413678 OF JULY 30, 1949, TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD ON THE REASONS FOR IMPRISONMENT OF CERTAIN WHITE GUARDS WHO ARE SOVIET CITIZENS

With reference to the Note of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics No. 178 of June 25, 1949, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, under instructions from the Government of the FPRY, notifies the Embassy of the USSR of the following:

The Embassy of the USSR intervened on several occasions, by its Notes No. 455, 463, 483 in 1948, and by its Note No. 7 in 1949, on behalf of the arrested White Guard Russian émigrés, and by its Note No. 141 of June 27, 1949, on behalf of a group of twelve White Guards who were refused further stay in the FPRY by the Yugoslav authorities.

(See document No. 46.) In its Note No. 313-I of July 8, 1949, the Embassy of the FPRY protested against an attack upon the automobile of the Military Attaché of the FPRY in Sofia by a group of Yugoslav traitors supported by Bulgarian security agents. The Embassy of the FPRY protested, in Note No. 342-I of July 18, 1949, against the official participation of the terrorist organization of Yugoslav deserters, as the representatives of Yugoslavia, at the funeral of the late Premier of the Bulgarian Government, Georgi Dimitrov. The Embassy protested in Note No. 409-I of August 24, 1949, against the physical assault perpetrated by a group of deserters in Sofia on the driver of the Military Attaché of the FPRY in Bulgaria. The Embassy of the FPRY protested in Note No. 32-I of January 26, 1950, against a provocative demonstration organized and carried out with the support of the Bulgarian authorities, by an insignificant group of deserters from Yugoslavia, in front of the building of the FPRY Embassy in Sofia. The Bulgarian Government never answered a single one of these four Notes of protest.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY, in its Note No. 427486 of October 27, 1948, addressed to the Legation of the Republic of Hungary in Beograd, requested the Hungarian authorities to hand over to the Yugoslav authorities former Counselor of the Embassy of the FPRY in Budapest, Lazar Brankov, who committed the crime of theft and embezzlement of the Legation's property. The Ministry of the Republic of Hungary, in its Note No. 776 of October 28, 1948, rejected the allegations contained in the above-mentioned Note, saying that they were unfounded and put forward with the aim of politically compromising and vilifying

Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY in its Notes No. 428705, 41729 and 413273 stated a number of convincing facts and gave the necessary explanations regarding the reasons for which a group of White Guards, enemies of Yugoslavia, were arrested and refused further stay in the FPRY, the Embassy of the USSR, ignoring all this, under instructions from the Government of the USSR, again sent a Note endeavouring to prove that Soviet citizens "who permanently reside in Yugoslavia" were groundlessly arrested and persecuted by the Yugoslav authorities. It is further maintained in the Embassy's Note that these persons are kept "in prison under altogether intolerable conditions," and that the reasons for the persecution of the Soviet citizens lie "exclusively in the fact that the Yugoslav authorities consider them upholders of friendly relations between the peoples of the FPRY and the USSR."

Who are the persons for whom the Embassy of the USSR intervenes and whom it so persistently defends? They are, in the first place, White Guard émigrés who, owing to their counter-revolutionary activities, fled from the USSR in order to carry on anti-Soviet and anti-Yugoslav activity under the protection of the reactionary and pro-fascist regimes of the former Yugoslavia. Their hostile attitude and actions both against the USSR and against the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia before the war, as well as their collaboration with fascist invaders during the war, are very well known to the peoples of Yugoslavia.

With reference to the Note of the Embassy of the USSR No. 178 of July 25, 1949, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is compelled again to state

L. Brankov of whom the Hungarian authorities had the best opinion. The Legation of the FPRY in Budapest, in its Note No. 394 of November 7, 1948, reiterated the request for the handing over of Brankov, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary did not answer this Note. The Legation of the FPRY in Budapest, in its Note No. 402 of November 10, 1948, again requested that Brankov be handed over, and enclosed written proof of the crimes of theft and embezzlement committed by Brankov. The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in its Note No. 0289 of December 3, 1948, answered that it would examine the contents of the Note and the attached documents. L. Brankov, however, was not handed over to the Yugoslav authorities since he was given the right of asylum in Hungary after having declared himself for the Cominform Resolution. Lazar Brankov appeared at the Budapest trial of the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Laszlo Rajk, in September, 1949, as one of the chief "defendants," accused of hostile activities against the PR of Hungary for the benefit of Yugoslavia. In fact, however, he was the chief provocateur at this trial and had the task of corroborating by his statements the fantastic fabrications against Yugoslavia contained in the indictment.

The Embassy of the FPRY in Bucharest, in its Note No. 468 of May 26, 1949, protested against the help the Rumanian Government was extending to a group of deserters from Yugoslavia and to their anti-Yugoslav activities, requesting that the Rumanian authorities prohibit the printing and the circulation of the paper published by this terrorist group. The Rumanian Government did not answer this Note.

All the above-mentioned endeavours of the Government of the FPRY to receive satisfaction from the USSR Government and the Governments which are dependent upon it were without result. These Governments are continuing in their respective countries to offer full support and help to small terrorist groups of deserters from Yugoslavia, placing state-owned radio and printing works and other facilities at their disposal and enabling them to publish newspapers for the development of hostile activity against the FPRY. They also use them for purposes of espionage and subversive activity in the FPRY with a view to undermining the existing socialist order in the FPRY and detaching certain of its parts.

the facts indicating the moral-political qualities of the persons arrested, who are enemies of Yugoslavia. After the war they acquired Soviet citizenship, and are considered champions of Yugoslav-Soviet friendship by the Embassy of the USSR in Beograd.

From the above-mentioned Notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Embassy of the USSR knows very well, for instance, that:

Arseniy Boremovich, during the war collaborated closely with the invaders. He was Deputy Public Prosecutor at Travnik during the occupation; on various occasions he indicted arrested members of the National Liberation Movement, almost all of whom were shot. In drawing up the indictments Boremovich most closely collaborated with the ill-famed Ustashi criminals: President of the Court-Martial, Dr. Vidnjević, Major Kren and the chief of the Ustashi police at Sarajevo, Dr. Tuka. After the liberation of Yugoslavia he established contact with the enemies of the FPRY, and spread propaganda both against the new Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. He carried on propaganda against subscription to the National Loan in the FPRY. On April 20, 1948, he declared: "The Soviets are afraid of letting us emigrés return to the country. For we all belong to the intelligentsia, and as such we would certainly influence the people there."

Anatolij Zolotarev, as technical manager of the Crveni Bregovi State cattle breeding farm near Negotin, on the Vardar River (Kavadar District), committed acts of sabotage causing the infection and death of cattle and thereby did damage amounting to 1 million dinars to the State. In this way Zolotarev tried to compromise the State agricultural sector and thereby supported kulak elements in their propaganda against the rural socialist reconstruction in the FPRY.

Vladimir Poplavski, in September, 1948, established an illegal terrorist organization consisting of some young people. Their plan was to carry out a series of assassinations aimed at destroying the State order in the FPRY. He was author of illegal leaflets having a subversive nature which were spread by his organization.

Natalia Kiselevska, in 1920, was in the Wrangel counter-revolutionary detachments in the capacity of a company medical aide. From the Soviet Union she emigrated to Bulgaria and thence to Yugoslavia. After the publication of the Cominform Resolution she became one of its active supporters, propagating the forcible destruction of the socialist order in the FPRY.

Simeon Papkov, during the war collaborated with the invaders and after the Cominform Resolution spread slanders against the FPRY and gave false information to a foreign country on the situation in Yugoslavia. Apart from this, he attempted to inveigle a member of the Army into betraying his country.

Vsevolod Kondratenko, submitted false reports on the situation in Yugoslavia to a foreign country, carried on espionage activities and spread propaganda against the existing order in the FPRY.

Valentina Barnikov, worked for a foreign intelligence service.

Aleksey Leonov, also worked for the intelligence service of a foreign country.

Fyodor Salamonov, former Gestapo agent. From 1943 on, he worked actively for the German intelligence service. He was permanently in close touch with Gestapo officers, Schubert and Bondurchuk.

Petar Oranski, in 1941, during the occupation, took part in the massacre at Kragujevac⁽¹⁾ and in other places. During the war his whole family was in the service of the forces of occupation, taking part in various actions carried out by the invader. His father and brother were sentenced for collaboration with the invader and for hostile activity against the FPRY. Petar Oranski assisted his father and brother in their hostile activities. After their arrest, he continued his activities along the same lines.

Nikola Novoseltsov, during the occupation was closely attached to Gestapo agent and former White Guard officer, Petrovski. After the war he continued his hostile activity against the USSR and the new Yugoslavia. After the Cominform Resolution he was actively engaged in work on the destruction of the order in the FPRY.

Vasilij Kozlitsov, priest, in March 1947 established contact with the illegal VMRO organization⁽²⁾ designed to destroy the existing order in the PR of Macedonia by terrorist methods, and to create, with the help of a foreign power, an "independent" Macedonia with Vancha Mihailov at its head. As a member of the organization, he was assigned the task of reading in church the orders issued by the headquarters of the organization, of creating illegal organizations in the field and directing them, of collecting food in church for the terrorists and providing them with shelter. He used church money and food to help the families of the terrorists, etc.

Aleksandar Kolashnyikov, sentenced before the war for forging reduced-fare railway tickets while an official of the General Railway Administration. During the war he was closely connected with the war criminal, Dragi Jovanović, chief of the Special Police in Beograd, and after the liberation he worked for a foreign intelligence service.

Nikolay Stradetski, collaborator with the German intelligence service. Member of the Auxiliary Police; fought in the ranks of the SS detachments on the Eastern Front, whence he sent reports to German papers on the cordial welcome given to the German Army by the peoples of the USSR, on the misery of Soviet citizens, etc.

Andrey Filipenko, during the war worked for the German armed forces enlisting volunteers among the Russian émigrés for the struggle against the USSR and the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. He was one of the organizers of the White Guard "Russian Corps" and secretary of the Commander of this "Corps." He had a permit for remaining out-of-doors after curfew in Beograd, which was given by the fascist invaders only to the most trustworthy persons. He openly carried arms and received supplies from German stores. He used most insulting expressions against the Premier of the USSR, Stalin, and the

⁽¹⁾ On October 21, 1941, the Nazis, in conjunction with local quislings, shot over 7,000 adult men and pupils of the Intermediary School, in Kragujevac, Serbia.

⁽²⁾ Vnatreshna makedonska revolucionerna organizacia (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization).

partisans of Yugoslavia. His apartment was a meeting place daily visited by members of the German armed forces.

Yuriy Lobachev, son-in-law of the well-known White Guard General Apuhtin, during the war worked in the German propaganda apparatus. His cartoons praising the strength of Hitler's army, ridiculing the USSR, the Red Army and the Premier of the USSR, Stalin, appeared in the daily papers. On the arrival of the Red Army in Yugoslavia he was sought by the Soviet intelligence service because of his collaboration with the invader, but he managed to enter the ranks of the Red Army even before that and with them he went to Hungary as an interpreter thus evading punishment, etc., etc.

From the list of names of the persons arrested, attached to the last Embassy's Note of July 25, 1949, it can be seen that the Embassy tried to select and give the names of only those persons who had carried on anti-Yugoslav activity, but whose past it considered spotless. The Embassy, however, did not succeed in this nor could it have done so, for all the arrested White Guards enjoyed the full protection both of the anti-popular regimes in the former Yugoslavia and of the fascist invaders during the war.

Thus, for instance, **Suzana Velubekova**, whose name appears in the above-mentioned list, was a singer and notorious prostitute in the Kazbek night-club in Beograd during the occupation. After the war, she was arrested for larceny and prostitution and, after the Cominform Resolution, began to work actively against the existing order in the FPRY.

Aleksey Krizhko, before the war worked for the intelligence service of a foreign country, and during the occupation for the Gestapo. He was a well-known organizer of the White Guards whom he sent to the Russian Volunteer Corps to fight on the Eastern Front. He continued his hostile activity after the war, working on the overthrow of the existing order in the FPRY.

These are the moral-political qualities of these counter-revolutionary White Guard elements who have no homeland and who have always been ready to commit the most sordid and vile deeds against everything progressive and democratic — and, to this end, to serve anybody whomsoever. The Embassy of the USSR in Beograd, in its Note represents such elements as model supporters of friendly relations between the peoples of the FPRY and the USSR. Such an attitude proves, at the very least, that the Embassy of the USSR in Beograd has a distorted conception of what the relations between the FPRY and the USSR should be like — viz. relations between the peoples of the FPRY and the USSR.

In this way, defending persons who should answer before the Yugoslav authorities according to the existing laws of the FPRY for their criminal activity against its peoples, the Embassy not only deliberately insults the peoples of our country and their democratic order, but also impairs the relations between the FPRY and the USSR even more.

Although the Government of the USSR gave such White Guard elements Soviet citizenship after the war, it never proposed their repatriation to the Government of the FPRY, nor did it attempt to effect such repatriation. On the contrary, particularly after the Cominform Resolution, such and similar elements were given new impetus in their anti-

Yugoslav activity. They acted with the conviction that they would, in every one of their actions against socialist Yugoslavia, enjoy the protection of the Embassy of the USSR in Beograd since they were Soviet citizens.

On the other hand, the Government of the USSR, as it transpires from the Embassy's Note, quite unfoundedly considers that the Yugoslav authorities should tolerate such counter-revolutionary and espionage activities simply because the Government of the USSR had given these people Soviet citizenship after the war.

As regards the Yugoslav citizens of whom the Embassy of the USSR groundlessly asserts that they are Soviet citizens and whose names also appear in the above-mentioned list, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has, on several occasions, in its earlier Notes, given a competent answer confirming the fact that these persons were citizens of the FPRY for they either never requested or never obtained release from citizenship. Accordingly, persistent intervention in their favour on the part of the Embassy of the USSR represents inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of the FPRY.

Intentionally accusing the Yugoslav authorities of "intolerable" and "inhuman" treatment of the arrested persons, the Soviet Government in this case, too, attempts to conceal from the Soviet and the world democratic public the truth about the situation in Yugoslavia and maliciously to misrepresent the truly democratic socialist nature of the People's Government in our country.

The Government of the FPRY rejects these tendentious fabrications with the greatest indignation and notes that the methods imputed by the Soviet Government to the People's Government of Yugoslavia are entirely alien and unknown to the democratic socialist order established in Yugoslavia in the course of the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of this country.

The Government of the FPRY is certain that the facts stated in the previous Notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will convince the Embassy of the USSR of the justifiability of the action taken by the Yugoslav authorities, and that the Embassy of the USSR will, in the interest of its own prestige and the prestige of the Soviet Union, cease intervening in favour of these counter-revolutionary elements. For this reason, the Government of the FPRY did not publish any of its Notes although their publication would have indicated certain activities by the Embassy of the USSR in Beograd which have nothing in common with the activities of the diplomatic mission of one socialist country in another.

The Soviet Government published the Note of the Embassy of the USSR in Beograd with the intention of giving new stimulus to the hostile, anti-Yugoslav campaign and offering support to the remnants of reaction in Yugoslavia and to all the counter-revolutionary elements in their endeavours, to undermine the socialist order in the FPRY.

The Government of the FPRY resolutely rejects all the allegations contained in the Note of the Embassy of the USSR in Beograd as a deliberate insult and hostile act against the FPRY and again declares that it will not allow anyone, regardless of whose support he may enjoy, to undermine the building of the new socialist order in Yugoslavia. The

Government of the FPRY will also in the future undertake legal action against all those who attempt to destroy the socialist order which was created with great sacrifices during their revolutionary struggle by the peoples of Yugoslavia who are now exerting tremendous efforts to develop and consolidate the socialist order further.

The Government of the FPRY finally emphasizes that the White Guard elements, who obtained Soviet citizenship after the Second World War, will not be allowed to stay in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia unless they observe the Laws in force in this country.

Beograd, July 30, 1949.

DOCUMENT No. 51

SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 208 OF AUGUST 18, 1949, IN REPLY TO THE YUGOSLAV NOTE OF JULY 30, 1949, WHICH STATED THE REASONS FOR IMPRISONMENT OF CERTAIN WHITE GUARDS WHO ARE SOVIET CITIZENS

"...What are, therefore, the real reasons for the persecution of Soviet citizens by the Yugoslav Government? The real reason for the persecution of Soviet citizens is not the fact that the Soviet citizens were émigrés in the past, but the fact that they are upholders of friendly relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, that they have a negative attitude towards the present hostile policy of the Yugoslav Government towards the Soviet Union. The real reason for the persecution of the Soviet citizens is the fact that, together with all patriots of Yugoslavia, they disapprove of the generally-known, inadmissible attitude of the Yugoslav Government. The latter deserted from the camp of democracy and socialism to the camp of international capital and is trying to do as much mischief as possible to the Soviet Union, in order to win the praise of the representatives of international capital and thereby make a career for itself. It is for this reason and not for their émigré past that the Yugoslav Government is persecuting the Soviet citizens. It is for this reason and for no other that thousands of Yugoslav patriots are persecuted and imprisoned.

"The Yugoslav Government itself was compelled to recognize this in its Note. Aware of the unfounded nature of the accusations based on the emigré past of these people, the Yugoslav Government in its Note alleges that there is another charge against them to the effect that certain imprisoned Soviet citizens have a negative attitude towards the existing regime in Yugoslavia, that they sympathize with the well-known Resolution of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties (Cominform), and that they help in its dissemination. But what kind of a charge is this? This is not so much a charge against the arrested Soviet citizens as against the existing political regime in Yugoslavia. The fact that the Yugoslav Government makes such accusations shows what kind of political regime is now in force in Yugoslavia. In no other country, excepting those with a fascist regime, is the free expression of democratic views considered a crime. Accordingly, in the present-day Yu-

Yugoslavia, this serves as a pretext for unlawful arrests and merciless revenge upon people who criticize the fascist order in Yugoslavia.

"Aware of the fact that such an argument is unconvincing and false, and in order to make it appear convincing, the Yugoslav Government falsely attributes propaganda for the forcible overthrow of the order in Yugoslavia to certain prisoners, linking this with the Resolution of the Cominform. Such fabrications, however, are outspoken provocations and slanders. In the Resolution of the Cominform there is no mention of "propaganda for the overthrow of the order in Yugoslavia," nor of "forcible" measures for the changing of this order. The Resolution of the Cominform, which was published on the eve of the Party Congress in Yugoslavia, said in part, as though addressed to the Congress: The Information Bureau does not doubt that inside the Communist Party of Yugoslavia there are sufficient healthy elements, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the international traditions of the Yugoslav Communist Party and to the united socialist front. Their task is to compel their present leaders to recognize their mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them; to break with nationalism, return to internationalism; and in every way to consolidate the united socialist front against imperialism. Should the present leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party prove to be incapable of doing this, their job is to replace them and to advance a new internationalist leadership of the Party. The Information Bureau does not doubt that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia will be able to fulfil this honourable task."

"There is, as you see, no mention in the Resolution of the overthrow and even less of the forcible overthrow of the state order in Yugoslavia. The Resolution simply says that the Communists in Yugoslavia should compel the existing leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to change the course of its policy, or, if they are unable to do so, to change the leadership of the CPY, to elect a new leadership..."

"There are only two Governments in Europe: the Greek and the Spanish, the Government of Tsaldaris and that of Franco, which consider the Resolution of the Cominform as a "criminal leaflet." These Governments are both fascist. Apparently, the Yugoslav Government is the third Government of this sort which also thinks the Resolution of the Cominform is a "criminal leaflet," considering its circulation and even its reading sufficient reason to imprison thousands of people. Is it not clear that this coincidence is not accidental?..."

"The Soviet Government, however, is bound to tell the truth about the present regime in Yugoslavia even if this truth "insults" and irritates some people.

"If we only glance at what is happening now in Yugoslavia we can immediately see that there can be no question of any kind of people's government or democratic and socialist order in Yugoslavia. Can there be any question of a socialist order in Yugoslavia when the country has been placed under the control of foreign capital and the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is at war with the Communist Parties of the whole world?"

"Can there be any question of the democratic character of the Government when all of Yugoslavia is ruled by Gestapo methods of administration, when every free expression of ideas is persecuted, when all

human rights are violated, when the Yugoslav prisons are crowded with supporters of the socialist camp, when the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has been transformed into a Department of the Political Police, subordinate to the chief of police Ranković?

"It is clear that the statements of the Yugoslav Government about the building of socialism, which is allegedly being carried out in Yugoslavia, are no more true than similar statements made in their time by Hitler and Mussolini..."

"The Yugoslav Government tries to talk about some kind of interference by the Soviet Government in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. It represents the matter as if the Soviet Government did not recognize the right of the Yugoslav Government to take to task those Soviet citizens guilty of certain crimes. This assertion of the Yugoslav Government has no grounds, for Soviet citizens are not, in this case, persecuted for action in violation of the law. The Yugoslav Government persecutes Soviet citizens not for any crime, but for expressing democratic views and supporting friendly relations between the Soviet people and the people of Yugoslavia.

"The Yugoslav Government apparently intends to continue its inhuman treatment of Soviet citizens, unlawfully arresting, beating and ridiculing them. The Yugoslav Government obviously does not intend to punish the offenders who are responsible for this fascist procedure. If this is so, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state that it will not reconcile itself to such a state of affairs and that it will be compelled to resort to other, more effective means, indispensable for the protection of the rights and interests of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia, and to take to task the fascist tyrants who have gone beyond all limits."(*)

Beograd, August 18, 1949.

DOCUMENT No. 52

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 415140 OF AUGUST 23, 1949, IN REPLY TO SOVIET NOTE OF AUGUST 18, 1949, IN CONNECTION WITH THE QUESTION OF WHITE GUARDS AND OF THE OPEN THREATS CONTAINED IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S NOTE

In answer to the Note of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics No. 208 of August 18, 1949, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia communicates the following:

The Government of the FPRY does not intend to embark upon a dispute with the Government of the USSR on the nature of the regime in Yugoslavia, on the real aims of the Cominform Resolution and on whether or not the Yugoslav economy has become an appendage to the economies of capitalist countries. Facts concerning the foreign trade of Yugoslavia and the principles on which it is based are public and well-

(*) Note given in excerpts.

known, as is the real situation in our country, so that it is not necessary to give a special explanation of these things on this occasion. This is even less necessary since the Government of the USSR, the responsible Soviet leaders and the Soviet propaganda by-passed all these facts and represented them in the wrong light in order to justify their acts towards Yugoslavia before the public in any way they could.

The Government of the FPRY, however, considers that it is its duty to point out that the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is an independent and sovereign State and that its peoples and Government are under no condition willing to allow anyone whomsoever to interfere in their internal affairs. Further, the Government of the FPRY underlines that no pressure from abroad has had any influence on its internal policy, nor will it have in the future. As regards the foreign policy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the Government of the FPRY likewise considers it necessary to emphasize that it is pursuing this policy in accordance with the independence and sovereignty of the country, in accordance with the progressive principles of peace and cooperation of peoples and States on the basis of equality and mutual respect of sovereignty, in accordance with the international treaties and obligations which were and still are public instruments of the Government of the FPRY. The peoples and the Government of the FPRY are not willing under any conditions to renounce these principles under pressure from abroad.

The Government of the FPRY wonders how the arrest of several White Guard Soviet citizens, persons with an obscure past, who violated the laws and hospitality of the FPRY, could give rise to such an insulting, crude and unfounded Note from the Government of the USSR. The Government of the FPRY wonders even more why the Government of the USSR at the same time ignores the question of repatriation of the Yugoslav children from the USSR, repeatedly claimed both by the Government of the FPRY and by their parents and guardians, as well as the repatriation of citizens of Yugoslav nationality residing in the USSR to whom the Government of the USSR has still not issued exit visas although they have not violated its laws and are free.

The Government of the FPRY notes that the assertions about the acts of Yugoslav organs towards certain Soviet citizens, mostly White Guard émigrés, are completely invented, untrue and insulting. The above-mentioned persons, as stated in a number of Notes of the Government of the FPRY, are being detained for having seriously violated the laws of the FPRY by their espionage and hostile activities against the FPRY which, as a sovereign country, has the right to defend itself from such activities. However, although irrefutable proofs on the guilt of these persons are available, the Government of the FPRY, expressing its goodwill to settle the disputed question between the two Governments, is ready to hand over all these arrested persons to the Government of the USSR in the shortest possible time. At the same time the Government of the FPRY expresses its readiness to enable all Soviet citizens, permanently residing in the FPRY, to leave Yugoslav territory immediately, if they express a desire to do so, and to put all the necessary facilities at their disposal.

The Government of the FPRY and its most responsible representatives have always expressed their readiness to settle with the Government of the USSR all the disputed issues between the two countries by way of agreement. The Government of the FPRY reiterates on this occasion its readiness to approach the settlement of all disputed questions with the Government of the USSR in accordance with, and in the spirit of, the international obligations assumed by both Governments.⁽⁴⁾

Beograd, August 23, 1949.

⁽⁴⁾ The Government of the USSR did not answer this Note or the proposals made therein.

5. THE STAGING OF COURT TRIALS IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FOR THE PURPOSE OF MANUFACTURING PROOFS OF THE DISLOYALTY OF YUGOSLAVIA AS AN ALLY IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY THE AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITIES BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TOWARDS YUGOSLAVIA

DOCUMENT No. 53

COMMUNIQUE OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S INFORMATION OFFICE OF SEPTEMBER 17, 1949, REGARDING THE TRIAL OF LASZLO RAJK IN HUNGARY⁽¹⁾

1. Even before Hungary was completely liberated from the fascist invaders, the Government of the FPRY, with the authorization and agreement of the Soviet Government, sent to Hungary on March 10, 1945, a delegation attached to the Allied Control Commission. The relations between the Soviet occupation authorities and the Yugoslav mission were founded on full mutual confidence and closest cooperation. All data necessary for the normal conduct of affairs were placed at the disposal of this delegation by the Soviet occupation organs.

Apart from this, the Yugoslav representatives in Hungary established the closest friendly cooperation with the highest Hungarian State and Party leaders, exclusively for the sake of strengthening the democratic order in Hungary and cooperation between the two countries. On the part of Hungary, Matyas Rakosi and Mihaly Farkas were the initiators of the closest cooperation along all lines with the new Yugoslavia and its representatives in Hungary. This was particularly manifested during frequent visits to Beograd by Rakosi, Farkas, and other leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party. While seeking advice and help for the

⁽¹⁾ The trial was held in Budapest from September 16 to 24, 1949. Brought before the court together with Laszlo Rajk, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Hungary, were the following: György Palfy, former Lieutenant General in the Hungarian Army; Lazar Brankov, former Counselor of the Yugoslav Legation in Budapest; Dr. Szonyi Tibor, former Deputy in the Hungarian Parliament; Szalai Andras, former civil servant; Milan Ognjenović, former civil servant; Korondy Bela, former police Colonel; and Justus Pal, former Deputy in the Hungarian Parliament and Vice-President of the Hungarian Radio.

The defendants Laszlo Rajk, Tibor Szonyi and Andras Szalai were sentenced to death, Lazar Brankov and Justus Pal received life imprisonment, Milan Ognjenović got nine years, while the other two defendants, György Palfy and Bela Korondy, were turned over to the jurisdiction of Military Courts.

settlement of issues they were faced with, they gave full information to the leadership of the FPRY about conditions in Hungary. Rakosi and Farkas gave instructions to their subordinates to treat the representatives of the FPRY in Hungary in the same way. These facts are very well known to Rakosi and Farkas.

These facts prove how repulsive and miserable are the slanders regarding an alleged network of Yugoslav spies in Hungary.

The whole activity of the representatives of the FPRY in Hungary was aimed at implementation of the line of policy of the Government of the FPRY with regard to new Hungary. This was the line of the consistently internationalist policy of the leadership of our country — of extending full help to the democratic forces of neighbouring countries. This policy found expression, with regard to Hungary, even in the course of the war, by the formation of the first Hungarian partisan battalion, named the Petöfy battalion(*) on the territory of Yugoslavia.

The policy of our leadership to extend help to Hungarian democratic forces was especially manifested after the war. This is what the organ of the CP of Hungary "Szabad Nep," in its issue of January 4, 1947, wrote about it:

"Yugoslavia's help in the economic field will add to the political stabilization of our democracy. Apart from the Soviet Union, no other country has offered us as much friendship as Yugoslavia has. Yugoslavia, more than any other country, had the right to feel resentment against us. Yugoslavia, however, does not want to revenge itself upon democratic Hungary for the crimes of Horthy's men. At the Paris Conference, too, Yugoslavia extended her hand to Hungary, breaking through the barriers between the victors and the vanquished."

In the discussion on the Preamble of the Draft Peace Treaty with Hungary, on August 25, 1946, the Yugoslav delegate, stating the attitude of the Government of the FPRY, said in part: "In submitting its amendments to the Draft Peace Treaty with Hungary, the Yugoslav delegation is guided by the policy of good neighbourly and friendly relations with the Hungarian people and desires to help the Hungarian people to establish a strong democratic order in their country. For all these reasons, our Delegation has reduced its claims to the minimum with regard to the huge damage caused by the Hungarian occupation, the amount of which is ten times higher than that allocated to us by the Peace Treaty. We did not want our demands to aggravate the political and economic situation of Hungary as a vanquished country. On the contrary, we wanted to help this country to recover speedily. The Government of the FPRY will continue pursuing a policy of friendship towards this neighbour because it is convinced that this policy can only facilitate the strengthening of democracy in Hungary and the stabilization of peace in this part of Europe." The Yugoslav delegate further stated that, for the same reasons, "Yugoslavia did not submit territorial claims, although a certain number of Yugoslavs have been left on the other side of the frontier."

Edvard Kardelj, Vice-Premier of the FPRY, in the discussion on the Peace Treaty with Hungary on September 15, 1946, stated in part: "We Yugoslavs did not want the Hungarian people, who suffered so much

(*) The Petöfy Battalion, formed on August 15, 1943, was part of the forces of the Second Corps of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia.

owing to Horthy's policy, again to find themselves on the path of the same or a similar policy . . . The Hungarian people can find a way out of the catastrophe; this way is to liquidate the source of the former aggressive, revisionist policy and to establish close friendly relations with the other Danubian peoples."

It is also known that such a policy of the FPRY was expressed not only in the political assistance and support offered to democratic Hungary, but also in the economic field: in the reduction of reparation claims in spite of the huge damage incurred by Yugoslavia by the action of the Hungarian occupation troops, in facilities extended regarding payment of reparations, in the granting of interest-free credits to the Hungarian economy, in advances of money, etc.

This friendly policy of the Government of the FPRY towards Hungary was manifested in the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the FPRY and the Republic of Hungary, on December 9, 1947. During the visit of the Yugoslav delegation to Budapest for the signing of the above-mentioned Treaty, Marshal Tito delivered a speech in which he said in part: "At the end of the war, when new Yugoslavia, in the first stages of her formation, laid the foundations of her foreign policy, the basic line of this policy was: to do away with everything which had taken place in the past, with everything which had separated us. When the Government of the FPRY set itself this task, it obviously had to have further perspectives in view. We endeavoured, in the first place, to create good relations with our neighbours, including Hungary, although the Hungarian people could not express themselves fully at that time since the forces which were there hindered this. Precisely for this reason, in our desire to help the Hungarian people to realize their wishes regarding the internal reorganization of the country — we extended a friendly hand to them and decided to pass over everything that had happened in the past, over the really dark past, and to advance towards a common future, i. e. to establish the best relations between the new Yugoslavia and the new Hungary."

The Government of the FPRY signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Republic of Hungary ignoring the approaches made by the representative of the Government of Czechoslovakia to the Government of the FPRY, aimed at hindering the conclusion of this Treaty.

What the conclusion of this Treaty with Hungary meant can be seen from the writing of the Hungarian Communist Party newspaper "Szabad Nep."

"Our people are grateful to Marshal Tito and his people not only because they showed confidence in us and offered us their friendship in the hardest period of our struggle for freedom and democracy, but also because Marshal Tito was the first of our neighbours to note the important achievements of Hungarian democracy."

Consequently, by Marshal Tito's visit to Hungary and by the signing of the afore-mentioned Treaty, the Government of the FPRY showed in an obvious manner that Yugoslavia was ready — irrespective of the grievous events in the past separating the two neighbouring peoples, and irrespective of the crimes, offences and devastation wrought by the

Hungarian fascist occupation troops, — to extend a friendly hand to the neighbouring Hungarian people who had taken a course of consolidating the democratic order in their country. This visit also gave powerful support to the democratic forces of Hungary in the hard struggle they were waging at that time against the reactionary forces in their own country.

These are historical facts well known not only to the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian people, but also to the public of the world.

In the light of these facts it becomes clear that the monstrous accusations to the effect that the Government of the FPRY was allegedly working to overthrow the Hungarian Government and to forcibly destroy the democratic order in Hungary, are only vile attempts to impute to the Government of the FPRY those sinister plans and hostile acts which the Hungarian and other leading Cominform circles have been forging and carrying out for a year and a half against the socialist order in Yugoslavia and its leadership. No trace of such intentions with regard to Hungary or any other country can be found in any speech or article by any State or Party leader in Yugoslavia. It is, on the other hand, a generally known fact that there is hardly one article or speech by the most responsible State or party leaders in Hungary, or by any other Cominform leader, that does not contain a public and direct appeal to overthrow the Government of the FPRY and to destroy the socialist order of Yugoslavia.

These hysterical calls to rebellion in Yugoslavia are accompanied by a number of hostile acts and provocations directed against the independence and integrity of Yugoslavia. International treaties and obligations with regard to the FPRY are being violated openly. An economic blockade against Yugoslavia is being carried out. Almost daily, provocations and incidents are being systematically caused and carried out on Yugoslav frontiers, especially zealously by the Hungarian frontier organs, in spite of the existing Agreement on Prevention of Frontier Incidents, concluded at the initiative of the Government of the FPRY.^(*) Hostile elements are sent to Yugoslavia to carry out acts of espionage, terrorist activities and sabotage, and criminal fascist individuals are recruited to commit crimes and murders. This has been proved by public trials against the spies of the Hungarian A.V.O.^(*) (State Security Department) Peter Hust, Antal Kovacs, Radosz Kermeny, Janos Szabo and others. The Yugoslav minority is subjected to unheard-of terror and violence and its fundamental rights are suppressed. With the participation of officials, unprecedented witch-hunts and fascist attacks are organized against the diplomatic representatives of the FPRY who are arbitrarily and unlawfully arrested and expelled.

All the above-stated proves that the accusation against the Government of the FPRY to the effect that it is threatening the independence

^(*) The Agreement on the work of mixed commissions for the investigation and ascertainment of frontier incidents between the FPRY and the People's Republic of Hungary was signed on August 3, 1949, in Subotica, and renounced by the Hungarian Government in its Note No. 10343 of October 31, 1949, less than three months after its conclusion.

^(*) "Alam Védelmi Osztály (Department of State Security) was renamed the "Alam Védelmi Hatosag" (Administration of State Security) in the middle of 1948.

of Hungary and the existing order in it is an obvious lie. Facts, on the contrary, prove that it is precisely the Hungarian Government, as well as the governments of certain other countries that are attempting by way of pressure, blackmail and various kinds of threats to overthrow the legal Government of the FPRY and to destroy the achievements of the people's revolution and the socialist building of Yugoslavia.

Since there are no facts regarding any activities by the Government of the FPRY aimed at destroying the existing order in Hungary, the authors of the accusation construed an even more infamous lie, which, by its fantastic nature, exceeds anything stated in the accusation. They allege that a secret meeting was held between Laszlo Rajk and the Minister of the Interior of the FPRY, A. Ranković, "in the beginning of October, 1948, in the vicinity of Paks, on the hunting grounds of the Horthyist landlord, Antal Klein," in Hungarian territory. Laszlo Rajk was allegedly brought to this secret meeting by the Minister of the FPRY in Hungary, Karlo Mrazović, who was said to have been accompanied by a certain Tarisnyas Györgyi.

According to the indictment, the meeting was held in the beginning of October, 1948. Obviously, the authors of these political provocations did not dare invent the exact date of the alleged meeting, because they knew very well that Minister Ranković was in Yugoslavia at that time. By stating an exact date the authors of the indictment would have run the risk of having their lie discovered immediately.

Further, the Envoy of the FPRY was said to have come to this "secret meeting" in the company of the above-mentioned Tarisnyas Györgyi. Why was it necessary for the authors of the indictment to involve this woman in this highly "secret" meeting? Obviously, in order to have an "authentic" witness, to corroborate that construed lie at the trial. How else could we explain the fact that such an "important secret meeting," at which instructions of a highly confidential nature were being transmitted, could be attended by a person who obviously could not have any connection with it. This is even more evident in view of the fact that according to the wording of the indictment, only Tito, Kardelj, Ranković and Djilas were acquainted with the alleged confidential instructions transmitted at this meeting.

Naturally, since no such meeting ever took place, there could have been no sensational plans for destroying the Hungarian State order. Consequently, from all the above it follows that the afore-mentioned "secret meeting" and the alleged plans are only a product of the corrupt imagination of the Cominform conspirators against the FPRY.

All the sordid offences and slanders directed against the Secretary of the CC of the CPY, Aleksandar Ranković, appear even baser in the light of indisputable facts regarding his efforts to establish sincere cooperation with the Hungarian leaders with the aim of strengthening friendly relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary. The leaders of the Hungarian Workers' Party on numerous occasions asked Aleksandar Ranković himself for advice and help in settling various internal problems. He offered full help to the Hungarian leaders who utilized Yugoslav experiences and applied them to their own conditions. All this is very well known to the present Hungarian leaders, which makes the inventions about him even more grotesque.

2. The initiators and organizers of the anti-Yugoslav conspiracy do not hesitate to use the vilest means in order to realize their plans against Yugoslavia. Thus, in the afore-mentioned indictments, Yugoslavs who fought in the Spanish Liberation War, are atrociously slandered and insulted by the allegation that as early as 1941 the Gestapo had sent to Yugoslavia from camps in France 150 Yugoslavs who had fought in Spain. In addition to this, the indictment emphasized that Rajk established contact with the Yugoslav fighters of the International Brigade in the French concentration camps of Gurs, Saint-Cyprien, Vernet, and that the said Yugoslavs were allegedly foreign spies — the names of Aleš Bebler, Ivan Gošnjak, Božidar Maslarić, Kosta Nadj and Karlo Mrazović being mentioned.⁽⁵⁾ Neither in this case nor in any other did the slanderers give any consideration to the truth. It is known, for instance, that neither Maslarić, nor Bebler, nor Mrazović were in these camps. Maslarić went from Spain to North Africa and from there to the USSR in 1939, whereas Mrazović and Bebler, seriously wounded, were evacuated from Spain in the summer of 1938 and taken directly to Paris, whence they returned to Yugoslavia.

This sordid and atrocious insult thrown in the face of all the Yugoslav fighters in Spain is not only an attack on the liberation struggle and revolution of the peoples of Yugoslavia. It is also an attack on the struggle of the Spanish people, the glorious International Brigade, and the whole international revolutionary workers' movement, the best sons of which fought against fascism in the ranks of these brigades. The infernal plan of attacking the Yugoslav fighters in Spain could have only one aim in view, — to disorientate and undermine the revolutionary zeal of all fighters for freedom, since they are exposed to the danger of some day being proclaimed imperialist agents and provocateurs.

3. The sponsors of the atrocious trial assigned the chief role to provocateur Lazar Brankov, whose name can be found on the list of the defendants. Before the war, Lazar Brankov became a municipal official, which job he retained until 1941, thanks to his connections with Kačanski, a deputy of the JRZ fascist party.⁽⁶⁾

After the occupation of Yugoslavia, Brankov was taken prisoner by the Germans, but soon returned to Stari Bečej where he lived, and moved about freely with permits from the German and Hungarian authorities in Vojvodina. On the eve of the attack against the USSR, Brankov was arrested by the Horthy police and released two weeks later. At that moment began Brankov's espionage for the Hungarian police. Following reports and denunciations by Brankov, the police arrested and shot eleven communists in January, 1942. Then Brankov disappeared from Bečej and appeared in Budapest under the name of Lazić with German papers. At that time, through the Hungarian intelligence service, Brankov established

(⁵) Dr. Aleš Bebler, Chief of the Permanent Mission of the FPRY to the UNO in New York and Yugoslav representative in the Security Council of the UNO; Ivan Gošnjak, Colonel General, Deputy Minister of National Defense of the FPRY; Kosta Nadj, Colonel General of the Yugoslav Army; Božidar Maslarić, Minister in the Yugoslav Government; Karlo Mrazović, President of the Presidium of the Sabor of the People's Republic of Croatia.

(⁶) "Jugoslovenska Radikalna Zajednica" — JRZ, (the Yugoslav Radical Union), ruling pro-fascist party in pre-war Yugoslavia, founded in 1935. The leaders of this Party were Stojadinović, Cvetković, Korošec and Spaho.

contact with the intelligence service of a great power for which he has been working since.

In 1943, Brankov, on an espionage job, went from Budapest to the liberated territory in Vojvodina.⁽¹⁾ Owing to war conditions, he managed to present himself there as an old member of the Communist Party and one of the people's fighters who had survived the bloodshed in Bečej.

Thanks to the fact that most of the comrades who knew him were killed during the war, Brankov, a skilful spy, forged his documents and gave false data in his biography, succeeding thereby in posing as a functionary of the CP since 1941. Owing to the lack of vigilance on the part of certain comrades, Lazar Brankov managed to get to Budapest as a member of the Yugoslav Delegation. Taking advantage of his position as an official in the Legation, Brankov submitted reports to the Hungarian intelligence service, A. V. O., and also executed the orders of his foreign masters.

On the eve of the Fifth Congress of the CP of Yugoslavia, upon orders from his Cominform masters, Brankov organized the murder of Miloš Mojić, who was living in Hungary as a displaced person. According to the plans of its Cominform sponsors, this outrageous provocation was intended to compromise our Legation in Hungary. It was, however, disclosed in time, which helped to expose Brankov as a spy and agent provocateur. At the same time our authorities discovered frauds committed by Brankov, as well as his record as a spy. Brankov was immediately discharged and recalled. He then declared himself for the Cominform Resolution and found shelter with his Cominform masters. Even before his public declaration in favour of the Cominform, Brankov, accompanied by Hungarian policemen, publicly arrested Yugoslav diplomatic officials in Budapest. Despite all this, the entire Cominform press gave full publicity to Brankov's treacherous and slanderous statements about the FPRY.

At this provocative trial, this notorious spy, Brankov, was assigned the role of "confessing" the crimes with which he was charged in the indictment, and of "confirming" in his testimony the alleged connections of the other defendants with Yugoslavia.

The Budapest leaders relied upon such sinister individuals in their plots against socialist Yugoslavia.

Among the defendants was Palfy György, who graduated from the Ludovik Academy and was a former Horthyist officer. After the liberation of Hungary, he was in the Hungarian Army as Director of the Military Political Department of the Army Ministry, Chief Inspector of the Hungarian General Staff and State Secretary in the Ministry of the Army.

He was accused, in the indictment, among other things, of having "worked for the Yugoslav intelligence service from 1945 on under instructions from Brankov and of having transmitted through him highly confidential information on the Hungarian Army to the Yugoslav intelligence service."

Without entering into a discussion of the guilt or innocence of Palfy György on the counts in the indictment which have no connection with Yugoslavia, we must immediately point out the fact that Yugoslavia

(1) Territory liberated by Yugoslav partisans during the war is referred to here.

neither had nor could have had any influence upon the rapid climb of this Horthyist soldier in the new Hungarian Army. It is, on the contrary, generally known that it was others who appointed and promoted cadres in the Hungarian Army. It is interesting to note that Palfy György had no service in the workers' movement to his credit. Despite this fact, however, he advanced rapidly not only in the Army, but also in the CP of Hungary. As early as 1947 he was elected to the CC. Rakosi, Farkas and others know well whom Palfy György served and that he showed representatives of Yugoslavia in Budapest even less conventional courtesy than his position required.

This case also reveals without a doubt the unethical nature of the indictment against Yugoslavia and its representatives in Hungary.

Also among the defendants was Milan Ognjenović, a civil servant, born in 1916, a Yugoslav citizen, who was proclaimed a Hungarian citizen in the indictment. The latter describes Ognjenović as a spy of the Yugoslav intelligence service in Hungary, working under its instructions in the organization of the Yugoslav minority in Hungary. He is also accused of having introduced other officials in the minority organization to the afore-mentioned intelligence service, to be recruited by it and used for espionage activities.

At this time Milan Ognjenović had the role of an agent provocateur in relation to the Yugoslav minority in Hungary. Sufficient illustration of Ognjenović's activities is offered by the following details, based on authentic documents. Ognjenović, who had sympathized with the Chetniks, was taken to Germany as a prisoner of war. On his return from Germany during the war, he lived in Hungary with his in-laws. Upon the arrival of units of the Soviet Army, Ognjenović immediately placed himself at their disposal. He first became an interpreter, and later worked in the Soviet command. The latter appointed him head of the Hungarian police at Veszprém, where he remained for about a year. He then went to the Pecz coal mines which were under the management of the Soviet Army officers. In those mines Ognjenović acted as an official of the HCP and the Hungarian Trade Unions. After a certain period of time, Ognjenović was transferred to the "Democratic Union of South-Slavs"⁽⁸⁾ and worked there. When Lazar Brankov declared himself for the Cominform, Ognjenović, "upon instructions," did the same.

It might seem strange at first glance, that Milan Ognjenović was a defendant in this trial. But if we examine the intentions of the authors of the indictment, who wanted to use the trial to compromise Yugoslavia, we clearly see that Ognjenović was assigned the task of thoroughly discrediting the organization of the "Democratic Union of South-Slavs" and, along with it, the Yugoslav minority in Hungary whose devotion to,

(8) "Democratic Union of South Slavs in Hungary," founded at the end of 1944, in conjunction with the Slovaks, was originally called the Anti-Fascist Front of Slavs in Hungary. In 1947, the organization split up. Anton Rob, a Deputy in the Hungarian Parliament, became the head of the DUSS. Immediately after the Cominform Resolution in June 1948, the Hungarian authorities took away his seat in the Parliament while they arrested the other members of the Society's Central Board. In the middle of July 1948, at the so-called conference of the DUSS, the Hungarian police imposed upon it a new leadership headed by Andrija Hovan with the purpose of working against the interests of the FPRY.

and confidence in the new Yugoslavia could not be destroyed by the terror of the Hungarian Cominform followers.

Why the organizers of the trial tried to link up the defendant Justus Pal,^(*) a well-known Trotskyist, with the representatives of Yugoslavia in Hungary is also quite clear. This Trotskyist was admitted into the Hungarian Communist Party where he had important functions thanks to his close ties with Mihaly Farkas. After the fusion with the Socialists he became a member of the CC of the Hungarian Workers' Party. Justus Pal never had any connections with the representatives of Yugoslavia in Hungary.

We have mentioned only a few defendants in order to show the world public the truth as to how the Budapest lackeys bogged down as soon as they began fabricating accusations against the people of Yugoslavia.

Certain facts confirm that the Hungarian leaders have no right, nor can they have, to accuse Yugoslavia and its leadership of anything whatsoever. On the contrary, through this disclosure of their low intentions and actions with regard to Yugoslavia, they will be condemned not only by the peoples of Yugoslavia but also by all democratic public opinion.

The whole indictment, in so far as it refers to Yugoslavia, its Government and its Party leadership, is the most shameless and infamous document in the history of the international workers' movement. It is based exclusively on lies and base forgeries which characterize the beginning of this staged trial as a provocation directed against Yugoslavia, its Government and its leadership. Our peoples have no record even from the period of darkest mediaeval reaction of methods such as those that are being used now by the leaders of the USSR and the countries of the people's democracy against our glorious country.

The counter-revolutionary campaign against the existing social order in Yugoslavia, organized and initiated by the leaders of the CPSU(B) and the Soviet Government, has met with complete political failure. This is so despite the great efforts exerted by their huge centralized propaganda machine, despite discriminatory and other measures, threats, pressure, blackmail, etc., to which a small, independent and sovereign country, its peoples, its Government and its Party leadership were subjected by the USSR and the countries of people's democracy.

In order to give new impetus to this base campaign, the Government of the USSR was compelled to assume, openly and publicly, before all the world, as a government, the role of chief attacker on the FPRY. This was proved by the most recent Notes of the Soviet Government. The afore-mentioned Notes entirely divested the anti-Yugoslav campaign of its mask of "party," "theoretical" and "comradely" criticism and disclosed the character which the attack against Yugoslavia has had from the very first day.

(*) Justus Pal, former Director of the Budapest Radio, a member of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party, one of the most prominent members of the Social-Democratic Party. It was officially announced that he was arrested on July 15, 1949. He was brought before the court together with Laszlo Rajk and others and sentenced to life imprisonment.

This attack against the FPRY was intended, from the very beginning, to place Yugoslavia on an unequal footing in order to bring it around to a position of political and economic subordination.

The trial in Budapest, now being staged by the leading circles of Hungary, is one of the latest vile and criminal attacks against Yugoslavia. It is an example of the political gangsterism to which those "criticizing" the CPY have been reduced.

These most recent attacks and conspiracies against Yugoslavia, how- the peoples of Yugoslavia by themselves, even under conditions of complete blockade and unprecedented attacks by the USSR and the countries of people's democracy, smashed to smithereens all the "theories", all the "prognoses" and all the endeavours to destroy the existing social order in Yugoslavia, to alienate the leadership of the country and the Party from the people, and to carry out the criminal plan of subjugating the country politically and economically and making it subordinate and dependent.

These are the fundamental reasons for which the leaders of the Cominform accuse Yugoslavia of allegedly plotting with the imperialists. Such a shameless accusation is supposed to justify the basest attacks against Yugoslavia and its peoples before their own masses and before the international workers' movement. It is precisely along these lines that the trial at Budapest was staged with a view to fabricating new "evidence" of Yugoslavia's having joined the imperialist camp.

These most recent attacks and conspiracies against Yugoslavia, however, will meet the same fate as the previous ones, for they will be crushed by the consistent foreign policy of the FPRY which is in accordance with the interests of the independence and sovereignty of the Yugoslav peoples who are building socialism.

On the other hand, it is necessary to underline that the Cominform attacks on Yugoslavia incite nationalistic and chauvinistic hatred on the part of the Hungarian people for the peoples of Yugoslavia.

These attacks aggravate and worsen the relations between the two countries and peoples. The full and exclusive responsibility for this rests with the Hungarian Government. The afore-mentioned accusation is really a document of warmongering provocations representing a serious blow to international cooperation and peace in this part of Europe.

This furious hue and cry against Yugoslavia is detrimental not only to the unity of democratic and socialist forces in the world, but also weakens the offensive capacity of the international workers' movement. It is being used more and more by the imperialists who, not without success, are trying to divert the attention of their masses from their own burning problems to the attack of the USSR and other democratic countries on a small socialist country. This latest and unparalleled provocation by the Hungarian Government will only aggravate even more the relations between our country and the other socialist countries to the detriment of the international socialist, democratic front, and to the benefit of the imperialist front and reaction in the world.

The Budapest indictment, the most recent attack against Yugoslavia, even more obviously than those preceding it, bears the earmarks of sinister machinations not only against the development and building of socialism in Yugoslavia, but also against the achievements of the

international workers' movement in general. The criminal attempts, however, to strike a blow at the cause of socialism and the struggle for peace are unconditionally doomed to failure regardless of whence they come. The provocative trial in Budapest will inevitably turn against its organizers."⁽¹⁰⁾⁽¹¹⁾

⁽¹⁰⁾ After the "trial" in Budapest, there was a series of similar staged trials in all the other countries of Eastern Europe. Their aim was to represent Yugoslavia as a country threatening the existing order and independence of those countries by way of lies and slanderous accusations. At almost all of these trials, organized along the lines of the Budapest model, the defendants included one or several Yugoslav citizens who were in the intelligence services of these countries even before their arrest, or after pressure and mistreatment had been applied while they were in jail under investigation. They agreed to play the role of provocateurs assigned to them by the organizers of these trials against Yugoslavia.

Several dozen such judicial farces have been staged in the Eastern European countries so far, that is, up to October, 1950. Among them are the trial of Koci Xoxe in Albania in May, 1949; of a group of Albanian citizens in Tirana in April, 1950; in Durrës in June, 1950, and in Kukës in September, 1950. In Bulgaria there was the trial of three Yugoslav citizens in March, 1949; the Tralcho Kostov trial in December, 1949; the trial of a group of Bulgarian citizens and Yugoslav deserters in March, 1950. In Rumania there was the trial of a group of Yugoslav citizens and members of the Yugoslav national minority in August, 1950. In Hungary there was the trial in Szegedin of a group of Hungarian citizens in February, 1950. In Poland there was a trial in Katowice of a Yugoslav citizen in November, 1949, and in Czechoslovakia the trial of a group of Yugoslav and Czechoslovak citizens in August, 1950, etc.

⁽¹¹⁾ The Government of the FPRY sent the Government of the PR of Hungary Note of protest No. 417397 of September 24, 1949, in connection with the false accusations against Yugoslavia brought out at the Laszlo Rajk trial. No answer has been received.

6. UNILATERAL BREACH OF TREATIES OF ALLIANCE AND OTHER AGREEMENTS WITH YUGOSLAVIA BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE

DOCUMENT No. 54

SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1949, UNILATERALLY BREAKING THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND POST-WAR COOPERATION BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE USSR⁽¹⁾

At the trial concluded in Budapest on September 24, 1949, of the state criminal Rajk, and of his accomplices, who were also agents of the Yugoslav Government, it was revealed that the Yugoslav Government has for a rather long period of time been conducting an extremely hostile policy, and carrying on subversive activities against Soviet Union, hypocritically disguised by false declarations of "friendship" for the Soviet Union.

The trial at Budapest also revealed that the leaders of the Yugoslav Government have been and still are carrying on their hostile and subversive activities against the USSR not only on their own initiative but also under instructions from foreign imperialist circles.

The facts revealed at this trial further showed that the present Yugoslav Government is completely dependent on the foreign imperialist circles and that it has been transformed into an instrument of their aggressive policy which was bound to lead, and did so, to the liquidation of the independence of the Yugoslav Republic.

All these facts prove that the present Yugoslav Government has flagrantly violated and torn to shreds the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation between the USSR and Yugoslavia, concluded on April 11, 1945.

On the basis of the above-stated, the Soviet Government declares that the Soviet Union from now on considers itself free of the obligations deriving from the above Treaty.

By order of the Government of the USSR
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
A. Gromyko

⁽¹⁾ Notes with almost identical contents breaking the Treaties of Alliance were addressed to the Government of the FPRY by the Government of the PR of Hungary on September 30, 1949, by Note No. 10411; by the Government of the Republic of Poland by Note No. 0862/16 of September 30, 1949; by the Government of the PR of Bulgaria, by Note No. 103-VI of October 1, 1949; by the Government of the Rumanian PR by Note No. 3280 of October 1, 1949, and by the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic by Note No. 141096 of October 4, 1949.

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 417782 OF OCTOBER 1, 1949, ON THE UNILATERAL BREACH OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND POST-WAR COOPERATION BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia communicates the following to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

By its Note of September 28, 1949, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics unilaterally broke the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed in Moscow on April 11, 1945, for a duration of 20 years.

In this connection the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia considers it necessary to underline that the Yugoslav Government proceeded to sign the above-mentioned Treaty with the sincerest intentions. It was convinced that this Treaty would result in even stronger friendship between the peoples of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, that it would insure close cooperation between the peoples of both countries, that it would serve as an example of sincere cooperation between free peoples in the interest of the consolidation of peace and international security, and that it would serve the further economic development of both countries. As the Premier of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, stated on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty, the peoples of Yugoslavia regarded this Treaty as the result of the joint heroic struggle of the Soviet Army and the Yugoslav Army, as well as the realization of all their desires to live in close friendship with the Soviet Union.

The peace-loving and freedom-loving peoples of Yugoslavia and the entire democratic public of the world are witnesses to the unilateral and arbitrary breach of this Treaty of Friendship between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. They are witnesses to the attempts of the Soviet Government to utilize this breach as a means to blackmail, and put pressure on the peoples of Yugoslavia and their free independent socialist homeland.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, aware of the gravity of this latest hostile act towards the peoples of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and of the effect this unprecedented act will produce on the international democratic public, in its customary manner attempts to shift the responsibility upon the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. In doing so, it resorts to slanders about the alleged hostile policy of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia towards the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, slanders based exclusively on the fabrications brought out at the recently staged trial in Budapest.

Facts regarding the development of relations between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, however, show what is, in practice, the actual policy of the Gov-

ernment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics towards Yugoslavia. It is well-known that the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics tried to organize their own network of agents within the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Army, in order to overthrow the legal Yugoslav Government by force. This outright interference in the internal affairs of a small, sovereign, independent, socialist country was to have imposed unequal relations upon the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and put it into a politically and economically subordinate position. Having failed to achieve these intentions, certain leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, trying to disguise the actual ideological and material substance of their policy, used the Cominform as a front to carry out these non-socialist aims. Certain leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as the press and radio, with the knowledge of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, then started propagating openly for the overthrow of the existing socialist order in Yugoslavia, calling upon the Yugoslav peoples to rebel against their legal Government. They went even further than that, initiating and organizing the hostile activity of a group of States against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Thus the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics arbitrarily cast off the obligations assumed under the Treaty of Friendship long before it was formally broken.

Certain leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have been working for over a year on the organization of a furious and savage campaign of lies and calumnies against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, a campaign which is being carried out both by the press and the radio. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics organized economic pressure against Yugoslavia, pressure which went so far as to become an almost complete economic blockade by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the countries upon which the Soviet Government succeeded in imposing unequal relations. The Soviet Government gave full material and moral assistance to traitors and deserters from socialist Yugoslavia, using them as tools for the realization of its anti-Yugoslav plans. By diplomatic Notes full of brutal insults and threats, accompanied by conspicuous movements of Soviet troops in the neighbouring countries along the Yugoslav frontiers, and by other similar measures, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics tried to intimidate the peoples of Yugoslavia and put pressure on them in order to implement its anti-democratic and anti-socialist intentions with regard to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

These anti-democratic practices by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in regard to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia are in direct contradiction with the principles of foreign policy proclaimed by the Soviet Government during World War II and after the war. Here are the principles of this policy as formulated by the Soviet Premier, J. V. Stalin, in his speech of November 6, 1941:

"We have not, and cannot have, any such war aims as that of imposing our will and our regime upon the Slavonic and other enslaved nations of Europe, who are expecting our help. Our aim is to help these nations in the struggle for liberation they are waging against Hitler's tyranny and then to leave it to them quite freely to arrange their

lives on their lands as they think fit. There must be no interference whatever in the internal affairs of other nations!"

On the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, explicitly stated that we were signing this Treaty "to enable our peoples to advance — each in its own way — along the path of national independence and true freedom."

The peoples of Yugoslavia never expected, nor could they have done so, that it would be precisely the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which would deny the importance of their revolutionary struggle and their contribution to the struggle against fascism, that it would be precisely the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which would deny them the right to conduct their own affairs as a mature people, and that it would be precisely the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which, in its relations with the peoples of Yugoslavia, would violate so outrageously the Treaties and the proclaimed principles of a freedom-loving democratic and socialist foreign policy.

The statements of the Soviet leaders regarding non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, the free will of peoples to organize their affairs in their own countries, and the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Government — are words devoid of any meaning when compared with the present anti-democratic behaviour of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics towards the Government of an independent country like Yugoslavia, which has always pursued a policy of the sincerest friendship and cooperation with regard to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its Government.

This friendly policy of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia towards the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a natural expression of the liberation and revolutionary struggle, and of the socialist transformation, carried out by the peoples of Yugoslavia in their country. They considered the support of the Soviet Union a guarantee of their independence and their unhindered national and State development. For this purpose a treaty of alliance was concluded with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics even before the end of the war. This alliance was the first treaty concluded by the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia with another country. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, pursuing with the utmost sincerity a policy of friendship towards the Soviet Union, concluded a number of economic and other agreements with the Soviet Government aimed at developing the closest friendly relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia invited Soviet military and other specialists to come to Yugoslavia; it sent its best military and other personnel to schools in the Soviet Union; it entrusted the Soviet Government with the education of Yugoslav children, sent to schools in the Soviet Union. In conformity with the Treaty of Friendship, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, in all international forums and in all international relations, sincerely cooperated with, and actively supported the positions of the Government of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics in foreign policy — which is a generally known fact. In this way, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia consistently implemented the Treaty of Friendship concluded with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Despite all the violations on the part of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Yugoslav Government always invoked this Treaty and persistently endeavoured to solve all questions arising between our two countries in the spirit of the afore-mentioned Treaty.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics unilaterally broke the Treaty of Friendship with the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, although it was well acquainted with such endeavours by the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and with the facts stated in the speech of the Yugoslav Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edvard Kardelj, at the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, on September 26, 1949, to the effect that Yugoslavia "does not enjoy the support of any bloc, that it has not concluded any secret pacts, nor entered into any military obligations with any adversaries of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." Thus the Government of the Union of Soviet Republics showed that it did not care to have the relations between Yugoslavia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics develop in a spirit of friendship and mutual cooperation, as provided in the Treaty.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in order to justify its latest unpacific act towards the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, refers in its Note to one single proof of the alleged hostility of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia towards the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — to the fabrications, falsehoods and provocative inventions brought forth at the trial staged in Budapest. Even during the trial, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, protesting against such a provocation — unparalleled in history — underlined that it was being used for the purpose of imputing to the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia the sinister plans being carried out by some leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and certain other countries against an independent socialist country — against Yugoslavia. The fact that it was precisely the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that first evoked the "Budapest trial" in order to justify its latest unpacific acts against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, clearly reveals the identity of the initiator and organizer of this atrocious anti-Yugoslav provocation, and who considered it necessary and why. It is obvious that the reason for the breach of the afore-mentioned Treaty on the part of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is not the allegedly hostile policy of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia towards the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as supposedly established at the Budapest trial. It is obvious that this entire trial was staged to justify this latest act in the hostile policy and aggressive pressure being brought to bear on Yugoslavia by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Government and the peoples of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia were not surprised at the breach of this Treaty on the

part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A number of earlier acts by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics actually violated this Treaty and transformed it into a dead letter. The formal breach of the Treaty is another serious act revealing the unpacific intentions of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics towards the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Such an act by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics serves only the ends of the most reactionary circles in the world and their war-mongering campaign, contributes to the creation of war hysteria and strikes a serious blow at international cooperation and peace.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia notes that, since the end of World War II, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has undertaken no similar measures with regard to any other country, even a capitalist one, although the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics described the policy of some of these countries as hostile and anti-Soviet.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia notes that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics unilaterally broke the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation, after the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, in its Note No. 415140 of August 23, 1949, had reiterated its readiness "to undertake the settlement of all disputed questions with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in conformity with, and in the spirit of, international obligations assumed by both Governments." The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics not only left this positive proposal by the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia unanswered, but even attempted, by its arbitrary breach of the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation, to cast off solemnly-assumed international obligations, and to prevent a settlement by agreement of the situation created by the hostile policy of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics towards the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

By such a policy and such acts towards the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics violates the international principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

Taking cognizance of the Note of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 28, 1949, on the arbitrary breach of the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia notes that the responsibility for the consequences which might arise from this unpacific act of the Soviet Government towards the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia rests exclusively with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Beograd, October 1, 1949.

**YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 419126 OF OCTOBER 22, 1949,
CONCERNING THE BREACH OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, MUTUAL
ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK
GOVERNMENT**

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia communicates the following to the Government of the Republic of Czechoslovakia:

The Government of the Republic of Czechoslovakia by its Note of October 4, 1949, unilaterally and faithlessly broke the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Peacetime Cooperation between the FPRY and Czechoslovakia, signed in Beograd on May 9, 1946, for a duration of 20 years, and the Convention on Cultural Cooperation signed on April 27, 1947, for a duration of 5 years. The Government of Czechoslovakia in the same Note, without any grounds, asked that the Ambassador of the FPRY, Marijan Stilinović, leave the country and requested his recall.

In the afore-mentioned Note the Government of the Republic of Czechoslovakia vainly attempts to shift to the FPRY the responsibility for this latest hostile and unpacific measure. In the interest of truth and untroubled friendship between the peoples of the FPRY and the Czechoslovak Republic, who neither can, nor will, be alienated by such acts, the Government of the FPRY notes that:

The Government of the FPRY undertook the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Peacetime Cooperation, and of the Convention on Cultural Cooperation with the Czechoslovak Republic, expressing the aspirations of the peoples of Yugoslavia and guided by the desire to strengthen and develop further the close and friendly relations with brotherly Slav peoples. The friendship between the peoples of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia has been manifested in the past, particularly in the most difficult moment in the history of our peoples. It suffices to remind the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic of the great demonstrations of sympathy by the people of Yugoslavia — already then inspired by the present political leadership — and their determination to help Czechoslovakia defend itself from attack by Hitler's Germany, at the time of the Munich crisis in 1938, despite the treacherous attitude of the anti-popular clique then ruling Yugoslavia. Calling the peoples of Yugoslavia to armed struggle against the fascist invaders, the leadership of the National Liberation Movement formed detachments and brigades of Czechs and Slovaks in Yugoslavia and thus enabled them to fight for the liberation not only of their new but also of their former homeland.^(*) At a time when the Czech and Slovak peoples were under the murderous terror of invaders and local traitors, the struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia served as an example and impetus to the peoples of Czechoslovakia. Before the notorious Comin-

(*) On October 26, 1943, the Jan Žižka brigade was formed, within the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia. It was composed of Czechs and Slovaks, who were Yugoslav citizens.

form Resolution, the most responsible leaders of the Czechoslovak Republic openly used to underline that this had meant important support for the freedom-loving aspirations and efforts of the peoples of Czechoslovakia. The struggle of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia inspired those fighting in the uprising of the Slovak people in 1944. The Yugoslav fighters — who are still remembered by the people of the regions where the insurrection occurred — took active and exemplary part in the uprising, fighting in the front ranks.

This is what the Minister of Information, Vaclav Kopecky, said, on July 7, 1947, in Prague, about the significance of the Yugoslav peoples' struggle for that of the peoples of Czechoslovakia: "We remember that Tito marched at the head of brave Yugoslav fighters not only in order to annihilate the oppressors and enemies of the peoples of Yugoslavia, by defeating the Germans, but also to weaken those who were torturing our people and to fight not only for the freedom of Yugoslavia, but also for our freedom, for the freedom of the Czechoslovak Republic. . . . Today we can appreciate even more fully what a strong support the Yugoslav National Liberation Army was for the liberating Red Army by keeping twenty German divisions pinned down and fighting bravely until the total defeat of Hitler's Germany."

The victory over fascism in the Second World War for the first time in history created the conditions for the realization of the traditional friendship between the peoples of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, in sincere, close and brotherly relations between their countries. The signing of the Treaty of Alliance between both countries expressed the will of the peoples of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia to defend jointly the independence of their people's states and to prevent a recurrence of the recent bitter past.

The Government of the FPRY, consistently pursuing a policy of friendship with the peoples of Czechoslovakia and with their country, concluded a Treaty of Alliance with the Czechoslovak Government. This Alliance again confirmed the readiness of the peoples of Yugoslavia to share the good and the bad with the brotherly peoples of Czechoslovakia in the future as well. This Treaty was a basis for the development of even stronger and more profound friendly relations between the FPRY and the Czechoslovak Republic, a basis for full cooperation in the interest of their independence, security and peace. The peoples of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia welcomed this Treaty with enthusiasm convinced that it was stable and lasting. Even the reactionaries, who then held strong positions in the administration of the Czechoslovak Republic, did not dare oppose openly the conclusion of this Treaty. Inspired by the achievements of the building of socialism in Yugoslavia, the working people in Czechoslovakia considered this Treaty a great asset in their struggle against the same reactionary elements who were trying to prevent the building of socialism in Czechoslovakia.

The magnificent welcome given the Delegation of the FPRY, headed by Marshal Tito, in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1946, reflected great satisfaction and the assurance that a lasting alliance with brotherly Yugoslavia had been realized and that the peoples of Czechoslovakia had found a reliable and proved ally in the FPRY.

The following are the words pronounced by Marshal Tito, Premier of the FPRY, during his stay in Prague, in 1946, regarding the importance of joint defence of the independence of both countries: "I am convinced that our armies will cooperate in the future even more closely than in the past. We learned from the past that we must stand together for only together can we defend our frontiers. Since the end of this war, the frontier of Yugoslavia has been at the frontier of Czechoslovakia... just as the frontier of Czechoslovakia is down on the Vardar and Soča Rivers."

After the infamous Cominform Resolution, yielding to pressure from abroad, the Czechoslovak leadership began to pursue a hostile policy towards the FPRY and its Government, violating the obligations they had assumed on behalf of their people and solemnly confirmed before all the world. The people of Czechoslovakia, however, did not approve of this policy. At the Sokol Rally in Prague huge masses of people from all parts of Czechoslovakia, both in Prague streets and at the stadium where the Rally was held, enthusiastically demonstrated their friendship for the new Yugoslavia. The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic tried to interpret the sincere sympathies of the Czechoslovak people for the FPRY as the result of an allegedly provocative attitude on the part of Yugoslav sportsmen in Prague. Unable to conceal these demonstrations of sincere friendship by the Czechoslovak people for Yugoslavia, the Czechoslovak Government vainly attempted to mislead the world democratic public, and to justify its hostile policy towards the FPRY and its violation of all the assumed obligations.

The peoples of Yugoslavia welcomed the Treaty of Friendship, which they regarded as an important link in the system of safeguarding the peace and fruitful cooperation between the two countries in the political, economic and cultural fields. Taking the initiative for the conclusion of a long-term treaty for capital goods and of trade agreements, the Government of the FPRY considered that they would be equally useful for both contracting parties. The agreement on capital goods, as an economic contract of a completely new type between States, ensured long-term planning for Czechoslovak industrial production by securing a permanent market for Czechoslovak industry and its supply with the most important raw materials. At the same time, it was to have ensured Yugoslavia the necessary materials for the electrification and industrialization of the country.

The Government of the FPRY consistently and completely fulfilled the obligations it had assumed under the contracts and agreements, since it was in this way that it had conceived of the development of economic relations between the FPRY and Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, the Government of the FPRY readily came to the assistance of the Czechoslovak Government when the supplying of the population in the Republic was endangered and when this became a serious political issue in that country. The Government of the FPRY, going beyond the obligations it had assumed, sent Czechoslovakia grains, meat and other food, although it was compelled to do so at the expense of its own people.

The Government of the FPRY likewise did whatever it could to realize fully the Convention on Cultural Cooperation which expressed the profound desire of the peoples of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia to

get to know each other better and to draw closer together. From the conclusion of the Convention on Cultural Cooperation up to the Cominform Resolution, the cultural links between the FPRY and the Czechoslovak Republic grew in strength steadily and developed to a level which had never been attained before in the relations between the peoples of both countries. Visits of whole groups of young people, artists, public figures and cultural workers were exchanged frequently, and there were periodical visits by groups of performing artistes.

The Government of the FPRY enabled Czechoslovak workers to spend their holidays on the shores of the Adriatic under the same conditions as the working people of Yugoslavia, considering that the Czechoslovak working people should also enjoy the benefits of the Yugoslav seaside which, until the liberation, was equally inaccessible both to the Yugoslav and to the Czechoslovak working people. The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, in August, 1948, prohibited the Czechoslovak tourists from visiting the Adriatic coast. It also prohibited further visits to Yugoslavia, giving false and insolent reasons for this through the Czechoslovak tourist agency, CEDOK, to the effect that "Czechoslovak visitors were undesirable in Yugoslavia," although it was a well-known fact that the Yugoslav authorities had given them no cause to do so. On the contrary, numerous expressions of gratitude by the Czechoslovak tourists prove that they were received in Yugoslavia in a brotherly and friendly way. The Government of Czechoslovakia obviously made this decision fearing that thousands of Czechoslovak tourists would see in Yugoslavia that the campaign launched in Czechoslovakia against the FPRY was absurd and fallacious.

The Government of the FPRY, guided by principles of consistent internationalism, and implementing the revolutionary solution of the national question in Yugoslavia, even in the course of the war guaranteed minority rights to the Czech and Slovak as well as to all the other national minorities in the FPRY. After the liberation these rights were guaranteed by the Constitution, enabling the minorities to live and develop a full national and cultural life in complete equality with the peoples of the FPRY. At the request of the Government of Czechoslovakia, the Government of the FPRY enabled certain members of the Slovak and Czech minorities, who expressed their desire to do so, to return to Czechoslovakia.

The Government of the FPRY considerably enabled the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic and its organs, in the postwar reconstruction of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, to learn from, and utilize, the experiences of the development of Yugoslavia, the experiences of the People's Government, the Army, etc.

In all the other questions, either directly or before international forums, the Government of the FPRY consistently fulfilled its obligations towards the Czechoslovak Republic deriving from the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation. After the Cominform Resolution, however, without having been given any cause by the Government of the FPRY, the Government of Czechoslovakia, under orders from abroad, began to pursue a policy of violation and breach of the obligations assumed, a policy of increasingly overt and aggressive hostility towards the FPRY. At the same time, certain leaders of Czecho-

slovakia openly called upon the peoples of Yugoslavia to rebel against the legal Government and against the socialist order in Yugoslavia, and are still doing so. This policy of the Government of Czechoslovakia towards the FPRY has been reflected in a number of openly hostile acts.

Thus, the Government of Czechoslovakia enabled a counter-revolutionary centre of traitorous activity directed against the FPRY to be organized in Prague, providing it with full political and material help. In this way, the Czechoslovak Government, utilizing a small mercenary group of traitors and people who deserted from the building of socialism in Yugoslavia, tried to destroy the friendship and brotherhood between the peoples of both countries. Certain members of the Czechoslovak Government, closely cooperating with the criminal and treacherous Yugoslav group in Prague, proceeded to break up the mass organization, the Union of Friends of Tito's Yugoslavia,^(*) which played an important role in the rapprochement of the peoples of both countries in the spirit of the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation and of the Convention on Cultural Cooperation. For over a year and a half the Czechoslovak Government has been utilizing its whole propaganda machine, the press, radio, films, etc. for a systematic campaign of calumnies and lies against the FPRY. The most responsible Czechoslovak leaders took part in this campaign, drawing the material for it not only from the base inventions of the entire Cominform press, but also from the most reactionary western newspapers and propaganda. In this fashion, the Government of Czechoslovakia diverts the attention and interest of its peoples from the vital problems of Czechoslovakia.

The Government of Czechoslovakia offered training in Czechoslovakia to a considerable number of Yugoslav apprentices. After the Cominform Resolution, the Czechoslovak Government tried to turn even this fine act against the FPRY by attempting to compel the young Yugoslavs, by means of bribery and violence, to betray their country and their peoples. The Czechoslovak Government thus abused the confidence of the Government of the FPRY and of the parents who had entrusted their children to it. It used armed security forces against the Yugoslav working youth whose work and loyalty to socialism had been exemplary. During their stay in Czechoslovakia, this was most obviously expressed during the events in February, 1948.

From the very beginning the Czechoslovak Government, in its economic relations with the FPRY, manifested a tendency to frustrate the efforts of the peoples of Yugoslavia in the industrialization of their country. In this respect the Czechoslovak Government adhered to the principles which characterize economic relations between capitalist countries and the competition between them. The economic relations between our countries, however, developed successfully and increased yearly owing to the persistent endeavours and constant initiative of the Government of the FPRY which intentionally adjusted its foreign trade

(*) The Society of Friends of Tito's Yugoslavia in Czechoslovakia was founded on the initiative of workers in the Kolben-Danek factory (later the Tito Works) towards the end of 1945. Later, in many towns of Czechoslovakia, similar societies were founded. They made up the Union of Friends of Tito's Yugoslavia in Czechoslovakia. This society was disbanded at the beginning of November, 1948, and the "Association of Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Friendship" was created with the purpose of carrying out activities directed against the interests of the FPRY.

primarily to the democratic countries. This was not only due to the fact that the economies of both countries were complementary, but especially to the fact that Czechoslovakia's economy needed raw materials from Yugoslavia. These economic relations were particularly important for Czechoslovakia after the events of February, 1948, when Czechoslovak economy was to a considerable extent cut off from supplies of essential raw materials from the West.

In spite of this, after the Cominform Resolution, as the result of obvious pressure from abroad, the Czechoslovak Government began systematically weakening the economic relations with the FPRY, although there was resistance to such a policy from economic quarters in Czechoslovakia because it was detrimental to the country's economy. This weakening of economic relations on the part of Czechoslovakia was manifested in the extension of schedules for the delivery of materials and equipment important for the fulfilment of the Five Year Plan of the FPRY, in the delivery of goods of increasingly poor quality and even deliberately damaged equipment, etc. A further result of the weakening of these relations on the part of the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic was a considerable reduction in the volume of commodity exchange for 1949, as compared with 1948, when the FPRY held third place in the over-all foreign trade of Czechoslovakia. Yielding to pressure, the Czechoslovak Government joined the economic blockade of the countries of the Eastern bloc against the FPRY. In June, 1949, it completely broke off economic relations with Yugoslavia thereby violating all the treaties and agreements on which these relations were based. The Czechoslovak Government tried to justify this hostile measure against the FPRY before the peoples of Czechoslovakia by alleged Yugoslav debts, although it had been officially informed that the goods intended for Czechoslovakia were ready in Yugoslavia and that the value of these goods exceeded the amount of the alleged debts.

By such hostile actions, the Government of Czechoslovakia not only dealt a blow to the Yugoslav economy and made the efforts of the peoples of Yugoslavia in the building of socialism even harder, but also showed itself ready to subject the essential interests of its own country to a dictated anti-Yugoslav policy, to the detriment of the peoples of Czechoslovakia.

Included in the series of harsh, inimical acts are actions taken by the Czechoslovak security forces against Yugoslav citizens in Czechoslovakia, which have recently become more frequent. Yugoslav citizens were deprived of freedom and maltreated without any grounds. Such acts reached their climax in the abuse of officials of the Yugoslav Missions in Czechoslovakia and in the expulsion of most of the diplomatic and other personnel, headed by the Ambassador, Marijan Stilinović. All this was done with the aim of besmirching the prestige and dignity of the Yugoslav diplomatic representatives who worked sincerely and loyally to intensify and strengthen the friendly relations between the FPRY and Czechoslovakia.

Aware of the real situation in the FPRY and fearing that the truth about it might reach the Czechoslovak people, the Government of Czechoslovakia systematically obstructed the circulation of the Yugoslav dailies and periodicals in Czechoslovakia. It prohibited its citizens,

workers and tourists from visiting the FPRY in order to prevent them from learning the truth about socialist reality in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, in spite of the international obligations it had undertaken, the Czechoslovak Government prevented the participation of Yugoslav delegates in the Peace Congress in Prague, in the spring of 1949; in the Session of the Executive Committee of the International Journalists' Organization in Prague, on September 15, 1949, and in the International Volleyball Congress in Prague, on September 16, 1949. By undertaking these unexampled discriminatory measures, the Czechoslovak Government is working deliberately on the disruption of the front of peace and international cooperation among democratic forces.

The Government of the FPRY sent the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic a number of notes of protest against the violation of the Treaty of Friendship and other agreements, requesting that the Czechoslovak Government put an end to its hostile policy against the FPRY and proposing that all the disputes and differences be settled on the basis of the Treaty of Friendship. Continuing to violate the obligations assumed, the Czechoslovak Government showed, however, that it did not desire to regulate relations with the FPRY on the basis of the existing treaties and agreements and, by its unilateral breach of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, proved that it was subjecting the interests of the peoples of Czechoslovakia to orders from abroad.

Lacking arguments for this latest hostile act against the FPRY, the Czechoslovak Government copied from the Note of the Government of the USSR the "proofs" from the Budapest provocation, thus proving its own participation in the conspiracy against the FPRY. The Czechoslovak Government vainly tried to explain thereby the formal breach of the Treaty of Friendship with the FPRY which it had in fact broken long ago.

The Czechoslovak Government is trying to estrange the peoples of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and to start a feud between them. In the past, however, they have lived in friendship even under anti-popular regimes.

By breaking off the Treaty of Alliance with the FPRY, the Czechoslovak Government weakened the security and the defence of the independence of the Czechoslovak Republic. It also dealt a serious blow to the interests of the peoples of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia who cannot and will not agree to this, precisely for the above-mentioned reasons.

The most recent hostile acts of the Czechoslovak Government serve the ends of the warmongers and enemies of peace. They endanger international cooperation and inflict a hard blow to the international democratic and progressive movement.

The Government of the FPRY protests most energetically against the brutal and inimical action of the Czechoslovak Government in asking, without any grounds, the Ambassador of the FPRY in Prague, Marijan Stillinović, a well-known anti-fascist fighter and friend of Czechoslovakia, to leave the country.

Acknowledging the Note of the Government of Czechoslovakia of October 4, 1949, the Government of the FPRY notes that the responsibility for the consequences which might result from such an unpacific policy of the Czechoslovak Government with regard to the FPRY and its peoples rests exclusively with the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic.

Beograd, October 22, 1949.

DOCUMENT No. 37

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 418584 OF OCTOBER 13, 1949, REGARDING THE BREACH OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BY THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT(*)

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia informs the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria of the following:

By its Note of October 1, 1949, the Government of the PR of Bulgaria unilaterally broke the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, concluded at Evksinograd on November 27, 1947, between the FPRY and the PR of Bulgaria for a duration of 20 years. The Bulgarian Government thereby faithlessly broke this Treaty less than two years after its conclusion.

The Bulgarian Government was aware of the fact that this latest hostile and unpacific act against the FPRY would be unfavourably received not only by the peoples of Yugoslavia, but also by the people of Bulgaria and by the entire democratic public of the world. It therefore followed the example of certain other Governments, and in its Note attempted to shift the responsibility for its faithless breach of the Treaty on the Government of the FPRY, accusing it of alleged enmity against the PR of Bulgaria.

In the interests of true and accurate establishment of the historical facts in the relations between the FPRY and the PR of Bulgaria, the Government of the FPRY considers it necessary to remind the Bulgarian Government of the following:

In its relations with the neighbouring democratic countries, the Government of the FPRY was guided by the principle of closest brotherly cooperation and friendship, based on mutual confidence. Even during the Second World War, the leaders of the Liberation Movement and of the People's Revolution of Yugoslavia based their relations with the brotherly Bulgarian people and their struggle on the principles of close brotherly assistance and cooperation. They did so with the clear perspective that the victory over the fascist invaders should forever put an end to the heavy legacy of the past and lead our brotherly peoples and their countries to the closest friendship and cooperation, to complete unity.

Implementing such a policy, the leadership of the Liberation Movement of the Yugoslav peoples enabled, and fully contributed to, the formation of Bulgarian partisan battalions, detachments and brigades in

(*) The Embassy of the PR of Bulgaria returned this Note.

Yugoslav territory. In the liberated territory of Serbia and Macedonia the following Bulgarian partisan units were formed: the Georgi Dimitrov Brigade and the Hristo Botev Battalion. It is well-known that these Bulgarian partisan units, formed on Yugoslav territory, played a significant role in the development of partisan detachments in Bulgaria before the end of the war. The leadership of the National Liberation Movement of the peoples of Yugoslavia offered full political and material aid and support to the Bulgarian partisan detachments. One of the chief tasks of all units of the National Liberation Army in Serbia and Macedonia, in the second half of 1943 and in 1944, was to help, by their operations, the Bulgarian partisan detachments to penetrate into the interior of Bulgaria and rouse the Bulgarian people to armed struggle. The Bulgarian leadership was kept informed of the experiences of our struggle, with the organisation of the partisan detachments, the people's army, etc.

Consistently pursuing a policy of the closest friendship with the Bulgarian people and assistance to Bulgaria, the Government of the FPRY, passing over the heavy wounds inflicted by the Bulgarian fascist invaders on the peoples of Yugoslavia, allowed and rendered possible a certain amount of participation by the Bulgarian Army in the final operations against the German troops in Yugoslavia. The participation of the Bulgarian Army in these operations was not necessary from a military point of view, because the liberation of the FPRY was already only a question of days. In spite of this, after persistent requests by the Bulgarian delegation, headed by Dobri Terpeshev, which visited the General Headquarters of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, in the autumn of 1944, the Yugoslav Government consented to have Bulgarian units take part in the final operations. This it did only in order to enable the new Bulgaria to assert itself before the freedom-loving world as a democratic country which had broken all links with the fascist Bulgaria of Boris and San Stefano and, in this way, to remove the blemish put upon the Bulgarian people by its fascist rulers and the Bulgarian occupation soldatesque.

The endeavours of the Government of the FPRY to develop and strengthen relations with the PR of Bulgaria were fully manifested during the visit to Yugoslavia of the Bulgarian Government Delegation, headed by the Premier Georgi Dimitrov, towards the end of July, 1947. The results of the negotiations conducted during this visit were the decisions of the Bled Conference at which the text of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was agreed upon and the Agreement on Economic Cooperation, the Agreement on Customs Facilities and other agreements were signed.

Expressing the thoughts and feelings of the peoples of Yugoslavia, the Premier of the FPRY, Marshal Tito, after the signing of the Bled Protocol of August 1, 1947, said: "Today, in this house, we have carried out the will of our peoples, realizing their centuries-old ideals... and now it is our duty to implement and put them into effect without delay. Our peoples expect deeds and not mere words from us."

In answering Marshal Tito, the Premier of the PR of Bulgaria, Georgi Dimitrov, said: "It is with joy that I must underline that the words of our Comrade Tito, Marshal of Yugoslavia, from start to finish, expressed our own thoughts, feelings and desires. We are happy to note that all the

questions were settled in full unanimity between the two Government Delegations... I must underline that the sentiments of our brotherly peoples have anticipated us, as the leaders of both fraternal countries, in the establishment, strengthening and organization of the political, economic and cultural cooperation yearned for by the people... Finally, on behalf of our Delegation and the Bulgarian people I should like to express my deepest gratitude for the cordial, brotherly welcome we received here, as well as for the understanding shown by our Yugoslav brothers, and Marshal Tito personally, in the settlement of all the questions considered at our conference."

One of the decisions of the Bled Conference was that "a special declaration was to be made concerning the brotherly gesture" by which the Government of the FPRY forfeited the reparations Bulgaria was supposed to pay the FPRY according to the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria. This declaration reads: "In consideration of the fundamentally changed relations between the peoples of Yugoslavia and the Bulgarian people resulting from the victory of the National Liberation struggle in Yugoslavia, from the victory of the Fatherland Front in Bulgaria, and from the active participation of the Bulgarian people in the struggle against Germany; in consideration of the coordination of the economic plans of both countries, and, desiring fully to develop brotherly cooperation between the peoples of the FPRY and the Bulgarian people, to facilitate the development of their economic relations and to help the economic progress of the brotherly PR of Bulgaria, the Government of the FPRY, on behalf of the peoples of Yugoslavia, as established by the Protocol on the decisions of the historic conference between the Government Delegations of the FPRY and the PR of Bulgaria, held on July 30, 31 and August 1, 1947, at Bled, decided to forgo the 25 million dollars worth of reparations allocated to it by the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria."

The following is what the present Bulgarian Premier, Vasil Kolarov, said about this generous, brotherly gesture of the Government of the FPRY at the session of the Bulgarian People's Sobranie on August 25, 1947: "The faith of the Bulgarian people in genuine victory was recently strengthened by the noble decision of the Government of the FPRY to renounce reparations amounting to 25 million dollars, allocated to it by the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria. This decision expresses the finest feelings towards our People's Republic for which I express, on behalf of the Great People's Sobranie and the whole Bulgarian people, the deepest gratitude to the brotherly peoples of Yugoslavia and their distinguished leaders, headed by the glorious Marshal Tito."

This fraternal gesture, which no other Government has ever made towards another country, is even more significant considering the need of the peoples of Yugoslavia for at least partial compensation for the tremendous damage suffered in the course of war and fascist occupation. The PR of Bulgaria today still enjoys the benefits of this selfless and generous policy of the Government of the FPRY, while the Bulgarian Government is pursuing a policy of open hostility, and employing the basest methods against the peoples of Yugoslavia and their Government.

The truly friendly policy of the Government of the FPRY towards the PR of Bulgaria was once again proved by the visit paid to Bulgaria by a Delegation of the Yugoslav Government, headed by Marshal Tito,

In November 1947. On this occasion, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the FPRY, and the PR of Bulgaria was signed at Evksinograd, on November 27, 1947. By this Treaty the two Governments undertook the obligation to cooperate closely and fully for the benefit of both countries on all questions relating to the future of their peoples and their mutual relations.

After the solemn signing of this Treaty, the Bulgarian Premier, Georgi Dimitrov, said:

"This is a sincere Treaty expressing the sovereign will of our peoples to live in peace and brotherly relations, to help each other in a fraternal manner, to work together side by side for prosperity, to defend themselves together against all enemies, to work together and participate in the stabilization of a lasting peace in the Balkans, in South-East Europe and in the whole world.

"Our Treaty of Alliance is not the result of secret diplomacy. It is free of any hypocrisy or tricks, or concealed intentions. It is not a mere scrap of paper which can be blown away by the wind. It has been sealed by the blood shed by our peoples in the struggle for freedom and prosperity. With us there is no discrepancy between words and acts nor can there be any."

On the same occasion, the Premier of the FPRY, Marshal Tito, said the following: "Along our way we heard many cries of 'We don't want frontiers — we want a federation,' and the like. Had this happened only in one place, someone might have said that it had been rehearsed. But, the same cry came from the people in Sofia and in the interior of the country, from youths and adults, from workers, peasants and ordinary citizens. What does this mean, what does it show? It shows how much this idea has grown in the minds of the people, how far it has developed, how great and indestructible it has become. So much the greater, Comrades and Friends, is our responsibility and obligation to respect the will of the people and to implement our agreement in full. And not only this. We must do everything we can to realize this desire for the creation of a strong South Slav community and a better future for our peoples."

Bulgarian leaders, and various Delegations of Bulgarian representatives, often visited the FPRY in order to get acquainted with the development of the people's democratic Government and the socialist order in Yugoslavia, asking for advice, support and help from the Government of the FPRY and its organs. As the Bulgarian Government knows well, the Government of the FPRY enabled the Bulgarian leaders and representatives to become fully acquainted with everything they were interested in and it offered them full brotherly support and help on all questions and problems. This was always publicly admitted by the Bulgarian leaders and the Bulgarian press. They pointed out the example of Yugoslavia, the struggle of her people, the building of socialism in the FPRY, and praised the initiative taken by the FPRY in the establishment of new democratic relations among the peoples in this part of Europe.

In the fatal days of the Second World War, when fascist rulers were leading Bulgaria into a new catastrophe on the side of Hitler's Germany, we cannot say, however, that the present leaders of Bulgaria were guided by the same principles towards the peoples of Yugoslavia, especially towards the Macedonian people, by which the leadership of the National

Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia was guided in relation to the Bulgarian people and its struggle. The attitude of the present Bulgarian leadership towards the Bulgarian occupation of Macedonia was tantamount to a sanctioning of the occupation in the sense of realization of the Great-Bulgarian "national ideal," of a San Stefano Bulgaria.^(*) Their negative attitude towards the struggle of the Macedonian people against the Bulgarian occupation hindered the development of the National Liberation Movement. Their attitude towards the decisions of the Second Session of the Anti-fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia on the settlement of the Macedonian national question was also a negative one. All these are eloquent proofs of the incorrect, detrimental policy and the hostile attitude of certain Bulgarian leaders towards the peoples of Yugoslavia in the course of the Second World War, particularly towards the liberation and the right to self-determination of the Macedonian people.

By the victory over the fascist invaders and the establishment of people's democratic Governments in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, all the necessary conditions were created for the opening of a new era of close, friendly and brotherly relations between the FPRY and the PR of Bulgaria, an era of complete unity between the peoples of Yugoslavia and the Bulgarian people. This had never existed before in their history nor could it have.

This attitude of the Government of the FPRY was best expressed at the close of 1944, and later in the course of 1945 and 1946. Then, at the initiative of the Yugoslav Government, there were exchanges of views between the Yugoslav and Bulgarian Governments on the question of the union of the FPRY and the PR of Bulgaria on a federal basis. The attitude of the Government of the FPRY towards this question was always consistent, profoundly democratic, based on the principle of a truly revolutionary solution of the national question of the South Slav peoples through a federation of peoples with equal rights. In Yugoslavia's first proposal, in November, 1944, it was already stated that Democratic Federal Yugoslavia and Bulgaria should unite into a federal State which would consist of seven federal units, namely: Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina — which would have a common people's representative body, a common federal Government and form a single customs area.

However, in the course of all the negotiations conducted between the representatives of both countries, it was established that the Bulgarian Government did not approach the question of the union into a federal State from the standpoint of equal rights for all the seven South Slav people's republics. On the contrary, it actually claimed for the PR of Bulgaria a superposed position in relation to the other six people's republics. Such an unprincipled, anti-democratic attitude towards the national question was particularly expressed in relation to the question of the right of self-determination of the Macedonian people.

(*) Under the Treaty of San Stefano, signed on March 3, 1878, after the Russo-Turkish War (1877—1878), considerable parts of the present Yugoslav territory, then under Turkish rule, were annexed to Bulgaria. This territory covered the greater part of Macedonia and the eastern part of Serbia.

It is well known that the right of the Macedonian people in Pirin Macedonia — referred to in the Note of the Bulgarian Government of October 1, 1949, as the "Pirin Region" — to territorial autonomy is not guaranteed even today by the Constitution of the PR of Bulgaria, that the Macedonians in Bulgaria are not even recognized as a national minority, not to speak of the right of the Macedonian people in Bulgaria to self-determination.

The Bulgarian Government is now trying to represent the stand of the Yugoslav Government on the question of a federation of the South Slav peoples and the right of self-determination for the Macedonian people in Bulgaria as an attempt by the Government of the FPRY to "seize the Pirin Region" and enslave Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government is thus deliberately trying to suppress the most profound aspirations of the peoples of both countries towards federation. It deliberately forgets that this idea was supported by the greatest and most progressive men of Bulgaria, and even by some of the present Bulgarian leaders while they were still making independent decisions and that negotiations on this question were conducted between both Governments. This is what the Bulgarian leaders said about the question of the union of the Macedonian people before the Cominform Resolution. The present Bulgarian Premier, Vasil Kolarov, in his address delivered during the celebration of the Yugoslav national holiday on November 29, 1945, said in part: "Yugoslavia and the new Bulgaria solemnly declare that the Macedonian question must be settled in accordance with the interests of the Macedonian population itself... the Bulgarian people sincerely welcome the formation of the Macedonian federal unit within the frontiers of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia." At the meeting at Razlog, on October 9, 1946, the Bulgarian Vice-Premier, Dobri Terpeshev, in the presence of the present Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Poptomov, said the following: "Tito's Yugoslavia and the Bulgaria of the Fatherland Front are ready to support with all their might the union of the Macedonian people in its own people's republic of Macedonia within the framework of the FPRY."

After the Cominform Resolution and in the campaign against the FPRY, certain Bulgarian leaders considered that the moment had come to undertake the transformation of the PR of Macedonia into a "Vardar Region" to be annexed to the "Pirin Region" under Bulgarian administration. The suppression of even the most fundamental national rights of the Macedonians in Pirin Macedonia, as reflected in the prohibition of the Macedonian language, the expulsion of Macedonian teachers, the closing of cultural institutions, theatres, bookshops, etc., shows that this would actually amount to the annihilation of Macedonian statehood, won by the Macedonian people in common struggle with the other peoples of Yugoslavia. Further, this is also reflected in the fact that the Bulgarian Government organized hostile actions intended to cut the PR of Macedonia off from Yugoslavia. Certain of the present Bulgarian leaders attempt to conceal this Boris Coburgish plan under the slogan of some kind of "Independent Macedonia," spread in some western countries after the Second World War by reactionaries who endeavoured to jeopardize the achievements of the Liberation Struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia and primarily those of the Macedonian people. This plan to create a so-

called "Independent Macedonia" is, therefore, simply another sinister, counter-revolutionary machination directed against the independence and integrity of the FPRY.

The above facts show, on the one hand, the sincere desire of the Government of the FPRY to settle the question of federation in the most democratic way, so that lasting brotherly relations might be forever established between the peoples of Yugoslavia and the Bulgarian people. But the above facts also indicate, on the other hand, that the Bulgarian Government approached the realization of this great achievement with ulterior motives, based on Great-Bulgarian chauvinism and Great-Bulgarian hegemonistic tendencies. These were particularly reflected in the attitude of the Bulgarian Government towards the national question of the Macedonian people, which really frustrated the creation of the South Slav federation. Obstructing the fulfilment of this great idea of a joint life for all the brotherly South Slav peoples, which would open up new perspectives for a happy future, the Bulgarian Government did great harm particularly to the Bulgarian people, who would have advanced more rapidly in the building of socialism in their country through common efforts and cooperation with the peoples of Yugoslavia.

Finally, facts show that the attitude of certain Bulgarian leaders towards the question of federation, clearly expressed after the Cominform Resolution, demonstrates that their intentions regarding this question of vital importance for South Slav peoples were unfair even before the above-mentioned Resolution.

Consistent with its hostile attitude, the Bulgarian Government organized a furious campaign of lies and slanders against the FPRY, carried out by the Bulgarian press and radio with the participation of the most responsible Bulgarian leaders. They openly call upon the peoples of Yugoslavia to rebel against, and overthrow, the socialist order in the FPRY. In this manner the Bulgarian Government attempts to revive the chauvinistic hatred incited by all Bulgarian anti-popular fascist regimes, in order to realize the Great-Bulgarian, San Stefano pretensions and aspirations, to the misfortune of the Bulgarian people.

The Bulgarian police authorities, with the knowledge, and by order means to a group of traitors and deserters from Yugoslavia who are carrying on their criminal and subversive activities in Bulgaria against the socialist order in the FPRY.

The Bulgarian police authorities, with the knowledge, and by order of the Bulgarian Government, undertook a number of brutal, hostile actions against the citizens of the FPRY, including arrests, chicanery and maltreatment, as well as the expulsion of Yugoslav citizens from Bulgaria. Yugoslav citizens are exposed to pressure and attempts to inveigle them into betraying their people and their socialist homeland. Even the officials of the diplomatic Mission of the FPRY in Sofia were subjected to attacks in broad daylight, in public places, in the capital of Bulgaria. The insolent and rude provocations on the part of the Bulgarian security organs with regard to the Embassy of the FPRY in Sofia reached such proportions that the building of the Yugoslav Embassy in Sofia was entirely blocked by the police, while agents of the State security closely followed the officials of the Yugoslav Embassy about, insulting them and trying to provoke incidents at all costs.

Similarly well-known are the unexampled, brutal and terrorist acts of the Bulgarian frontier authorities towards Yugoslav militiamen who, on the basis of the agreement of November 27, 1946, on the regulation of the border service, cross into Bulgarian territory in order to check on the traffic of passengers and goods. Bulgarian frontier authorities abused the Yugoslav militiamen, ordered them off the trains and, pointing rifles at them, compelled them to walk tens of kilometers, etc.

The Bulgarian Government also brutally violated other agreements concluded between the FPRY and the PR of Bulgaria in the interest of the population in the frontier region. Thus the Bulgarian authorities, forbidding the Yugoslav population from the frontier area to cross the Bulgarian frontier with permits issued by Yugoslav authorities, broke the agreement of August 1, 1947, on facilitating the crossing of the frontier.

The Bulgarian authorities also violated the agreement on properties cut by the Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier.

Bulgarian frontier authorities have been provoking frequent incidents on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border. Bulgarian soldiers fired at Yugoslav frontier authorities, crossed into Yugoslav territory, attempted to kidnap Yugoslav frontier guards, shifted boundary-posts, etc. Bulgarian planes flying over the Yugoslav frontier violated the airspace of the FPRY.

The Bulgarian Government also broke all the economic agreements existing between the FPRY and the PR of Bulgaria and all economic relations with the FPRY despite the fact that this dealt a serious blow primarily to the interests of the Bulgarian people.

Exploiting the situation created after the Cominform Resolution, the Bulgarian Government has so far refused to restitute the cultural objects looted from Yugoslavia by the Bulgarian fascist occupation army. In this manner the Government of the PR of Bulgaria flagrantly violated the Peace Treaty. Article 22 of this Treaty actually binds Bulgaria to return all the cultural, artistic and historical objects removed to Bulgaria from Yugoslavia.

In a number of Notes the Government of the FPRY drew the attention of the Bulgarian Government to, and warned and protested against, the afore-mentioned violations of obligations which had been assumed. These acts were in complete contradiction with the spirit and the letter of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. The notes further requested the Bulgarian Government to put an end to the hostile policy towards the FPRY and to settle all disputes on the basis of the above mentioned Treaty.

The above facts clearly show that, since the Cominform Resolution, the Government of the PR of Bulgaria, pursuing its hostile policy, dictated from abroad, towards the FPRY has violated all treaties and agreements concluded by the PR of Bulgaria with the FPRY. Thus the Bulgarian Government transformed the Treaty of Friendship with Yugoslavia into a worthless scrap of paper long before its unilateral, faithless and formal breach. The Bulgarian Government is trying to justify this latest hostile and unpacific step against the Government of the FPRY not only

by the customary false accusations aimed against the Government of the FPRY, but also, of course, by the judicial provocation in Budapest which was staged to serve as a pretext for all the new hostile acts against Yugoslavia. The notorious Budapest "trial," however, not only failed to sully socialist Yugoslavia, but, on the contrary, completely revealed the counter-revolutionary conspiracy in which certain Bulgarian leaders have been taking an active part.

Breaking faith with the words of Georgi Dimitrov, who said that the Treaty of Friendship was not a piece of paper which could be blown away by the wind at any time, but that it expressed the sovereign will of the peoples of Yugoslavia and of the Bulgarian people to live in peace and brotherly relations, and that it would further strengthen the eternal brotherhood of the peoples of Yugoslavia and the Bulgarian people, the Bulgarian Government has by these acts brutally offended the deepest feelings and interests not only of the peoples of Yugoslavia, but also of the Bulgarian people. The Bulgarian people can never and will never approve of this latest hostile act of the Bulgarian Government directed against the FPRY.

The Government of the FPRY acknowledges the Note of the Government of the PR of Bulgaria of October 1, 1949, on the unilateral breach of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the FPRY and the PR of Bulgaria, and notes that the responsibility for the consequences which might derive from such an unpacific policy by the Bulgarian Government towards the FPRY and its peoples rests exclusively on the Government of the PR of Bulgaria.^(*)

DOCUMENT No. 58

NOTE OF THE YUGOSLAV LEGATION IN TIRANA No. 348 OF NOVEMBER 2, 1949, INVITING THE ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT TO RESUME THE POLICY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH YUGOSLAVIA

Owing to the situation created in the relations between the FPRY and the PR of Albania by the policy of the Albanian Government towards the FPRY, which is in complete contradiction with the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance concluded between the FPRY and the PR of Albania, the Legation of the FPRY considers it necessary, under instructions from the Government of the FPRY, to draw the attention of the Albanian Government to the following.

(*) The Government of the FPRY also sent Notes to the Governments of other Eastern European countries on the occasion of the unilateral breach of Treaties of Alliance, viz: to the Government of the Rumanian PR Note No. 418679 of October 15, 1949; and to the Government of the Republic of Poland Note No. 418143 of October 21, 1949. In these Notes the Yugoslav Government pointed out the sincerity and friendship with which it had approached the signing of the Treaties of Alliance with these countries and the fulfilment of obligations deriving therefrom. It qualified the unilateral breach of these Treaties as a new unpacific act against the FPRY and a serious violation of international obligations by the Governments of the above-mentioned countries.

On July 1, 1948, the Albanian Government unilaterally broke all the economic treaties, agreements and protocols concluded between the FPRY and the PR of Albania and requested all Yugoslav specialists, advisers and experts to leave Albania immediately although they were sent by the FPRY to Albania at the explicit request of the Albanian Government to help in the building up and the economic and cultural development of the PR of Albania.

At the same time, a campaign in which the most responsible State and other leaders took part was launched in Albania against the FPRY.

The citizens of the FPRY in Albania were subjected to treatment which put them in a difficult position. They were prevented without any grounds from being repatriated to Yugoslavia. In spite of the obligations it has assumed, the Albanian Government delays solution of this question.

The diplomatic Mission of the FPRY in Tirana, its members and officials, were subjected to such extraordinary measures that they were hampered in the performance of their normal activities and in the exercise of the functions of the Diplomatic Mission of the FPRY in Albania. These acts went as far as depriving the personnel of the Legation of the FPRY of various kinds of necessary service and even medical aid.

The Albanian Government gave shelter to a group of deserters from Yugoslavia carrying on hostile activities against the FPRY.

On the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier, incidents were provoked on the Albanian side. There were casualties among the Yugoslav frontier authorities as a result of these incidents. Thus, on October 7, 1949, the Albanian frontier authorities on the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier killed a Yugoslav frontier guard, Mitar Vojnović.

The Albanian Government did not allow Yugoslav sportsmen, who, as members of the Yugoslav Army, were running relay races around Skadar Lake, to return to Yugoslavia. What is more, they refused to give any information on their fate.

Certain individuals apprehended in Yugoslavia admitted that they had been sent from Albania in order to execute actions directed against the FPRY.

The Government of the FPRY, however, consistently applying its peace-loving policy, notwithstanding all this showed the utmost restraint with regard to such a policy of the Albanian Government towards the FPRY. It showed its readiness to settle by agreement all the disputed questions between the FPRY and Albania, in the spirit of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance. To this end, the Government of the FPRY submitted a series of positive proposals to the Albanian Government.

Thus, in its Note No. 410227 of May 9, 1949, the Government of the FPRY reiterated its proposal, contained in Note No. 49338 of April 9, 1948, to regulate the question of credits and debts which had arisen in the economic relations between the FPRY and the PR of Albania, by way of negotiations between delegations of both Governments.

Although the Albanian Government declared that it recognized the necessity for the consideration of these questions, it still has not appointed a delegation for these negotiations.

In its Note No. 416250 of September 5, 1949, the Government of the FPRY proposed to the Albanian Government the establishment of mixed

Yugoslav-Albanian commissions for the investigation and ascertainment of frontier incidents, and the conclusion of an agreement. In the same Note the Government of the FPRY proposed that the condition of the existing boundary-posts on all the sections of the frontier line be examined and that the Commission establish if any were missing or not clearly or correctly marked. So far, the Albanian Government has not accepted these proposals of the Government of the FPRY.

The Government of the FPRY has never been indifferent to acts endangering the independence and integrity of Albania. In August 1949, the Government of the FPRY interceded with the representatives of Great Britain and the USA in Beograd, indicating the serious violations of the southern Albanian frontiers by Greece. On August 17, 1949, the Government of the FPRY received from the Ambassador of Great Britain in Beograd, Sir Charles Peake, and the Ambassador of the USA, Mr. Cavendish-Cannon, satisfactory official answers to the effect that they had brought their opinion to the attention of the Government in Athens and had received from it an entirely satisfactory reply. The official attitude of the Government of the FPRY regarding this question was given in a communique of the Yugoslav Press Agency, TANJUG, on September 1, 1949, which was published by the Yugoslav press and broadcast over the air.

In its Notes, and through steps taken by its representatives, the Government of the FPRY drew the attention of the Albanian Government to the fact that the present policy of the Albanian Government towards the FPRY was in complete contradiction with the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance existing between the FPRY and the PR of Albania. Endeavouring to uphold the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, the Government of the FPRY called upon the Albanian Government to bring its relations with the FPRY into conformity with the spirit and letter of the Treaty and to fulfil the obligations deriving from it both for the Albanian Government and the Yugoslav Government. The Albanian Government, however, did not give a positive answer to these endeavours on the part of the Government of the FPRY.

The Government of the FPRY considers that it is not sufficient for the Government of the FPRY alone to meet its obligations under the afore-mentioned Treaty, and for the Government of the FPRY alone to be guided by the principles contained in the Treaty, in its policy towards Albania but that, on the contrary, it is imperative that it be observed by both sides. As the above facts show, the Government of the PR of Albania has violated its obligations deriving from this Treaty and is continuing to do so in increasingly drastic form.

The Government of the FPRY invites the Government of the PR of Albania to resume a policy of friendship and cooperation with the FPRY, to respect and fulfil the obligations it assumed under the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the FPRY and the PR of Albania.

The Government of the FPRY considers it desirable that the Albanian Government answer this Note within the shortest time.

The Legation of the FPRY in Tirana expresses its consideration to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Albania.

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 420458 OF NOVEMBER 12, 1949, IN WHICH THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT STATES THAT IT CONSIDERS ITSELF RELIEVED OF OBLIGATIONS ISSUING FROM THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA

In connection with the openly hostile and unpacific policy of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, which it has been persistently pursuing against the FPRY for over a year, and which is in complete contradiction with the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the FPRY and Albania, and, after the rejection of the latest proposal of the Government of the FPRY, stated in the Note of November 2, 1949, which invited the Albanian Government to resume a policy of friendship with the FPRY — the Government of the FPRY communicates the following to the Albanian Government:

The friendship and solidarity between the peoples of Yugoslavia and the Albanian people, which found the fullest expression in the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the FPRY and Albania, are the product of their joint struggle, especially in the recent past, for freedom, independence and a better future. Inspired by their present leadership, the peoples of Yugoslavia demonstrated their solidarity with the small Albanian people when the latter was attacked by the Italian fascist invaders in 1939, and expressed their readiness to come to its assistance despite the treacherous policy of the then anti-popular Yugoslav regimes.

Upon the appeal of Albanian patriots, the leadership of the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia, in 1941, gave direct help to the Albanian people in the formation of their liberation movement, in their struggle against the fascist invader and for their survival and national independence.

By applying the experiences, and by following the example of the National Liberation Struggle and the Revolution of the peoples of Yugoslavia, the liberation movement of the people of Albania developed and strengthened with direct day-to-day help from the Yugoslav leadership. The help the Yugoslav movement and its leaders extended to the Albanian people was a decisive factor in the successful development of the Albanian liberation struggle, and in its national liberation and democratic transformation.

The newly-created, independent, people's democratic State of Albania has from the very beginning enjoyed the sincerest and greatest help from the FPRY in the preservation and strengthening of its independence and integrity. It is a well-known fact that international reactionary circles did all they could to hinder the creation of a free, truly democratic and independent Albania. In such a situation, Albania found a sincere friend in the FPRY and its Government which has always been ready to assist it.

Consistently pursuing such a policy towards Albania, the Government of the FPRY, on April 28, 1945, made a decision to recognize the Albanian Government and to establish diplomatic relations with Albania.

The Government of the FPRY was the first to take this step which meant important support and help to Albania. In February, 1946, in the National Assembly, Marshal Tito, formulating the policy of the Government of the FPRY towards Albania, stated the following: "The peoples of Yugoslavia are not indifferent towards the Albanian people. By virtue of its contribution in the war on the side of the United Nations, Albania fully deserves to have its independence and integrity respected . . . The Government will continue to strengthen and intensify the economic, political and cultural relations with Albania. Such cooperation is not only to the great advantage of both countries, it also represents a significant contribution to peace in the Balkans."

Through its delegates the Government of the FPRY has resolutely defended and pleaded for the interests of the Albanian people in all the international forums whenever the rights of the Albanian people were in question. It was only thanks to the resolute stand of the Yugoslav representatives at the Conference on Reparations, in December, 1945, that Albania was recognized as an Associated Power in the war against Hitlerite Germany. Her right to reparations from Germany was also recognized. At the request of the Albanian Government, the Government of the FPRY consented to let the competent Yugoslav organs assume all the technical and other obligations in connection with the transport of reparation goods from Germany to Albania.

It is well known to the world public, and especially to the Albanian people, with what unselfish determination the Yugoslav delegation at the Peace Conference in Paris fought for the Albanian demands, and how resolutely it defended the integrity of Albania by fighting against the territorial claims of the Greek delegation regarding Southern Albania. The position of the Yugoslav representatives in the UN and the support given to the request of Albania to be admitted to membership in the United Nations are equally well known.

Through its diplomatic and consular representatives abroad, at the request of the Albanian Government, the Yugoslav Government represented and protected the interests of Albania in almost all countries for a long time without asking for compensation.

Consistently pursuing an internationalistic policy of brotherhood and friendship towards the Albanian people — and endeavouring to help the full development of the PR of Albania in the new post-war conditions — the Yugoslav Government, at the request of the Albanian Government, concluded a number of treaties very significant for both countries, and especially for Albania. On July 9, 1946, the Government of the FPRY concluded the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with Albania and almost simultaneously the Agreement on Economic Cooperation between the FPRY and Albania. These treaties led to the conclusion of the Treaty on Coordination of Economic Relations, on a Customs Union and on Equalization of Currency; further, the Convention on Cultural Cooperation and a number of other treaties, agreements and protocols.

Appreciating the significance of Yugoslav aid to the Albanian people and of the Treaty of Alliance and Friendship binding the Albanian people and the peoples of Yugoslavia, the Albanian Premier, Enver Hoxha, on October 5, 1947, said the following: "Imagine, comrades, what a fate our small people would have met without democratic and friendly Yugosla-

via. The small Albanian people would not have had the freedom it now enjoys; dark days and a black fate would have been its lot. It is in this light that the friendship, brotherhood and alliance binding us to Tito's Yugoslavia should be appreciated. If it were surrounded by States such as Greece, could our poor, small country defend the fruits of the blood shed in the war for the establishment of this present democratic order, one of the most progressive; could our small country stand on its feet and honourably and freely build a new life? This would have been very hard, almost impossible. This is why close friendship with the peoples of Yugoslavia is so precious for our people."

Although Yugoslavia found itself in a difficult situation after the great devastations of the war especially with regard to supplies and food, the Government of the FPRY came to the assistance of the Albanian people in its most critical period. In 1946 alone, 20,000 tons of wheat and maize were sent to Albania. This was sent as relief without request for compensation. Later, in addition to this, other great shipments, exceeding 33,000 tons of corn, were sent under agreements. The FPRY sent corn to the Albanian people despite threats from abroad that it would therefore be deprived of UNRRA supplies. In October, 1946, when the people of Albania were afflicted with catastrophic floods, the citizens of the FPRY were the first to come to their assistance. In a short time, an amount of 52,000,000 dinars was collected as aid to those in distress. This is also an example of the policy of friendship pursued by the FPRY with regard to the Albanian people.

The Albanian people have not forgotten the help they received from the peoples and the Government of the FPRY at the time it was most needed, nor will they forget it.

Preparing for the transition from the period of reconstruction to the Five Year Plan for the building of socialism in Yugoslavia, the Government of the FPRY responded to the desires and aspirations of the Albanian Government to enable Albania to develop jointly with the FPRY, because this would guarantee the speedy liquidation of Albania's economic backwardness. In doing so, the Government of the FPRY was aware of the great resources which would have to be furnished to Albania to enable it to reach economic prosperity. In spite of this, however, the Government of the FPRY concluded economic agreements with Albania, and linked and coordinated the help to be given Albania with the efforts of the peoples of Yugoslavia to fulfil the Five Year Plan for the development of the FPRY.

Implementing the concluded treaties, the Government of the FPRY granted Albania a loan of 2 billion dinars for 1947 for the purchase of capital goods and other material necessary for the development of Albania and for the raising of the living standard of the Albanian people. This loan represented 56.73% of the total budgetary revenues of Albania. In 1948, Albania was granted another loan amounting to 3 billion dinars. These loans were granted to Albania without the Yugoslav Government ever posing the question of when and how they would be repaid. On the basis of the loans granted, the Government of the FPRY delivered large quantities of all kinds of commodities to Albania. Among other things there were locomotives and railway cars, trucks, automobiles, fishing boats, agricultural machines, equipment and machines for factories, iron,

cement, leather, etc. At the request of the Albanian Government, the Government of the FPRY also presented Tirana with a complete automatic telephone exchange, a complete printing works and equipment for a radio broadcasting station. It also furnished extensive resources for the creation of a material basis for the development of Albanian national culture; it gave supplies for medical services, and, at the request of the Albanian Government, sent to Albania a large number of specialists and skilled workers for the most varied economic, military, cultural and other purposes. It enabled over 1,500 Albanian students to get their training in agricultural and industrial schools in the FPRY; granted about 500 scholarships to Albanian university students and sent Albania 30 teachers for elementary and secondary schools, music schools, teachers' training institutes, etc.

The Albanian Government particularly requested the assistance of the FPRY in the organization, equipment and supply of the Albanian Army. Meeting the requests of the Albanian Government, the Government of the FPRY sent Albania a number of instructors, enabled the Albanian Army to become acquainted with the organizational, military and other experience of the Yugoslav Army, supplied the Albanian Army with the necessary armaments, clothing and other material means — without asking any compensation for this.

The economic relations the Government of the FPRY established with Albania, in substance, represent a unique example in the history of international relations. For the first time in the relations between socialist countries there appeared a new socialist form of economic cooperation, devoid of any form of capitalist economic relations of exploitation of the economically weaker by the economically stronger. By this example, the Government of the FPRY proved and, for the first time applied in practice, the principle of socialist assistance to an underdeveloped country without any exploitation or political conditions. Consistently pursuing such a policy, the Government of the FPRY invested all its efforts in the further development of these truly socialist relations between the FPRY and Albania. The Government of the FPRY pursued this policy convinced that it would thereby contribute to the creation of close and brotherly relations which would be a strong safeguard for the independence and integrity of Albania, and contribute to the intensification of the cooperation between the Balkan peoples, and to the preservation of peace in this part of Europe.

The entire Albanian press and all the Albanian leaders often made statements referring to the selfless, generous and full help given by the FPRY to the Albanian people. Thus, in his address to the Albanian people on New Year's Eve, 1947, the Premier, Enver Hoxha, said: "We are bound to the heroic peoples of Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia by unshakeable brotherhood and unity, by the guarantee of freedom, independence and sovereignty of our people and of all the other democratic peoples in the Balkans, by a brotherhood and unity which rendered our country selfless fraternal help both in the course of the war and today, in the period of full development and the building of a new life."

Even on May 11, 1948, immediately before the infamous Cominform Resolution, in his speech in the National Assembly, Enver Hoxha said the following: "Our people will daily strengthen and cement more and

more the brotherhood, the precious friendship and alliance with the fraternal peoples of Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia with whom they fought side by side to win freedom, with whom they are working side by side to build a better common life."

Overnight, however, on July 1, 1948, after the publication of the ill-famed Cominform Resolution, rupturing the friendly and brotherly relations between the FPRY and Albania, violating the solemnly given promises, treaties and agreements, the Albanian Government unilaterally broke all the economic treaties, agreements and protocols concluded between the FPRY and Albania. It requested that all the Yugoslav specialists, advisers and experts leave Albania within 48 hours. Thereby the Albanian Government, on orders from certain leaders of the USSR, began to carry out shameless acts against the peoples and the Government of the FPRY, acts unworthy of the Government of an independent country. They had to strike the first blow precisely at this new form of economic relations between the FPRY and Albania. It was this form that had to be debased and compromised. It was these economic links that the Albanian Government broke immediately in order to erase an example which was thwarting the intentions of those who fear, do not want, and do not allow, the introduction of new socialist relations between socialist countries, and who desire to take advantage of the exploiting right of the stronger in relations between socialist countries as long as they can.

The Albanian Government committed this unreasonable and foolish act without any consideration of the serious consequences for the Albanian people. In this manner the Albanian Government was transformed into an instrument of the policy of those who are putting the interests of the Albanian people at stake.

At the same time, the Albanian Government launched a most furiously hostile campaign against the FPRY with the participation of the most responsible Albanian leaders. The Albanian press and radio use the most despicable calumnies and lies in their campaign against the FPRY.

The Albanian authorities immediately prohibited the operation of "Jugoslovenska Knjiga" in Tirana, prohibited the sale of all books, papers and periodicals written in Serbo-Croat, and all Yugoslav films. By such and similar acts, the Albanian Government violated the Cultural Convention signed on July 9, 1947.

Yugoslav citizens in Albania were subjected to rude and hostile treatment. They were prevented from being repatriated to their socialist homeland and were subjected to pressure, ill-treatment, blackmail and arrests.

The diplomatic Mission of the FPRY in Tirana as well as the personnel of the Legation of the FPRY were subjected to the most reckless police chicanery. The Albanian security service shadowed representatives of the FPRY, insulting and provoking them. The Albanian authorities went so far in their hostile acts towards the officials of the Mission of the FPRY, that they prohibited the rendering of any regular indispensable services to the officials of the Legation of the FPRY, even depriving them of medical aid.

The Albanian Government introduced unprecedented methods, inadmissible in international relations, into its official communication with the Government of the FPRY and its representatives. Almost all the Notes sent to the Government of the FPRY by the Albanian Government in the period following the Cominform Resolution expressed the great hostility of the Albanian Government towards the peoples of Yugoslavia. Unable to counter the facts and arguments put forth in the Notes of the Government of the FPRY, the Albanian Government in a number of cases groundlessly returned these Notes without answering them, thus making diplomatic communication impossible between the Governments of the two countries. By order of the Government, the Albanian frontier authorities prevented Yugoslav owners of property cut by the frontier line from crossing the border and making use of their property in Albanian territory. Such Yugoslav property owners were ill-treated, arrested and sent to Albanian prisons.

The Albanian Government received and organized a group of traitors and deserters in order to use them for hostile activities against the peoples of Yugoslavia. It used them for the provocation of frontier incidents and for subversive activity directed against the independence and integrity of the FPRY.

The Albanian Government was the first to begin organizing provocative trials with the purpose of slandering the FPRY and its Government.

Using the same methods and slogans that the reactionary and fascist regimes and circles employed in the past, in their attempt to sow the seeds of discord between the peoples of Yugoslavia and the Albanian people, the Albanian Government endeavoured at any price to incite the Albanian people to chauvinist hatred for the Yugoslav people. From the program of the fascist organization, "Bali Kombëtar"⁽¹⁾, the Albanian Government borrowed everything that could be used to revive this chauvinism. The Albanian Government is now borrowing the slogan of an "ethnic Albania" from the arch-enemies of the freedom of the Albanian people and of brotherhood among the Balkan peoples. The Albanian Premier, Enver Hoxha himself, as well as the Vice-Premier, Tuk Jakova, publicly and openly call upon the people of Kosovo and Metohija to rebel and secede from the FPRY.

The Albanian Government is constantly and systematically organizing frontier incidents and provocations on the Yugoslav border. Albanian frontier organs move boundary posts, open fire from ambush at Yugoslav soldiers, kill Yugoslav frontier guards, etc. At the same time, the Albanian Government is still detaining Yugoslav Army sportsmen, who were basely attacked and captured while running a relay race around Skadar Lake. The Albanian Government has so far given no information on their fate, although it was requested to do so by the Government of the FPRY in a number of Notes and verbal interventions.

The Albanian Government sends spies and diversionist groups into Yugoslavia. They come into the country with personal instructions from

(1) "Bali Kombëtar" (National Front), an Albanian quisling organization founded in 1942 for the purpose of suppressing the influence of the People's Liberation Front of Albania, and for waging an armed struggle against the People's Liberation Army of Albania.

the Vice-Premier and of the Minister of the Interior of Albania, Mehmed Shehu, to execute diversionist and subversive actions.

The Albanian Government thereby violated completely the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, taking upon itself the role of a provocateur in the plot against the independence and integrity of the FPRY. By its active hostilities and provocations against the FPRY, the Albanian Government totally subordinated its policy to the sinister conspiratorial plans against the FPRY. In this manner, the Albanian Government is deliberately destroying all the friendly ties between the FPRY and Albania — adventurously and foolishly preparing the ground for the complete isolation of Albania and pursuing a policy of national betrayal, fatal to the vital interests of the Albanian people and peace in the Balkans.

Consistently pursuing its peace-loving policy and endeavouring to avoid the serious consequences which might result for the Albanian people and peace in the Balkans from such a policy by the Albanian Government, the Government of the FPRY, in spite of all this, has showed utmost restraint in regard to the hostile and provocative acts of the Albanian Government. It showed its readiness to settle all the disputed questions between the FPRY and Albania by agreement, invoking the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance. For this purpose, the Government of the FPRY submitted a number of positive proposals to the Albanian Government.

In its Note No. 4501 of January 10, 1949, the Government of the FPRY proposed to the Albanian Government that an Agreement be concluded for reclamation works on Skadar Lake. The Government of the FPRY declared itself willing to undertake the obligation to carry out the regulation of the Drim River, the digging of a new river bed and the construction of a dam for the retention of alluvial deposits near Vaudejs with Yugoslav material, resources and specialists while Albania would help in this scheme by providing unskilled labour, the expenses for which would be covered by the Government of the FPRY.

The reclamation of the Skadar basin is a vital question for the population of North Albania, for, by the reclamation of land in this basin, the Albanian economy would gain over 30,000 hectares of fertile land. The melioration of this whole area would be of great importance from the point of health, too. The Albanian Government, guided by its hostile policy towards Yugoslavia and contrary to the vital interests of the Albanian people, rejected even this proposal of the Government of the FPRY.

In its Note No. 410227 of May 9, 1949, the Government of the FPRY renewed its proposal stated in Note No. 49338 of April 9, 1949, to the effect that the Albanian Government send a delegation to Beograd so that the question of credits and debts incurred in the economic relations between Albania and Yugoslavia, might be settled. On this occasion the Government of the FPRY declared that it would keep in mind the fact that the Albanian Government was probably unable to pay its debts to the FPRY immediately and stated that it was ready to offer the Albanian Government favorable conditions for payment in settlement of the

credits received from the FPRY. However, although in its Note No. 3288 of September 2, 1949, the Albanian Government declared that it recognized the necessity of examining mutual debts and credits deriving from the economic relations, and, although it communicated that it would appoint a delegation for the negotiations soon, it has still not sent a delegation for the negotiations in spite of inquiries made by the Government of the FPRY in Note No. 418261 of October 10, 1949.

Consistent in the pursuit of a peace-loving policy, in the desire to avoid frontier incidents and to establish normal relations on the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier, the Government of the FPRY, in its Note No. 416250 of September 5, 1949, proposed to the Albanian Government the formation of mixed Yugoslav-Albanian commissions for joint investigation and ascertainment of frontier incidents with a view to concluding an agreement. In the same Note the Government of the FPRY also made a proposal that the afore-mentioned commission, established to negotiate the conclusion of this agreement, be authorized by both Governments to investigate the boundary-posts along all sections of the frontier, and that the commission establish where they are missing, or not clearly and correctly marked, so that new ones may be placed. The Albanian Government did not accept the proposal of the Government of the FPRY although on September 13 and 29, 1949, inquiries were made regarding the answer to the afore-mentioned Note, through the Albanian Chargé d'Affaires in Beograd. The Albanian Government even continued to organize frontier incidents and on October 7, 1949, the Albanian frontier guards assassinated Yugoslav frontier guard, Mitar Vojnović, from ambush. Thus, they openly showed that the Albanian Government did not desire a peaceful settlement of the question of frontier incidents or the placing of boundary-posts, but wanted a free hand to cause new and even more serious frontier incidents and provocations.

The Government of the FPRY has made a number of proposals and shown the utmost forbearance in its endeavours to make the Albanian Government enable the repatriation of Yugoslav citizens from Albania. The Albanian Government not only ignored the obligations it had assumed but even introduced a regime of terror and violence against the Yugoslav repatriates. Yugoslav citizens were first beaten by the police and then compelled, under the harshest conditions, with rifles pointed at them, to wait a whole night before they were enabled to cross the border to Yugoslavia. They were not allowed to take their personal effects, nor were any means of transport placed at their disposal. They were driven hungry and barefoot across the frontier to Yugoslav territory.

In spite of this openly hostile, provocative and inimical policy of the Albanian Government towards the FPRY, the Government of the FPRY did everything on its part to avoid any further deterioration of the relations with Albania. The Government of the FPRY endeavoured to keep in force the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and, despite the hostile policy of the Albanian Government, took measures which were in the interest of preservation of the integrity and independence of Albania. It thus proved that it was ready to fulfil completely all its obligations deriving from this Treaty. In August, 1949, when there were

major violations of the southern Albanian frontier by the Royal Greek Army, the Government of the FPRY interceded, through the Ambassadors of Great Britain and the USA in Beograd, indicating the serious violations of the territorial integrity of Albania. The Government of the FPRY obtained in this respect a satisfactory answer from the Governments of Great Britain and the USA. The official attitude of the Government of the FPRY on this question was given in a communique of the Yugoslav news agency, TANJUG, on September 1, 1949, and was published in the Yugoslav press and broadcast over the radio.

The Albanian Government, however, answered all these peace-loving and positive endeavours of the Government of the FPRY with a further deterioration in relations and with ever harsher hostile acts and provocative actions against the independence and integrity of the FPRY. This was the product of instigation and help from abroad received by the Albanian Government in its hostile policy against Yugoslavia. The Government of the FPRY, endeavouring to do all in its power to have the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the FPRY and Albania still kept in force, in its Note of November 2, 1949, drew the attention of the Albanian Government to the fact that it was not sufficient for the Government of the FPRY alone to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and called once more upon the Albanian Government to resume its policy of friendship towards the FPRY. By rejecting even this peace-loving invitation of the Government of the FPRY, the Albanian Government clearly showed that it does not desire to, and will not in the future, pursue a policy of friendship and cooperation with the FPRY. It showed, on the contrary, that it intends to pursue a hostile policy towards the peoples and the Government of the FPRY in full contradiction with the existing Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance. By continuing to pursue its hostile policy and criminal intentions against the FPRY, and by rejecting the peace-loving proposals of the Government of the FPRY, the Albanian Government is playing the provocative role assigned to it in the plot against the independence and integrity of the FPRY.

The Government of the FPRY also notes that Albania has deliberately been brought into a difficult international position by the unilateral and faithless breach of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with the FPRY on the part of the USSR and the countries of people's democracy and by the pressure being put on Albania to pursue a policy of overt hostility and of violation of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with Yugoslavia. The Government of the Eastern European countries headed by the USSR have thus sacrificed the interests of Albania only in order to realize their sinister plans against Yugoslavia.

By accepting and playing the role assigned to it in the conspiracy against Yugoslavia, the Albanian Government has not only violated the Treaty of Mutual Assistance but, in its inimical acts towards the FPRY, has violated the fundamental principles governing the relations between States. Thus the Albanian Government actually broke the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with Yugoslavia and simultaneously

attempted to create the possibility of using the formal obligations under the Treaty for new intrigues and machinations against Yugoslavia.

On the basis of all the above-stated, the Government of the FPRY declares that it considers itself free from the obligations under the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, concluded between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania on July 9, 1947, although it is not indifferent to the threats against the independence and integrity of Albania and although the sympathies of the Government and peoples of Yugoslavia towards the Albanian people remain unchanged and sincere.

Beograd, November 12, 1949.

7. REPETITION OF OPEN CALLS BY THE MOST RESPONSIBLE STATE AND PARTY LEADERS OF THE USSR AND THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE FOR THE FORCIBLE OVERTHROW OF THE SOCIALIST STATE ORDER AND LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF YUGOSLAVIA

DOCUMENT No. 60

THE COMINFORM RESOLUTION, "THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE POWER OF MURDERERS AND SPIES," PASSED AT THE COMINFORM SESSION IN THE SECOND HALF OF NOVEMBER, 1949, IN HUNGARY

The Information Bureau, consisting of representatives of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, Rumanian Workers' Party, Working People's Party of Hungary, United Workers' Party of Poland, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Communist Party of France, and the Czechoslovak and Italian Communist Parties, having considered the question "The Yugoslav Communist Party in the power of murderers and spies," unanimously reached the following conclusions:

Whereas, in June 1948 the meeting of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties noted the change-over of the Tito-Ranković clique from democracy and socialism to bourgeois nationalism, during the period that has elapsed since the meeting of the Information Bureau this clique has travelled all the way from bourgeois nationalism to fascism and outright betrayal of the national interests of Yugoslavia.

Recent events show that the Yugoslav Government is completely dependent on foreign imperialist circles and has become an instrument of their aggressive policy, which has resulted in the liquidation of the independence of the Yugoslav Republic.

The Central Committee of the Party and the Government of Yugoslavia have merged completely with the imperialist circles against the entire camp of socialism and democracy; against the Communist Parties of the world; against the New Democracies and the USSR.

The Beograd clique of hired spies and murderers made a flagrant deal with imperialist reaction and entered its service, as the Budapest trial of Rajk—Brankov made perfectly clear.

This trial showed that the present Yugoslav rulers, having fled from the camp of democracy and socialism to the camp of capitalism and reaction, have become direct accomplices of the instigators of a new war, and, by their treacherous deeds, are ingratiating themselves with the imperialists and kow-towing to them.

The change-over of the Tito clique to fascism was not fortuitous. It was effected on the order of their masters, the Anglo-American imperialists, whose mercenaries, it is now clear, this clique has been for long.

The Yugoslav traitors, obeying the will of the imperialists, undertook to form in the People's Democracies political gangs consisting of reactionaries, nationalists, clerical and fascist elements and, relying on these gangs, to bring about counter-revolutionary coups in these countries, wrest them from the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp and subordinate them to the forces of imperialism.

The Tito clique transformed Beograd into an American centre for espionage and anti-Communist propaganda.

When all genuine friends of peace, democracy and socialism see in the USSR a powerful fortress of Socialism, a faithful and steadfast defender of the freedom and independence of nations and the principal bulwark of peace, the Tito-Ranković clique, having attained power under the mask of friendship with the USSR, began on the orders of the Anglo-American imperialists a campaign of slander and provocation against the Soviet Union, utilising the most vile calumnies borrowed from the arsenal of Hitler.

The transformation of the Tito-Ranković clique into a direct agency of imperialism, and accomplices of the warmongers, culminated in the lining up of the Yugoslav Government with the imperialist bloc at UNO, where the Kardelj, Djilas and Bebler joined in a united front with American reactionaries on vital matters of international policy.

In the sphere of home policy, the chief outcome of the activity of the traitorous Tito-Ranković clique is the actual liquidation of the People's Democratic system in Yugoslavia.

Due to the counter-revolutionary policy of the Tito-Ranković clique which usurped power in the Party and in the State, an anti-Communist, police State — fascist type regime — has been installed in Yugoslavia.

The social basis of this regime consists of kulaks in the countryside and capitalist elements in the towns.

In fact, power in Yugoslavia is in the hands of anti-popular reactionary elements. Active members of the old bourgeois parties, kulaks and other enemies of People's Democracy, are active in central and local government bodies.

The top fascist rulers rely on an enormously swollen military-police apparatus, with the aid of which they oppress the peoples of Yugoslavia.

They have turned the country into a military camp, wiped out all democratic rights of the working people, and trample on any free expression of opinion.

The Yugoslav rulers demagogically and insolently deceive the people, alleging they are building socialism in Yugoslavia.

But it is clear to every Marxist that there can be no talk of building socialism in Yugoslavia when the Tito clique has broken with the Soviet Union, with the entire camp of socialism and democracy, thereby depriving Yugoslavia of the main bulwark for building socialism and when it has subordinated the country economically and politically to Anglo-American imperialists.

The State sector in the economy of Yugoslavia has ceased to be people's property, since State power is in the hands of enemies of the people.

The Tito-Ranković clique has created wide possibilities for the penetration of foreign capital into the economy of the country, and has placed the economy under the control of capitalist monopolies.

Anglo-American industrial-financial circles, investing their capital in Yugoslav economy, are transforming Yugoslavia into an agrarian-raw materials adjunct of foreign capital.

The ever-growing slavish dependence of Yugoslavia on imperialism leads to intensified exploitation of the working class and to a severe worsening of its conditions.

The policy of the Yugoslav rulers in the countryside bears a kulak-capitalistic character.

The compulsory pseudo-cooperatives in the countryside are in the hands of kulaks and their agencies and represent an instrument for the exploitation of wide masses of working peasants.

The Yugoslav hirelings of imperialism, having seized leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, unleashed a campaign of terror against genuine Communists loyal to the principles of Marxism and Leninism and who fight for Yugoslavia's independence from the imperialists.

Thousands of Yugoslav patriots, devoted to Communism, have been expelled from the Party and incarcerated in jails and concentration camps. Many have been tortured and killed in prison or, as was the case with the well-known Communist, Arso Jovanović, were dastardly assassinated.

The brutality with which staunch fighters for Communism are being annihilated in Yugoslavia, can be compared only with the atrocities of the Hitler fascists or the butcher Tsaldaris in Greece or Franco in Spain.

Expelling from the ranks of the Party those Communists loyal to proletarian internationalism, annihilating them, the Yugoslav fascists opened wide the doors of the Party to bourgeois and kulak elements.

As a result of the fascist terror of the Tito gangs against the healthy forces in the Yugoslav Communist Party, leadership of the party is wholly in the hands of spies and murderers, mercenaries of imperialism.

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia has been seized by counter-revolutionary forces, acting arbitrarily in the name of the Party. Recruiting spies and provocateurs in the ranks of the working class parties is, as is well-known, an old method of the bourgeoisie.

In this way the imperialists seek to undermine the Parties from within and subordinate them to themselves. They have succeeded in realising this aim in Yugoslavia.

The fascist ideology, and fascist domestic policy, as well as the perfidious foreign policy of the Tito clique, completely subordinated to the foreign imperialist circles, have created a gulf between the espionage fascist Tito-Ranković clique and the vital interests of the freedom-loving peoples of Yugoslavia.

Consequently, the anti-popular and treacherous activity of the Tito clique is encountering ever-growing resistance from those Communists who have remained loyal to Marxism-Leninism, and among the working class and working peasantry of Yugoslavia.

On the basis of irrefutable facts testifying to the complete change-over of the Tito clique to fascism and its desertion to the camp of world imperialism, the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties considers, that:

1. The espionage group of Tito, Ranković, Kardelj, Djilas, Pijade, Gošnjak, Maslarić, Bebler, Mrazović, Vukmanović, Koča Popović, Kidrič, Nešković, Zlatić, Velebit, Koliševski and others, are enemies of the working class and peasantry and enemies of the peoples of Yugoslavia.

2. This espionage group expresses not the will of the peoples of Yugoslavia, but the will of the Anglo-American imperialists, and has therefore betrayed the interests of the country and abolished the political sovereignty and economic independence of Yugoslavia.

3. The "Communist Party of Yugoslavia," as at present constituted, being in the hands of enemies of the people, murderers and spies, has forfeited the right to be called a Communist Party and is merely an apparatus for carrying out the espionage assignments of the clique of Tito-Kardelj-Ranković-Djilas.

The Information Bureau of Communist and Workers' Parties considers therefore, that the struggle against the Tito clique — hired spies and murderers, is the international duty of all Communist and Workers' Parties.

It is the duty of Communist and Workers' Parties to give all possible aid to the Yugoslav working class and working peasantry who are fighting for the return of Yugoslavia to the camp of democracy and socialism.

A necessary condition for the return of Yugoslavia to the socialist camp is active struggle on the part of revolutionary elements both inside the Yugoslav Communist Party and outside its ranks, for the regeneration of the revolutionary, genuine Communist Party of Yugoslavia, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the principles of proletarian internationalism, and fighting for the independence of Yugoslavia from imperialism.

The loyal Communist forces in Yugoslavia who, in the present brutal conditions of fascist terror, are deprived of the possibility of engaging in open action against the Tito-Ranković clique, were compelled in the struggle for the cause of Communism, to follow the path taken by the Communists of those countries where legal work is forbidden.

The Information Bureau expresses the firm conviction that, among the workers and peasants of Yugoslavia, forces will be found capable of ensuring victory over the bourgeois-restoration espionage Tito-Ranković clique; that the toiling people of Yugoslavia led by the working class will succeed in restoring the historical gains of People's Democracy, won at the price of heavy sacrifice and heroic struggle by the peoples of Yugoslavia, and that they will take the road of building socialism.

The Information Bureau considers one of the most important tasks of the Communist and Workers' Parties to be an all-round heightening of revolutionary vigilance in Party ranks; exposing and rooting out bourgeois-nationalist elements and agents of imperialism no matter under what flag they conceal themselves.

The Information Bureau recognizes the need for more ideological work in the Communist and Workers' Parties; more work to train Com-

munists in the spirit of loyalty to proletarian internationalism; irreconcilability to any departure from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and in the spirit of loyalty to Peoples' Democracy and Socialism.(1)

(1) The above-mentioned Resolution from the meeting of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties held in the second half of the month of November, 1949, in Hungary, was signed by:

Vlko Chervenkov, Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Secretary-General of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

Vladimir Poptomov, Vice-Premier of the PR of Bulgaria, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Vice-Premier of the Rumanian People's Republic, President of the Supreme Economic Council of the Rumanian People's Republic, Secretary-General of the Rumanian Workers' Party.

Iosif Chisinevski, Vice-Premier of the Rumanian People's Republic, member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party.

Alexandru Moghioros, Member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party.

Matyas Rakosi, Vice-Premier of the People's Republic of Hungary, Secretary-General of the Hungarian Workers' Party.

Ernö Gerö, Minister in the Government of the PR of Hungary and President of the Council of National Economy, Deputy Secretary-General of the Hungarian Workers' Party.

József Reval, Minister of Education in the Government of the PR of Hungary, member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party.

János Kádár, Minister of Internal Affairs in the Government of the PR of Hungary, member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party.

Jakub Berman, Secretary-General of the Government of the Republic of Poland, member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the United Polish Workers' Party.

Alexandar Zawadzky, Vice-Premier of the Polish Republic, Secretary of the Central Committee of the United Polish Workers' Party.

Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks).

Pavel F. Yudin, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) and permanent representative of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) in the Cominform.

Jacques Duclos, Member of the Politbureau and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of France.

Georges Cogniot, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of France.

Etienne Fajon, member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of France.

Rudolf Slansky, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

Stefan Baštovansky, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Slovakia.

Ladislav Kopriva, now Minister of National Security in the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic and member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

Palmiro Togliatti, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Italy.

Eduardo d'Onofrio, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Italy.

A. Cicalini, Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Italy.

8. ATTEMPT BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE FOURTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO OBSTRUCT THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE UN

DOCUMENT No. 61

STATEMENT BY THE CHIEF OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, A. J. VISHINSKY, SOVIET MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AT A PRESS CONFERENCE HELD AT LAKE SUCCESS ON OCTOBER 18, 1949, AGAINST THE YUGOSLAV CANDIDACY FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

"As we know, the election of non-permanent members to the Security Council is a rather complicated and delicate question, because the United Nations Organization, apart from the five permanent members of the Security Council, consists of fifty-four other nations, each one of which has the right to request that its representative be elected a non-permanent member of the Security Council. But there are only six such seats for non-permanent members.

"This is where the difficulty comes in.

"The United Nations Organization can, however, easily remove all these difficulties, if all its members show good will and remain true to the tradition which was established in accordance with the principle expressed in Article 23 of the Charter. You will remember that this Article provides that, in the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council, a great deal of attention must be paid to the principle of just geographical distribution. You will remember that the agreement, and I would call it a gentlemen's agreement, which still exists on this question, has so far been adhered to strictly. Accordingly, the elections for the Security Council, despite friction from time to time, have netted satisfactory and positive results.

"What does the principle of just geographical distribution mean? It actually means that: all the main regions of the world should be represented in the Security Council and distribution of the non-permanent seats in the Security Council is to be carried out in accordance with this. According to this tradition, which was established in regard to this principle, the countries which belong to a given geographical region select their candidate for the non-permanent seat in the Security Council by

mutual agreement, and all the other delegations accept that candidacy as a fact, without going into a discussion of why this or that country was chosen.

"In this way the question of the candidacy of a representative from a given geographical region for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council is solved by those countries which belong to that geographical region and so far no other candidates have ever been put forward or elected."

"Now there is an attempt to destroy all this, a wish to violate both the agreement and the law, a wish to violate them for the purpose of certain considerations of a political nature. It is well-known that, as the result of behind-the-scenes bargaining between the USA and certain other delegations which support the USA, on the one hand, and the Yugoslav delegation, on the other, a group of delegations headed by the USA has the intention of putting a representative of Yugoslavia into the Security Council. This group of delegations does not want to take into consideration the fact that the countries which belong to the region of Eastern Europe have come to an agreement about nominating Czechoslovakia as a candidate and not Yugoslavia. This apparently does not suit the plans of the U.S. Government which is prepared to support the disruptive activity of Yugoslavia in everything, including the question of the coming election for the Security Council."

"As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, as the "Newsweek" magazine said in an article of October 17, 1949, the USA decided to lend its support to the candidacy of Yugoslavia instead of Czechoslovakia considering that the presence of Yugoslavia in the Security Council, of 'this intended victim,' as Yugoslavia was called in "Newsweek," 'might actually act as a deterrent to the Russians.' In this case it is no use at all talking about Yugoslavia since the fact that the Yugoslav Government and the Government of the USA have struck a bargain behind the scenes is obvious enough. Apparently the old Roman legal formula can be applied to this in its entirety: 'Do ut des, facio ut facias' — I am giving so that you give, I am doing so that you do. For such cases in Russian we say 'one hand washes the other.' If we examine this fact, it becomes quite clear that the USA and certain other countries which lend support to the USA are by no means guided by the interest of strengthening the United Nations Organization, of strengthening its authority and influence, of strengthening cooperation and mutual understanding when they undertake such machinations. On the contrary, such a step can only deepen the divergencies. Such a step can only bear witness to the fact that the Anglo-American bloc intends to continue along the path of deepening the split and weakening even more the minimum measure of agreement in the work of the United Nations Organization. Such a step can be interpreted in no other way than as provocation of the countries of the people's democracy and the Soviet Union. Naturally, such a step cannot but lead to complications inside the United Nations Organization, cannot but have an unhealthy effect on the state of affairs in the United Nations Organization. Such machinations undoubtedly undermine the foundations of the United Nations Organization, and of the Security Council in the first place. This is not the first time that an attempt has been made to undermine the foundations of the Security Council, to reduce its significance, to upset

its work in order to make it easier to shift the blame on the impossibility of reaching any kind of a positive result in the Security Council owing to the existence of its principle of unanimity.

"We should nevertheless bear in mind that the election of non-permanent members by way of such a flagrant violation of the Charter and of the existing tradition cannot be considered either lawful or just. The Soviet Delegation will take such an attitude towards the elections if the majority of the General Assembly does not offer the necessary resistance to such behind-the-scenes undertakings by the enemies of unity and cooperation in the United Nations Organization, and if it does not take steps to prevent such violation, and such flagrant violation, at that, of the Charter of the Organization. The Soviet Government has never reconciled itself, and it never will, to such violation of the Charter, especially violation which represents undermining of the very foundations of the United Nations Organization."

Answering the question of the representative of the Agence France Presse: "Could your statement be interpreted as meaning that the Soviet Union will refuse to sit in the Security Council if Yugoslavia is elected and could your presence in the Security Council be considered as recognition of this election?", M. Vishinsky said:

"I have said that the Soviet Union cannot consider either as correct or as lawful such elections which violate so flagrantly both the traditions to which I referred and Article 23 of the Charter. As regards any future action by the Soviet Union, the honourable correspondent who posed this question should know that the Soviet Union never says what it is going to do in advance. I see no reason to change this good strategic rule."⁽¹⁾

(Quoted from PRAVDA, No. 293 of October 20, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 61

FROM THE SPEECH BY A. J. VISHINSKY AT THE 231st PLENARY MEETING OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ON OCTOBER 20, 1949, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION OF THE THREE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED⁽²⁾

Mr. VISHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (Interpretation from Russian): The results of the elections to the Security Council, as announced at this meeting of the General Assembly, have displayed the fact that these elections have taken place in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular in violation of Article 23, which

(1) The press conference of A. J. Vishinsky, Chief of the USSR Delegation, against the candidacy of Yugoslavia for election to the Security Council is the first instance in the experience of the UNO that a third country has carried on open propaganda against the candidacy of one country for the benefit of another country.

(2) A. J. Vishinsky asked for the floor in order to "explain the voting". Since the voting was secret an explanation of it was not in order. However, the Rules of

requires that in the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council due regard should be paid to the principle of equitable geographical distribution. The elections have entailed a violation of a firm tradition according to which expiring memberships on the Security Council are replaced by countries belonging to the same geographical region. These two principles have always been strictly adhered to thus far in the election of non-permanent members to the Security Council. These two principles have now been flagrantly violated.

It is well known that the delegations of the five countries of Eastern Europe have unanimously advanced the candidacy of Czechoslovakia. The candidacy of Yugoslavia was not advanced by any one of these countries. However, despite the practice of previous elections to Security Council membership, in the present case a substantial number of countries failed to support the candidacy of Czechoslovakia, and instead gave their support to the candidacy of Yugoslavia, a candidacy which, as I have already said, was not advanced by nor voted for by any of the delegations belonging to the Eastern European region.

Yugoslavia is being dragged into the Security Council not as a result of free elections in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in accordance with established tradition, but as a result of a behind-the-scenes plot between Yugoslavia, the United States of America, and a number of other delegations that apparently decided to utilize for their own ends the political situation that has arisen between Yugoslavia, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and the countries of the People's Democracy, on the other hand.

Such a situation was the result of a behind-the-scenes plot, as I have said, between Yugoslavia, the United States of America, and a number of other delegations, which...

THE PRESIDENT: The representative of the Soviet Union...

Mr. VISHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (Interpretation from Russian): I shall be finished in a few seconds; please do not worry... which thus count on strengthening their position in the Security Council with a view to transforming that Council into an obedient tool of the Anglo-American bloc.

In this connection the Soviet Union delegation declares with full determination that Yugoslavia shall not, cannot, and will not be considered as a representative of the Eastern European countries, and that the introduction of Yugoslavia to the Security Council shall be considered by the Soviet Union delegation as a new violation of the Charter undermining the very foundations of co-operation in the United Nations.⁽³⁾

(Quoted from the Verbatim Record of the UN General Assembly. Document A/PV 231.)

Procedure did not explicitly prohibit explanations of secret voting, considering that such a prohibition issued from its very nature. Vishinsky, however, made use of this procedural loophole in order to have the opportunity to attack the election of Yugoslavia to the Security Council. This abuse of explanation of the voting and lack of respect for the secrecy of the voting later led the General Assembly to introduce explicit prohibition of explanations of secret voting in Article 68 and 127 of the Rules of Procedure.

⁽³⁾ The Polish Delegation also made a statement claiming that the election of Yugoslavia was carried out by dishonest methods which undermine the prestige of the United Nations, and that the Polish Delegation considered the election of Yugoslavia illegal.

**THE POLICY OF OBSTRUCTING AND WRECKING NORMAL
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS THROUGH DISCRIMINATION
BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND EASTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AGAINST DIPLOMATIC AND
OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF YUGOSLAVIA**

DOCUMENT No. 63

**SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 4 OF OCTOBER 25, 1949, REQUESTING
YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, KARLO MRAZOVIĆ, TO LEAVE
THE COUNTRY**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is authorized by the Soviet Government to state the following to the Government of Yugoslavia:

It was established in the course of the Budapest trial of the State criminal and spy, Rajk, and his collaborators, that the present Yugoslav Ambassador in the USSR, Mrazović, has for some time been engaged in spying and subversive activities against the Soviet Union and that, as Ambassador of Yugoslavia in the USSR, he published slanderous fabrications against the Soviet Union in the Yugoslav press.

For this reason the Soviet Government considers it impossible to allow Mrazović to remain in the capacity of diplomatic representative of Yugoslavia in the USSR.

Moscow, October 25, 1949.

DOCUMENT No. 64

**YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF PROTEST No. 419631 OF OCTOBER
29, 1949, AGAINST THE GROUNDLESS EXPULSION OF THE YU-
GOSLAV AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR, KARLO MRAZOVIĆ**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia considers entirely groundless the Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics No. 4 of October 25, 1949, by which the Soviet Government refuses to allow the former Ambassador of the FPRY in Moscow, Karlo Mrazović, to remain in the country. It is a well-known fact that, on October 15, 1949, at the Sixth Regular Session of the Sabor of the PR of Croatia at Zagreb, Karlo Mra-

zović was unanimously elected by the People's Deputies to the post of President of the Presidium of the Sabor of the PR of Croatia.

In connection with the insults and slanders against Karlo Mrazović contained in the note of the Soviet Government, however, the Government of the FPRY considers it necessary to underline that the Soviet Government is lending further support to the infamous conspiracy against Yugoslavia staged at Budapest and that it is attempting to sully the honour and prestige of the President of the Presidium of Croatian Sabor.

It is well-known that Karlo Mrazović joined the progressive revolutionary movement in his early youth, and took part in the revolutionary struggle of the Hungarian people after the First World War. He went from Moscow, where he spent seven years as a member of the CPSU(B), to Republican Spain, where he was seriously wounded in 1937 while fighting as a member of the International Brigade. Disabled, he left Spain, and continued his self-sacrificing revolutionary struggle in the former Yugoslavia, upholding the honour and prestige of a true people's fighter. In 1941, Karlo Mrazović was one of the organizers and leaders of the people's uprising in Croatia, and was a high military and political leader in the National Liberation Struggle until the end of the war. After the war he was elected People's Deputy, and was a Minister in the Government of the PR of Croatia. He was then sent as Minister Plenipotentiary of the FPRY to Hungary and later to the USSR as Ambassador of the FPRY.

All these facts are well-known to the Soviet Government. It therefore clearly follows from the above that the afore-mentioned Note of the Soviet Government is meant to give new impetus to the anti-Yugoslav campaign and, after the unilateral breach of the Treaty on Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation, to make relations between the FPRY and the USSR even more strained, on the one hand, and to calumniate the State leadership of the FPRY before the world public to the greatest possible extent, on the other hand.

The Government of the FPRY, protesting against the methods being introduced by the Soviet Government into the relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, rejects most energetically these slanders aimed at the President of the Presidium of the Sabor of the People's Republic of Croatia, Karlo Mrazović.

Beograd, October 29, 1949.

DOCUMENT No. 63

SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 7 OF NOVEMBER 16, 1949, REQUESTING THE YUGOSLAV CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN MOSCOW, LAZA LATINOVIĆ, TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR is authorized by the Soviet Government to state the following to the Government of Yugoslavia:

The Ministry has at its disposal reliable documents, bearing witness to the fact that the Chargé d'Affaires of the Yugoslav Embassy in the

USSR, Laza Latinović, is abusing his official position in Moscow and engaging in spying and subversive activities against the Soviet Union.

On the basis of the above-stated, the Ministry considers it imperative to notify the Yugoslav Government that it would be impossible for Laza Latinović to remain in the capacity of diplomatic representative of Yugoslavia in the USSR.

Moscow, November 16, 1949.

DOCUMENT No. 66

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF PROTEST No. 420758 OF NOVEMBER 21, 1949, AGAINST THE GROUNDLESS EXPULSION FROM THE USSR OF THE YUGOSLAV CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES, LAZA LATINVIĆ

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia communicates the following to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

With reference to the Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR No. 7 of November 16, 1949, by which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the Government of the USSR, requests Laza Latinović, Chargé d'Affaires of the FPRY in the USSR, to leave Moscow, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY strongly protests against the accusations brought out in the afore-mentioned Note against the Chargé d'Affaires of the FPRY, Laza Latinović. They have been invented in their entirety, are devoid of any grounds, and are designed to besmirch the prestige of Yugoslav diplomatic representatives and of the Embassy of the FPRY in the USSR.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY notes that the refusal to allow the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires, Laza Latinović, to remain in the USSR, which followed immediately upon the entirely groundless expulsion of the Ambassador of the FPRY in Moscow, Karlo Mrzović, indicates that the Government of the USSR is deliberately tending towards rendering impossible the work of the diplomatic Mission of the FPRY in Moscow and the maintenance of normal diplomatic relations between the FPRY and the USSR. The responsibility for the consequences which might result therefrom will rest entirely on the Government of the USSR.

Beograd, November 21, 1949.

DOCUMENT No. 67

LETTER OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, DATED DECEMBER 8, 1949, ASKING THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY MISSION IN THE SOVIET SECTOR OF BERLIN TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY

To the Chief of the Military Mission
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Monsieur Major General Rade Pehaček.
Berlin W. 35
Rauchstr. 17—18

Subordinate organs of the Ministry of the Interior of the German Democratic Republic have established that the members of the Military

Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the German Democratic Republic have been pursuing activities directed against the legal order.

I am, therefore, compelled to request all members of the Military Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to leave the German Democratic Republic as of December 8, 1949.

For the Ministry of the Interior
(Sgd.) Warnke
State Secretary

DOCUMENT No. 68

LETTER OF PROTEST No. C-235/49 OF DECEMBER 12, 1949, FROM ACTING CHIEF OF THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY MISSION, LIEUTENANT COLONEL SIBINOVIC, TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY V. I. TCHUIKOV, PRESIDENT OF THE SOVIET CONTROL COMMISSION IN GERMANY

Sir,

I have the honour to address you with reference to the latest actions of the Ministry of the Interior of the German Democratic Republic and to draw your attention to certain factors typical of these relations.

In its letter dated December 8, 1949, the Ministry of the Interior of the German Democratic Republic informed this Military Mission that it would not be allowed to remain in this territory owing to its unlawful activities in the German Democratic Republic.

Incidents following the transmission of the above-mentioned letter of the Ministry of the Interior of the German Democratic Republic deserve even more censure.

The letter was forwarded to this Mission in a very unusual manner at 5:30 p. m., after office hours. It was handed to a person who was not a member of the Mission and who merely happened to be in the Mission's building. The Ministry of the Interior of the German Democratic Republic, 24 hours after the transmission of the above-mentioned letter, blocked the premises of the Mission in Berlin, Niederschoenhausen, Pfeilstrasse and Homayerstrasse, and made normal activities and movement impossible for the members of the Mission. A member of the Volkspolizei who was guarding the apartment of the Chief of the Mission broke into it and, with three other men, seized the personal effects of the Chief of the Mission and his family from an automobile and took them to the nearest police station without writing out a receipt for them.

The next day, December 9, early in the morning, a large number of Volkspolizei occupied the apartments of members of the Mission and stood watch in the neighbouring streets, preventing the members of the Mission from contacting each other. They cut the telephone connections of some of the members and left them without food until the afternoon. They also prevented the mess-hall where employees have their meals from functioning normally.

In this situation, I tried several times to contact by phone the Protocol and Liaison Department of the Soviet Control Commission Admini-

stration in Germany. I could not contact them in any other way for I was prevented from moving about. All my attempts in this regard, however, did not bring any results. Finally, shortly after 10 a. m., I managed to reach Captain Agafonov from the Protocol and Liaison Department by phone and explained the whole affair to him requesting him to enable me to leave the house and come to the Protocol and Liaison Department. He promised he would investigate the matter and inform me later when I would be allowed to leave my house. After my third conversation with M. Agafonov, he advised me to refer to the Ministry of the Interior of the German Democratic Republic, which was competent in the matter, and finally, to try and persuade the policeman at the gate to let me go to the Soviet authorities. When I protested against such an attitude on his part, he gave no answer. This clearly meant that the Soviet authorities were "neutral" in this case, and even more, that they were backing the attitude of the Ministry of the Interior of the German Democratic Republic.

Finally, at 1:30 p. m. of the same day, two representatives of the Municipal Council of Greater Berlin and a representative of the Volkspolizei came to my apartment and handed me a letter from the Municipal Council of Greater Berlin, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. In the letter, the Municipal Council stated that the Military Mission of the FPRY in Germany had to evacuate by midnight, December 17, 1949, all the premises and apartments at its disposal in the Eastern Sector of Berlin and leave behind all the furniture, etc. which the Soviet authorities had earlier given the Mission to use. On the same day when the officials of the Mission tried to take from the blocked apartments their personal effects and those of the members of the Mission who had left for Yugoslavia on December 7, they were rudely prevented from doing so. They were made to produce their identity papers and their effects were searched. All the members were prevented from taking wireless sets, typewriters, electrical ranges, pictures, carpets, refrigerators. One member was not even allowed to take his bedding, while the Commercial Attaché was not permitted to take his personal effects, such as clothing and suitcases. On December 10, the Volkspolizei was reinforced by the Criminal Police which also took part in the searches and identification.

The police also prevented us from taking our coal from the blocked apartments.

I protest most strongly against such attitude by the Government of the German Democratic Republic and state that I will not discuss this matter either with the representatives of the Ministry of the Interior of the Government of the German Democratic Republic or with the representatives of the police and the Municipal Council of Greater Berlin. I insist that this question be settled with the representatives of the Soviet Control Commission for Germany.

I also protest most strongly against such an arbitrary and provocative action by the German Democratic Republic, which is in full contradiction with the Four Power Agreement in regard to the Status of Allied Military Missions attached to the Control Council for Germany. So far, no one has ever informed this Mission that the Eastern Sector of Berlin is considered part of the territory of the German Democratic Republic. Therefore, the action of the Government of the German De-

mocratic Republic is even more unlawful. I underline particularly that the Military Mission of the FPRY in Germany was accredited to the Control Council for Germany and not to the Government of the German Democratic Republic, which has not yet been recognized by the Government of the FPRY.

I also protest most strongly against the provocative attitude of the Protocol and Liaison Department of the Administration of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany, and I request:

1. That the blockade of private apartments of members of this Military Mission by the Volkspolizei be stopped and that the members of this Mission be enabled to take their personal effects and furniture;

2. That the members of this Mission be enabled to move about freely in Eastern Berlin; and

3. That, insofar as Soviet authorities have any claims concerning borrowed items with respect to this Mission, this matter be settled between authorized representatives of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany and this Mission.⁽¹⁾

Respectfully yours,
Acting Chief of the Military Mission
of the FPRY,
(Sgd.) Lieutenant Colonel M. Sibinović

DOCUMENT No. 69

**NOTE OF PROTEST OF THE YUGOSLAV LEGATION IN TIRANA No. 699/6
OF OCTOBER 23, 1948, AGAINST THE REFUSAL OF MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE TO THE LEGATION COUNSELOR'S WIFE**

The Legation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has the honour to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Albania that the Albanian health authorities refused medical assistance to, and hindered the treatment of, the wife of the Counselor of the Legation who was taken ill with Melintesis in September.

1. The Director of the Tirana hospital refused, despite repeated requests, to examine the sick wife of the Counselor of the Legation.

2. A doctor of the Military Hospital, Dr. Theodoso, who examined the patient later, ordered a nurse of the hospital to go every second day to the Counselor's apartment to give her injections. On October 16, the Director of the Military Hospital told the driver of the Legation, who had come to fetch the nurse as usual, that the nurse had been ordered to discontinue the visits.

3. On the same day, on October 16, a servant of the Legation asked the nurse on duty at a Tirana Polyclinic to send someone to continue giving the injections, but the nurse refused this, saying: "We won't go to you Yugoslavs, because you are Tito's men."

⁽¹⁾ General V. I. Tchulkov did not answer this letter. After being expelled from the Soviet sector, the Yugoslav Military Mission set up headquarters in the British sector of Berlin.

The Legation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, communicating this to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, protests against the refusal of medical assistance to the wife of a member of the Yugoslav Mission by the Director of the Tirana Hospital, the Director of the Military Hospital and an official of the Tirana Polyclinic, considering their acts as extremely inhuman.

The Legation avails itself of this opportunity to express its consideration to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Albania.

Tirana, October 23, 1948.

DOCUMENT No. 70

NOTE OF THE ALBANIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS No. 2024 OF NOVEMBER 12, 1948, RETURNING THE YUGOSLAV NOTE OF PROTEST OF OCTOBER 23 IN CONNECTION WITH THE REFUSAL OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE LEGATION COUNSELOR'S WIFE

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Albania has the honour to return Note No. 699/6 of October 23, 1948, to the Legation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, because its contents do not at all correspond to the actual facts and because such fabrications are being made up for the sake of kindling the hostile campaign against the People's Republic of Albania which has been developing in Yugoslavia for the last few months.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to express its consideration to the Legation.

Tirana, November 12, 1948.

DOCUMENT No. 71

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S AIDE-MEMOIRE ON THE REOPENING OF THE YUGOSLAV LEGATION IN TIRANA, HANDED TO THE ALBANIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON JULY 4, 1950

In the middle of 1948, the Albanian Government began to apply discriminatory measures and to undertake various kinds of hostile actions, against the Legation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Tirana. These measures have been intensified in the course of the last two years and are aimed at making all work difficult and finally impossible for the Yugoslav Mission in Albania.

Diplomatic and other officials of the Legation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Albania have, in the course of the last two years, been subjected to increasing chicanery, shadowing and spying on the part of the Albanian police organs. Members of the Yugoslav Mission have often been asked for identity papers, challenged and insulted in the street by Albanian police. The building of the Legation of the FPRY

in Tirana was placed under the constant surveillance of the State security forces. For this purpose, the Albanian police authorities established special observation posts facing the Legation and the apartment of the representative of the FPRY in Tirana.

The Albanian authorities prevented and prohibited various craftsmen, barbers, tailors and restaurant-keepers from rendering their services to the personnel of the Legation of the FPRY. There were also cases of doctors being prevented from giving medical assistance.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in its Note No. 45336 of April 20, 1949, protested against such actions by the Albanian authorities towards the Yugoslav Legation stating that such acts and excesses of the Albanian Government officials towards the members of the Legation of the FPRY in Tirana were unexampled in the history of diplomatic usage. It requested the Government of the People's Republic of Albania immediately to order the afore-mentioned officials to cease such similar acts.

The Albanian police organs, however, in spite of this, continued violating all international customs even more flagrantly. On the night of February 20, 1949, Albanian police, disregarding the inviolability of the apartment of a diplomatic official of the Legation of the FPRY, Janko Havliček, broke into it by force. The Legation of the FPRY protested against this in its Note No. 62 of February 24, 1949.

In order to make the normal activities of the Legation even more difficult, in February 1949, the Albanian Government groundlessly expelled from Albania officials of the Legation, Janko Havliček and Mitar Đamjanović, and in May, 1950, again expelled two officials, Dragoljub Krstić and Tomo Lončar.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Albania frequently returned the Notes of the Legation of the FPRY without stating any reasons for this. Often the Ministry simply did not answer the Notes.

In spite of written inquiries by the Legation, viz. in Notes No. 178 of May 7 and No. 193 of May 11, 1949, and frequent verbal inquiries, the Albanian Government has still not released or given any information regarding the fate of the three members of the Yugoslav Army. These men had been running a relay race when they were basely attacked by Albanian frontier guards and captured on May 6, 1949, on the Lake of Skadar.

The Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs delayed receiving diplomatic representatives of the FPRY and even refused to see them. Thus it hindered and prevented normal business contacts, i. e. the examination and settlement of certain questions regarding mutual relations. From January to May 1950, the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs delayed the reception of the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires, M. Drago Flis. On March 22 and April 1, 1950, the Deputy Minister, M. Koco Tashko, and the Director of a Department of the Ministry, M. Halim Buda, refused to receive the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires under the insulting pretext that they were not disposed to see him.

The Albanian authorities prevented the repatriation of Yugoslav citizens and kept them from having any contact, even written, with the diplomatic Mission of the FPRY in Tirana.

Despite repeated requests by the Government of the FPRY to change its attitude towards the Legation of the FPRY, the Albanian Government, through its organs, has continued and, in the last few months, even intensified its discriminatory actions towards the Legation of the FPRY.

Thus, on January 22, 1950, Albanian police within a short period of time several times halted Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires Drago Flis in a Tirana street asking him for his identification papers. They tried to intimidate him and by threats to compel him to go to the police station. The same day the police, in the course of fifteen minutes, asked the officials of the Legation, Miško Paško and Janko Urbančić, for their identity papers five times while they were in the street. On May 8, 1950, in the streets of Tirana, the police, in a most insulting way, requested a diplomatic official of the Legation, Dragoljub Krstić, to show his papers several times. On May 10, 1950, Albanian police, along a stretch of 200 metres, requested the official of the Legation, Urbančić, to show his papers four times. On May 11, 1950, during a period of ten minutes, the police asked Chargé d'Affaires, Drago Flis, and diplomatic official, Dragoljub Krstić, for their papers four times and sought an explanation why they were in town and where they were going. The Legation of the FPRY lodged a protest against the above-mentioned actions of the Albanian police towards officials of the Yugoslav Mission with the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Notes No. 397 of January 27, 1950; No. 504 of May 9; No. 505 of May 10; No. 507 of May 11 and No. 534 of May 22, 1950.

The Albanian postal authorities prevented the Legation of the FPRY from getting telephone connections with the FPRY. This was the case, for instance, on May 25, 26 and 27, 1950, thus making contact between the Legation and the Yugoslav Government impossible.

On May 28 this year, when the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires, Drago Flis, was leaving for the FPRY, the Albanian frontier authorities prohibited him and the driver from crossing the frontier by car. They retained the car of the Legation at the frontier and, despite the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Note No. 411637 of June 10, 1950, have not returned it to this day.

The application of discriminatory measures, by which the Albanian Government has been increasingly limiting the possibility of normal conduct of affairs by the Yugoslav Mission, reached a climax on May 10, 1950, when the movements of members of the Legation of the FPRY were drastically restricted. By its Note No. 49294 of May 13, 1950, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY lodged a strong protest against these measures, intended to prevent all activities by the Legation of the FPRY, and the further stay of Yugoslav representatives in Albania.

Owing to the intolerable conditions mentioned above and the discriminatory measures applied by the Albanian Government, through its organs, against the Legation of the FPRY in Tirana, the work of the Legation was made impossible. For this reason the Government of the FPRY was compelled temporarily to suspend the work of the Yugoslav Mission in Albania. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY informed the Albanian Legation in Beograd on May 30, 1950, of the temporary suspension of work of the Yugoslav Legation in Tirana, as well as of the reasons which caused it.

Considering that the obstacles aggravating diplomatic relations between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of Albania should be removed, the Yugoslav Government has been consistently trying to establish whether the Albanian Government is ready to enable the Diplomatic Mission of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to carry out its normal activities in Albania. In this connection, the Yugoslav Government has in mind freedom of movement for members of the Yugoslav Mission in Albania, granted to members of other diplomatic Missions; maintenance of normal business contact between the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Legation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and cessation of discriminatory measures with respect to the Mission of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and its officials in Tirana.

It is understood that, in this case, the Albanian Mission and its officials in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia would be guaranteed the same rights as other foreign Missions in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

If the Yugoslav Legation in Tirana cannot be reopened, owing to the unchanged attitude of the Albanian Government towards it, the continuation of the present situation, i. e. the afore-mentioned suspension of activities by the Yugoslav Mission in Albania on the one hand, and the simultaneous functioning of the Albanian Legation in Beograd on the other, would put Yugoslavia into a position whereby she would not be getting reciprocal treatment. In that case business contacts for the Legation of the People's Republic of Albania in Beograd would be made impossible until the reopening of the Legation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Tirana.^(*)

(*) In its reply to this Aide-Mémoire by its Note No. 1636 of July 31, 1950, the Albanian Government attempted to deny the facts revealed in the Aide-Mémoire, alleging that the Yugoslav Legation in Albania and its personnel all enjoyed the same rights as the other diplomatic missions in Albania and that the Yugoslav Legation would continue to enjoy those rights. The Government of the PR of Albania, by simply rejecting all concretely illustrated statements made in the Note of the Yugoslav Government, actually let it be known that it had no desire to change its stand towards the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Tirana or to stop obstructing its regular work. This is also borne out by the actions of the Government of the PR of Albania in its diplomatic contact with the Yugoslav Government after the mentioned Note of the Albanian Government as well. Thus, the Albanian Government continues to return without any explanation the Notes of the Yugoslav Government, as it did in the case of the Note of protest No. 416971 of August 30, 1950. It continues to forward Notes to the Yugoslav Government written in discourteous tone, for example the Note of the Albanian Legation No. 1641 of September 9, 1950, in which the legal Government of the FPRY is insulted in the most scurrilous manner, although the Albanian Government maintains diplomatic relations with it.

NOTE OF PROTEST OF THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN WARSAW No. 362/49 OF SEPTEMBER 16, 1949, FOLLOWING VARIOUS DISCRIMINATORY ACTS AND CHICANERY AGAINST OFFICIALS OF THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY

The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia informs the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland of the following:

After the imprisonment of M. Milić Petrović,^(*) the campaign in the Polish press against Yugoslavia was intensified and a campaign was started against her representatives in Poland.

The Embassy of the FPR of Yugoslavia underlines that it is not willing to enter into a discussion with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Republic on the character of the system, and the foreign policy of the Government of the FPRY, either on the basis of allegations brought forth in the Note, published in the Polish press on September 10, or on the basis of articles in the press in connection with this Note. The tone and manner in which these allegations were made, indicate their nature and purpose. Such a discussion is all the more unnecessary, since the real facts regarding the policy of the Yugoslav Government and the socialist realities in Yugoslavia are well-known all over the world and in Poland too, despite the fact that the Polish press not only conceals the truth about the FPRY, but even misinforms the Polish public regarding the real reasons behind the campaign against the FPRY. The Embassy of the FPRY avails itself of this opportunity to draw the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland to the following facts:

1. Before the publication of the Cominform Resolution, representatives from the FPRY, and other Yugoslav citizens who visited Poland for various purposes, were hospitably received and were never disturbed by the Polish authorities.
2. After the publication of the Cominform Resolution, the attitude of the Polish authorities underwent a fundamental change. Systematically, they started bringing pressure to bear upon the officials of this Embassy who were shadowed and searched. There were even attempts to search the persons of officials enjoying diplomatic immunity. Such was the case with the former Commercial Attaché, M. Petrović.
3. On July 20, 1948, in Washington Street, the official mail of this Embassy was forcibly taken from the automobile in which it was being transported. The mail included Notes from the Embassy addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. So far, however, the mail has not been returned to the Embassy, nor has the Ministry informed the Embassy about any measures taken by the Polish authorities to trace and punish those responsible for the theft of the mail.
4. After the publication of the Cominform Resolution, Yugoslav apprentices were subjected to pressure, inveigling and intimidation. They

(*) Milić Petrović, delegate of the Ministry of Transport of the FPRY in Poland. In November, 1949, during the mounted court trial held in Katowice, he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

were threatened with concentration camps in order to make them renounce their State leaders and betray their socialist homeland.

5. Yugoslav officers who were receiving military training at Rembertovo were called upon twice by their teachers, after the Resolution, to sign a declaration against Marshal Tito and the CC of the CPY. On these occasions they were promised a comfortable life, higher ranks in the Polish Army and even entertainment by beautiful girls.

6. An official of the housing office molested the secretary of the Embassy, M. Popović, and, when the Embassy drew the attention of the Ministry to this case, the Polish authorities, instead of apologizing to M. Popović, put a guard before the door of his apartment. This guard was removed only after repeated requests by the Embassy.

7. On April 18, an attack was carried out on M. Popović's apartment. Two bricks were thrown at the windows. One of them broke through the glass just at the moment his two-year old child was standing near the window. The Embassy drew the attention of the Ministry to this attack by Note No. 153 of May 13, 1949, requesting at the same time that an investigation be made, the offenders punished and the Embassy informed of the measures taken in this respect. Although the Embassy requested a reply in its Note of July 9, 1949, the Ministry has not yet answered what steps have been taken by the Polish authorities to find the offenders.

8. Polish authorities hospitably received and gave full assistance to the handful of Yugoslav traitors and deserters permitted by the Polish authorities to publish the counter-revolutionary paper "Za Pobedu." In the August issue of this paper, Yugoslav Trade Union delegates, who took part in the work of the Fourth Conference of the Trade Union International of Educational Workers, were referred to in such a manner and in such terms that it was clear the tendency was to provoke reprisals by the Polish authorities towards Yugoslav representatives and delegates. (August issue, pages 36, 37.)

9. Since the Cominform Resolution, suspicious-looking cars have followed this Embassy's car from time to time and the Embassy's officials have been closely shadowed by questionable persons. All these measures have been intensified lately.

In the light of these facts, the Embassy of the FPRY considers that the imprisonment of M. Milić Petrović, based on fabricated facts, is but another step in the series of attempts to put pressure on and discredit the Yugoslav representatives in Poland and prevent them from exercising their normal functions.

The Embassy of the FPRY most resolutely protests against the series of such acts towards Yugoslav officials in Poland.⁽⁴⁾

⁽⁴⁾ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Republic replied with its Note No. 0862-15-49 of September 19, 1949, slandering the FPRY on the basis of untruthful charges brought against Milić Petrović. With its Note No. 497 of November 25, 1949, the Yugoslav Embassy in Warsaw protested against the staged trial of Milić Petrović. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Republic returned this Note.

**NOTE OF PROTEST OF THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN SOFIA No. 441-II
OF SEPTEMBER 22, 1949, CONCERNING HOSTILE AND INSOLENT ACTS
BY BULGARIAN AUTHORITIES TOWARDS THE EMBASSY OFFICIALS**

The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Sofia communicates the following to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria:

The Bulgarian authorities have recently been taking such measures towards, and creating such conditions for, the diplomatic representatives of the FPR of Yugoslavia and the other personnel of the Embassy of the FPRY in Bulgaria, that they must be considered as hostile and offensive discriminatory acts by the Government of the PR of Bulgaria which are employed against no other mission in that country.

Bulgarian State security forces shadowed Yugoslav representatives who came to set up the Yugoslav pavilion at the International Fair at Plovdiv. The Government of the PR of Bulgaria did not allow this pavilion to be opened. During their stay at Plovdiv the Yugoslav representatives were subjected to the harshest type of treatment. They were constantly followed by the State security agents who, intent on provoking them, often used most insulting terms against the Yugoslav peoples and their Party and State leadership. Furthermore, during several of his visits to Plovdiv, the Commercial Attaché of the Embassy of the FPRY, Vinko Trumbić, who had gone there in connection with the preparations for the opening of the Yugoslav pavilion at the Fair, was regularly shadowed by the State security agents who openly stated that they had been ordered to follow every Yugoslav. The same happened to the Secretary of the Embassy, B. Milijanović, and his wife, and to the wife of the Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy of the FPRY, Ivković, on September 6, 1949, during their visit to the Fair at Plovdiv. In an even ruder and more insolent manner the State security agents shadowed Chargé d'Affaires of the FPRY in Sofia, Ivković, and the Secretary, Vujačić, on September 7, 1949, during their visit to the Fair at Plovdiv. On this occasion the State security members continually followed the car of the Embassy in an auto bearing licence plate No. PL 14862. At the Fair itself, they followed on the heels of every official of the Embassy including, of course, the Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy of the FPRY. When the Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy of the FPRY protested, the State security forces declared that they had been ordered to do so. This is not all. This time they also used the most insulting terms against the peoples of the FPRY and the State and Party leadership, and against the Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy Ivković and Secretary Vujačić. On the way back from Plovdiv, five members of the State security forces in a car bearing the above-mentioned licence plate, followed the car of the Chargé d'Affaires, threatening with their fists and cursing the representatives of the FPRY. On September 9, 1949, the national holiday of the Bulgarian people, State security forces with five cars and about 30 people blocked all the buildings of the Embassy of the FPRY in Sofia and closely followed every official. They even threatened the personnel of the Embassy. In the evening of the same day, they organized a miserable group of deserters with whom they

marched in front of the Embassy building, No. 47 on 6th of September Street, demonstrating against the FPRY, the State and Party leadership of the FPRY. Speaking in Bulgarian, they used offensive language against the representatives, the peoples and the State and Party leadership of the FPRY.

Apart from the above, State security agents regularly stop citizens of the FPRY who visit the Mission of the FPRY, ask for their identification papers and search them. They also ask Bulgarian citizens for their identification papers and interrogate them. They also needlessly and illegally take documents and Yugoslav newspapers away from citizens of the FPRY.

State security organs have recently been organizing small groups of wretched deserters to stand before the windows of the Embassy and, together with them, to threaten and insult the representatives of the Embassy of the FPRY. This is almost a daily occurrence.

The Embassy of the FPRY in Sofia considers that these and similar acts by the Bulgarian authorities are examples of flagrant discrimination towards the diplomatic Mission of the FPRY in Sofia, intended to prevent it from exercising its normal diplomatic functions. These acts are contrary to the most elementary international customs and to the provisions of International Law. The Bulgarian authorities do not treat any other mission in this way.

The Embassy of the FPRY notes that all these and similar acts represent a premeditated attempt by the Government of the PR of Bulgaria to wreck the prestige enjoyed by the FPRY and the Embassy of the FPRY in the eyes of the Bulgarian people. These acts express the hostile policy now being pursued by the Bulgarian Government against Yugoslavia.

The Embassy of the FPRY in Sofia most vigorously protests against these hostile and insolent acts by the Bulgarian authorities against officials of the diplomatic Mission of the FPRY in Bulgaria and requests the Bulgarian Government immediately to issue the necessary orders to put an end to such unprecedented ill-treatment and provocations by the police with regard to the Embassy of the FPRY in the PR of Bulgaria.

The Embassy of the FPRY expresses its consideration to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Bulgaria.⁽²⁾

Sofia, September 22, 1949.

⁽²⁾ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Bulgaria did not reply to this Note.

**EXAMPLES OF ATTEMPTS BY RUMANIAN STATE SECURITY
ORGANS TO COMPROMISE THE YUGOSLAV DIPLOMATIC
MISSION IN RUMANIA**

DOCUMENT No. 74

**EXCERPTS FROM REPORT No. 45 OF OCTOBER 25, 1949, FROM THE
YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR IN BUCHAREST**

"Various kinds of provocateurs and notorious police agents have recently been coming to the Embassy every day offering it various services such as plans concerning mining or economy, data on alleged geological research relating to Yugoslavia, etc. All this is intended to provoke us and to provide them with compromising material.

"Pressure is also being brought to bear upon servants of Rumanian origin who clean the Embassy and serve in the apartments of our officials. They are openly told in their Trade Unions that they are serving fascists and are being recruited by the police in various ways for espionage."

DOCUMENT No. 75

**FROM THE REPORT BY THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR IN BUCHAREST,
OF DECEMBER 7, 1949**

Bucharest, Telegram No. 18

"In the second half of November, in my absence, there were some attempts at provocation. An open letter on the situation in Rumania, signed by "a Group of Communists" was transmitted to the Embassy. They rang us up and then one man of this group came to the Embassy and expressed his desire to have the letter published in "Borba."^(*) A letter addressed to the Ambassador personally, signed 'Goldenberg,' came by mail. Later 'Goldenberg' came to the Embassy and again brought out the contents of the letter verbally. The officials of the Embassy correctly appraised this as a provocation and were not duped by it. They said that if they were not satisfied, they should bring that out before the Rumanian people and Government because the Embassy had nothing to do with it."

"Yesterday and today again, unknown police agents (both our citizens and Rumanians) came to see us. One of them came to learn about the situation, another offered us his services and one Rumanian stated that he was dissatisfied and them clumsily asked us to entrust him with the task of getting subscribers throughout Rumania for our newspapers in the Rumanian language. He had allegedly been informed that the Embassy had such newspapers. We rejected such offers and did not discuss anything

(*) The daily paper of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

with these people. I think that the Rumanian police are making such attempts because they would like to put our arrested officials on trial and are hurrying to construe material compromising the Embassy and our country."

DOCUMENT No. 76

ANSWERS BY THE YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER, EDVARD KARDELJ, TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY DEPUTIES IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON MAY 16, 1950, REGARDING THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TOWARDS YUGOSLAV DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES AND CITIZENS

Comrade Deputies,

The question asked here by Comrade Bakić has justifiably been troubling our public. It has been the object of many protests and diplomatic steps taken by our Government.

Our public already knows, from a series of published Notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of our diplomatic missions, as well as from news regularly printed in our newspapers, that for almost two years flagrant discriminatory measures have been undertaken in the countries of Eastern Europe against diplomatic and other representatives and officials of the FPRY, measures which are without precedent in international relations. Simultaneously with the measures of pressure, economic blockade and propaganda witch-hunts, an important place in the aggressive policy towards our country is held by the attempts made to discredit our diplomatic representatives in these countries, to hinder and make impossible normal activities and, in some countries, any activity at all by our representatives, and even to threaten the very existence of Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in some of these countries.

On the one hand, the aim of these flagrant discriminatory measures was to isolate the diplomatic missions of the FPRY and prevent them from having normal contact with Yugoslav citizens who asked for protection, or with citizens from the respective countries who, for any reason whatsoever, might have come into contact with the missions. Such persons were intimidated by attempts to describe our diplomatic and other representatives as enemies of the peoples of those countries. Various kinds of provocations and trials were organized. Apart from other purposes, their aim was to falsely accuse and discredit our diplomats, after which their recall was always requested or they were expelled from some of those countries. Included among those of our diplomatic and other representatives who were expelled from Eastern European countries, falsely accused and slandered, were the Ambassadors of the FPRY to Moscow and Prague, who were forced to leave the USSR and Czechoslovakia respectively. This evidently was supposed to serve as "new proof" that the Yugoslav Government was pursuing a hostile policy with regard to these countries, through its most highly placed representatives.

On the other hand, the persistent continuation of such measures with respect to our diplomatic representatives in some countries can be interpreted in no other way but as an intention by the Governments of those countries de facto to break diplomatic relations with our country and to shift upon Yugoslavia the responsibility for such unpacific acts. I leave it to the organizers of the Cominform blockade against our country to judge the extent to which this policy is an instrument of aggressive pressure and extent to which it is the consequence of fear of the mere presence in those countries of representatives of an independent and free socialist State like Yugoslavia. The fact remains, however, that the so-called "diplomatic relations" of the Eastern European Governments with our country have fallen to the level of mere ill-treatment and persecution of our diplomatic personnel. Our comrades in the diplomatic service who, despite all this, are resolutely standing by their posts, defending the interests of their country and conscientiously doing their duty, really merit our appreciation. We have, however, no right to keep on tolerating forever such ill-treatment of our people.

The Government of the FPRY has continuously been drawing the attention of the Governments of the Eastern European countries to these unworthy, discriminatory measures against our representatives. It has protested persistently against such and similar acts and requested the discontinuance of these provocative and insulting practices.

The Governments of the Eastern European countries, however, not only did not cease employing such measures but even continued to increase the discrimination against the diplomatic missions of the FPRY and against our representatives personally. Through its authorities, which have been using particularly harsh, insulting and humiliating measures, the Albanian Government has lately intensified to the utmost the already inadmissible conditions of pressure, terror and discrimination with regard to the Legation of the FPRY in Tirana. For almost two years the Albanian Government has gone to extremes in hindering, impeding and rendering impossible the functioning of the Yugoslav Mission in Albania. For instance, our representatives were publicly and openly shadowed and kept under surveillance by the police who threatened them, continually asked to see their identification papers and provoked and ridiculed them in the street. The Legation of the FPRY in Tirana is surrounded day and night by the police who have set up a permanent observation post in front of the Legation itself. The police broke into the apartments of our officials some of whom had firearms aimed at them. Under entirely fictitious and false charges, the Albanian Government requested the recall from Albania of a number of our representatives and officials.

The chicaning and ill-treatment of our diplomatic representatives and officials in Tirana has recently reached a climax. On May 11 this year, within a period of 10 minutes, a group of 10 policemen and several agents, asked the Chargé d'Affaires of the FPRY and a diplomatic official for their identification papers several times and requested an explanation of why they were in town and where they were going.

The climax of these measures, as published in the Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY of May 13, 1950, is a new and drastic restriction of the freedom of movement of the Yugoslav representatives and officials in Albania. According to the most recent restrictions, the

movements of the Yugoslav diplomatic representatives have practically been limited to the town of Tirana.

On May 15, 1950, the Albanian Government requested the recall of another two officials of the Legation of the FPRY in Tirana without any grounds whatsoever.

All these and other facts mentioned earlier about the unworthy discriminatory measures and actions of the Albanian Government with respect to the Legation of the FPRY in Tirana, show once more that their aim, apart from deliberate deterioration of relations and the creation of tension between the two countries, is completely to obstruct all the activities and the operation of our Mission in Tirana and to make it practically impossible for our representatives to remain in Albania.

The attitude towards the Yugoslav missions in other countries of Eastern Europe has not been very different. In Bulgaria, too, there has been special discrimination with respect to the Yugoslav Mission. The members of the Yugoslav Embassy are openly shadowed, provoked, and threatened verbally and with arms by the police. In the presence of the police and with their benevolent assistance, miserable groups of deserters from our country carry out provocations and attacks on our representatives. From time to time the Bulgarian authorities organize strict police blockades around the Embassy of the FPRY in Sofia. The Bulgarian Government limited the movement of our representatives and officials in a discriminatory manner. The Bulgarian police authorities gave the roughest kind of treatment to all those who came to our Embassy to do their patriotic duty as citizens on the day of elections for Deputies to the Federal Assembly of the FPRY.

The discrimination to which the Missions of the FPRY in Czechoslovakia are subjected has recently intensified. Apart from constant and un concealed shadowing by the police; terrorization of our representatives and officials; police blockade of the Embassy, the apartments of our representatives in Prague and the Consulate in Bratislava; requests for identification papers and even searches of persons who visit our Mission; preventing our missions from receiving Yugoslav publications, etc. — the Czechoslovak security forces have started arresting our diplomatic, consular and other officials. Thus, on November 26, 1949, without any grounds whatsoever, the Czechoslovak authorities arrested the Transjug representative, Zvonimir Tomić, and later certain other Yugoslav representatives and officials.

I will not speak about the matter Comrade Bakić mentioned in his speech — about the crimes perpetrated against our citizens in Czechoslovakia, crimes which have very few precedents in the civilized world.

A particularly serious violation of all customs and usage is the non-issuance of visas to our diplomatic, consular and other officials by the Czechoslovak authorities. Visas for diplomatic and official passports were denied. The Czechoslovak authorities even went so far as to refuse ration cards to all those who were waiting for visas, although such persons were forcibly kept in Czechoslovakia by the non-issuance of visas. Besides, the Czechoslovak authorities requested that visas for diplomatic and official passports be requested through the Ministry of the Interior, although there is an established usage with regard to all other Missions that such visas are granted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The position of our Missions in other countries of Eastern Europe does not differ from their position in Albania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. I only mentioned examples from these three countries because, for the moment, the situation there is the worst. Besides, the roles change around in this respect too, which is also the case with the whole anti-Yugoslav policy of the Eastern European countries. Sometimes one, sometimes the other country has the "leading role," or the "current job" to do in the provocative actions against Yugoslavia. The ill-treatment of our diplomats is, of course, one factor in such aggressive "combined actions." It should be pointed out that such actions are organized by people whose talk, at the same time, overflows with peace-loving verbiage and condemnation of war-mongers. For a long time it has been clear to every honest person that the Cominform organizers of various actions for peace should first pass the test for peace-loving sentiments on the basis of the relations of the Eastern European countries with Yugoslavia or, at any rate, on the basis of at least some kind of respect for the most elementary diplomatic forms — if the will of the Yugoslav peoples means nothing to them. We cannot, however, consider their present actions in this regard as anything but actions which not only do not serve the peace but which belong to the arsenal of the war-mongers.

From the very beginning the Government of the FPRY has shown serious concern over all the above-mentioned discriminatory acts against the Yugoslav Missions and their members and has reacted to them strongly. The Government of the FPRY reacted immediately and resolutely to each of the above-mentioned measures or actions undertaken by the Albanian, Bulgarian, Czechoslovak or other Governments of Eastern European countries, requesting that these and similar inadmissible measures in relations between countries be stopped and their application discontinued. In its Notes and demarches the Yugoslav Government drew the attention of the afore-mentioned Governments to the fact that it had given no cause whatsoever for such measures or actions, that it had never been, and never would be, the initiator of any kind of inadmissible measures in its relations with the Missions of any of these countries. Simultaneously with the protests it lodged against these discriminatory measures and actions, the Yugoslav Government warned the afore-mentioned Governments that if these extraordinary measures against the Yugoslav Missions are not stopped — it would have to take steps to protect its interests. Reciprocal measures, which did not go beyond the limits permitted under international law and customs in international relations, were taken by the Yugoslav Government only in answer to measures which had always first been taken by the afore-mentioned Governments. These Governments bear the exclusive responsibility for the present situation.

Allow me to remind you, in this connection, of the words Comrade Tito recently uttered at a session of the Federal Assembly:

"The Government of the FPRY notes with regret that, owing to the persistently hostile attitude of the USSR and the countries of people's democracy towards the FPR of Yugoslavia, it is not, on its part, in a position to influence the improvement of relations with those countries. This regret is all the greater since the Government and the peoples of the new Yugoslavia continue to have friendly feelings towards the peo-

ples of those countries and have a strong desire to maintain relations with these countries that are, at least to some extent, tolerable, normal relations.

"I can say here, both on behalf of the Government and on behalf of the peoples of the FPRY, that neither the Government nor the peoples of Yugoslavia have any hostile feelings towards those countries, that neither the Government nor the peoples of Yugoslavia have ever done anything with regard to those countries which might sully the name of our socialist country, nor are they doing any such thing today. All that we have been reproached for by certain leaders of those countries and all that they have asserted about us in various ways — is completely untrue and fabricated, and history will brand those who wanted to calumniate us in various ways."

This, Comrade Deputies, is the essence of the policy the Government of the FPRY will pursue with regard to the Eastern European countries and in this sense it will fight for normal diplomatic relations with these countries. It should be pointed out, at the same time, however, that the Government is not willing endlessly to tolerate the mistreatment of our diplomatic officials in those countries and that it will be compelled to consider new measures in order to protect our representatives from such ill-treatment and humiliation.(⁷)

(From the stenographic record of the First Public Session of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Federal Assembly, held on May 16, 1950, in Beograd; pp. 13—19.)

(⁷) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY and the missions of the FPRY in the Eastern European countries addressed 128 Notes to the Governments of those countries during the period from July 2, 1948, to July 9, 1950, protesting against the discriminatory acts of those governments towards Yugoslav diplomatic and other missions and their officials, owing to which their work was hampered and obstructed and even the existence of the diplomatic representatives of the FPRY in some of the mentioned countries was made impossible.

During the period from July 2, 1948 to June 10, 1950, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY and the Yugoslav Legation in Tirana addressed 25 Notes to the Albanian Government in connection with the intolerable situation which the Albanian Government created for the Yugoslav Legation in Albania and for its staff. In these Notes it protested against the unwarranted expulsion of Yugoslav officials from Albania, the non-issuance of exit visas to them and their forcible detention in Albania, against the withholding of medical, barbering and other services from them. The Notes also protested against the fact that identity papers were being incessantly examined in the streets without reason and officials were taken to the police station, that the police raided apartments and constantly kept blockading the Legation and taking persons visiting the Legation into custody. Police agents with weapons in their hands also broke into the Legation's automobile by force, fire-arms were drawn and aimed at a Legation official and movement was restricted in a discriminatory manner. There was incessant and offensive police surveillance of Yugoslav diplomatic officials and the members of their families, frequent insults, chicanery and provocation in the streets, official contact by the representative of the FPRY with officials of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was obstructed, Albanian diplomatic correspondence had a coarse and insulting tone, etc., etc.

The Albanian Government replied in all to 7 Notes, and, by simply denying the facts revealed in them, attempted to conceal the acts of its organs for which it is fully responsible. It considered these acts against the Legation of the FPRY as fully possible and permissible. The remaining 18 Notes the Albanian Government either returned or left without a reply.

10. PERSECUTION OF YUGOSLAV CITIZENS AND VIOLATION OF THEIR MOST ELEMENTARY RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE

DOCUMENT No. 71

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 410402 OF JUNE 11, 1949, REQUESTING THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO RETURN CHILDREN SENT TO SCHOOL IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND NOW BEING FORCIBLY DETAINED IN THE USSR, TO THEIR PARENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has the honour to draw the attention of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Note of the Embassy of the FPRY in Moscow, No. 75 of April 25, 1949, in connection with the return of Yugoslav children who are in the Suvorov Military Schools in the USSR. The Soviet Government has still not answered this note.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY and the Embassy of the FPRY in Sofia addressed seventeen Notes to the Bulgarian Government in the period from August 18, 1949, to July 6, 1950. In them it protested against the obstruction of Embassy functions and official contact with functionaries of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, against the blockade of the Embassy, against the insulting shadowing of Embassy officials by the police; against the chicanery to which the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires and other diplomatic officials were exposed in the streets of Sofia; against the refusal of the Sofia Post Office to receive telegrams; against the physical attack on the Yugoslav Consul by Bulgarian police agents in the streets of Sofia in the presence of the Chief of the Protocol Section of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; against the expulsion from Bulgaria of the Yugoslav Ambassador and of other diplomatic representatives, etc.

The Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs answered only four Notes and gave no answer to the remaining thirteen.

During the period from July 13, 1948, to February 15, 1950, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY and the Yugoslav Embassy in Bucharest addressed 27 Notes to the Rumanian Government. In them, apart from other things, it protested against the police raid of a villa leased by the Yugoslav Embassy, against the expropriation of the villa although the lease was still in force, against the police raid and closure of the Yugoslav Jugoknjiga book-shop, against the confiscation of the exhibition of photographs "Yugoslavia in Construction", against discrimination in the allocation of apartments to Yugoslav diplomatic officials, against the unwarranted arrest of officials of the Yugoslav delegation in the Iron Gates Administration and officials of the Yugoslav Embassy, against the chicanery and expulsion of the Yugoslav delegation for the repatriation of prisoners of war from Rumania, against the maltreatment of Yugoslav diplomatic couriers at the frontier, against the non-issuance of an exit visa to the Ambassador of the FPRY in Rumania, etc., etc.

The Rumanian Government replied to 10 of these Notes, giving no answer to the remaining 17.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY considers it necessary to indicate that the afore-mentioned Note of the Embassy of the FPRY was sent after several fruitless intercessions by the Yugoslav Military Attaché in Moscow with the competent Soviet authorities, and by the Yugoslav military authorities through the Military Attaché of the USSR in Beograd.

The parents and guardians of the Yugoslav children in the USSR, who have not yet been repatriated, justly expect the speedy return of their children and wards. They are applying more and more often, persistently requesting the Government of the FPRY to enable them to realize their fundamental rights as parents and have their children returned to them. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs encloses herewith some

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY and the Yugoslav Legation in Budapest addressed 11 Notes to the Hungarian Government during the period from October 27, 1948, up to September 27, 1949, against the arrest of Yugoslav diplomatic and other officials, against the discriminatory acts of the Hungarian Government organs towards Yugoslav railway officials who, on grounds of an agreement, were crossing into Hungary to escort trains, against the chicanery and rude attitude of the Hungarian organs towards members of a Yugoslav delegation which was conducting negotiations in Hungary, against the expulsion from Hungary of almost all the officials of the Yugoslav Legation headed by the Chargé d'Affaires, against the maltreatment of evicted officials at the frontier, etc., etc.

The Hungarian Government gave no reply whatever to 6 Notes, while the answers to the other 5 Notes were in the negative. They simply denied the facts in them by making bare assertions.

During the period from July 24, 1948, to December 9, 1949, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the FPRY in Warsaw addressed 17 Notes to the Polish Government protesting against various kinds of discriminatory acts by the Polish authorities towards the Yugoslav Embassy such as the following: in a Warsaw street, a diplomatic pouch was forcibly snatched away from an official who was sitting in the Embassy automobile with the pouch, Yugoslav officials are subjected to offensive surveillance and examination of identity papers in the streets, the police molest Yugoslav officials in their apartments and arrest them, officials of the Yugoslav Embassy are expelled from Poland collectively, Polish police agents are offensive in their behaviour towards the Yugoslav Ambassador, etc., etc.

The Polish Government gave no reply whatever to five Notes, and in the main denied the statements contained in the remaining 12 Yugoslav Notes. It did not show the least intention of changing the attitude of the Polish authorities towards the Yugoslav representatives in Poland for which it is fully responsible.

The Embassy of the FPRY in Prague and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY addressed 28 Notes to the Czechoslovak Government during the period from January 14, 1949, to July 9, 1950, against the intolerable situation created in Czechoslovakia for diplomatic and other Yugoslav missions, which was manifested in all manner of discriminatory acts by the Czechoslovak authorities. For instance, attempts were made to recruit Yugoslav officials for espionage on behalf of the Czechoslovak intelligence service, Yugoslav papers sent by post from Yugoslavia were not delivered to the Embassy, letters and postal deliveries sent to Embassy officials from Yugoslavia were either not forwarded or were destroyed, the Bulletin was banned, the Jugoknjižica branch in Prague was closed down, its officials were maltreated and police searches made of their apartments, the police blockaded the Embassy and the apartments of its officials and kept Yugoslav officials under offensive police surveillance, the diplomatic mail was confiscated, a discriminatory attitude was displayed with regard to the issuance of diplomatic and official visas for members of the Embassy, exit visas were not issued to diplomatic and other officials whereby they were forcibly detained in Czechoslovakia, they were prevented from contacting their country and discharging their normal duties. The police agents were rude and offensive in their behaviour, entry visas were not issued to Yugoslav delegates who were to have attended various international congresses in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslav officials were arrested without reason, the Yugoslav Ambassador and diplomatic and

of the many letters sent to the Government of the FPRY by parents thus separated from their children. In these letters, as in all the others, the desire and the resolute demand of the parents for the return of their children is clearly expressed.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY expresses its surprise and anxiety at the fact that, in spite of repeated requests on the part of the FPRY, the Government of the USSR has still not allowed, or arranged for, the return of Yugoslav children to their homeland and that these children are still being detained in the USSR against the explicit will of their parents and guardians.

The Government of the FPRY requests the Government of the USSR to take steps for the return of the Yugoslav children to their parents in Yugoslavia.

The Government of the FPRY expects that the Government of the USSR — realizing how hard it is for parents and relatives to be separated from their children — will quickly make a positive decision and inform the Government of the FPRY of the date and manner in which the above-mentioned Yugoslav children can be repatriated to Yugoslavia.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia avails itself of this opportunity to express its consideration to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.⁽¹⁾

Belograd, June 11, 1949.

other officials were expelled from Czechoslovakia, etc., etc. The notes protested against all these acts.

The Czechoslovak Government replied only to 7 Notes, returning or giving no answer whatever to the other 21.

In their replies to the Notes of the Government of the FPRY, the Governments of the mentioned countries did not show the least intention of changing the attitude of the Government organs towards the diplomatic and other missions of the FPRY. Discriminatory acts towards the Yugoslav representatives are continuing in these countries for which the Governments of those countries bear full responsibility.

(1) In connection with this question, the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow addressed two more notes (No. 75 of April 20, 1949, and of May 18, 1949) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, requesting that the Yugoslav children be returned to their parents in Yugoslavia, but the Government of the USSR did not answer either of these notes.

In addition to the Yugoslav children whom the Soviet Government is detaining by force, there is also a number of Yugoslav citizens in the Soviet Union who either went there as prisoners of war in World War One, and did not return to Yugoslavia after the termination of the war, or as political emigrants from Yugoslavia during the period between the two world wars. Finally, there were Yugoslav citizens who had gone to the USSR from Yugoslavia to attend various schools before the Cominform Resolution, where they happened to be at the time of the outbreak of events connected with the Resolution. There are also others whose return to Yugoslavia is being prevented. Although the Soviet authorities are obstructing and preventing contact between the Yugoslav citizens in the USSR and the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow, the Yugoslav authorities have been informed that many of them wish to be repatriated to Yugoslavia. All intercessions of the Yugoslav Embassy in this direction, however, have proved of no avail.

FROM REPORT NO. 119 OF DECEMBER 29, 1948, BY THE YUGOSLAV
AMBASSADOR IN SOFIA, ON THE PERSECUTION OF YUGOSLAV
CITIZENS IN BULGARIA^(*)

"I also brought up the question of Blagoje Simovski,^(*) who was held under preliminary investigation for two and a half months after which they decided to deport him, although they had claimed that he was a serious offender, that the investigation had yielded grave results and that he would be tried. I reproached them for this whole case and concluded by saying that all loyal citizens of the FPRY were treated like this, while deserters and traitors were protected, given moral and material help, etc. In connection with this, I requested that they finally put an end to these unlawful acts against our innocent citizens.

"With regard to this question and the question of our citizens in general, he answered categorically, quoting Kolarov this time, too, and said that they were resolutely against any unlawful acts and in favour of the most honest application of the law. But, he rather openly made me understand — both regarding the case of Simovski, and other citizens as well — that the State security organs told them one thing and did another, so that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs often had the wrong information. For instance, he mentioned that, according to information given by the State security organs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Simovski ought to have been evicted long ago — but he was not. Recently, they got definite information that he had been deported on a certain day — and then learned that this had not yet been done."^(*)

DOCUMENT No. 79

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF PROTEST No. 411791 OF JUNE
12, 1950, TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK EMBASSY FOLLOWING THE GROUND-
LESS ARREST AND DEATH IN PRISON OF DIMITRIJE DIMITRIJEVIĆ,
PRESIDENT OF THE "PEOPLE'S FRONT OF YUGOSLAVS" IN PRAGUE

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia informs the Embassy of the Czechoslovak Republic of the following:

In its Note No. 261 of May 16, 1950, the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Prague protested most vigorously to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic against the unlawful and inhuman actions of the Czechoslovak police which

^(*) The report refers to the meeting of Yugoslav Ambassador Josip Gjergja with Bulgarian Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sava Ganovski.

^(*) Blagoje Simovski, former President of the People's Front of Yugoslavs in Bulgaria.

^(*) The report is quoted in excerpts.

caused the death of a Yugoslav citizen, Dimitrije Dimitrijević, President of the "People's Front of Yugoslavs" in Prague.^(*)

When a representative of the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia transmitted the above-mentioned Note, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic, at the same time, handed him its Note No. 25615. According to the explicit statement made by the representative of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this should have been an answer to the Note of the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia that had just been transmitted, the contents of which were not known to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia considers that the afore-mentioned Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic does not and cannot represent an answer to the Note of the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The Note of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs is merely an attempt to justify, by way of arbitrary allegations, the unlawful arrest, detention and death of Dimitrije Dimitrijević, and to evade the responsibility of the Czechoslovak Government and its police for the inhuman treatment and torture to which Dimitrije Dimitrijević was subjected. By this note the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempts to evade the responsibility of the Czechoslovak police and the Czechoslovak Government for the unlawful action towards the late Dimitrijević which caused his death in the Czechoslovak prison in Brandys-nad-Labem.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia notes that it was almost a month after the death of the late Dimitrijević, and only after the details of the cruel treatment he had received in Czechoslovak prisons, and of the circumstances under which he died, had reached the public, that the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in its afore-mentioned Note, admitted the death of Dimitrije Dimitrijević, notifying the Yugoslav Embassy thereof. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic, in the aforesaid Note, asserts that the late Dimitrijević was arrested in December, 1949, as President of the "People's Front of Yugoslavs" in Prague under the suspicion of anti-State activities. The Note continued that the investigation later revealed that he had committed offences in connection with foreign exchange after which he was, on April 19, 1950, handed over to

(*) The People's Front of Yugoslavs in Czechoslovakia was founded towards the end of 1945 for the purpose of rallying Yugoslav citizens in Czechoslovakia, acquainting them with political, cultural and economic life in the new Yugoslavia, and developing friendly and brotherly relations between the peoples of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. On December 17, 1949, the President of the People's Front of Yugoslavs in Prague, Dimitrije Dimitrijević, the Vice-President of the same organization, A. Trstenjak, and others were arrested. The Czechoslovak police searched the premises of the organization in Prague, and then had them boarded up. By the closing down of the premises and the arrest of the leadership of the People's Front of Yugoslavs in Czechoslovakia, the work of the organization was virtually made impossible. On January 10, 1950, the Yugoslav Embassy in Prague protested against the prohibition of the organization's work and requested that its property be restored, which the Czechoslovak authorities have not done to this day. The People's Front of Yugoslavs in Czechoslovakia was formally banned on April 7, 1950, according to Law No. 134 from 1887.

the financial authorities in the expectation that he would be sentenced. He was then sent to the Brandys-nad-Labem prison where he died on April 22.

The allegations contained in the Note of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, reveal the untenability of assertions regarding the anti-State activity of Dimitrijević and show that he was arrested not for any offence, but for being a functionary of the "People's Front of Yugoslavs" in Prague, for remaining faithful to his socialist homeland and for refusing to join the hostile campaign being carried out by the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The mere assertions regarding his anti-State activities which, according to the allegations in the Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic, were suddenly transformed into an alleged foreign-exchange violation three days before his death, are intended to conceal, in any way possible, the real reason for the arrest and detention of the entirely innocent Dimitrije Dimitrijević for more than four months. The attempt by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs to conceal the causes of the death of the late Dimitrijević by medical findings, to the effect that the death was caused by heart failure, cannot be accepted either. The Ministry did not state what brought the heart failure about or under what conditions it took place, for in that case it would have had to admit the accuracy of the statements in the Note of the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia notes that the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs has still not answered the concrete accusations stated in the Note of the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia regarding the brutal methods of violence, ill-treatment and torture to which the late Dimitrije Dimitrijević was subjected by the Czechoslovak police while in prison, and to which he finally succumbed without having been given any medical assistance or treatment whatsoever. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic did not inform the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Prague of the measures taken to hold responsible and to punish those persons who were to blame for the death of the late Dimitrijević.

On the basis of all the above, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia resolutely rejects the protest contained in the note of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 25615 regarding the writing of the Yugoslav press. The latter expresses the just and deep indignation and protest of the Yugoslav public against the ill-treatment, torture and death of Dimitrije Dimitrijević and the persecution of other Yugoslav citizens in the Czechoslovak Republic. The Ministry stands by the statements and requests contained in the Note of the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Prague of May 16, 1950.^(*)

Beograd, June 12, 1950.

(*) The Czechoslovak Embassy returned this Note without any answer.

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF PROTEST No. 412732/I OF JULY 22, 1950, AGAINST THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT'S UNLAWFUL DECISION TO PROCLAIM AS BULGARIAN CITIZENS A CERTAIN CATEGORY OF PERSONS OF BULGARIAN NATIONALITY HOLDING YUGOSLAV CITIZENSHIP

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and communicates the following:

According to the newspaper "Izgreve," of May 28, 1950, the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria brought a decision based on the last paragraph of Article 3 of the Law on Bulgarian Citizenship. The decision stated that all persons of Bulgarian nationality and Yugoslav citizenship who had moved prior to December 31, 1946, from western regions to the PR of Bulgaria, and who had registered as inhabitants of the municipality in which they resided when the Law took effect, became Bulgarian citizens. The exception to this were those persons who had, by September 1, 1950, submitted written statements to the competent municipal people's council that they wished to retain their former citizenship.

The afore-mentioned decision of the Council of Ministers of the PR of Bulgaria is contrary to the international treaties and obligations assumed by the PR of Bulgaria. Its application violates the interests of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia which were recognized and guaranteed by international instruments signed by the People's Republic of Bulgaria as well.

By the Armistice Agreement concluded on October 30, 1944, between Bulgaria and the Allied and Associated Nations, Bulgaria assumed the obligation, under Article 2, to annul all legal and administrative provisions relating to the annexation of Yugoslav territory to Bulgaria, or its incorporation therein. One of the consequences of the legal and administrative provisions promulgated by the Bulgarian Government during the occupation was that Bulgaria considered all Yugoslav citizens from the annexed and incorporated territory as Bulgarian citizens and compelled them to take oaths of allegiance, although this was explicitly forbidden by Article 45 of the Hague Convention concerning laws and customs of war on land. By the Armistice Agreement, however, Bulgaria assumed the obligation to annul all these acts. Thereby, the persons from this territory had their former citizenship status restored to them. This included both those who continued to reside in this territory and those who had for any reason temporarily moved out of it either to Bulgaria or any other country.

The provision of the Armistice Agreement to the effect that Bulgaria was to annul all the legal and administrative acts relating to the annexation of Yugoslav territory was confirmed in Art. 1 of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria under which the frontiers of Bulgaria remained where they had been on January 1, 1941. It is clear that this provision, apart from others, annulled all consequences relating to the citizenship of Yugoslav citizens from the annexed territory.

According to Article 2 of the Peace Treaty, Bulgaria assumed the obligation to take all the necessary measures to secure the enjoyment of human rights and of fundamental freedoms for all persons under Bulgarian jurisdiction, regardless of race, sex, language or religion. Likewise, Article 3 of the Peace Treaty proclaims the general obligations of Bulgaria and establishes the principle that Bulgaria will not enact discriminatory legislation either against her own or foreign citizens.

The above-mentioned decision of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is nothing but a circumventive legal act violating both the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and those of the Peace Treaty. "The western regions," mentioned in the above decision, are precisely those Yugoslav territories which were occupied by the Bulgarian army during the war. The persons referred to in this decision are precisely those who had moved into the People's Republic of Bulgaria before December 31, 1946, i. e. mostly those who were in Bulgaria during the occupation, viz. until the end of the war with Bulgaria. By the Armistice Agreement and the Peace Treaty, Yugoslav citizenship was returned to these persons, by virtue of treaty between the two countries, and they are now citizens of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia not only as far as the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is concerned, but in respect of Bulgaria, too. Accordingly, by a unilateral and arbitrary act of the Bulgarian Government, these persons were faced with compulsory option. Thereby, discriminatory measures which were not applied to other foreigners were used against them. In this manner these persons were deprived of the elementary human right to remain citizens of their country, of the consular protection of their country and of the fundamental right of every foreigner to be repatriated to his own state.

For the above reasons, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, under instructions from its Government, protests against this illegal decision of the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria by which, as stated above, it violated its international obligations assumed under the Armistice Agreement and the Peace Treaty, and requests the Bulgarian Government to annul this decision.(')(*)

Beograd, July 22, 1950.

(*) The Bulgarian Embassy in Beograd replied to this Note by Note No. 2637 of October 5, 1950, alleging that the request of the Yugoslav Government for the abrogation of the Decree of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers constitutes interference in the internal affairs of Bulgaria.

With its Note No. 419836 of October 26, 1950, the Yugoslav Government rejected the viewpoint of the Bulgarian Government that the request for the abrogation of the mentioned Decree constituted interference in the internal affairs of Bulgaria. The Note stated that the respecting of human rights and liberties, as well as the prohibition of discriminatory measures, are international obligations of Bulgaria prescribed by the Peace Treaty, and that violation of the international obligations of a state is not and cannot be an internal affair of that state.

(*) The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Yugoslav diplomatic missions sent 33 Notes to the Governments of the countries of Eastern Europe during the period from July 3, 1948, to May 8, 1950. The Notes protested against the maltreatment of, and discriminatory acts against, Yugoslav citizens by Albanian authorities; against the fact that the Yugoslav citizens were prevented from repatriating, Albanian citizenship was forcibly imposed upon them, their property was appropriated and individuals who had been granted repatriation were subjected to harsh treatment by the

11. DENIAL OF THE RIGHT OF YUGOSLAVIA TO SOVEREIGN EQUALITY IN THE DANUBE COMMISSION⁽¹⁾

DOCUMENT No. 11

FROM THE YUGOSLAV DELEGATE'S ADDRESS AT THE MEETING OF THE DANUBE COMMISSION OF NOVEMBER 13, 1949, RELATING TO THE DISCUSSION OF THE STATUTE AND THE COMMISSION'S RULES OF PROCEDURE

"In the opinion of the delegation of the FPRY, the draft of the Soviet Union could be amended, especially as regards fundamental issues..."

"The draft of the Soviet Union deals with the question of the duties and rights of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary. With respect to the Members of the Commission, it refers to them only where sessions are involved. The draft says not a word of the Members' role in the

(¹) In December, 1946, six months after the peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary came into force, the Council of Ministers decided to call a conference, with a view to drafting a new convention on navigation on the Danube, to be attended by members of the Council of Ministers from the USA, Great Britain and France in addition to the riparian, Danubian states. It was subsequently decided to hold the conference in Beograd, where it was held from July 31 to August 18, 1948, with the participation of the representatives of the FPRY, the USSR, PR Bulgaria, PR Hungary, PR Rumania, the Ukrainian SSR and the Czechoslovak Republic. The representatives of the USA, Great Britain and France (who did not sign the convention) also took part in it. Austria was represented with the right of advisory vote. The conference drafted a new Convention on Navigation on the Danube. The Convention provided for the establishment of a Danube Commission comprising representatives of the riparian countries of the Danube, and of two special river administrations, one for the narrows of the Iron Gates on the Yugoslav—Rumanian frontier and one for the Danube's mouth on the Soviet—Rumanian frontier. The first session of the Danube Commission took place in November, 1949, and the second session in March, 1950. The third session has been convoked for December, 1950. The special river administrations have not been established yet. The administration of the mentioned sectors, i. e. in the narrows of the Iron Gates and at the mouth of the Danube, is carried out by temporary bodies composed of representatives of the riparian states.

Albanian authorities. The Yugoslav citizens who persisted in seeking repatriation were intimidated and arrested without reason, they were forcibly detained in Albania, etc. The Albanian Government replied to only six of these Notes, and that in the negative. It rejected the requests put forward in the Notes, and simply denied the facts in them, while it returned some of the 27 remaining Notes, and gave no reply whatever to others.

The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Yugoslav Embassy in Prague addressed 39 Notes to the Czechoslovak Government in the period from September 1, 1948, to June 12, 1950. The Notes protested against the difficulty of repatriation of Yugoslav citizens to the FPRY, the non-issuance of export permits for the personal property of Yugoslav citizens returning to their country, the appropriation of personal

period between two sessions. Its articles do not provide the least possibility for Commission Members to follow the Commission's work and keep posted on it between two sessions, nor does it provide for them to have a survey of the implementation of the Resolution..."

"The Secretary is charged with special competence and thus given an exceptional role in the Commission. It is the Secretary who is exclusively competent in a number of questions of first-rate significance..."

"In a Commission in which all Members must in principle have equal rights, it is unacceptable for such powers to be given to the representative of one member-country of the Commission, because he is responsible to his Government and the Commission cannot recall him from the post of Secretary for a period of three years.

"It is obvious that, in this instance, a member of the Commission, who is the representative of one country, is simultaneously the Chief of the Secretariat and of the Commission's machinery, i. e. the most important official in the Commission, with broad powers. In practice, the Commission cannot take him to task because he is the representative of an equal and sovereign country which is a member of the Commission. This is indeed something unusual in international organizations.

"One gets the impression that the Commission's machinery, headed by the Secretariat, rather resembles the board of a company, with the members coming to the meetings occasionally to become familiar with its business only on the evidence of the Director's report."

belongings of those returning to the FPRY, the forcible returning of Yugoslav citizens from the frontier although they were supplied with adequate documents, against the unwarranted expulsion of Yugoslav citizens from Czechoslovakia, the closing and confiscation of small artisan shops which are the property of Yugoslav citizens, the unfounded and unlawful banning of social organizations of the Yugoslav colony in Czechoslovakia and the arrest of their officials, the unfounded arrest of a large number of Yugoslav citizens in Czechoslovakia, the inhuman treatment of arrested Yugoslav citizens by the Czechoslovak authorities, the torturing and murder of Yugoslav citizens in Czechoslovak jails, etc. The Czechoslovak Government did not answer 19 Notes and gave unsatisfactory replies to the other 20, simply denying facts and rejecting the requests set forth in the Notes, or only acknowledging the receipt of the Notes without entering into the substance of the matters set forth in them.

The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Yugoslav Embassy in Bucharest addressed 4 Notes to the Rumanian Government protesting against the forcible detention in Rumania of Yugoslav citizens, the obstruction of their repatriation and their arrest. The Rumanian Government replied only to one Note, giving no reply whatever to the remaining three.

The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Yugoslav Embassy in Sofia addressed 34 Notes to the Bulgarian Government. The Notes registered protests because Yugoslav citizens in Bulgaria were prevented from repatriating and were forced to accept Bulgarian citizenship, and because the Bulgarian wives of Yugoslav citizens were prevented from leaving for Yugoslavia with their husbands. The Notes also protested against the arrest and maltreatment of Yugoslav citizens in Bulgarian jails, and other discriminatory measures by the Bulgarian authorities towards Yugoslav citizens who permanently reside in Bulgaria or who had been going to Bulgaria for official reasons on the bases of existing agreements. The Bulgarian Government gave no answer whatever to 13 Notes, and replied to many others only with the mere assertion that the statements in the Notes were untrue.

Despite all these many intercessions of the Yugoslav Government, persecution and all manner of discriminatory measures against Yugoslav citizens in the countries of Eastern Europe have not stopped to this day.

**FROM THE YUGOSLAV DELEGATE'S SPEECH AT THE MEETING OF THE
DANUBE COMMISSION ON NOVEMBER 16, 1949, AFTER THE ADOPTION
OF THE COMMISSION'S RULES OF PROCEDURE**

"The Rules of Procedure which were adopted by the majority of votes, actually represent the Draft of the Soviet delegation, plus several minor amendments. These Rules of Procedure restrict the role of the Commission. The Commission is merely to hold occasional meetings which is the only form provided by the Rules through which our countries can participate in the work of the Danube Commission. The role of the Commission, i. e. its Members, is really reduced to plenary meetings. There is not one provision making it possible for the members of the Commission to participate actively in, and to follow the execution of, its decisions and to maintain the necessary contact with the administrative machinery of the Commission whose statute we are to draw up today..."

"All that the whole Convention says of the Secretary is that he is to be elected from among the Commission's Members, and nothing else. We ask where did the Soviet delegation find the basis to grant such powers to the Secretary? Is this not something inadmissible in international practice? Is it not a fact that the Soviet delegation and the majority in this Commission want to transfer the basic rights of the Commission to one of its members?"^(*)

(*) The Convention on Navigation on the Danube entrusts the jurisdiction of the navigable part of the Danube to the so-called Danube Commission, composed of representatives of all the Danubian states. Under the Convention, the Secretariat is an auxiliary organ of the Commission. The Rules and Statute of the Danube Commission, however, adopted at the Soviet proposal by a majority vote during the first session of the Commission, transferred the entire jurisdiction of the Commission to the Secretariat and to the services of which Art. 1 of the Statute explicitly states that "they represent the entire practical activity of the Commission." The Secretariat and the services are managed by the Secretary of the Commission, elected for a term of three years from among the delegates of the Danubian countries in the Commission. There is no obstacle to electing a delegate from the same country several times in succession. The Secretary of the Danube Commission, an international organization, is at the same time the delegate of his Government and renders account only to his Government for his work, because neither the Rules nor the Statute make provision for his responsibility before the Commission. The Secretary appoints and recalls all officials of the Commission, and in case of absence his duties are discharged not by one of the officials in the Commission but by his deputy in the Government delegation. Accordingly, contrary to the Convention, which entrusts jurisdiction over the navigable part of the Danube to the Commission composed of representatives of all the Danubian countries, the Rules and Statute centre all powers deriving from the Convention in the hands of the delegate of one single country, who receives instructions from his Government and is responsible to it alone. In the formal juridical respect, this actually makes the hegemony of one single state on the Danube possible, concretely the USSR. Besides this, the Rules and Statute in no way guarantee minority rights so that it is formally possible for one Danubian state constantly to be kept out of all the leading posts in the Commission. Naturally, the USSR availed itself of this possibility in relation to Yugoslavia so that Yugoslavia failed to receive one single leading seat or one single executive post in the administration.

At the first session of the Danube Commission in Galatz, at the second plenary meeting of November 12, 1949, the head of the Soviet Delegation, G. N. Morozov, was elected Secretary of the Commission at the proposal of the Bulgarian Delegation by five votes. The Yugoslav Delegation abstained from voting.

FROM THE SPEECH OF THE CHIEF OF THE YUGOSLAV DELEGATION
AT THE SECOND SESSION OF THE DANUBE COMMISSION, ON MARCH
24, 1950, AT GALATZ, ON THE QUESTION OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE
COMMISSION'S SECRETARY, THE SOVIET DELEGATE, TOWARDS THE
YUGOSLAV DELEGATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONVOKING OF
THAT SESSION

"The first thing we wish to point out is the attitude of the representative of the Soviet Union, the Secretary of the Danube Commission, towards the delegations of the member-countries of the Commission. We do not intend to speak of his attitude towards other delegations: we shall restrict ourselves to his attitude towards the delegation of the FPRY.

"In the period between the two sessions, the Delegation of the FPRY did not receive an answer to any one of its letters addressed to the Danube Commission, or even an acknowledgement of their receipt. Or let us take, for example, the question of payment of advances by the delegation of the FPRY. On several occasions the delegation of the FPRY attempted, either directly or through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Rumanian People's Republic, to get in touch with the Rumanian National Bank with a view to regulating the question of payment of advances by the FPRY in accordance with the resolution of the last session. It was prevented from doing so by the negative attitude of the Rumanian authorities. The Delegation then informed the Danube Commission of all this, but received no information from it about this matter or about any intercession by the Commission with the competent Rumanian authorities although the Commission's own interests were involved. Finally, the delegation remitted a certain sum, having made an approximate estimate of the advance in lei. It informed the Danube Commission of this but no answer was forthcoming, nor was there any acknowledgment of receipt of the remitted sum.

"A decision was taken at the last session, to convoke the second session of the Danube Commission in February, 1950. As we know, however, the February meeting was not held. It was only on February 28 that the Secretary and the Vice-Chairman informed the Delegation of the FPRY, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Rumanian People's Republic that the meeting had been fixed for the 23rd of March. The Delegation of the FPRY had never been consulted on the change of date. The invitation for the March session stated that this decision was taken pursuant to Art. 7 of the Convention. Article 7 of the Convention, however, says that the Commission alone is empowered to set the date for sessions and does not authorize anyone else to alter the Commission's decisions.

"In addition to this, for no point on the agenda was there any explanatory material submitted to the delegations, except for the material regarding the question of Gabčikovo-Göñjü.^(*) Scanty as it is, even

(*) Gabčikovo-Göñjü is the frontier part of the Danube between Czechoslovakia and Hungary on which navigation was hampered owing to various natural obstacles. As a result, it is necessary constantly to carry out river-regulation works. The Convention on Navigation on the Danube makes provision for the Danube Commission to establish a body to carry out the necessary river-regulation works on this sector.

this material was received by the Delegation of the FPRY only at the last moment. The point is that questions are involved which directly interest all the members of the Commission. Normal and customary procedure in international organizations would, in addition to this, call also for the participation of all the members of the Commission, on an equal basis, in the preparing and studying of questions of such importance. The cooperation of all the members and the pooling of all their experiences would then enable the Danube Commission to solve all questions in the common interest of all the riparian states. But this was not the case here.

"At the last session, the Yugoslav Delegation drew the attention of the Commission to the tendencies of the Danube Commission's Rules of Procedure, which were proposed by the Soviet Delegation, to obstruct the possibility of cooperation based on the equality of all the delegations and to make it possible to isolate certain delegations in practice from all the work of the Commission. These facts show that our objections had a foundation and that the methods of work employed in the Danube Commission generally, and particularly in connection with the drawing up of the agenda, methods actually employed by the representative of the Soviet Government who is at the same time Secretary of the Commission — for he is the one really directing all the activities of the Commission — do not allow real cooperation among the Danubian countries, cooperation which would be based on the principles of sovereign equality among states.

"The Yugoslav Delegation is opposed to the Danube Commission being an instrument in the hands of the Soviet Government for the realization of its hegemony on the Danube. The point is that the Danube Commission is convoked only in order to vote decisions prepared and adopted in advance, while giving the whole affair the outward appearance of cooperation among states with equal rights.

"The delegates, however, should not forget that, by the nature of things, the Danube is something common to all the riparian states and that its problems cannot be settled by these methods.

"If we want results on these problems that are positive at least to a certain extent, it is necessary to enable all the members to give some study to the proposed material."

DOCUMENT No. 11

FROM THE SPEECH BY THE CHIEF OF THE YUGOSLAV DELEGATION
AT THE SECOND SESSION OF THE DANUBE COMMISSION ON MARCH
27, 1950, AT GALATZ, IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEGATIVE RESULTS
OF THE COMMISSION'S WORK OWING TO DICTATION BY THE SOVIET
DELEGATION

"The Yugoslav Delegation deems it necessary to say a few words at the close of our session about the results of the work. It can be stated that the method by which it was prepared, and which, incidentally, was imposed on it in the course of the session itself, yielded only negative

results, which run counter to real cooperation among sovereign states with equal rights.

"It was only at the last moment that the Yugoslav delegation received documents relating to the majority of questions which are very important for the Commission, for example, the question of plan of work, the lists of official posts, the budget, etc. On its part, the Yugoslav Delegation insisted that it was indispensable to achieve at least a minimum of cooperation in the Commission. If there was to be any talk about cooperation at all, it proposed that the discussion of the mentioned questions be deferred for several days so that they could be studied thoroughly. It then proposed the formation of a sub-committee to examine the budget thoroughly, and, finally, it requested that the principle of equality with regard to the distribution of official posts be respected. All these proposals were turned down, however, and all these questions were settled in a day and a half.

"In addition to this, a whole series of proposals was submitted here to us. We were supposed to solve them haphazardly, immediately upon submission, which gave us no possibility to read them, much less to study them.

"It is quite obvious that all this was prepared beforehand and that the work of the members of the Commission consisted, in the main, of adopting and voting all that which the Soviet Delegation had decided in advance. It is not hard, however, to see through this game and to realize once again what kind of an idea the Soviet representatives have of cooperation among nations and how they carry it through. They insist on certain principles when they are left in the minority, but no sooner do they find themselves in a stronger position than formal principles give place to pressure and dictation. In the past the Danubian countries were compelled constantly to combat the domination of non-riparian imperialists, whom they finally succeeded in ousting from the Danube.

"I must openly state that, today, a very similar situation exists. But this time it is the Government of only one big power — the Soviet Union, that is endeavouring to impose its hegemony on the Danube without regard either for the interests or rights of the riparian states, subjecting them to its domination. Whenever it is necessary to take some decision, methods and forms are employed here that are very similar to those used by the western imperialists who could look with envy at the voting machine which exists in this Commission.

"No mere words or apologetic speeches can alter these facts. The Yugoslav Delegation underlines that all this has nothing in common with noble socialist aims.

"Can there be any talk of socialist methods, to which the Soviet delegate has referred several times, when the will of one is imposed upon others, when coordination of the special interests of the member-countries of this Commission is prevented and when only the interests of one are realized in this way?

"The Yugoslav Delegation vigorously opposes all this and states that such a procedure again tramples upon the interests and sovereign equality of member-states of this Commission."

LETTER OF THE PERMANENT YUGOSLAV DELEGATE IN THE DANUBE COMMISSION, OF JUNE 1, 1950, ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY OF THE DANUBE COMMISSION IN GALATZ, IN REPLY TO HIS LETTER OF APRIL 28, 1950, ON THE QUESTION OF THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF POSTS IN THE DANUBE COMMISSION

To the Secretary
The Danube Commission
Galatz

June 1, 1950, Beograd

In answer to the letter of the Danube Commission of April 28 this year the Commission is informed of the following:

During the Second Session of the Danube Commission, the Chief of the Delegation of the FPRY advanced the concrete request that 7 official posts, out of the 62 permanent posts in the Secretariat and in the administrative apparatus of the Danube Commission, be filled by citizens of the FPRY. In advancing this request the Delegation of the FPRY took into consideration the total number and importance of the prescribed official posts. It did not insist upon the number of posts to which each state is proportionally entitled, but requested the minimum according to an equal distribution of official posts among the citizens of all the member-states in the Commission.

However, in the afore-mentioned letter, the Commission suggests four posts, and only secondary ones at that, for citizens of the FPRY. Not one leading post is proposed. It is a fact that of the total of 16 executive posts (Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, two Assistant Secretaries, and 11 chiefs of sections), not one has been assigned to the Yugoslavs. Such a distribution of official posts in the Danube Commission obviously bears out that the Soviet Delegation, which has the post of Secretary in the Commission, is endeavouring in this case, too, not only to place the FPRY in a position of inequality, but also to prevent the effective cooperation and participation of citizens of the FPRY in the work of the Danube Commission. This is discrimination against the FPRY, and is contrary to the spirit of the Danube Convention of 1948 which explicitly stressed that the Convention was elaborated pursuant to the interests and sovereign rights of the Danubian countries.

Notwithstanding all this, the Yugoslav Delegation is content to have only four official posts filled by Yugoslav citizens for the time being, provided that the other posts coincide with our requests for equal distribution of posts, at least by importance.

The Delegation of the FPRY could accept the following posts:

1. One of the two posts of Assistant Secretary of the Commission;
2. Two posts of chief of section: Chief of the Technical Section and Chief of the Hydro-Meteorological Section and Navigation Service, and should this not be possible, two other posts of chief of section, which correspond to the afore-mentioned in importance, namely: Chief of Plans and Statistics Section, Chief of River Superintendance Section and Chief of Accountancy Section;

3. In this case, as a fourth post the Delegation of the FPRY would accept one of the official posts which it requested earlier: Jurist, Chief Clerk for Fees, or a post in the Accountancy Section.

The Commission is requested to reply to the above immediately so that the Delegation of the FPRY can forward the necessary data about Yugoslav officials appointed to the mentioned posts.⁽⁴⁾

Permanent Delegate in the Danube Commission
and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Sgd.) Radoš Jovanović

⁽⁴⁾ In reply to this letter and to a subsequent inquiry by the Permanent Delegate of the FPRY of June 11, 1950, the Secretary of the Danube Commission, in his letter of June 15, reiterated his proposal of March 28, 1950, offering the FPRY only four secondary official posts in the Danube Commission. Owing to this, the Permanent Delegate of the FPRY, by letter No. 13 of September 13, 1950, protested against the discriminatory acts of the Secretary of the Danube Commission and again insisted upon his request, set forth in letter No. 3 of June 1, 1950, for an equal distribution of posts in the Danube Commission.

12. GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THEIR INFLUENCE, BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON YUGOSLAV NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

DOCUMENT No. 86

NOTE OF PROTEST OF THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN PRAGUE No. 139 OF MAY 5, 1949, AGAINST THE FACT THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR A DELEGATION OF THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENCE OF PEACE TO TAKE PART IN THE WORK OF THE PRAGUE PEACE CONGRESS IN APRIL, 1949

The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Prague has the honour to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Czechoslovakia of the following:

During the Prague Peace Congress, Yugoslav traitors and exiles residing in Prague were invited to attend the Congress and they participated officially in its work. Not only did this group of miserable hirelings participate in the work of the Congress but, enjoying the protection of the Czechoslovak Government and its hospitality, it distributed slanderous and provocative anti-Yugoslav pamphlets on the premises of the Czechoslovak Parliament. These pamphlets were directed against a Government and country with which the Czechoslovak Republic had concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance as well as a Convention on Cultural Cooperation, which are still in force.

While the Yugoslav traitors-exiles were invited to attend the Peace Congress in Prague, the Czechoslovak Government treated in a discriminatory manner the Yugoslav delegates who were to have taken part in the same Congress. Although the Embassy of the Czechoslovak Republic in Beograd and the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague had received timely notice of the urgent request for visas for Yugoslav Delegates designated to take part in the Prague Peace Congress, and although, according to an explicit statement by an official of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, responsible officials of that Ministry had also been informed of this, the Czechoslovak Government deliberately and tendentiously delayed the issuance of visas in order to make it impossible for the Yugoslav delegation to participate in the Peace Congress in Prague. Thus, we have a paradox whereby visas were received in time

to delegates from remote continents but the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, an allied, friendly country that is nearby, could not get visas for its delegates in time despite constant telephone inquiries by the Yugoslav Embassy in Prague on April 20, 1949, from 3:15 p. m. until 11:30 p. m., a Verbal Note of the same date and inquiries made at the Embassy of the Czechoslovak Republic in Beograd.

The benevolence of the Czechoslovak Government towards a mercenary group of Yugoslav traitors and exiles, armed with pistols for criminal purposes, was not confined to this support. The members of the Czechoslovak Government held a reception in honour of the Prague Peace Congress and sent a written invitation to Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in Prague. The Protocol Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic officially answered an inquiry by the Embassy of the FPRY in Prague, and said that the Yugoslav traitors and exiles had not received invitations to the reception. It was not true, however, that the Yugoslav traitors and exiles would not be present at the reception organized by members of the Czechoslovak Government. What is more, on April 25, 1949, the Protocol Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic officially informed the Embassy of the FPRY in Prague by telephone that the invitations for the Yugoslav diplomatic representatives had been cancelled. This was done under the pretext that the Delegation of the FPRY had not participated in the Prague Peace Congress, although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic had not been officially informed of the non-participation of Yugoslav delegates at the Congress which in effect was the result of the above-mentioned discriminatory acts by the Czechoslovak Government. The Czechoslovak Government thus offers hospitality to, and honours, the criminal group of Yugoslav traitors ready to sell out to the highest bidder. It gives these people priority over the representatives of a country with which the Czechoslovak Government has regular diplomatic relations.

The afore-mentioned acts of the Czechoslovak Government are not only extremely detrimental to the cause of peace and unity of the progressive forces in the world. They also cause the Government of the FPRY serious concern regarding the further development of the relations between the two countries. It is high time for the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic not only to respect the contracted obligations assumed towards the FPRY but to discontinue its hostile policy towards the FPRY, and to consider in earnest its historical responsibility for the hospitality and protection offered to a handful of armed Yugoslav criminal traitors.

The action of the Czechoslovak Government is all the more regrettable because discriminatory measures were used against the artists, writers and prominent personalities of a country whose sons had received visas by the thousands, without any delays or pretexts whatsoever, in the most critical period of Czechoslovak history — on the eve of Hitler's aggression — when these young people were ready to sacrifice their lives for the liberty and independence of the Czechoslovak Republic and a better future for the people of both countries.

In view of the above and on the basis of the existing Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and the Convention on Cultural Co-

operation, the Embassy of the FPRY in Prague most resolutely protests against the aforesaid hostile acts by the Czechoslovak Government. At the same time it requests an answer to its Verbal Note No. 16 of April 2, 1949, in which the attention of the Czechoslovak Government was drawn to the criminal plans of the Yugoslav traitors and exiles who are enjoying the hospitality and goodwill of the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic.

The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Prague avails itself of this opportunity to express its consideration to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic.⁽¹⁾ (?)

Prague, May 5, 1949.

DOCUMENT No. 17

NOTE OF PROTEST OF THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN SOFIA No. 428/I OF SEPTEMBER 17, 1949, TO THE BULGARIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGAINST THE EXPULSION FROM SOFIA OF A DELEGATION OF YUGOSLAV STUDENTS SCHEDULED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS

The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has the honour to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria of the following:

(1) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic replied by Note No. 117251 of May 18, 1949, attempting to shift responsibility for its act on the Organizational Committee of the World Congress of Partisans of Peace in Paris. It is obvious, however, that only the Czechoslovak Government can be responsible for the issuance or non-issuance of visas to a foreign delegation and that in no case can it be the Organizational Committee of an international non-governmental social organization.

The Prague Peace Congress sat simultaneously with the World Congress of Partisans of Peace in Paris, in April, 1949. Those delegates to whom the French authorities failed to grant entry visas, including the Yugoslav delegates, were to have taken part in the work of the latter.

(2) In addition to the above-mentioned hostile acts, the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, the Governments of the countries of Eastern Europe and the leadership of the World Congress of Partisans of Peace undertook a series of discriminatory measures and acts against the Yugoslav National Committee for the Defence of Peace. Thus, at the meeting of the Bureau of the Permanent Committee of the World Congress of Partisans of Peace, held on October 7, 1949, in Paris, the Yugoslav National Committee for the Defence of Peace was attacked for supporting the pacific policy of its legal Government, which was slandered at this meeting in the sense of the charges put forth in the Cominform Resolution. At the plenary meeting of the World Congress of Partisans of Peace in Rome, from October 28 to 30, 1949, the decision was taken to expell the Yugoslav National Committee for the Defence of Peace. The expulsion was put through without the participation of Yugoslav representatives, who were not allowed to attend the meeting. With its disruptive activities, which run counter to the interests of world peace and caused tremendous damage to the unity of democratic and progressive forces in the world, the leadership of the World Congress of Partisans of Peace, which professes to fight for peace, actually offers active support to the aggressive and warmongering campaign of a big power against a small, independent socialist country, and in this way has become an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

The Delegation of the People's Student Youth of Yugoslavia arrived in Sofia on September 14, 1949, with proper passports and with credentials for participation in the work of the Council of the International Union of Students to be held in Sofia on September 15—25, 1949. The Delegation was composed of five representatives of the Yugoslav student youth, to wit: Milorad Pešić, Nijaz Dizdarević, Rajko Tomović, Marko Šarić and Jakša Bučević.

Upon their arrival, the Yugoslav delegates were accommodated in the Slavjanska Beseda Hotel together with student delegates from other countries. About 5 p. m., however, while the Yugoslav delegates were taking a rest after their journey, some individuals started to knock on their doors. These persons introduced themselves as representatives of the Bulgarian student youth. They requested the Yugoslav delegates to come down to the lobby of the hotel immediately as a meeting was, allegedly, to be held which all the delegates should attend. The Yugoslav delegates did not have the slightest inkling that they were dealing with Bulgarian State security agents and that they would encounter provocations and trouble. Believing they were speaking to Bulgarian students, they asked what kind of a meeting was in question as they had been officially advised that only the meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Union of Students was scheduled for that day, at 8 p. m. After persistent requests and explanations by these people, who introduced themselves as Bulgarian students, to the effect that there would be a meeting of all the delegates at 6 p. m. in the hotel and that the Yugoslav delegates must attend, three Yugoslav delegates, Milorad Pešić, Marko Šarić and Jakša Bučević went to take part in this "meeting." But, going down to the lobby, escorted by the same people, they learned from the Czechoslovak delegates that no meeting had been fixed for that time. Seeing that these people were not Bulgarian students but members of the Bulgarian State security, who might cause provocations, the three Yugoslav delegates went to the office of the Secretariat of the International Union of Students, located in the Central Army Club, to register and submit their credentials. At the same time they wanted to request the Secretariat of the International Union of Students to intercede in regard to such behaviour by the Bulgarian State authorities towards them. While they were in the office of the Secretariat, agents of the Bulgarian State security waited in front of the building.

While they were still in the Secretariat, an official of the Bulgarian State security, accompanied by two agents, entered the office, came up to them and very insolently requested that the Yugoslav delegates leave the office immediately and go back to the hotel. In the presence of Rajna Georgijeva, a member of the executive of the Bulgarian youth organization and representative of the Bulgarian youth in the World Federation of Democratic Youth; of Jarmila Maršalekova, internal secretary of the International Union of Students; of the British delegate Carmela Brickman, who was registering the delegates in the Secretariat, and in the presence of several members of the Czechoslovak, Chinese and other delegations who happened to be in the office at that moment — the Yugoslav delegates requested an explanation for such an attitude towards them. The official of the Bulgarian State security then showed them an identity card and declared that "the Government of the PR of Bulgaria

had decided that the delegation of Yugoslav students should immediately leave Bulgaria."

The Yugoslav delegates protested and expressed their astonishment at such an unprecedented procedure, since the Government of the PR of Bulgaria, in agreeing to have the meeting of the International Union of Students' Council in Sofia, had assumed the obligation to make it possible for all members of the Union to take part in its work. This was all the more so since the Yugoslav delegates had been invited by cable to take part in the Council's work. Upon that, the members of the Bulgarian State security rushed upon the Yugoslav delegates and pushed them roughly out of the building into a waiting militia car. During the whole time, they were insolently cursing and insulting the FPR of Yugoslavia, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the State and Party leadership of the FPRY. All this happened in the presence of the above-mentioned student delegates who intervened and requested the Council of the International Union of Students to settle the question of participation of the Yugoslav delegates.

Without permitting the Yugoslav delegates to take their personal effects from the hotel or to inform the Embassy of the FPRY in Sofia of all this, the Bulgarian State security agents drove the three Yugoslav student delegates to the Bulgarian frontier authorities at Dragoman. On the way, the Bulgarian State security members tried to inveigle them. Failing in this, they subjected the students to the harshest ill-treatment and chicanery which was continued by the Bulgarian frontier authorities while the Yugoslav delegates were held in the prison there, i. e. until the departure of the train for the FPRY.

The other two Yugoslav delegates, Nijaz Dizdarević and Rajko Tomović, who had remained in their hotel rooms, were also arrested and expelled in a similar way. It should be pointed out here that when the two Yugoslav delegates requested two Finnish delegates they had met in the hotel to inform the President and the Secretary General of the International Union of Students of the behaviour of the Bulgarian authorities towards the Yugoslav delegates, the same representative of the Bulgarian State security, who had earlier arrested the Yugoslav delegates Pešić, Šarić and Bučević, brutally forbade the Finnish delegates from telling anyone what had happened to the Yugoslav delegates and compelled Dizdarević and Tomović to follow him, saying that "he would resort to force" if they tried to speak to anyone.

In stating the above, the Embassy of the FPRY must emphasize that this latest brutal and completely unprovoked action by the Bulgarian authorities who thus arrested and expelled the Yugoslav delegates, four of whom are members of the International Union of Students Executive, is a hostile act by the Government of the PR of Bulgaria against the peoples of the FPRY of Yugoslavia. Such behaviour, by which a Government authorizes a delegation to enter the country in order to arrest and expell it on the same day, is unprecedented in international relations even between countries maintaining only ordinary and formal diplomatic relations, to say nothing of countries bound by a series of treaties and agreements, and even by a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance as is the case with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Only a Government pursuing an unprincipled and hostile campaign against

the existing socialist order in Yugoslavia and one that does not want the truth about the FPRY to be known could decide upon such a step.

On the basis of the above, and under instructions from its Government, the Embassy of the FPRY in Sofia protests most vigorously to the Government of the PR of Bulgaria against the unfounded and unprovoked arrest, ill-treatment and expulsion of the Yugoslav student delegation and emphasizes that the responsibility for such acts rests fully and exclusively with the Government of the PR of Bulgaria.

The Embassy of the FPRY expresses its consideration to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Bulgaria.^(*) (')

(*) The Bulgarian Government did not answer this Note.

(') The cited example of the eviction of the Yugoslav student delegation from Sofia by the police is only one of many such discriminatory acts against Yugoslav non-governmental mass organizations and their representatives in the Eastern European countries. For example, in 1948, the youth leaderships in the Eastern European countries and some youth organizations in other countries cancelled without cause the already planned exchanges of youth work brigades, student groups, children, letters, etc. with the People's Youth of Yugoslavia. They rejected the invitation of the People's Youth of Yugoslavia to attend the Congress of Unification of the Communist Youth League of Yugoslavia and the People's Youth of Yugoslavia, in December, 1948. The representatives of the People's Youth of Yugoslavia in the Provisional Committee for the World Youth Festival were arrested and evicted from Budapest in August, 1949. The governments of the Eastern European countries refused to issue visas to the Yugoslav delegates for various congresses and festivals of the World Federation of Democratic Youth, etc. After a number of such acts towards the People's Youth of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav youth organizations were expelled in an arbitrary and undemocratic manner from various international federations. The Union of Student Youth of Yugoslavia was expelled from the International Union of Students and the People's Youth of Yugoslavia was expelled from the World Federation of Democratic Youth by its Executive Committee, in January, 1950, although the People's Youth of Yugoslavia was one of the founders of the World Federation of Democratic Youth.

The governments of the countries of Eastern Europe and the leadership of the World Federation of Trade Unions endeavoured by way of various discriminatory acts towards the Yugoslav Trade Union Confederation to obstruct contact between this working class organization of Yugoslavia, numbering more than 1,700,000 members, and other trade union organizations in the world, and to prevent its participation in the work of the World Federation of Trade Unions, of which the Confederation of Yugoslav Trade Unions was one of the founders and most active members. By not issuing visas to the delegates of the Yugoslav trade unions in 1949, certain governments of the countries of Eastern Europe prevented the participation of the representatives of the Confederation of Yugoslav Trade Unions in the foundation of various trade union internationals. Thus, the Government of the PR of Bulgaria refused to grant visas to members of a Yugoslav trade union delegation for the inaugural conference of the Trade Union International of Hotel, Food and Tobacco Industry Workers in November, 1949. The Soviet occupation authorities in Germany prevented a Yugoslav trade union delegation from attending the inaugural conference of the Trade Union International of Post, Telegraph, Telephone and Radio Workers in October, 1949. The Government of the Polish Republic failed to grant visas to a delegation of the Yugoslav Trade Union Confederation for the inaugural conference of the Trade Union International of Farm and Forestry Workers in Warsaw, in December, 1949.

At all these and at many other international trade union conferences, the Confederation of Yugoslav Trade Unions was attacked simply because it did not support the policy of aggressive pressure by the Soviet Government on the FPRY which the leadership of the World Federation of Trade Unions was pursuing. The peak of undemocratic acts against the Confederation of Yugoslav Trade Unions was reached when the Secretariat of the World Federation of Trade Unions severed relations with Djuro Salaj, Chairman of the Central Council of the Confederation of Yugoslav Trade Unions. Djuro Salaj had been elected in a democratic manner to membership in the Executive Committee at the Second Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions in 1949. Since this undemocratic act of the Executive Committee of the World

13. UNILATERAL CLOSURE BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF ALBANIA, BULGARIA, RUMANIA, AND HUNGARY OF FRONTIERS WITH YUGOSLAVIA TO OWNERS OF PROPERTY CUT BY THE BOUNDARY LINE

DOCUMENT No. 11

NOTE OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT No. 414709/I OF JULY 22, 1950, REGARDING THE UNILATERAL BREACH BY THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE UTILIZATION OF PROPERTY CUT BY THE YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN FRONTIER, OF AUGUST 27, 1947

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, in the name of its Government, acknowledges the communication of the Bulgarian Government made in the Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Bulgaria, addressed on June 29, 1950, to the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Sofia, on the unilateral renunciation of the Agreement of August 27, 1947, on the utilization of property cut by the Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier line, and wishes in this connection to point out the following:

Federation of Trade Unions constituted an attack on the entire membership of the Confederation of Yugoslav Trade Unions, which was represented in the WFTU by Djuro Salaj, the Yugoslav Trade Union Confederation, at the eleventh plenary meeting of its Central Council held on May 15, 1950, in Beograd, decided to withdraw from the World Federation of Trade Unions in view of the fact that the latter's present leadership had been "turned into a bureaucratic machine of the hegemonistic foreign policy of the USSR."

A number of equally rude and insulting acts were undertaken in regard to the Women's Anti-Fascist Front of Yugoslavia. Among them were the attempt to prevent the Women's Anti-Fascist Front from displaying material at an exhibition in Paris, in 1948; the discrimination, insults and provocations with regard to the Yugoslav delegation to the Second Congress of the Women's International Democratic Federation in Budapest, in 1948; the failure to invite the Yugoslav delegates to the plenary meeting of the Women's International Democratic Federation in Moscow; the arbitrary and undemocratic eviction of the Women's Anti-Fascist Front from the Women's International Democratic Federation at that plenary meeting etc., etc.

The same methods of discrimination were applied also towards the Federation of Yugoslav Journalists. The governments of the countries of Eastern Europe refused to grant visas to Yugoslav delegations to international congresses. Such was the case, for instance, with the Congress in Budapest, in November, 1948, and with the meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Journalists' Organization in Prague, in September, 1949, for which the Czechoslovak authorities not only refused to grant visas to Yugoslav delegates, but the organizers of the meeting even prevented the correspondent of TANJUG in Prague, who was delegated to represent the Federation of Yugoslav Journalists, from entering the hall where the meeting was being held. Other undemocratic acts on the part of the International Journalist's Organi-

Two years ago the Bulgarian frontier authorities started violating the provisions of the above-mentioned Agreement by a series of hostile and unlawful acts, and with the passage of time these violations have grown worse. By maltreatment, intimidation and arrests, by taking away permits to cross the frontier from persons whose property is cut by the frontier line, by prohibiting the crossing of the frontier and by seizing the property of such owners the Bulgarian frontier authorities made it impossible for Yugoslav owners to use their properties located in Bulgarian territory.

Despite numerous intercessions in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY, and the Embassy of the FPRY in Sofia, underlined the detrimental consequences of such actions by Bulgarian frontier authorities, the Bulgarian Government did not in any way change its attitude towards the Yugoslav owners of properties cut by the frontier line. On the contrary, the Bulgarian frontier authorities continued their excesses with ever-increasing violations of the Agreement.

The Bulgarian Government is well aware that, owing to such actions by the Bulgarian frontier authorities, all traffic connected with properties cut by the Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier line has been rendered impossible. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY in its Note No. 421720 of January 21, 1950, submitted to the Bulgarian Government a whole series of facts in this regard.

Nevertheless, inspired by the desire to normalize traffic connected with properties cut by the frontier line, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY, in its Note No. 46453 of March 23, 1950, proposed to the Bulgarian Government that the validity of permits issued to Yugoslav and Bulgarian owners of property cut by the frontier line be extended for one year, i. e. until March 31, 1951, in accordance with Art. 12 of the above-mentioned Agreement. By its statement of March 25, 1950, the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accepted, on behalf of its Government, the proposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY, underlining that the Bulgarian authorities would respect the Agreement.

The Yugoslav authorities have been trying to keep traffic connected with properties cut by the frontier line proceeding normally. They made no difficulties for such Bulgarian owners in the exploitation of their landed property. This is proved by the fact that the Bulgarian Government has not intervened at all with the Yugoslav Government regarding this matter since the traffic had been renewed. In contrast to such an attitude by the Yugoslav authorities, and even after the Yugoslav proposal had apparently been accepted by the Bulgarian Government, the Bulgarian frontier organs continued their systematic violations of the provisions of the Agreement. By a series of arbitrary and hostile acts, they made it impossible for the Yugoslav owners of property

tion towards the Federation of Yugoslav Journalists were the severance of all connections with the Federation of Yugoslav Journalists and the failure to invite it to international congresses, etc. Owing to these acts, the Federation of Yugoslav Journalists withdrew from the International Journalists' Organization in April, 1950.

All the given examples of acts against Yugoslav non-governmental mass organizations prove that the leaderships of the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the International Journalists' Organization and others have become instruments of the hegemonistic foreign policy of the Soviet Government.

stretching on both sides of the border to utilize that portion of their property that is in Bulgarian territory.

This is proved by the following facts:

The Bulgarian frontier authorities prohibited all traffic connected with property situated along the border of the PR of Macedonia, property cut by the Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier line, although they had received and endorsed the permits of Yugoslav owners for crossing the frontier. On the frontier line skirting the People's Republic of Serbia the Bulgarian frontier authorities, from time to time and without any grounds, prevented Yugoslav owners from crossing into Bulgarian territory. Such was the case, for instance, on March 27 and 28, 1950, in the region of Črnomasnice and Koilovo villages (southeast of Negotin).

In a number of cases the Bulgarian authorities arbitrarily appropriated the estates of Yugoslav owners and gave them to Bulgarian citizens and cooperatives for cultivation. Such was the case with the property of the following Yugoslav owners: Boris Vladimirov Cankov, Krum Tešev, Petar Aleksov, Djordje Stankov, Kirko Pešev, Novka Iljeva, Djordje Milenkov, Konstantin Stankov and Konstantin Georgijev, all from the village of Mazgoš, Dimitrovgrad District. Their properties are situated in Bulgarian territory in the region of the village of Stanjancl, Godeč District. Such was also the case with Vasa Stojkov from village of Bačevo. Dimitrovgrad District, whose property is in the administrative area of the village of Kalotina, Godeč District; Asen Aleksov and Asen Velkov, both from the village of Donje Nevlje, Dimitrovgrad District, whose properties are in the administrative area of the village of Bare, Godeč District; Mirovna Spaseva, from the village of Vlkovlje, Dimitrovgrad District, whose property is located in the territory of the village of Smolče, Godeč District; Sima Todorov Punev, Rangel Minčev, Simeon Bodenov, all from the village of Gradinja, Dimitrovgrad District, whose properties are situated in Bulgarian territory in the area of the village of Kalotina, Godeč District.

On March 25, 1950, the Bulgarian frontier authorities, without any reason, forbade Todor Punev Simeonov, from the village of Gradinja, to transport hay from his property into the FPRY.

The Bulgarian frontier authorities have been arresting Yugoslav owners after they cross into Bulgarian territory and requesting intelligence information from them. Such was the case with Vaso Stojanov and his daughter Gineja, from the village of Gradinja. They were arrested by the Bulgarian authorities, taken to the Frontier Command at Kalotina village and cross-examined by the frontier officers, who asked them for information on the armaments of the Yugoslav frontier guard and army units.

On April 19, at 12 noon, the Bulgarian frontier patrol arrested a Yugoslav owner of property cut by the frontier line, Petar Dragičević, and took him to the Halovske Kolibe frontier post. Later he was conducted to the Frontier Command at Goleminovo village where the frontier officers interrogated him about the armaments of Yugoslav frontier units and the fortifications and security service along the Yugoslav border. Dragičević was set free only on April 21, at 11 a. m.

On March 22, 1950, without any grounds, the Bulgarian frontier authorities also arrested the Yugoslav owners of property cut by the

frontier line: Angel Marinkov Todorov, Nikola Rangelov Rančev and Pavle Kostov, all from Slivnica village, Dimitrovgrad District. These people were arrested while working on their land. They were later conducted to the village of Višanj where the Bulgarian frontier officers interrogated them at a frontier post.

In addition to the above, Bulgarian frontier forces undertook other unjustified measures to obstruct Yugoslav citizens and to make it impossible for them to cultivate and utilize their property in Bulgarian territory. Thus, the Bulgarian border control officials regularly arrived three to four hours late at the designated place where such owners had to cross the frontier. Owing to that, the peasants wasted a lot of time waiting at the frontier. This was an especially regular occurrence at the Halovo crossing, Zaječar District. Such a procedure was in obvious contradiction with the provisions of the Agreement, according to which owners could stay on the other side of the border from sunrise to sunset.

Contrary to the Agreement, the Bulgarian frontier authorities systematically prevented Yugoslav owners from driving their cattle to graze on the meadows owned by them. Thus, the Bulgarian authorities prevented such owners from the village of Halovo from driving their cattle over the border, although they produced valid veterinary certificates proving the cattle's health. The Bulgarian authorities took away all their certificates, kept them about 15 days, and then returned them without allowing the cattle to be driven across the frontier. The Bulgarian authorities also applied such bans regarding the grazing of cattle of Yugoslav owners of property cut by the frontier line from the villages of Gornji Krivodol, Vlkovlja, Mazgoš, Brebnica, Donji Krivodol, although these Yugoslav citizens had regular permits.

The Bulgarian frontier authorities arbitrarily closed fixed crossing points such as Babina Mahala. For this reason, people from the Gradinja village were forced to cross the frontier at the next crossing point, 4 to 5 kilometres away. Thus, they encountered great difficulties because they were compelled to cover 20 kilometres a day in order to reach their property in Bulgarian territory.

Further, the Bulgarian authorities took permits away from Yugoslav owners of property cut by the frontier line under the pretext of wanting to endorse them, but they failed to return them. Thus, on March 26, 1950, his permit was taken from Yugoslav citizen, Pavle Kostov, of Slivnica village, Dimitrovgrad District, and it has not been returned to him.

The Bulgarian frontier authorities have recently started issuing permits to certain Bulgarian citizens who have no property in the FPRY, while refusing permits to other Bulgarian citizens, who are owners of property in Yugoslav territory. The Bulgarian authorities thus issued permits to the following persons who have no property in Yugoslavia: Boris Petrov, permit No. 79; Gorgica Saranova, permit No. 31; Fengolis Topđžijev, permit No. 113; Frol Ukrajnov, permit No. 72; all of them from Bregova village, Kula District; and also to Temarin Korov from the Halovo village who crossed into Yugoslav territory with such a permit on March 25, 1950.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia resolutely rejects the protest of the Bulgarian Ministry of:

Foreign Affairs contained in the Note of June 29, 1950, because it is based on statements regarding alleged actions by the Yugoslav authorities towards Bulgarian owners of property cut by the frontier line, which do not correspond to the facts. The above-mentioned facts confirm that it was the Bulgarian and not the Yugoslav authorities who systematically violated the provisions of the aforementioned Agreement, and that the Bulgarian authorities acted in this way in order to obstruct normal traffic connected with property cut by the Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier line, and to stop it altogether at a suitable moment. It is a fact, however, that the Yugoslav Government was the initiator of a positive solution by agreement of all disputed questions concerning the normalization of this traffic. It is likewise a fact that since March, 1950, when it accepted the proposal of the Yugoslav Government to prolong the validity of permits for one year, the Bulgarian Government has not indicated a single case of any act by the Yugoslav authorities aimed at obstructing the traffic connected with properties cut by the Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier line. Even these facts alone show that the Bulgarian Government, by making arbitrary assertions about alleged unlawful acts by the Yugoslav authorities towards Bulgarian owners, wishes to ascribe to the Yugoslav authorities the actions of the Bulgarian authorities themselves. Thus the Bulgarian Government wishes to conceal under a transparent pretext the real motives for the unilateral renunciation of the Agreement on the utilization of properties cut by the Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier line.⁽¹⁾

Beograd, July 22, 1950.

(1) Before the beginning of the war on April 6, 1941, the traffic connected with property cut by the boundary line between Yugoslavia on the one hand and Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Albania respectively on the other, proceeded on the grounds of agreements concluded between Yugoslavia and the above-mentioned countries. Immediately after World War II, such traffic along the frontier between the FPRY and the foregoing countries was reopened and it proceeded temporarily on the basis of pre-war agreements.

The Government of the FPRY concluded new agreements and protocols regulating the method of utilization of property cut by the boundary line and small-goods traffic over the border with the Government of the PR of Bulgaria on September 21, 1947, with the Government of the Hungarian Republic on November 27, 1947, with the Government of the PR of Albania on February 20, 1948, while the Convention on Real Estate in the Frontier Zone of July 5, 1924, remained in force with the Rumanian People's Republic.

After the Cominform Resolution of June, 1948, this traffic along the frontiers of the FPRY with the mentioned countries was either immediately cut off altogether, as was the case with such traffic between the FPRY and Albania and Rumania respectively, or it unfolded under very difficult circumstances, as was the case along the frontiers with Bulgaria and Hungary, until these Governments likewise closed such traffic on their frontiers. Immediately after the publication of the Cominform Resolution, on July 1, 1948, the Government of the PR of Albania broke a number of agreements and treaties concluded with the Government of the FPRY which, apart from other things, regulated this question as well, so that all traffic connected with property cut by the boundary line immediately ceased on this frontier. On June 30, 1949, the Rumanian Government arbitrarily broke the Convention of July 5, 1924. By its Note of July 1, 1950, the Bulgarian Government also broke the agreement on the utilization of property cut by the boundary line, while traffic connected with property cut by the boundary line on the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier was virtually stopped towards the middle of 1949, although the Protocol signed on November 27, 1947, in Subotica was formally still in force.

4. STATEMENTS MADE BY THE MOST RESPONSIBLE STATE AND PARTY LEADERS OF THE USSR AND COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS LEGAL GOVERNMENT(*)

HOSTILE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE VICE-PREMIERS OF THE USSR AND MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE CC OF THE CPSU(B), V. M. MOLOTOV, K. Y. VOROSHILOV, N. A. BULGANIN, G. M. MALENKOV, BY THE SECRETARY OF THE CC OF THE CPSU(B), M. A. SUSLOV, AND BY MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION AND MEMBER OF THE CC OF THE CPSU(B), S. M. BUDENNY

DOCUMENT No. 89

FROM THE REPORT BY VYACHESLAV MIKHAILOVICH MOLOTOV, VICE-PREMIER OF THE USSR, THEN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE CC OF THE CPSU(B), DELIVERED IN CONNECTION WITH THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION, NOVEMBER 6, 1948, IN MOSCOW

"The betrayal by the leading, nationalistic group in Yugoslavia has done great harm to her peoples. No one can doubt, however, that the CPY, faithful to its internationalist traditions, will find the road along which Yugoslavia will again become a member of the brotherly community which is being created by the USSR together with the countries of people's democracy."

(PRAVDA, November 7, 1948.)

(*) These quotations are only some of the statements made by the highest State, Party and military leaders of the USSR and countries of Eastern Europe against Yugoslavia.

In connection with the violation of the mentioned agreements and conventions by Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, committed by the unwarranted closing of particular frontier crossings, by the non-issuance or non-endorsement of passes of owners of property cut by the boundary line, by the confiscation of farm produce, by cutting down the forests of Yugoslav owners of such property, by arrests, beatings, chicanery and attempts to recruit such Yugoslav owners for espionage on behalf of the intelligence services of the mentioned countries, by infiltrating spies and terrorists into Yugoslavia with the aid of passes of owners of property cut by the boundary line, etc., Government of the FPRY addressed 38 Notes of protest to the Governments of the mentioned countries during the period from July 21, 1948, to July 22,

**FROM THE SPEECH BY KLIMENT YEPHREMOVICH VOROSHILOV, VICE-
PREMIER OF THE USSR, MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE CC
OF THE CPSU(B), MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION, ON THE FIFTH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE LIBERATION OF RUMANIA, AUGUST 22, 1949,
IN BUCHAREST:**

"Sad is the fate of the present rulers of Yugoslavia, the fate of those people who deserted from the camp of socialism and democracy to the camp of capitalism and reaction. It clearly shows where betrayal of the brotherly countries and of the principles of proletarian internationalism inevitably leads. These traitors to socialism are restoring the capitalist system in their country, they are liquidating the democratic achievements of the Yugoslav peoples and introducing a sanguinary fascist regime in the country. Having deprived themselves of the brotherly, moral, political and economic help of the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy, the rulers of Yugoslavia have deliberately led the economy of their country into an impasse and, thereby, determined in advance a place for their people in the caravan of infuriated imperialist capital.

"Starting little by little, by refusing to cooperate loyally with the Soviet Union and by sinister bargaining behind the scenes with the imperialists, the rulers of Yugoslavia transformed themselves into overt and malevolent enemies of the Soviet Union, of the countries of people's democracy and of the whole anti-imperialist camp.

"The savage violence and terror of this criminal Tito clique, however, which is ready to bend over backwards to earn a smile from its severe Wall Street bosses, cannot deceive the honest Yugoslav people. And the people of Yugoslavia know very well that the Soviet Union, the countries of people's democracy, and the entire mighty anti-imperialist camp headed by the Soviet Union under the leadership of the great Stalin, are the only powerful force which can oppose the sinister forces of reaction and the instigators of a new war.

"Only the camp of peace and democracy, headed by the Soviet Union, can defend the people, including the peoples of Yugoslavia, from the sinister, aggressive imperialist forces which are drawing the world toward a new war and chaos."

(SCANTEIA No. 1511 of August 23, 1949.)

1950, namely: 16 to the Government of the PR of Bulgaria, 14 to the Government of the PR of Hungary and 8 to the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic.

By preventing and cutting off completely all small-goods traffic and traffic connected with properties cut by the boundary line, the Governments of the mentioned countries did serious material damage to the population on both sides of the frontier. Especially hard-hit was the Yugoslav national minority in Hungary and in Rumania which is for the most part settled in the frontier region. In view of various measures which the Governments of the mentioned countries are undertaking along the frontiers of the FPRY, the prohibition and abolition of small-goods traffic and traffic connected with property cut by the boundary line with Yugoslavia also has a military character.

FROM THE SPEECH DELIVERED BY NIKOLAI ALEXANDROVICH BULGANIN, VICE-PREMIER OF THE USSR, MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION, MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE CC OF THE CPSU(B), AT THE CELEBRATION OF THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE LIBERATION OF BULGARIA, SEPTEMBER 9, 1949, IN SOFIA

"Judas Tito and his abettors — malevolent deserters from the camp of socialism to the camp of imperialism and fascism — have transformed Yugoslavia into a Gestapo prison, where every expression of free thought and human rights are suppressed, where the finest representatives of the working class, the working peasantry and intelligentsia are savagely killed because they are fighting for democracy and socialism.

"Wrenched away from the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy, Yugoslavia is each day becoming more and more of a colony of international and, primarily, American imperialism.

"The whole of progressive mankind looks with loathing upon these despised traitors, agents and accomplices of imperialism who are fulfilling the wishes of their masters. But the Yugoslav people will have their say. The traitors will not escape the terrible judgment of their people. They will have to account for their sanguinary crimes, for their repulsive deception and betrayal of the Yugoslav people and of the whole democratic camp."

(RABOTNICHESKO DELO No. 242, of September 11, 1949.)

FROM THE SPEECH BY GEORGI MAXIMILYANOVICH MALENKOV, VICE-PREMIER OF THE USSR, MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU AND SECRETARY OF THE CC OF THE CPSU(B), HELD IN CONNECTION WITH THE THIRTY-SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION, ON NOVEMBER 6, 1949, IN MOSCOW

"The Budapest trial of Rajk and his associates in espionage revealed that the war-mongers and their Yugoslav constables will shrink from nothing. They are trying to hinder the full historical development of the people's democratic republics, to break the ground for armed imperialist intervention against them and to transform these countries into their colonies.

"The Budapest trial also revealed that the subversive plans of the imperialists against the countries of people's democracy suffered one defeat after another. The Tito-Ranković nationalist-fascist clique has been completely exposed as an imperialist espionage network used by the imperialists for hostile activities against the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy."

(PRAVDA No. 311, of November 7, 1949.)

FROM THE REPORT BY MIKHAIL ANDREYEVICH SUSLOV, SECRETARY OF THE CC OF THE CPSU(B), SUBMITTED TO THE COMINFORM CONSULTATION DURING THE LATTER HALF OF NOVEMBER, 1949

"An important role in the achievement of aggressive plans, particularly in Central and South-East Europe, has been assigned by the Anglo-American imperialists to the Yugoslav Tito clique, which is in the espionage service of the imperialists. Accordingly, the task of defending the peace and struggling against the war-mongers requires continual unmasking of this clique which deserted to the camp of the worst enemies of peace, democracy and socialism, to the camp of imperialism and fascism."

("Defence of Peace and Struggle Against the Warmongers," PRAVDA No. 337, of December 3, 1949.)

FROM AN ARTICLE BY VYACHESLAV MIKHAILOVICH MOLOTOV, VICE-PREMIER OF THE USSR AND MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE CC OF THE CPSU(B)

"In order to seize power in Yugoslavia, it was indispensable for the men of Tito's clique, as we know, to pass themselves off as friends of the Soviet Union and as communists. The day is not far off, however, when the shameful fate of criminal hirelings of imperialist reaction will catch up with the traitorous clique of Tito, which has become a gang of paid murderers and spies, serving alien imperialist Governments, a gang whose hostile plans against the Soviet Union and against its own people have been disclosed."

("Stalin and Stalinist Leadership," PRAVDA No. 355, of December 21, 1949.)

FROM THE SPEECH BY KLIMENT YEPHREMOVICH VOROSHILOV, VICE-PREMIER OF THE USSR, MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE CC OF THE CPSU(B) AND MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION, HELD ON JANUARY 25, 1950, IN SOFIA, AT THE BURIAL OF VASIL KOLAROV, BULGARIAN PREMIER

"Comrade Kolarov directed all his talent, all his passion of a proletarian revolutionary, towards unmasking the intrigues of the Anglo-American imperialists, instigators of a new war and their Balkan network of agents, the traitorous clique of Tito. He was justly merciless towards

the vile traitors and enemies of the Bulgarian peoples of the Trajčo Kostov brand, who did their filthy and treacherous work by order of world imperialism and its Yugoslav lackeys."

(PRAVDA No. 26 of January 26, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 86

FROM THE SPEECH BY VYACHESLAV MIKHAILOVICH MOLOTOV, VICE-PREMIER OF THE USSR AND MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE CC OF THE CPSU(B), ADDRESSED TO VOTERS OF THE MOLOTOV ELECTORAL DISTRICT IN MOSCOW ON MARCH 10, 1950

"The unmasking of the sinister treason of Tito's clique in Yugoslavia had a great political significance. This criminal-fascist gang can no longer conceal itself under the guise of communism in its country; it will no longer be able to corrode the ranks of honest democrats and socialists in other countries. The peoples of Yugoslavia will, of course, draw a conclusion from the situation that has been created."

(PRAVDA No. 70, of March 11, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 87

FROM THE SPEECH BY KLIMENT YEPHREMOVICH VOROSHILOV, VICE-PREMIER OF THE USSR, MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE CC OF THE CPSU(B) AND MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION, HELD AT THE CELEBRATION OF THE LIBERATION OF HUNGARY IN BUDAPEST, ON APRIL 3, 1950

"Tito's gang of spies and provocateurs has transformed Yugoslavia into an agricultural and raw-materials appendage of capitalist countries. The peoples of Yugoslavia have been condemned to hunger, misery and privations such as they did not endure even in the darkest periods in the past.

"By order of the Anglo-American imperialists, the Beograd rulers stabbed the Greek liberation movement in the back and, together with the monarcho-fascist clique in Athens, are forging a criminal conspiracy against the countries of people's democracy. They are playing the role of war-mongers and are organizing for their Anglo-American masters espionage, terrorist actions and murders in the countries of people's democracy.

"The imperialists who have lost their heads, however, and their despised vassals in Beograd, are very much mistaken in their calculations to incite the peoples of Yugoslavia against the peace-loving countries of people's democracy and the Soviet Union. They will not succeed in transforming the Yugoslavs into servile tools of imperialist aggressive plans by any kind of terror, persecutions and slanders. The peoples of

Yugoslavia know that their place is in the camp of peace and democracy and that the only support of the freedom and independence of their country is the anti-imperialist camp headed by the Soviet Union.

"One need not doubt that the working class of Yugoslavia and all its toilers will find the strength within them to overthrow the clique of traitors and resume a place of honour among the brotherly republics of people's democracy."

(PRAVDA No. 95, of April 5, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 98

FROM THE SPEECH BY NIKOLAI ALEXANDROVICH BULGANIN, VICE-PREMIER OF THE USSR, MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION, MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE CC OF THE CPSU(B), HELD AT THE CELEBRATION OF THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE LIBERATION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC, IN PRAGUE, ON MAY 6, 1950

"The peoples of Yugoslavia are worthy of a bright future and we believe that the time is not far off when they will be victorious over the fascist Tito-Ranković clique."

(PRAVDA No. 127 of May 7, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 99

FROM THE SPEECH BY SIMEON M. BUDENNY, MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION AND MEMBER OF THE CC OF THE CPSU(B), AT A CELEBRATION IN SOFIA IN OBSERVANCE OF SEPTEMBER 9, THE BULGARIAN NATIONAL HOLIDAY

"The Democratic Camp, headed by the Soviet Union, growing stronger from day to day, is provoking the hatred and envy of the imperialists. The instigators of war are using all means to try to hamper the peaceful work of nations, to launch a new world war. They are carrying on destructive activities against the camp of peace, democracy and socialism, and have united all the forces of reaction — from the despicable traitors and imperialist hirelings of Tito's clique, down to the remnants of broken fascist gangs in various countries...."

(RABOTNICHESKO DELO No. 253, of September 10, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 100

FROM THE SPEECH BY THE CHIEF OF THE UKRAINIAN DELEGATION, D. Z. MANUILSKY, UKRAINIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HELD IN THE GENERAL DEBATE AT THE 229th PLENARY MEETING OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1949

"Attempts have been made here, by diversionist manoeuvres of the agents of the warmongers, to divert the attention of the General Assem-

bly from the proposals of the Soviet Union. Attempts have been made to thwart the adoption of these proposals by hook or by crook. It is to be regretted that such a serious statesman as Mr. Pearson, Minister for External Affairs of Canada, is included in this band which in one way or another attempts to checkmate or stymie the Soviet Union proposals.

"Among these attempts, we may list the orations of the Chinese representative, Mr. Tsiang, of the Chilean representative and of the representative of the bankrupt group of sharks in Yugoslavia. It is impossible to engage in polemics with such persons.

"Incidentally, I heard laughter throughout the hall. I believe that many people are content, many are mirthful and happy, but the history of the working movement and democracy has always been characterized by renegades who were picked up by the partisans of reaction, and the partisans of reaction have never received any benefit from such actions.

"It is of no use to engage in polemics with such persons, and brief but cogent replies were given to Mr. Tsiang and Mr. Santa Cruz(?) by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the Byelorussian SSR. As representative of the Ukrainian SSR, I shall dwell very briefly on the hypocritical and slanderous observations of the representative of Yugoslavia. For a long time, it has been well-known that, when some disingenuous government is about to crash or stands on the brink of bankruptcy, morally and materially speaking, it attempts to shift the blame to some force outside. It attempts to shift the blame for its own bankruptcy and failure to the shoulders of others. False and hypocritical, therefore, are the allegations of the representative of Yugoslavia that the Government which he represents stands midway, poised between the two camps. In fact, for a long time, the Tito regime has been in the camp of the "Tsiangs," the "Santa Cruz" and their ilk. For a long time, it has been in the camp of reaction. And it is doing the bidding of such reaction in the precincts of the General Assembly.

"The representative of Yugoslavia, as Messrs. Tsiang and Santa Cruz, heaped slander upon the Government of the USSR. He alleged that that Government interfered in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. It is the duty of the Government of the USSR to protect citizens of the USSR who are subjected to persecution and mockery behind the walls of Yugoslav gaols, where Fascist Gestapo methods of dealing with imprisoned Soviet citizens prevail. Let them try to deny that. The representative of Yugoslavia has no moral nor political right to speak of national sovereignty and independence, because it is a fact of notorious public knowledge that the Yugoslav regime of Tito has subjected that country to capitalist foreign monopolies. It is now bending every effort to obtain loans in exchange for strategic raw materials which will be supplied to foreign monopolies. The Yugoslav representative has no right to speak of the national sovereignty of states, as the Government which he represents is associating itself with Fascist Greece against the Albanian State and against neighbouring Bulgaria. The allegations of the representative of Yugoslavia to the effect that troop movements occur in

(?) Santa Cruz, Chief of the Chilean delegation to the Fourth Regular Session of the United Nations, was the chief of the Chilean Delegation to the First Special Session of the General Assembly in 1947 and Chile's representative in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in 1947.

neighbouring countries are nothing but provocations put into circulation by the agents of foreign intelligence services in order to justify the aggressive plans of imperialistic countries in respect of the popular democracies, and the representative of Yugoslavia knows that very well.

"Perhaps only the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Bevin, will be able to believe such allegations as have come from the mouth of the representative of Yugoslavia.

"The representative of Yugoslavia described the trial in Hungary of the State criminal, Rajk. He called that a provocational trial. But, during that trial, the criminal actions of the present leaders of Yugoslavia were exposed. For the leaders of Yugoslavia were acting "in cahoots with" United States Intelligence, headed by Mr. Allen Dulles.^(*) Together, they hatched plans for destroying the existing Governments of Hungary and other countries of the People's Democracies, with a view to setting up a Balkan federation under the aegis of quasi-fascist Yugoslavia, which would then head an anti-Soviet bloc. The clique that is now in power in Yugoslavia was caught in *flagrante delicto*. In attempting to evade its responsibility to its own people and to world public opinion, it now resorts to slanderous insinuations against the Soviet Union.

"Equally false are the allegations of the Yugoslav representative to the effect that the Soviet Union demonstrates a discrepancy between its words and its deeds. The actions of the Tito Government against the Slovenes in Carinthia have been sufficiently exposed; there is no need to dwell upon them. At the same time, the Yugoslav delegation should be well aware of the fact that every word of the Government of the Soviet Union is followed by deeds. The dirty attempts of the Yugoslav Government to undermine the proposals of the Soviet Union directed toward the strengthening of peace, under the mask of hypocritical phrases designed to impress disingenuous persons, should be exposed. These attempts, however, will not deceive anybody, because facts are facts and they are inescapable. The Yugoslav representative who ascended this rostrum as a paladin for small nations and who orated in favour of the adherence of small states to the Five-Power Peace Treaty was actually thus opposing the Soviet Union proposal for the establishment of a pact for the strengthening of peace among the five permanent members of the Security Council."

(Quoted from UNO Document No. General A/PV 229, September 26, 1949, English.)

DOCUMENT No. 101

FROM A STATEMENT BY A GROUP OF SOVIET CITIZENS WHO SPOKE AS "REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOVIET PUBLIC, THE SOVIET ARMY AND SOVIET ARTISTS" IN CONNECTION WITH THE RETURN OF YUGOSLAV DECORATIONS

"We, the representatives of the Soviet public, the Soviet Army and artists, know about the struggle being waged by the peoples of Yugo-

(*) Allen Welsh Dulles. In the diplomatic service of the United States since 1916. During the war he was an officer of the OSS.

slavia against the fascist Tito-Ranković gang; we sympathize with this struggle, we are proud of it and we trust that it will result in complete victory soon."(⁴)

Moscow, January 31, 1950.

(PRAVDA No. 33, Feb. 2, 1950.)

HOSTILE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE MOST RESPONSIBLE STATE AND PARTY LEADERS OF POLAND

DOCUMENT No. 102

FROM AN ARTICLE BY ROMAN ZAMBROWSKY, VICE-PRESIDENT OF
THE SEJM AND SECRETARY OF THE CC OF THE UNITED POLISH
WORKERS' PARTY

"The subversive activity of Tito's clique in the Balkans and his constant threats against Bulgaria and Albania are of great importance for the American imperialist warmongers, who are encircling the USSR and the countries of people's democracy with a system of military strategic bases. They attach particular importance to strategic bases in Italy and Greece. The imperialist press expresses the hope that Tito's constant threats will weaken the countries of people's democracy in the Balkans.

"Finally, the real thing linking Tito's clique with Anglo-American imperialism is his policy, particularly in the field of foreign trade. This policy is being pursued to the accompaniment of phrases on the industrialization of Yugoslavia. This policy is pushing Yugoslavia into the sphere of influence of Anglo-American imperialism and transforming it into a base of strategic raw materials of the Wall Street lords.

"The Beograd correspondent of the "New York Herald Tribune," Alsop, reported cynically that there was no fear that arms sold to Yugoslavia by the U. S. A. might one day be found in Russia's hands for the bullet sold today to Yugoslavia will probably find its way to Russia only through the head of a Russian.

"The ranks of Yugoslav communists continuing the internationalist traditions of the Yugoslav working class are growing. They are faithful to that Yugoslavia which was until recently growing and developing in the camp of socialism and democracy under the leadership of the USSR. Despite the terrorism of Ranković and the raging anti-Soviet propaganda of Djilas and Moša Pijade, the ranks of these Yugoslav communists will grow and penetrate ever deeper into the Yugoslav working class and the masses of the working peasantry; they will put an end to the shameful period of the treason of Tito's clique and return the

(⁴) This statement was signed by 82 persons, including the president of the Slav Committee of the USSR, Lt. General A. Gundorov, Academician N. Derzhavin, chief Secretary of the Slav Committee, Colonel of the Guards V. Mochalov, writer I. Ehrenburg, Colonel General V. I. Vinogradov, President of the National Committee for the Defence of Peace of the USSR, writer N. Tikhonov and others.

peoples of Yugoslavia to the path of socialism and true people's sovereignty, to the brotherly community of the countries of socialism and people's democracy. The Polish working class, which forged its internationalism in a hard struggle of several decades, follows with hope and faith the struggle of the Yugoslav communists against the nationalist and Trotskyist Tito clique, seeing in this struggle a guaranty for the revolutionary and socialist revival of Yugoslavia."

("The Road of Treason and the Yugoslav Trotskyist Renegades," TRIBUNA LUDU No. 139 (A) of May 22, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 103

FROM THE SPEECH BY FRANCISZEK JOZWIAK-WITOLD, PRESIDENT OF THE STATE CONTROL AND MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE UNITED POLISH WORKERS' PARTY, AT THE CONGRESS OF FIGHTERS FOR FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY, HELD ON SEPTEMBER 1 AND 2, 1949, IN WARSAW

"Those who declaim their love for their homeland and simultaneously talk against the front of anti-imperialist forces, headed by the Soviet Union, are traitors to proletarian internationalism, traitors to their own people.

"Such is the case today with Tito's clique. Reckless and nationalistic megalomania drew this clique into the hands of the Anglo-Saxon imperialists. They are traitors to the interests of the front of peace and democracy, to the idea of Marxism-Leninism. They started with nationalism and ended by coming to terms with American capital. They ended with slandering the Soviet Union, with a shameful attitude toward the Greek rebels, with provocations against Albania, with killing the best sons of the Yugoslav people. Tito became an agent of Wall Street in the cold war against the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy.

"On the day of our Congress, we join our voices to the protest against the reign of fascist-Titoist terror, violence and provocation. We send our warm, brotherly greetings to the Yugoslav comrades who are suffering in Ranković's prisons. We trust that the Yugoslav communists will win in the struggle for a new Communist Party of Yugoslavia."

(TRIBUNA LUDU No. 242 (A), of September 3, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 104

FROM THE SPEECH BY JAKUB BERMAN, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE UNITED POLISH WORKERS' PARTY, HELD AT THE CONSULTATION OF LEADERS OF PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENTS OF THE WOJWODSHIP COMMITTEES, IN WARSAW, ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1949

"Why are Tito's fascists hiding behind phrases about socialism? They are doing so because they are afraid to speak openly lest they disclose their fascist features prematurely. Hence directives for the weakening

of vigilance, directives for hypocrisy. It is evident that in Yugoslavia, where they have seized the power, they are applying the most brutal fascist-Gestapo methods of pressure.

"It is no wonder that all directives given to the Titoist network of spies and renegades were aimed at undermining the solidarity between the countries of people's democracy and the Soviet Union. Tito's agents were zealously active in this respect, using their habitual cynicism and hypocrisy. Tito's fascists openly use the poisonous arms of provocation because they cannot count on succeeding in an open fight."

(TRIBUNA LUDU No. 260 (A), of September 21, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 105

FROM THE REPORT BY BOLESŁAW BIERUT, PRESIDENT OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC AND PRESIDENT OF THE CC OF THE UNITED POLISH WORKERS' PARTY, SUBMITTED AT THE THIRD PLENUM OF THE PARTY'S CC, HELD FROM NOVEMBER 11 TO 13, 1949, IN WARSAW

"At the present moment we are witnesses to a new political diversion in the anti-imperialist camp, planned on a broad basis. The pillars of support of this diversion is Tito's network, composed of gangs of provocateurs and police agents, recruited before the war, in the period of intensification of the class struggle, and during the war, in the course of the National Liberation Struggle. Rajk's trial revealed the sinister scenes of this action. Tito's terrorist network, at work in Yugoslavia, was formed under special circumstances. It succeeded in seizing power in the State and is even today operating under the guise of pseudo-socialist building. It is attempting to continue to deceive the heroic Yugoslav people by using false phrases and superficial symbols. To attain its aim, the Tito-Ranković clique has been destroying the Communist Party systematically and imperceptibly year after year until it has made the latter an obedient tool in the hands of Ranković's police apparatus. The Government of Tito's clique is an anti-popular Government because it is directed by traitors and provocateurs who were inveigled into the service of the imperialists long ago. This clique is selling the interests of the working people and the peoples of Yugoslavia and their independence. Apart from that, this clique is trying to undermine the people's governments in other countries from within and to introduce dissension into the anti-imperialist camp. Nobody should be fooled by certain reforms carried out in Yugoslavia, such as the nationalization of industry, for it is not what is nationalized that is essential, but who carries out the nationalization and for whom. The essential thing is which class is the actual master and manager of the nationalized economy. In essence, it is a question of power.

"The power in the hands of a clique, a clique headed by provocateurs inveigled by the imperialists and ready to obey their orders — annuls the positive substance of all social transformations which are in such cases turned against the people.

"The revolutionary vigilance and perspicacity of the CPSU(B) unmasked Tito's clique on time as being an ideologically hostile product. The Budapest trial revealed its police-espionage links and exposed it as a gang of provocateurs and imperialist agents who were preparing a treacherous plot to overthrow the people's government in Hungary. There is no doubt that the working class of Yugoslavia will, sooner or later, succeed in building its own Communist Party despite the terror of Tito's clique, and that it will manage, in revolutionary struggle, to wrest the political power from the hands of the gang of traitors, spies and diversionists. Foreseeing this danger, Tito's clique is trying to attack the ideology of the working class, to undermine the principles of the Marxist-Leninist science in the minds of the masses and to force upon the Yugoslav masses nationalist and fascist dispositions and views; it is inciting the most backward elements against the USSR and the countries of people's democracy. In this manner, Tito's imperialist agents are repeating the old methods used by the Trotskyist agents and are trying to conceal themselves under a political-ideological guise."

(*"Tasks of the Party in the Struggle for Revolutionary Vigilance,"* TRIBUNA LUDU No. 315 (E), of November 16, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 106

FROM THE REPORT BY JOSEF CYRANKIEWICZ, POLISH PREMIER AND SECRETARY OF THE CC OF THE UNITED POLISH WORKERS' PARTY, MADE TO THE SEJM ON FEBRUARY 3, 1950

"The events of the last year have also shown the real features of Tito's clique which is ruling in Yugoslavia. The hostile attitude of this clique towards the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy, their numerous provocations and the fact that they openly joined the imperialist camp, were linked with the breach of international treaties by which it was bound. This policy of Tito and his clique, which is contrary to the principles of peaceful cooperation, affected the interests of Poland. For this reason, the Polish Government was forced to declare the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of March 18, 1946, null and void, and to break off all commercial relations with Yugoslavia. I should like to emphasize to the Sejm that these steps are in no way directed against the peoples of Yugoslavia for whom we have the most friendly feelings. I believe that, in spite of Tito's clique, they will succeed in leading Yugoslavia along the path of peace, progress, and building of socialism."

(TRIBUNA LUDU No. 35 (A), of February 4, 1950.)

FROM THE REPORT BY BOLESŁAW BIERUT, PRESIDENT OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC AND PRESIDENT OF THE CC OF THE UNITED POLISH WORKERS' PARTY, SUBMITTED TO THE FOURTH PLENUM OF THE CC OF THAT PARTY, HELD FROM MAY 8 TO 10, 1950, IN WARSAW

"In this total diplomacy, the traitorous gang of Tito, Kardelj, Ranković and Djilas is not playing the least important role. By order of the American total diplomats, this band had the role of a provocateur at the United Nations General Assembly session. It is being used as a channel for diversions by the United States in the countries of people's democracy. With lackey-like zeal, this gang is taking part in the base American campaign of slander against the USSR. Writing about Acheson's 'total diplomacy' and his policy of using Tito's clique, "The Economist"^(*) cynically and openly underlines that this is being done at a low price: 'The advantages of this policy are far greater than the expenses.' In fact, so far this has been the cheapest and most profitable of all the western investments.'"

("Tasks of the Party in the Struggle for New Cadres,"
TRIBUNA LUDU No. 131, of May 13, 1950.)

FROM THE REPORT BY HILARY MINC, POLISH VICE-PREMIER AND PRESIDENT OF THE STATE ECONOMIC PLANNING COMMISSION, MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE UNITED POLISH WORKERS' PARTY, DELIVERED AT THE FIFTH PLENUM OF THE CC OF THE UPWP ON JULY 15 AND 16, 1950, IN WARSAW

"The monstrous deceit in Yugoslavia showed that the negation of this course of action meant nothing but chaining the country in the worst sort of slavery to the American imperialists, to economic sabotage and final debacle, under the guise of false phrases about an 'independent road to socialism.'

"Those sinister heralds of the camp of war and death, those treacherous warmongers and worthy heirs of Hitler are intervening with arms in Korea and trying, through the gang of Tito agents, to incite a treacherous provocation in the Balkans."

("On the Six Year Plan for Economic Development,"
TRIBUNA LUDU No. 194 (A), of July 16, 1950.)

(*) Refers to the London "Economist."

HOSTILE STATEMENTS BY THE MOST RESPONSIBLE STATE AND PARTY LEADERS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

DOCUMENT No. 109

FROM AN ARTICLE BY VACLAV KOPECKY, CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE CC OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

"The Soviet Union, the first socialist state of the world, is now being joined by a whole group of countries of new democracy and socialism in Europe. Both their existence and their successful development have become an encouraging hope to the working masses of all the other countries of Europe. The more inspired we feel by this fact, the greater is our indignation at the fact that Tito's Yugoslav clique, Judas-like, betrayed the cause of socialism and sold the freedom of Yugoslavia to the western imperialists, a freedom which had been achieved by the great sacrifices of the Yugoslav people, by the countless casualties of the Red Army, by the Soviet mission of liberation. The stronger is our conviction, however, that this treason will be punished and that the Yugoslav working people will bring their country back to the path of honour, to the front of the countries of the people's democracy and the Soviet Union."

("Historic Accomplishment of the Great October Socialist Revolution," RUDE PRAVO No. 261, of November 6, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 110

FROM THE REPORT BY RUDOLF SLANSKY, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ON THE RESULTS OF THE COMINFORM MEETING IN BUDAPEST IN THE LATTER HALF OF NOVEMBER, 1949, SUBMITTED TO PARTY OFFICIALS OF THE PRAGUE DISTRICT

"... Tito liquidated the people's democratic regime in Yugoslavia and turned Yugoslavia into a Marshallized country, a colony of Anglo-American imperialists. In order to remain in power he introduced fascist terror in Yugoslavia, started killing all honest communists and filling the prisons and concentration camps with Yugoslav patriots who rebelled against the loss of Yugoslav independence.

"Having put the country at the mercy of foreign capitalists who are lending him dollars and exporting ores, lumber and other riches from the country, Tito's gang is restoring the capitalist system in Yugoslavia, exploiting the labour of workers and peasants, giving the kulaks back their power in the rural areas, relying upon them the way it relies upon capitalists in the towns.

"The Budapest trial, and now the indictment of Kostov, revealed that Tito, Ranković, Kardelj, Djilas and other Yugoslav chiefs were imperialist espionage agents. Even during the Second World War, Tito was in concert with the English, and that is why Churchill sent his son Randolph there on a special military mission and broke the ground for the present treason. It was further revealed that other Yugoslav leaders, who were in French concentration camps during the war, after France had been occupied by the Hitlerites, were sent by the Gestapo to Yugoslavia in 1941. Consequently, this means that Tito's clique is a gang of spies and agents-provocateurs who have been in the paid service of bourgeois espionage for years."

"... Today, when Beograd has become a centre of American espionage and anti-communist propaganda, the Anglo-American 'supporters' entrusted this task primarily to Tito's agents. Tito and Ranković were assigned the task of recruiting their followers in all the countries of people's democracy and, under the guise of bourgeois nationalism, of rallying the worst elements in reactionary, fascist and clerical circles. With their help, they were to cut our countries off from the Soviet Union. Along these lines, they directed the conspiratorial activities of Rajk in Hungary, Kostov in Bulgaria, and they are trying to do the same in other countries of the people's democracy, even in Czechoslovakia."

(RUDE PRAVO No. 289, of December 9, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 111

FROM THE SPEECH BY KLEMENT GOTTWALD, PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC AND PRESIDENT OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HELD AT THE MEETING OF THE CC OF THE PARTY IN PRAGUE, FROM FEBRUARY 24 TO 26, 1950

"In connection with the case of Tito's clique, in our Party sufficient light has not yet been cast on the deep causes of the fact that it was precisely Tito's clique which degenerated to such an extent that a country liberated by the Soviet Army, and apparently guided by the Communist Party, suddenly found itself in the clutches of a handful of traitors, spies, agents and criminals. I would like to indicate two profound causes for this degeneration and treason. It has been revealed that a large number of leading people in the Yugoslav Government — almost everyone around Tito — were earlier paid agents of the police, of the Gestapo, which the Anglo-American imperialists knew. When these people came to power later, the Anglo-American imperialists utilized this and said: 'You will either continue to serve, and in that case play an important role, or we shall unmask you as a veteran agent of Alexander's^(*) police or of the Gestapo, or Ustashi, and the like'..."

"... But it is in hard conditions like these that real Bolshevik cadres are steeled, so that sooner or later the CPY and the people of Yugoslavia

(*) Refers to King Aleksandar Karadjordjević who was killed in Marseilles in 1934.

will settle accounts with the clique of traitors. In other countries of people's democracy, the agents of Tito's clique were unmasked to a considerable degree, or at least their true nature was revealed so that it was easier to continue exposing them. The 'grand' plan according to which the Titoists were to have drawn a number of countries of people's democracy to the side of the imperialists can be considered a failure. We know today with whom we have the honour of dealing in Beograd, and this is a great success of the peace-loving movement. Two years ago, we did not know this yet and we considered this treacherous gang as comrades although they were already then imperialist agents. Since we know them now, they can do us much less damage than they did while we trusted them. Therefore we can rightly rank the unmasking of Tito's clique among the great contributions to the struggle for peace, and against war."

(RUDE PRAVO No. 51, of March 1, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 112

FROM THE SPEECH BY ANTONIN ZAPOTOCKY, CZECHOSLOVAK PREMIER AND MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE CC OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AT A FORMAL MEETING IN PRAGUE, HELD ON MAY 6, 1950

"... Only traitors and renegades of the type of Tito and company can lie about socialism and sully the Soviet Union and Stalin, can talk about socialism and hire themselves out at the same time as tools of imperialist intrigues and hostility against the united front of the working people and the front of peace of all progressive forces. This front is destroying the plans of the warmongers and it is headed by the Soviet Union and the great peace-maker, Stalin, who uncompromisingly guards world peace."

(RUDE PRAVO No. 108, of May 7, 1950.)

HOSTILE STATEMENTS BY THE MOST RESPONSIBLE STATE AND PARTY LEADERS OF HUNGARY

DOCUMENT No. 113

FROM THE SPEECH BY MATYAS RAKOSI, HUNGARIAN VICE-PREMIER AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS' PARTY, HELD AT THE MEETING IN KECSKEMET, ON AUGUST 20, 1948

"We hear that they are also killing consistent democrats, the most lauded heroes of the Yugoslav liberation war, and that they are ruthlessly terrorizing followers of the Soviet Union and peace. We hear of assassinations, torture and imprisonments.

"The followers of the Soviet Union and of working class internationalism are hunted down like wild animals in Yugoslavia today."

(SZABAD NEP No. 192, of August 22, 1948.)

DOCUMENT No. 114

FROM AN ARTICLE BY MATYAS RAKOSI, HUNGARIAN VICE-PREMIER AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS' PARTY, PUBLISHED ON JUNE 1, 1949, IN THE COMINFORM PAPER, "FOR A LASTING PEACE, FOR A PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY"

"Even formerly, there was a tacit agreement among Titoists whereby the leading part in their republic has been played by Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. After their treason, the oppression of national minorities became very intensive. In Montenegro, Bosnia and Vojvodina the local people are being squeezed out more and more as unreliable, and their places are being taken primarily by Pan-Serb chauvinists. The Serbo-Croat-Slovene accord is tottering because chauvinism is spreading throughout these countries and we hear increasing complaints from exiles to the effect that Pan-Serb chauvinism is oppressing other peoples just as it did during the monarchy.

"In this connection, people from the old regime who had been in the background are now emerging on the scene. The Premier of the former Royal Government, Miša Trifunović,⁽¹⁾ has again been assigned a role. The same is the case with Lazica Marković,⁽²⁾ a notorious lawyer, and Toša Mijatov, a former police captain and leader of the disbanded 'Soko'⁽³⁾ and of other nationalistic organizations.

"We send fraternal greetings to those heroes who are fighting with self-abnegation against the oppressor. We know that the same flame and the same resoluteness are burning in the hearts of these fighters today as when they were inspired to many heroic deeds in the fight against fascism, for which they won the gratitude of all progressive mankind.

"This flame is blazing today again. It is a sure guaranty that the terrible regime introduced in Yugoslavia today by the vile traitors to socialism, headed by Tito, will not be of long duration. This regime will perish and the working people of Yugoslavia will gladly return to the family of peoples who are building socialism."

("Yugoslav Trotskyists, Shock Troops of Imperialism,"
SZABAD NEP No. 131, of June 8, 1949.)

(1) Miša Trifunović was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment in 1947 as a national enemy. In 1950 he was released on probation owing to illness and advanced age (he is 79).

(2) Laza Marković, minister in pre-war Yugoslav governments. For collaboration with the enemy he was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment at the Draža Mihailović trial. He is now serving his term.

(3) Before World War I "Soko" was a national, democratic, gymnastics and cultural-educational organization. In the pre-war Yugoslavia, this organization was used as a mainstay by the reactionary governments, which attempted to turn it into a semi-military pro-fascist organization. Democratic elements in the leadership and the majority of the members resisted this policy. During the National Liberation War they joined the National Liberation Movement.

FROM AN ARTICLE BY JOSEF REVAI, MINISTER OF NATIONAL EDUCATION, MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS' PARTY AND CHIEF EDITOR OF THE PARTY NEWSPAPER, "SZABAD NEP"

"The trial of the conspiratorial gang of Rajk and company proves that Tito's clique, as a criminal association of imperialist spies and agents, 'took the lead' in the Yugoslav partisan struggle and came to power with a 'political program' to help the imperialists destroy the camp of democracy and socialism from within, overthrow the people's democracies and prepare a new aggressive, imperialist war."

(SZABAD NEP No. 223, of September 25, 1949.)

FROM A SPEECH BY MATYAS RAKOSI, HUNGARIAN VICE-PREMIER AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS' PARTY HELD AT A PARTY MEETING IN BUDAPEST IN SEPTEMBER, 1949

"Now we know that there were traitors and Rajkists⁽¹⁾ crawling about side by side with heroes in Spain, and that in Yugoslavia, too, apart from the Yugoslav heroes who fought with self-abnegation against the fascists and made great sacrifices — there were Titos, Rankovičs, Kardelj, Djilases and other police stooges swarming about. Their main concern during the liberation war was to hamper the struggle of the best sons of the Yugoslav working people, of Arsa Jovanović, Žujović, Hebrang. Now we know that the Titoists invited a whole army of English and American spies and stooges to Yugoslavia during the liberation struggle in order to gain in strength. Now we know that one of the main concerns of the Titoists during the liberation struggle was to annihilate the greatest possible number of conscious fighters, the greatest possible number of genuine sons of the Yugoslav peoples.

"From the first day of the liberation struggle, Tito and his gang hampered the wonderful zeal of the Yugoslav fighters for freedom and disorganized their struggle.

"We have no doubt that the Yugoslav people who started fighting so courageously against the terror and merciless oppression of two fascist great powers during World War II will cast off the yoke put on them by Tito and his gang in the interests of the American imperialists. We know that the opposition of the working people to the Tito janizary dictatorship and police terror is growing increasingly stronger and open, and that this opposition is supported by the knowledge that the whole of progressive mankind, headed by the great Soviet Union, stands behind it and sympathizes with it."

(SZABAD NEP No. 228, of October 1, 1949.)

(¹) Rajkists — followers of Laszlo Rajk.

FROM A SPEECH BY MIHALY FARKAS, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS' PARTY, AT A MILITARY PARADE IN BUDAPEST, ON APRIL 4, 1950

"After a series of failures, the imperialist warmongers realized that they would not reach their goal by means of internal anti-popular forces; they then mobilized Tito's fascist gang for the implementation of their vile plans and wanted its armed forces to attack the freedom of our homeland.

"We have pulled the mask off Tito's bandits. It has been established that Tito and his gang are an organized network of agents on behalf of the imperialist warmongers. Their role to destroy the ranks of the working class movement and to clear the road for a third world war by means of successive provocations."

(SZABAD NEP No. 80, of April 6, 1950.)

FROM AN ARTICLE BY MIHALY FARKAS, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS' PARTY, PUBLISHED IN THE COMINFORM PAPER, "FOR A LASTING PEACE, FOR A PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY"

"It has been established beyond the shadow of a doubt that the Anglo-American imperialist military circles smuggled their agents into Yugoslavia during World War II, both into the royal forces of 'resistance' and among the leaders of the heroic liberation struggle of the Yugoslav people. Both Mihailović,⁽¹⁾ the royal General, and Tito were in the Anglo-American service. The first was assigned the role of defence of the 'royal interests.' Tito, however, was entrusted by his imperialist masters with the task of preventing honest communists, devoted to the people, from entering the leadership of the Yugoslav liberation struggle. As we know, Tito did this. He eliminated the proved communists, killed them and thus seized the leadership by force, by terrorist means.

"Even during the National Liberation War, Tito and his gang used every possible occasion to deplete the ranks of communists steeled in struggle. Tito deliberately directed his 'military operations' in such a way that those units of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army which were under the command of reliable leaders devoted to the people, and which were composed mainly of veteran fighters steeled in the class struggle and faithful to socialist principles — found themselves in the most precarious positions and were made to endure the heaviest possible losses. By such treacherous 'methods,' Tito and his gang killed thousands

(1) Refers to Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović, war criminal and commander of quisling Chetnik formations in Yugoslavia during World War II.

of the best and the most courageous communist fighters, prominent partisan officers. They believed that there would, therefore, be no serious forces left capable of preventing his outright betrayal when the time came to join the camp of imperialism.

"After the end of the war, Tito and his gang drew up a wary and base plan to purge the Yugoslav Army, under the new conditions, of officers who had genuinely fought with self-sacrifice for the freedom of the people, for a socialist future for the Yugoslav people, for alliance with the great socialist Soviet Union.

"In the spring of 1945, the Yugoslav Government announced a broad amnesty embracing all those who had fought in the ranks of the Chetnik gangs. At one of its sessions, presided over by Tito, the Yugoslav General Staff ordered that, after the amnesty, Chetniks and former officers of the royal army should again be accepted in the Yugoslav Army and that their former ranks should be restored to them. At the same time, however, communist officers who were faithful to the people, hundreds and thousands of heroes from the National Liberation War, were discharged from the Army. Today, Yugoslavia is not only an international espionage centre of Anglo-American imperialism. Fascist Tito's Yugoslavia is today one of the most dangerous hotbeds of warmongers in Europe. Relying upon fascist Tito's Yugoslavia and making use of it, American imperialism suppressed the heroic struggle of the Greek national democratic army. Relying upon the armed forces of fascist Tito's Yugoslavia, the Anglo-American imperialists wanted to destroy the people's democratic order in Albania, Hungary and Bulgaria."

("The Yugoslav Army in the Power of the Anglo-American Imperialists," SZABAD NEP No. 145, of June 25, 1950.)

HOSTILE STATEMENTS BY THE MOST RESPONSIBLE STATE AND PARTY LEADERS OF RUMANIA

DOCUMENT No. 119

FROM AN ARTICLE BY VASILE LUCA, RUMANIAN MINISTER OF FINANCE, PUBLISHED IN THE COMINFORM PAPER, "FOR A LASTING PEACE, FOR A PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY" ON AUGUST 1, 1948

"Tito and his men are relying upon the State apparatus, upon the petty-bourgeois and the kulak strata. Under those conditions, the healthy forces within the CPY will have to wage a hard struggle for the salvation of the CPY, for a free and independent Yugoslavia. Marxism-Leninism has been victorious and it will always be victorious. And, there can be no doubt that the time will come when the CPY will severely take

to task the present nationalistic, petty-bourgeois leadership, when it will replace it and proceed again along the path of Marxist-Leninist internationalism."

("Nationalistic and Petty-Bourgeois Nature of Yugoslav Communist Party Leaders," SCANTEIA, No. 1188, of August 4, 1948.)

DOCUMENT No. 120

FROM A SPEECH BY JOSIF CHISINEVSCHI, SECRETARY OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE CC OF THE RUMANIAN WORKERS' PARTY, HELD AT A MEETING IN CONNECTION WITH "SCANTEIA" DAY IN BUCHAREST, ON SEPTEMBER 19, 1948

"The Yugoslav people, who fought heroically and unsparingly shed streams of blood for their liberation, who were liberated with the resolute help of the Soviet Army, cannot be kept long in fetters by their former leaders. Once the latter probably held the majority in the CPY under their influence, but they now represent only an insignificant nationalist faction, which has betrayed the people and which wanted to push them over the brink of the abyss."

"The title of Marshal, Tito's epaulets and Ranković's spears will not be able to keep the Yugoslav people under the yoke for long."

(SCANTEIA No. 1229, of September 21, 1948.)

DOCUMENT No. 121

FROM A SPEECH BY TEOHARI GEORGESCU, RUMANIAN MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR AND SECRETARY OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE RUMANIAN WORKERS' PARTY, HELD IN BUCHAREST ON MARCH 21, 1949, AT THE CONGRESS OF UNIFICATION OF RUMANIAN WORKING YOUTH

"Tito's clique, which is dragging Yugoslavia into the camp of imperialist jackals, who are impatiently waiting to dig their claws deep into the Yugoslav people, has betrayed the cause of the struggle against imperialism, the cause of the struggle for the defence of national independence, the cause of socialism.

"This gang of traitors and renegades is educating the Yugoslav youth in a nationalistic, chauvinistic spirit, a spirit of subjection to Anglo-American imperialism. There is no doubt, however, that the communists who are faithful to the cause of internationalism, i. e. the communists who are in the great majority, will triumph in Yugoslavia, and bring her back to the front of democracy and socialism."

(SCANTEIA No. 1381, of March 22, 1949.)

FROM A SPEECH BY JOSIF CHISINEVSCHI, SECRETARY OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE CC OF THE RUMANIAN WORKERS' PARTY, IN BUCHAREST ON MARCH 30, 1949, AT THE PEACE CONGRESS OF RUMANIAN INTELLECTUALS

"It is well known that the Tito-Ranković clique has really become a network of agents of the imperialist powers. The peoples of Yugoslavia are fighting against Tito's traitorous clique, they are fighting against this gang of nationalists, anti-Soviet inciters, provocateurs, enemies of people's democracy..."

"There can be no doubt that, thanks to this struggle, which is constantly growing in spite of heavy sacrifices, the peoples of Yugoslavia will free themselves from the yoke of domination by the criminal nationalistic clique of traitors, agents of imperialism, enemies of culture and peace."

(SCANTEIA No. 1391, of April 2, 1949.)

FROM A REPORT BY ANA PAUKER, RUMANIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND SECRETARY OF THE CC OF THE RUMANIAN WORKERS' PARTY, SUBMITTED IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF RUMANIA, ON JULY 12, 1949, IN CONNECTION WITH THE BILL ON THE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN RUMANIA AND POLAND

"In a country being run by a Government which is a traitor to the people's interests, as is the case with Yugoslavia, it is a hard task for the people to overthrow those acting against their interests in order to free themselves. Thus, by liberating themselves, these people will be able to join with all their might the anti-imperialist front, the front of peace, the front of democracy. They will thus be able to defend their own interests and contribute to the struggle for the defence of peace and prosperity in the world, together with the other free peoples."

(SCANTEIA No. 1476, of July 13, 1949.)

FROM AN ARTICLE BY ANA PAUKER, RUMANIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND SECRETARY OF THE CC OF THE RUMANIAN WORKERS' PARTY

"A black canopy of 'Marshallization' has been spread over Yugoslavia. Tito, agent-provocateur of American imperialists, whom they have held in reserve for a long time the way a robber keeps his knife con-

cealed, has pushed the peoples of Yugoslavia back into the grip of fascist terror, back into the yoke of international capital (Ed. Note: Underlined by Ana Pauker). For a long time Tito and his nationalist clique played a double role, the role of robbers who pretend to be honest people by day, and by night go plundering and committing crimes against their own people and others. Today, after the amazing revelations of the Soviet Note⁽¹⁾ on the question of Slovene Carinthia, no mask can conceal the mark of treason branded on the forehead of the imperialist agent Tito. But the fruits of the liberation of Yugoslavia by the Soviet Army and the heroic sacrifices endured by the peoples of Yugoslavia in the struggle against imperialism are the most precious treasure of the working people of Yugoslavia, a treasure with which the gang of Tito's robbers will not be able to bargain long and remain unpunished. The time is not far off when it will render accounts for its crimes to the peoples of Yugoslavia."

("The 23rd of August," SCANTEIA, No. 1510, of August 21, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 125

FROM A REPORT BY GHEORGHE GHEORGHU-DEJ, RUMANIAN VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CC OF THE RUMANIAN WORKERS' PARTY, DELIVERED IN HUNGARY DURING THE LATTER HALF OF NOVEMBER 1949, AT A MEETING OF THE COMINFORM

"We send militant communist greetings to all the Yugoslav comrades who are bravely enduring the sanguinary terror in the torture chambers and concentration camps of the hangman Ranković. But, the day is not far off when the peoples of Yugoslavia will settle accounts with this gang of spies, provocateurs and murderers..."

"The chief task in the struggle against Tito's fascist dictatorship falls to the working class and the peoples of Yugoslavia headed by revolutionary communists..."

"It is the duty of Communist and Workers' Parties to give full help to the Yugoslav working class and working peasants, who are fighting to return Yugoslavia to the camp of democracy and socialism.

"The struggle against the fascist regime of Tito's clique in Yugoslavia is assuming an increasingly bitter form: strikes, passive resistance especially against compulsory mobilization for work, dissemination of illegal leaflets, sabotage of the fulfilment of factory production plans and State purchase plans, etc. The Yugoslav workers see more and more clearly that increased production serves the interests of the imperialists and they are beginning to resort to passive sabotage.

"A necessary condition for the return of Yugoslavia to the socialist camp is active struggle by revolutionary elements both inside the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and outside of it, struggle for the rebuilding of a truly communistic, revolutionary party of Yugoslavia, faithful to

(1) Refers to the Note of the Government of the USSR No. 197 of August 11, 1949. (See Document No. 32.)

Marxism-Leninism, to the principles of internationalism, a party fighting for the independence of Yugoslavia from imperialism.

"The working class of Yugoslavia and the communists who are at its head must enjoy the strong support of the international working class for the building up of their party..."

"Let us be merciless and intolerant towards these vile agents!"

("Yugoslav Communist Party in the Hands of Murderers and Spies," SCANTEIA No. 1600 of December 6, 1949)

DOCUMENT No. 126

FROM A REPORT BY GHEORGHE GHEORGHU-DEJ, RUMANIAN VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE RUMANIAN WORKERS' PARTY, DELIVERED IN BUCHAREST, ON DECEMBER 8, 1949, BEFORE A PARTY GROUP

"Therefore it is the task of all the Communist and Workers' Parties to struggle against the Tito-Ranković clique, that tool of imperialist warmongers..."

"The struggle against the criminal plans of the Tito-Ranković gang not only means defence of the sovereignty of our State and its independence from imperialism, but also effective assistance to the peoples of Yugoslavia, fettered by the fascist Tito-Ranković regime."

(SCANTEIA No. 1607 of December 14, 1949.)

HOSTILE STATEMENTS BY THE MOST RESPONSIBLE STATE AND PARTY LEADERS OF BULGARIA

DOCUMENT No. 127

FROM A SPEECH BY VLKO CHERVENKOV, PREMIER OF BULGARIA AND SECRETARY OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, ADDRESSED TO CITIZENS OF THE FIRST SOFIA WARD, ON MAY 13, 1949

"History will reject and smash all those who stand in its way like miserable and despised renegades. Mercilessly and with revulsion, history will destroy Tito's clique which has definitely passed into the imperialist camp, and now represents the worst enemy of socialism, of the Soviet Union. It has been transformed into the vanguard of imperialist aggressors. The sole concern of this clique today is to slander and provoke the Soviet Union, to besmirch the countries of the people's democracy. In the whole world, there is no more hideous, provocative, baser rostrum against the USSR than the newspapers, agitators and propagandists of Tito's clique. Hissing with malice against the Soviet Union, the CPSU(B), and

the Soviet leaders, and openly flying the nationalist flag, the Titoists have definitely removed their mask and revealed themselves before all honest people as the sworn enemies of socialism, as agents of Anglo-American imperialism. Therefore, all honest people are turning their backs on them and branding them with the seal of shame. We trust that the brotherly Yugoslav peoples, faithful and true to the ideas of Lenin and Stalin, and the communists of Yugoslavia, will know how to send the nationalist Tito clique to the devil and reinstate the brotherly Yugoslav peoples in the ranks of the united front of peace and socialism."

(RABOTNICHESKO DELO of May 14, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 121

FROM A REPORT BY VLKO CHERVENKOV, BULGARIAN PREMIER AND SECRETARY OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, SUBMITTED TO THE EXPANDED JUNE PLENUM OF THE CC OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, ON THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS FOR PEOPLE'S COUNCILS AND JUDGE-ASSESSORS

"Because of the betrayal of Tito's clique, we must be alert in watching the West, too. It is not only from the South that efforts are being made to send against us those who would destroy the peace and calm of our country. The imperialist gangsters have found in the Titoists their most zealous and malicious agents working against our people, against the Communist Party and the Fatherland Front."

(RABOTNICHESKO DELO of June 21, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 122

FROM AN ARTICLE BY VLADIMIR POPTOMOV, THEN BULGARIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NOW BULGARIAN VICE-PREMIER AND MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE CC OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

"The fight against Tito's clique has a special importance for the Bulgarian Communist Party and for all of Bulgaria, particularly as regards the guaranteeing of our national independence, the security of our country and the creation of peaceful conditions for the building of socialism. For our country, the Titoists are not only vile deserters from the front of democracy and socialism, not only agents and spies of Anglo-American imperialism and the most vicious slanderers and provocateurs against the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy, but also very dangerous neighbours. The Titoists not only no longer conceal their territorial claims with regard to Bulgaria, but quite openly and insolently talk about their intentions to seize the Pirin Region — the Bulgarian Macedonia. They have reached an agreement with the Greek

monarcho-fascists on the suppression of the national liberation movement in Greece, on the partition of Albania and on the creation of a joint front against Bulgaria..."

"Our struggle against Tito's clique cannot be a defensive one. It must be offensive and it must be waged with increasing force..."

"The working people of Bulgaria have the correct attitude towards the Titoists as a clique which is an enemy of socialism and democracy, and an enemy of the vital interests of our country. Nevertheless, our Party considers that it has not yet developed the campaign of unmasking the Yugoslav hirelings of Anglo-American imperialism on a sufficiently broad scale."

("Tito's Clique, the Most Vicious Enemy of the Bulgarian People," RABOTNICHESKO DELO of January 8, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 130

FROM THE REPORT BY VLKO CHERVENKOV, BULGARIAN PREMIER AND SECRETARY OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, MADE AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE CC OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, IN SOFIA, ON JANUARY 16 AND 17, 1950, IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRIAL OF TRAICHO KOSTOV AND OTHERS

"The aggressive intentions of the Titoists regarding our country and their wolfish appetites for Bulgarian territory have been unmasked."

(RABOTNICHESKO DELO of February 4, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 131

FROM A REPORT BY VLKO CHERVENKOV, BULGARIAN PREMIER AND SECRETARY OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, SUBMITTED TO THE THIRD PARTY CONFERENCE IN SOFIA, ON JUNE 8 TO 10, 1950

"The Yugoslav fascist leaders, who betrayed their country and sold it to the Anglo-American imperialists, have transformed Yugoslavia into a base for them. They have placed the Serbian, Croat, Slovene, Macedonian and Montenegrin peoples in the grip of cruel terror and lawlessness and exposed them to the harshest and most merciless exploitation in order to serve the aims of imperialist instigators of a new war."

(RABOTNICHESKO DELO of June 13, 1950.)

HOSTILE STATEMENTS BY THE MOST RESPONSIBLE STATE AND PARTY LEADERS OF ALBANIA

DOCUMENT No. 133

FROM THE SPEECH BY ENVER HOXHA, ALBANIAN PREMIER AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ALBANIAN LABOUR PARTY, AT THE MEETING OF THE ALBANIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, ON JUNE 2, 1949

"Tito's clique raised a hue and cry around the draining of Lake Skadar.⁽¹³⁾ To adopt the proposal of the Beograd Government would mean reopening the gates to Tito's Trotskyists and fascist agents who, for several years, resorted to all possible means and methods to colonize our country. What Mussolini did to our country in 1939 was also attempted by Tito. In the opinion of the new Croatian king,⁽¹⁴⁾ Albania was to have been annexed to 'his monarchy,' while Mussolini's Adriatic Sea, 'Mare Nostrum,' was to have become the 'Mare Nostrum' of Titos's clique. Tito's clique began its endeavours to colonize Albania by granting credits to our republic, but what lay behind this loan was revealed later."

(BASHKIMI No. 1384, of June 2, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 133

FROM THE STATEMENT MADE BY ENVER HOXHA, ALBANIAN PREMIER AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ALBANIAN LABOUR PARTY, AT THE MEETING IN SKADAR, IN SEPTEMBER, 1949

"The fascist Tito opened the doors to American capitalism, which is seizing the key economic, strategic and political positions in Yugoslavia. Tito is nothing but a plucked parrot of the American imperialists and the shameless executor of their criminal and belligerent intentions. There is not the least difference today between Tito, Tsaldaris and Franco. They are only 'three locks on the same door,' as our people say, they are only three dogs tied to American leashes, gnawing imperialist bones and barking for American capital.

"The Trotskyist Tito has not laid down his arms and he will continue to attempt to harm the new Albania, until he is interred forever in the grave which the peoples of Yugoslavia are digging for him.

"Has the traitor Tito laid down his arms? No. He is continually whetting the point of his knife against our people. Only, he is counting his chickens before they are hatched. The fascist Tito, agent of Anglo-American imperialism, is nothing but a new Tsar of the Pan-Serbs and of the entire Yugoslav bourgeoisie in the service of the imperialists, while Tito's policy towards Albania is that same policy once pursued by the Tsars of Serbia and by the selfsame imperialists..."

⁽¹³⁾ On the question of the draining of Lake Skadar see Documents Nos. 217 and 218.

⁽¹⁴⁾ Refers to Marshal J. B. Tito who was born in Croatia.

"The population of Kosovo⁽¹⁵⁾ knows full well that their salvation and the salvation of the people of Yugoslavia will be ensured by their untiring struggle and by spreading that struggle against Tito's fascist band and his spies in Kosovo.

"The extermination of Tito's fascist band would mean salvation for the peoples of Yugoslavia and the only way to salvation for the Albanian people in Kosovo.

"In full agreement with Tito's fascist clique and under the auspices of Anglo-American imperialism, the Greek monarcho-fascists have already been provoking our country for several years, slandering Albania and threatening her."

(BASHKIMI No. 1474, of September 16, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 134

FROM THE SPEECH BY TUK JAKOVA, ALBANIAN VICE-PREMIER AND SECRETARY OF THE CC OF THE ALBANIAN LABOUR PARTY, HELD AT THE MEETING IN VALONA, ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1949

"The traitorous Tito clique which did not succeed in occupying our country by lies and betrayal, has not relinquished its plans and is attempting to grab Albania by other means.

"Tito wants to use Kosovo as a place for the preparation of armed units and illegally to infiltrate them into Albania, obviously in cooperation with the Anglo-Americans. The people of Kosovo, however, will not fall into that trap. They have other interests, other aspirations and desires, they want to be free and to realize their centuries-old aspiration — union with Albania, which has always been their dream. Our Party has not neglected this question. In the past and at appropriate times our Party posed the question of Kosovo's incorporation into Albania, but the traitor Tito said that this question would be discussed later, at a time when he thought he would have seized not only Kosovo but the whole of Albania. The road of the people of Kosovo is as follows: to rise together with the Yugoslav peoples and internationalist communists, to fight Tito's clique, to overthrow Tito, to win freedom, and then the question of Kosovo will surely be solved justly, and its future, in accordance with the principle of self-determination, will be its incorporation into Albania."

(ZERI I POPULIT of September 25, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 135

FROM THE SPEECH DELIVERED BY MEHMET SHEHU, ALBANIAN MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR AND SECRETARY OF THE ALBANIAN LABOUR PARTY, AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE CC OF THAT PARTY, HELD IN TIRANA, OCTOBER 11 TO 13, 1949

"Tito's clique, together with the Greek monarcho-fascists and Italian reactionaries, helped the hard struggle which our outside enemies waged

(¹⁵) Kosovo — a vast plain in Yugoslavia near the northern frontier of Albania.

in all fields and, according to all information, it appears that the masters of this Trotskyist clique, the Anglo-Americans, gave this gang the black flag of struggle against the People's Republic of Albania.

"With their concentrated provocations and premeditated and counter-revolutionary actions against our country, Tito and Tsaldaris figured they would be able to shake our people's government, cause disorder in Albania, encourage our home reaction and so push it into the struggle against the people's government, and later perhaps even intervene in Albania with their regular troops with the object of dividing up the country..."

"The government in Rome also had a role in this under-handed game against our homeland. It supplied Tito and Tsaldaris with spies and terrorists who were trained in Italy, with the aim of infiltrating them into Albania through underground channels..."

"It goes without saying that there must be a clandestine agreement between Beograd, Athens and Rome against Albania, which was dictated by the Americans."

(ZERI I POPULIT No. 252, of October 20, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 138

FROM AN ARTICLE BY ENVER HOXHA, ALBANIAN PREMIER AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ALBANIAN LABOUR PARTY

"Like Tsaldaris' Greece, Tito's Yugoslavia has become a centre for Albanian traitors who cherish hopes of harming Albania and are preparing to do so. Tito's aim, like Tsaldaris' own, is to cut up Albania and divide it between himself and Tsaldaris."

("Long May Our Party Live, As Long As the Mountains,"
ZERI I POPULIT of November 8, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 137

FROM THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE CC OF THE ALBANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN CONNECTION WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE CC OF THE MACEDONIAN COMMUNIST PARTY OF JULY 1, 1948, IN WHICH THE LATTER EXPRESSES FULL SUPPORT FOR THE STAND OF THE YUGOSLAV COMMUNIST PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON THE COMINFORM RESOLUTION

"In this difficult situation for the brotherly peoples of Yugoslavia, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania resolutely calls upon the Albanians of Kosmet⁽¹⁶⁾ and Macedonia to fight against the Albanian chauvinists and Pan-Serbs in Kosovo, against all hirelings

(16) Kosmet — an abbreviation for the Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohija in the PR of Serbia.

who are showering Tito and his clique with praise, because they are the enemies of the peoples of Yugoslavia and of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia. The only correct path for the Albanians of Kosmet and Macedonia is the path of firm unity with the brotherly people of Yugoslavia and with the healthy elements of the CP of Yugoslavia. This will enable them to beat the traitorous Tito clique, which is pushing the peoples of Yugoslavia towards the abyss and wants to turn Yugoslavia into a colony of imperialism."

("Statement of the CC of the CP of Albania on the Slanders of the CC of the CP of Macedonia," BASHKIMI of September 4, 1948.)

DOCUMENT No. 138

ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 2093 OF NOVEMBER 26, 1949, TO THE YUGOSLAV LEGATION FORWARDING A COPY OF A LETTER WRITTEN BY MEMBERS OF THE ALBANIAN CABINET, THE PRESIDUM OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE ARMY, RETURNING YUGOSLAV DECORATIONS

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Albania, upon instructions from its Government, forwards to the Yugoslav Legation in Tirana a copy of the letter addressed to this Ministry by the Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet of the PR of Albania, members of the Presidium of the Albanian National Assembly and members of the Albanian People's Army, returning the military decorations awarded by the Yugoslav Government.

Tirana, November 26, 1949.

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Albania.

The undersigned members of the CC of the Albanian Labour Party, of the Cabinet and of the Presidium of the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania, who have been wearing the decorations awarded to us by the Presidium of the Assembly of the Republic of Yugoslavia, have decided to return these decorations, for we cannot wear medals awarded by those who have betrayed their people, who have been working on the enslavement of our people, who have violated the friendship of the Yugoslav peoples with the Albanian people, who have betrayed the camp of democracy and the Soviet Union and have enlisted in the struggle against them as agents of the bellicose imperialists.

Implementing the plans of the bellicose imperialists, Tito's fascist clique, as their faithful agents, consistently pursued a hostile policy aimed at subjugating the Albanian Labour Party, colonizing our country and transforming our People's Republic into a bourgeois republic in the service of imperialism. After the Cominform Resolution, Tito's clique, the headquarters for imperialist agents in the Balkans, carrying out the coordinated plan of the imperialists for the enslavement of Albania, caused hundreds of provocations on the frontier of Albania, sent agents

into Albanian territory and tried to organize the reactionaries of Albania in this country and abroad, etc., all this with the aim of overthrowing by force the legal people's government in Albania, of depriving our people of the liberty it had won by sanguinary struggle.

In its consistently hostile policy against our country, against the glorious Soviet Union and the whole camp of peace and socialism in the world, Tito's clique is doing the bidding of its masters from Wall Street and endeavouring to prolong its existence with their help by terrorizing the brotherly Yugoslav peoples. But we are certain that the heroic people of Yugoslavia, who fought the German invaders, will regain their honour, freedom, peace and democracy for which their best sons gave their lives. With them is the Soviet Union, our liberator and saviour, with them is all progressive mankind which is fighting against bellicose imperialists.

Returning the decorations awarded to us by the Presidium of the Republic of Yugoslavia, we express the deepest hatred for Tito's traitorous clique and declare to the peoples of Yugoslavia that we and all the Albanian people have been and still are friends of the peoples of Yugoslavia. This friendship is very strong because it emerged from our common struggle; because it was born on the battlefields of Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, Metohija, Sandjak, etc., where our partisans fought side by side.

Long live the peoples of Yugoslavia, scorn to Tito's fascist clique.

We instruct the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to forward a copy of this letter to the Legation of the Republic of Yugoslavia in Albania.

General of the Army Enver Hoxha, Premier of the People's Republic of Albania and Secretary General of the Albanian Labour Party;

Doctor Omer Nishani, President of the Presidium of the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania;

Major General Tuk Jakova, Vice-Premier of the PR of Albania and Organizational Secretary of the CC of the Albanian Labour Party;

Lieutenant General Mehmet Shehu, Vice-Premier of the PR of Albania, Minister of the Interior and Secretary of the CC of the Albanian Labour Party;

Major General Myslim Peza, Vice-President of the Presidium of the National Assembly of the PR of Albania;

Major General Bedri Spahiu, Vice-President of the Presidium of the National Assembly of the PR of Albania and Secretary of the CC of the Albanian Labour Party;

Spiro Koleka, Vice-Premier of the PR of Albania, President of the State Planning Commission and member of the Politbureau of the Albanian Labour Party;

Major General Hysni Kapo, Director of the Political Department of the People's Army of Albania and member of the Politbureau of the Albanian Labour Party;

Major General Beqcir Baluku, Chief of the General Staff of the People's Army of Albania and member of the Politbureau of the Albanian Labour Party;

Manol Konomi, Minister of Justice of the PR of Albania and Member of the CC of the Albanian Labour Party;

Manush Myftiu, President of the Control Commission of the Government of the PR of Albania and member of the CC of the Albanian Labour Party;

Medar Shtyla, Minister of Health of the PR of Albania.⁽¹⁷⁾

⁽¹⁷⁾ The Government of the FPRY did not answer this note.

5. AGGRESSIVE WARMONGERING PROPAGANDA AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA ORGANIZED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT(*)

SLANDERING AND DISTORTION OF THE CHARACTER OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLES OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE SOVIET PRESS AND RADIO MOSCOW BROADCASTS

DOCUMENT No. 139

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF OCTOBER 11, 1949

"It is a generally well-known fact that, at the outbreak of the great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union against Hitler, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which numbered 15,000 members, assumed leadership in the struggle of the masses of the people in Yugoslavia. On Tito's orders, however, during the early period of the war 12,000 of the 15,000 steered Party members were killed. The fascist Tito-Ranković clique is to blame for the death of many thousands of Communists. Tito's work consisted of thinking up operations where the losses would be high and there, under various pretexts, he would send the Communists so that they would not return alive... Tito's clique actively prepared the occupation

(*) The cited documents are only a small, insignificant part of the extremely aggressive warmongering propaganda against Yugoslavia published in the Soviet press or broadcast over Soviet state radio stations. The given examples, however, reveal the essence of this anti-Yugoslav propaganda which has no equal in the world today as to form and proportion or to concentration of the media used in it in a number of countries. This book does not cite examples of the same kind of propaganda against Yugoslavia at meetings, in the press, over the radio, in the cinemas, etc., in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania and in the press outside of these countries that is under the influence of Soviet propaganda. This has been done for the reason that the anti-Yugoslav propaganda in the countries of Eastern Europe only repeats what is published by the Soviet press and broadcast over the radio, although the propaganda against Yugoslavia in certain countries of Eastern Europe, especially in Bulgaria and Albania, is not less intense or furious than the Soviet propaganda. The volume of this anti-Yugoslav propaganda campaign is so huge and contains such a great quantity of articles, radio broadcasts, speeches, statements etc., that it is not at all possible to review it in this book. In order to give some idea of the proportions of this propaganda campaign, statistical material has been presented in the Annex to the book, under the title "Survey of Articles, News Reports and Cartoons Against Yugoslavia Published in the Principal Newspapers of the USSR and Eastern European Countries" during various periods, and "The Number of Broadcasts for Yugoslavia in the Languages of the Yugoslav Peoples over the State Radio Stations of the USSR and Eastern European Countries During a 24 Hour Period," showing the duration of broadcasts in the languages of the peoples of Yugoslavia and the number of articles published in given periods of time. (See Annexes Nos. 20 and 22.)

of the Adriatic coast by the English and Americans, but the victorious advance of the Soviet Army frustrated the plans of Churchill and his agents. The Yugoslav peoples are now obviously convinced that the Titoists are sworn enemies of the people, paid agents of the imperialists. They see that Tito's clique has been using, the Yugoslav peoples to bargain with all along, that it has been annihilating the best men of Yugoslavia, faithful sons of the people. However, such machinations will not help Tito and his band to evade responsibility."

(From the article by Colonel of the Soviet Army Valentin Mochalov, "Tito's Clique — a Band of Sworn Enemies of Yugoslavia.")

DOCUMENT No. 100

FROM THE REVIEW "NOVOE VREMYA" No. 43/233 OF OCTOBER 19, 1949

"During the war the United States and Great Britain undertook measures against the development of activities by resistance organizations which were under the leadership of communists. The only exception was Tito's group. The OSS^(*) offered great support to Tito. Thus, a special organization was created in Bari^(*) which systematically sent shipments of armaments and war material to Tito. This organization was run by OSS agent, John Hamilton (a Hollywood film star known better under the name of Sterling Hayden). The generosity of the American imperialists is now understandable, as is the stay of numerous British and American missions at Tito's headquarters, and the headquarters of various formations of the Yugoslav Army which was fighting against the Germans. At the Budapest trial,^(*) it was established that Tito had secret contact with Allen Dulles in 1944. The OSS supplied Tito and his subordinates with arms.

"That is how the execution of the cunning and far-reaching plan of the imperialists started, which consisted in dealing a blow to the democratic forces from within, in introducing a Trojan Horse into the camp of democracy. Availing themselves of the Yugoslav traitors, they began in the strictest secrecy to create "another policy" for their agents in the countries of people's democracy, as was established at the Budapest trial. The American and British authorities categorically refused to supply arms to those resistance organizations in whose leadership they did not succeed in setting up their agencies."

(From the article by V. Minayev, "Underground Strategy of American Imperialism.")

(*) Office of Strategic Services.

(*) Bari, an Italian city and port in the southern part of the Adriatic.

(*) The trial against Laszlo Rajk, former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 1949.

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF FEBRUARY 7, 1950

"In its attempts to have the German fascists agree with Tito's coming into power, as we know, the then Beograd gang of traitors came to terms with the Hitlerite command, in the period between 1941 and 1943, on the discontinuation of war actions in Yugoslavia. After the decisive defeats of the German army near Stalingrad and Kursk, inflicted upon it by the Soviet Army, the Yugoslav nationalists embarked upon a policy of striking a bargain with the Anglo-American imperialists. In 1943, Tito allowed military missions from England and the United States to stay at his General Headquarters. These missions subjected the traitorous leaders who had seized the leadership of the partisan movement in Yugoslavia to their influence. The English military mission was headed by Churchill's deputy, McLean, and the American by Colonel Huntington. Anglo-American representatives were also attached to the headquarters of the partisan movements in Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Vojvodina, etc."

(From the article by A. Zarin, "The Self-Exposure of Churchill's Emissaries," in the review "Slavyane," organ of the All-Slav Committee, No. 1, January, 1950.)

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF FEBRUARY 22, 1950

"Only the enemies of the Yugoslav people and the enemies of the Soviet Union — despicable lackeys of the Anglo-American imperialists from the Tito-Ranković clique — can lie so shamelessly in their endeavours to belittle before the peoples of Yugoslavia the immortal deeds of the Soviet Army. But, the working people and the real Yugoslav patriots know very well who freed them from the yoke of Hitlerite tyranny and from those to whom they are now being surrendered up into new slavery, to the Anglo-American imperialists, the present pretenders to world domination. They know very well that while the Soviet Army was breaking the backbone of the fascist beast, while the suffering victims of the enemies of Yugoslavia were awaiting the arrival of the liberating Soviet Army, Tito and his gang were making arrangements with Churchill for the occupation of Yugoslavia by Anglo-American troops. This occupation was prevented by the brilliant victories of the Soviet Army. Feelings of love and appreciation for the Soviet Army are alive and will continue to live eternally in the hearts of grateful mankind."

(From the article by Alexei Balalov, "The Yugoslav People Are Eternally Grateful to Their Liberator, the Soviet Army.")

MISINFORMATION AND FALSEHOODS IN THE SOVIET PRESS AND RADIO MOSCOW BROADCASTS ABOUT THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

DOCUMENT No. 143

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF MAY 19, 1949

"Thousands of Yugoslav pioneer fighters who are today languishing in concentration camps and in Tito's prisons testify most eloquently to the hatred of the working class and working masses of Yugoslavia for Tito's order and to the fact they are prepared to persist to the end in their struggle against the sold-out handful of traitors who are stopping at nothing to reach their savage goals. They are turning Yugoslavia into a colony of the imperialists, and the Yugoslav peoples into slaves of the Western capitalists."

(From the article by the Yugoslav deserter, Branko Raspopović: "The Real Meaning of the Meetings and Congresses in Yugoslavia," in the newspaper of the Yugoslav deserters in the USSR "For a Socialist Yugoslavia.")

DOCUMENT No. 144

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF JUNE 29, 1949

"In order to stay in power the traitorous leadership of the CPY has introduced a veritable fascist terror in the country, employing on a large scale the blood-thirsty gangs of Ustashi, Chetniks and hirelings of Nedić(*) and Rupnik(†) who bestially murdered communists and sincere patriots and friends of Yugoslavia during the war."

(From the article by the Yugoslav deserter, Matija Trnovac, "The Anti-Communist and Terrorist Regime of Tito's Clique in Yugoslavia.")

DOCUMENT No. 145

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF JANUARY 11, 1950

"The struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia against the gang of traitors, murderers and spies who seized the state power in the country is growing and spreading. The Beograd mercenaries of imperialist reaction,

(*) Milan Nedić, general in pre-war Yugoslavia, during the German occupation premier of the quisling Serbian government, committed suicide after the war.

(†) Leo Rupnik, a general in pre-war Yugoslavia, during the occupation one of the chief collaborationists with the Italians. After the war sentenced to death as a war criminal.

attempting to suppress the resistance of the people, have introduced monstrous and sanguinary terror. Many tens of thousands of the best sons of Yugoslavia, who are fighting for the freedom and independence of their homeland, men devoted to the ideals of proletarian internationalism, are languishing in the fascist prison cells of the Tito-Ranković gang."

(From the article by Kozlov, "Stay the Bloodstained Hand of the Hangman of the People of Yugoslavia.")

DOCUMENT No. 146

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF MAY 18, 1950

"Tito's clique is employing all means to keep the people like colonial slaves... In order to reach this goal, it is trying to incite national and religious hatred. In Croatia, a party has been organized with the task of spreading hatred between Serbs and Croats, in Sarajevo there is a group of young Moslems who are creating hostility between Christians and Moslems, in Serbia there is the "Peasant Sickle", a kulak-fascist organization which incites hatred between the peasants and workers. Tito's clique is endeavouring to realize the old imperialist principle: "Divide and Rule."

(From the Radio Moscow commentary "Beograd Fascists Fan National Hatred.")

DOCUMENT No. 147

FROM THE PAPER "LITERATURNAYA GAZETTA", ORGAN OF THE UNION OF SOVIET WRITERS, No. 48 OF JUNE 14, 1950

"The population is heading for ruin. The military budget is steadily growing. Last year 33% of the budget went for military preparations, this year 51% has been appropriated. The Americans are satisfied. Like an endless river, armaments are flowing from the so-called "surpluses" in Western Germany, left over from the defeated Hitlerite army... The tom-toms of the medicine-men in Beograd are booming. The Beograd chief is whole-heartedly playing his cannibalistic role."

(From the article by Gribachev, "The Tom-Toms are Booming in Beograd.")

MISINFORMATION AND FALSEHOODS ABOUT YUGOSLAV FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SOVIET PRESS AND RADIO MOSCOW BROADCASTS

DOCUMENT No. 14

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF JUNE 5, 1949

"... Tito's clique did not confine itself to agitation and propaganda in order to incite chauvinism. It resorted to the organization of frontier incidents on the borders of the neighbouring people's democratic countries. The organization of these incidents as well as the wide publicity given to them in Yugoslavia have the purpose of inciting hatred among the Yugoslav peoples for the peoples of Bulgaria, Hungary and Albania, of inciting chauvinistic feelings against these peoples and creating an atmosphere of tension and trouble both in Yugoslavia and in the countries of people's democracy. The frequent incidents on the Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier are an obvious example of the incitement of chauvinism."

(From an article entitled: "The Chauvinism of Tito's Clique — an Instrument of Imperialist Policy in the Balkans," printed in No. 3 of the journal "For a Socialist Yugoslavia" of June 1, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 149

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF JULY 20, 1949

"A conference between Yugoslav Army officers and Greek monarcho-fascist officers was held in Yugoslavia in the presence of American and British officers. After the conference, the Yugoslav officers signed an order permitting the monarcho-fascist troops undisturbed use of Yugoslav territory for the purpose of stabbing the Greek democratic army in the back."

(From a report from the TASS correspondent in Sofia on a communiqué of the "Free Greece" Radio Station, published by the Moscow press.)

DOCUMENT No. 154

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF OCTOBER 8, 1949

"The foreign policy machinations of the Tito-Ranković clique have been completely unmasked. Its sordid deception regarding Slovene Carinthia has been revealed. Tito's network of agents has been uncovered in Albania, which Tito's clique wanted to annex to Yugoslavia. At the

same time, Tito's plans to incorporate Bulgaria into the so-called South Slav federation and to impose a fascist leadership upon the Bulgarian people have also failed.

"The fascist Tito-Ranković clique has become a shock brigade for imperialist reaction. It was established at the trial of Rajk and his accomplices that the Tito-Ranković clique intended to prepare and carry out a fascist putsch in Hungary and later in the other countries of people's democracy; to turn the peoples of Yugoslavia and of the Eastern European countries against the Soviet Union; to provoke mistrust and hostility towards the USSR among them. For the benefit of the imperialist warmongers, the Beograd spies wanted to make cannon fodder out of the peoples of these countries. Organizing conspiracies, planning the assassination of leading officials of the people's democracies, spreading repulsive propaganda against the Soviet Union, the Beograd fascists gave impetus to their spies and provocateurs by declaring that Anglo-American circles were in full agreement with their activities and that they had been promised the necessary support of imperialists from the USA and Great Britain."

(From the article by Medvedev, "The Beograd Hirelings of Imperialism Have Been Exposed," in the magazine "Bolshevik," theoretical and political organ of the CC of the CPSU(B), No. 16, September 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 151

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF NOVEMBER 27, 1949

"Tito's clique is dragging Yugoslavia into both the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Pact and is carrying through the malevolent plan of transforming Yugoslavia into a bridgehead for imperialist adventures against the countries of people's democracy and the Soviet Union."

(From an article by the Yugoslav deserter Petranović, "Facts Removing the Masks from Tito, the Fascist, and his Gang.")

DOCUMENT No. 152

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF NOVEMBER 16, 1949

"...that the representatives of Yugoslavia have declared themselves for the system of the North Atlantic Pact and that an American Mission headed by General O'Hara has arrived in Beograd. According to the American press it will check up on the army."

(From the article "The Beograd Dollar Lackeys.")

FROM THE NEWSPAPER "PRAVDA", CENTRAL ORGAN OF THE CC OF
THE CPSU(B), OF DECEMBER 6, 1949

"The shameless and hypocritical attempts by the despicable clique of Tito to conceal its true nature, a spying and murderous nature, under the false slogan of "building socialism", have failed completely. The whole world today knows that the Tito-Ranković clique is in the service of Anglo-American imperialists and that it is fighting with them against the international camp of peace, democracy and socialism..."

"Having seized power under the guise of friendship with the USSR, the Tito-Ranković clique, obeying orders from its Anglo-American masters, started to wage a campaign of slanders and provocations against the Soviet Union, using the basest fabrications borrowed from the arsenal of the Hitlerites. The fascist Tito clique set itself the task of organizing political gangs in the countries of people's democracy, made up of reactionary, nationalistic, clerical and fascist elements. Its aim was to carry out counter-revolutionary attacks in these countries with their support, with a view to estranging these countries from the USSR and from the whole socialist camp and subjugating them to the forces of imperialism. The Yugoslav fascists transformed Beograd into an American center of espionage and anti-communist propaganda.

"The Beograd gang of spies and murderers committed an act of perfidy against the Greek people, an act without precedent in history. They stabbed the national liberation army of Greece in the back at the most difficult moment in its struggle against the monarcho-fascist army and its Anglo-American patrons. Now, in the United Nations, the Yugoslav fascists are working together with the representatives of imperialist Governments, zealously inciting war hysteria... Yugoslavia has been turned into an armed camp. The working people of Yugoslavia have been deprived of all the democratic achievements won in the hard struggle against foreign and internal foes. The State sector of the Yugoslav economy is no longer the property of the people, for the State power is in the hands of the enemies of the people. The Anglo-American industrial circles are investing their capital in Yugoslav economy and are transforming the country into an agricultural and raw materials appendage of foreign capital. The workers of Yugoslavia have been reduced to a level of poverty and ruin unrecorded even in the hardest days of the German-fascist occupation. The exploitation of the working class has taken on unparalleled proportions."

(From an editorial, "The Internationalist Duty of all Communist and Workers' Parties.")

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF JANUARY 7, 1950

"The fight against Tito's clique has a special importance for the Bulgarian Communist Party and for all of Bulgaria, particularly as regards the guaranteeing of our national independence, the security of

our country and the creation of peaceful conditions for the building of socialism. For our country, the Titoists are not only deserters from the front of democracy and socialism, not only agents and spies of Anglo-American imperialism and the most vicious slanderers and provocateurs against the Soviet Union and countries of people's democracy, but also very dangerous neighbours. Now, the Titoists not only no longer conceal their territorial claims with regard to Bulgaria, but quite openly and insolently talk about their intentions to seize the Pirin Region — the Bulgarian Macedonia. They have reached an agreement with the Greek monarcho-fascists on the suppression of the national liberation movement in Greece, on the partition of Albania and on the creation of a joint front against Bulgaria . . .”

“Our struggle against Tito's clique cannot be a defensive one. It must be offensive, and it must be waged with increasing force . . .”

“The working people of Bulgaria have the correct attitude towards the Titoists as a clique which is an enemy of socialism and democracy, and an enemy of the vital interests of our country. Nevertheless, our Party considers that it has not yet developed the campaign of unmasking the Yugoslav hirelings of Anglo-American imperialism on a sufficiently broad scale.”

(From an article by Vladimir Poptomov, Bulgarian Foreign Minister, “Tito's Clique: Most Vicious Enemy of the Bulgarian People,” published in the newspaper “For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy,” No. 1, January 6, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 135

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF JANUARY 16, 1950

“Every honest Yugoslav patriot is now finally convinced that Tito's fascist gang has sold Yugoslavia to the Anglo-American imperialists. By order of their overseas masters, the Beograd traitors are transforming Yugoslavia into a bridgehead for attack on the countries of people's democracy and the USSR, grooming their people to serve as cannon fodder in this attack. The whole world knows that Tito's clique has actually drawn Yugoslavia into the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Pact. Yugoslav airports and a number of islands in the Adriatic Sea have already been handed over to Anglo-American imperialists. And now — as reported by the Berlin newspaper “Taegliche Rundschau” — the Beograd clique is recruiting SS soldiers and officers on a large scale for the Yugoslav Army and Rankovic's police in which there are already more than 400 SS-men. Recently, as this newspaper reports, 50 former Hitlerite airmen came to Beograd to instruct the Yugoslav Army. This recruitment — as the paper underlines — is supported by the American authorities in Western Germany. The support offered by the American authorities is not incidental, for Tito's Government under orders from Wall Street and the City, is transforming Yugoslavia into a military bridgehead for attack on the camp of democracy and socialism.

"These SS-men and the group of American officers who came to Yugoslavia a few months ago were asked to come to suppress the freedom-loving traditions of the Yugoslav Army and to incite Yugoslav officers and soldiers against the countries of people's democracy and the peoples of the Soviet Union. The arrival of the group of SS-men as instructors for the Yugoslav Army corroborates once more the tendency of Tito's clique to transform the Yugoslav Army into a fascist army, into an army which is to serve the interests of the Anglo-American imperialists. The Yugoslav people's, who knew how to resist the military dictatorship of King Alexander, who knew how to rise against all the anti-popular regimes in the old Yugoslavia, who knew how to fight heroically against Hitler's tyranny, will find enough strength within them to bridle these despised lackeys of Anglo-American imperialism in the Balkans, Tito's fascist gang."

(From a commentary by Yugoslav deserter Ivanović, "New Crimes by Tito's Clique Against the Yugoslav People.")

DOCUMENT No. 156

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF JANUARY 18, 1950

"In the struggle against the camp of peace, democracy and socialism headed by the Soviet Union, the Beograd puppets of imperialism are playing the part of storm troopers for the Anglo-American warmongers in the Balkans.

"Inciting chauvinistic hysteria, the Titoists are attempting to incite the Yugoslav peoples against the peoples of the neighbouring countries. Together with the Anglo-American imperialists and the Greek monarcho-fascists, they drafted a plan of occupation and partition of Albania among them. They were planning to wrench Pirin Macedonia from Bulgaria. Taking part in the military adventures of American imperialists, the Titoists are transforming Yugoslavia into a military bridgehead against the countries of people's democracy and the Soviet Union."

(From the article "The Titoists are Waging a Struggle Against Peace Together with the Anglo-American Imperialists", published in the newspaper "Za Socijalističku Jugoslaviju" ("For a Socialist Yugoslavia").)

DOCUMENT No. 157

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF FEBRUARY 4, 1950

"It has been learned from reliable sources that; by order of the US State Department, a plan is now being drafted in Beograd for the establishment of a Yugoslav anti-communist center for the struggle against the communist parties in Asia, for the disruption and the undermining of the national liberation movements in these countries. This center is supposedly to be set up in India. The Yugoslav fascist center which is

being created in India will try to propagate fascist ideology in a disguised form. That Yugoslav fascist centre, the Yugoslav Embassy in New Delhi, is an Anglo-American espionage centre, whereas the Yugoslav Embassies and Missions in other Asiatic countries are its branch offices. They will carry on subversive activity against the Communist parties and the national-liberation movements of the Asiatic countries, according to orders received from Washington and London, and collect espionage and intelligence information for America and England."

(From the article "US Imperialists Using Tito's Clique for Espionage in Asia", in the newspaper "For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy", No. 5 of February 3, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 158

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF FEBRUARY 23, 1950

"At the request of their masters, the Beograd authorities are now forcing the workers to build the strategic Beograd—Zagreb highway.(?) They plan to extend this highway via Ljubljana to Trieste. They are doing this upon direct orders from the Anglo-American imperialists who are transforming Yugoslavia into their bridgehead. Under the pretext of building passes underneath the road, they are constructing camouflaged concrete halls along the highway, which at a given moment are to be used as airfields."

(From the article by Smirnov, "Beograd Abettors of the Anglo-American Warmongers.")

DOCUMENT No. 159

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF MARCH 3, 1950

"American arms and instructors are arriving in Yugoslavia. The plans of the Beograd General Staff are subordinated to the general plans of the Anglo-American imperialists. The Beograd clique keeps about one million men under arms. The maintenance of such a large army is a heavy burden for the people. In case of a war, which the Titoists are busily inciting together with their Anglo-American masters, they intend to force Yugoslav workers to turn their arms against their friends, against the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy."

(From an article by Yugoslav deserter Ivić, "Struggle Against Tito's Fascist Clique is Struggle Against the Instigators of War.")

(?) Refers to the Beograd—Zagreb Highway, 382 km. in length, which was built after the war by the volunteer labour of Yugoslav youth, with the aid of foreign youth brigades, during a period of 3 years. The Beograd—Zagreb Highway is the first direct road connection in history between the two biggest Yugoslav cities.

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF MAY 21, 1950

"The Anglo-Americans are masters of the Yugoslav airports and use Yugoslav islands for their naval bases. Yugoslavia is making preparations to join the North Atlantic Pact and a Beograd-Athens axis is to be established for this purpose..."

(From the article by Yugoslav deserter Pero Popivoda, "The Yugoslav Peoples are Fighting Against the Fascist Tito Regime.")

FROM THE THEORETICAL AND POLITICAL MAGAZINE OF THE CC OF THE CPSU(B), "BOLSHEVIK", No. 11 OF JUNE 1, 1950

"With the active help of their Beograd lackeys, the initiators of new military adventures are rapidly fortifying the military-political bloc in the Mediterranean area as a direct complement to the aggressive Atlantic Bloc. Under orders from Washington and London, the Titoists are endeavouring to "normalize" their relations with the Greek monarcho-fascists and the Italian clero-fascists, in order to create an American axis between Athens, Beograd and Rome. The Titoists are likewise in a hurry to "arrange cooperation" with American puppets in Western Europe as well as with the Austrian neo-Nazis, forgetting the "earlier misunderstandings" about Carinthia.

"Having brought the country to the brink of national catastrophe and entangled themselves in their criminal home policy, the Beograd fascists feel a bestial fear in the face of the growth of the forces of peace and progress. In an atmosphere of war hysteria and war adventures, the Yugoslav hangmen think that they will succeed in prolonging their sanguinary rule in Yugoslavia and saving their skins from harsh punishment by the people.

"No force can succeed in extinguishing the liberation struggle of the Yugoslav workers against fascist dictatorship. Yugoslav revolutionary exiles, expressing the thoughts and aspirations of their peoples who have suffered so severely, write in the paper "Za Socijalističku Jugoslaviju" ("For a Socialist Yugoslavia"): "... The struggle against Tito's fascist regime is in the vital interests of the struggle for peace, for Tito's gang is an imperialist network of agents which is fervently serving the instigators of a new war and helping them in the achievement of their plans'.

"The revolutionary patriots of Yugoslavia consider their fight for the annihilation of the fascist regime as a sacred duty to the great aim of strengthening peace in the world..."

"The Beograd fascists established a Gestapo terrorist regime along fascist lines in Yugoslavia and they have been drawing their country more and more into the aggressive bloc of Anglo-American colonizers.

Under the guise of an agreement for the "development of air transport cooperation" the almighty Yugoslav rulers have handed over a number of Yugoslav airports to the American war machine for degrading gifts in dollars. Under this "agreement", the Yugoslav airports and air routes have come under the control of American militarists and are included in the general military air system of the aggressive American bloc. In April 1950, the Titoists gave the Anglo-American naval forces the right of access to Yugoslav territorial waters and harbours on the Adriatic coast. The corrupt press describes this shameless betrayal of the national interests of Yugoslavia as something 'normal', since the allegedly temporary 'visits' to Yugoslav ports by American and British vessels are made quite openly.

"Many facts illustrate that the Titoists, under the command of their Anglo-American teachers, are, with increasing intensity, building new military airports, strategic highways, roads and railway lines, fortifying their frontiers with the neighbouring democratic countries and increasing military expenditures. By order of the American militarists, the Yugoslav servants of the instigators of war are speedily building the Trieste—Zagreb—Beograd highway which they intend to extend to Salonika. They are spending billions of dollars for these schemes. According to information from the Rumanian paper "Universul", for one project alone, the military airport at Batajnica,^(*) the Beograd adventurers spent one billion dollars."

(From the article by I. Medvedev "Tito's Clique in the Service of the Instigators of a New War.")

THREATS, CALLS TO REVOLT AND TO UNDERMINE THE FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE SOVIET PRESS AND RADIO MOSCOW BROADCASTS

DOCUMENT No. 162

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF MAY 19, 1949

"All honest communists in Yugoslavia, all those who are sincerely fighting for peace, long ago realized that the struggle for peace in Yugoslavia is indivisibly linked with the struggle against the agents of the instigators of a new war, against Tito and his gang."

(From the article by the Yugoslav deserter S. Šahinpašić, "The Transparent Manoeuvres of the Wreckers of the Movement for Peace", in the paper "For a Socialist Yugoslavia.")

(*) Batajnica, a village near Beograd.

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF MAY 30, 1949

"The struggle of the Yugoslav communists, who have remained faithful to proletarian internationalism and who are against the nationalistic policy of Tito's clique, is growing in scope. Regardless of the fierce terror of the hangman Ranković against all honest communists, the forces of resistance against the traitorous Tito clique are growing every day and their struggle is beginning to acquire an organized character. The Yugoslav communists who, owing to the terror of the hangman Ranković, find themselves far outside the frontiers of their homeland, are uniting their forces in the struggle against Tito's clique. As we announced after the publication of the paper "Nova Borba", which has played a big role in the activation not only of Yugoslavs in exile but of the forces of resistance to Tito's clique within the country, and the newspaper "Za socijalističku Jugoslaviju" ("For a Socialist Yugoslavia"), the Yugoslav Communist political exiles have begun to publish a newspaper called "Pod zastavom internacionalizma" ("Under the Banner of Internationalism").

"Let us struggle for the speediest possible destruction of the traitors to the cause of internationalism, the agents of the Anglo-American imperialists, the murderers of the people of Yugoslavia: Tito, Kardelj, Djilas, Ranković, Pijade and their fellow travellers. Let us struggle for the return of Yugoslavia to a salutary and internationalist course, to the road of socialist construction. Let us struggle for the return of our party to the family of brotherly communist parties. For the victory of the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia!"

(From a commentary on the publication of the first number of the newspaper of Yugoslav traitors in Rumania, "Under the Banner of Internationalism.")

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF JULY 6, 1949

"The militant task of the Yugoslav communists is to start the struggle for the quickest possible overthrow and punishment of the traitors, of Tito's gang, and the sooner this task is accomplished, the sooner will the peoples of Yugoslavia realise their long-standing aspirations towards socialism."

(From the article "The Cominform Resolution — a Platform of Struggle for the Internationalist Majority of the CPY Against the Tito-Ranković Clique," in the newspaper "For a Socialist Yugoslavia.")

FROM THE NEWSPAPER "PRAVDA," CENTRAL ORGAN OF THE CC OF
THE CPSU(B), No. 333 OF DECEMBER 29, 1949

"An indispensable condition for the return of Yugoslavia to the socialist camp is active struggle by the revolutionary elements, both within the CPY and outside it, for the return of a revolutionary, truly Communist Party of Yugoslavia, faithful to the Marxist-Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism, which will fight for the independence of Yugoslavia from imperialism.

"The Cominform expresses the firm conviction that forces will be found among the workers and peasants of Yugoslavia capable of ensuring victory over the bourgeois-restoring, spy clique of Tito-Ranković, that the working people of Yugoslavia, under the leadership of the working class, will know how to reestablish the historic achievements of people's democracy gained at the cost of heavy sacrifices and heroic struggle by the peoples of Yugoslavia, and that they will set out upon the road of socialist construction."

(From the Cominform Resolution "The Yugoslav Communist Party in the Hands of Murderers and Spies," adopted at the meeting of the Cominform in November, 1949.)

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF JULY 19, 1949

"For several months, the fascist terror of the Tito-Ranković clique, which does not differ from Franco's terror, has been raging in Yugoslavia. Terror is being used against the working class of Yugoslavia, which is today waging an organized struggle against the traitors from Tito's clique."

(From the article "Bridle the Bloodthirsty Hangmen of the Yugoslav People," in the paper "For a Socialist Yugoslavia.")

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF JULY 20, 1949

"Unless Tito's gang is overthrown and unless Yugoslavia returns to the brotherly community of the peoples of the USSR and the countries of people's democracy, she will not preserve her sovereignty and independence. Victory in the struggle against all the enemies of the people can be guaranteed only by a struggle against the renegade Tito and his satraps."

(From an article by the Yugoslav deserter P. Popivoda, "Defence of the Achievements of the National Liberation War is the Task of Yugoslav Patriots," in the newspaper "For a Socialist Yugoslavia.")

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF OCTOBER 6, 1949

"Can the Yugoslav peoples allow themselves to become the slaves of the Anglo-American imperialists for the purposes of the base business of the spying fascist Tito clique which has sold them to the imperialists? Can the working class and working people of Yugoslavia allow themselves to remain the object of ruthless exploitation by the imperialists and their domestic hirelings? Can our people allow the criminal rule of the fascist spy Tito-Ranković clique to hamper the construction of a socialist future in their country with the aid and support of the Soviet Union? The working class and other working people, as well as all the people of Yugoslavia, cannot and will not allow this. The thought of bitter and bloody slavery under the fascist conquerors is a hard one for the masses of the people in our country, who will not allow a gang of spies and agents of the imperialist conquerors to turn them into a part of their plan for base barter with the imperialists. That is why the struggle of the working class and working peasantry against the spy fascist clique of Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Ranković is growing from day to day."

(From the article "Tito's Fascist and Espionage Clique Has Destroyed the Most Important Achievement of the Peoples of Yugoslavia," in the newspaper "For a Socialist Yugoslavia.")

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF NOVEMBER 5, 1949

"The Yugoslav fascists who are fighting the USSR have no cause to hope for any fate other than that which befell their German and Italian predecessors. The Yugoslav people, faithful to friendship with the USSR, will find the strength to do away with the gang of fascists who seized power in the country."

(From the article "The Soviet Union, a Bastion of Peace, Democracy and Socialism," in the paper "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy," No. 25 of November 4, 1949.)

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF DECEMBER 2, 1949

"Resistance to the Tito-Ranković spies and fascists is growing and spreading. Communists faithful to Marxism-Leninism are heading the resistance which is being put up to the traitors. Tito's clique will not intimidate the heroic people of Yugoslavia with terror. The time is not far off when the wave of popular wrath will devour the handful of traitors who seized power by deceit."

(From a review of the Yugoslav deserters' press by the commentator of Radio Moscow.)

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF JANUARY 2, 1950

"The basic and objective conditions already exist in Yugoslavia for the development of the opposition movement to a higher form: work stoppage, economic and political strikes in the existing conditions, demonstrations on economic questions are rapidly turning into political revolt against the state, that is against Tito's clique which is in power.

"In order to realize the chief goal of the progressive democratic movement, that is, in order to lead the struggle for the annihilation of Tito's clique and for the return of the Yugoslav republic to the anti-imperialistic, democratic and socialist camp, a new Communist Party of Yugoslavia must be formed, revolutionary and internationalistic, which will lead the working masses of town and village, and be capable of directing the masses resolutely and courageously in the struggle for the overthrow of the clique of Tito, Ranković, Kardelj and company.

"The communists of all countries will extend full support to the Yugoslav communists in the struggle for the removal of the existing fascist regime in Yugoslavia and for the return of the Yugoslav republic to the camp of peace, democracy and socialism."

(From the article by Pietro Rossi, "The Struggle Against Tito, the Internationalist Duty of the Communists," in the newspaper "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy," No. 33 of December 30, 1949.)

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF JANUARY 27, 1950

"But the peoples of Yugoslavia have not reconciled themselves to betrayal by the fascist gang of spies and murderers who seized power by deceit, nor will they ever reconcile themselves to this. The working people of Yugoslavia are rising in struggle against the low traitors. In this struggle hundreds and thousands of loyal patriots of their homeland, loyal friends of the Soviet Union, have died a heroic death."

(From the article by the Yugoslav deserter, R. Golubović, "The Working People of Yugoslavia are Combatting Tito's Clique," in the paper "Pravda.")

FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF JULY 20, 1950

"The working peasantry is resisting plundering by the Titoists with increasing determination and courage. The peasants are hiding and burying grain and other food, thus completely preventing the fulfilment of the Titoist plans of export of food to the capitalist countries. Although

Tito's gang last year reduced the state purchase plans, the fulfilment of these reduced plans was prevented owing to the increasing resistance of the working people of Yugoslavia to the fascist regime of Tito's clique. With a wealth of experience behind them, the peasants are not only not increasing arable surfaces but are diminishing them. The Titoists themselves admit the breakdown of their policy in the countryside. The struggle of the working peasants against Tito's policy in the countryside is directly linked with the liberation movement of the peoples of Yugoslavia for the overthrow of the bloody fascist regime of Tito's clique. By their selfless struggle, the broad masses of the working peasantry are making a great contribution to the all-national struggle against the Tito-Ranković clique, that despicable agency of imperialism."

(From the article by the Yugoslav deserter, A. Alihodžić, "The Working Peasantry of Yugoslavia Is Combatting Tito's Plundering Grain Assessment," in the newspaper "For a Socialist Yugoslavia.")

II

ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

1. GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES VIOLATE TREATIES OF ALLIANCE BY NOT INVITING YUGOSLAVIA TO JOIN THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

DOCUMENT No. 174

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 210 OF FEBRUARY 1, 1949, TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT REGARDING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA IN CONNECTION WITH THE FOUNDATION OF THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN MOSCOW

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, with reference to a communique of the official Soviet Agency, TASS, on the creation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Republic of Poland, the Czechoslovak Republic, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Rumanian People's Republic and the Republic of Hungary, has the honour to inform it of the following:

1. The Government of the FPRY notes with surprise that Yugoslavia was neither informed of, nor invited to participate in, the conference held in Moscow in January this year at which it was decided to establish a Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, although all the countries, without exception, which participated in that conference have treaties on political, cultural and economic cooperation and mutual assistance with the FPRY. The surprise of the Government of the FPRY is the greater as it is a known fact that the Yugoslav leaders had several times posed the question of closer cooperation in the interests of the speedier recovery and economic rehabilitation of countries bound by treaties of close mutual assistance and cooperation. The Government of the FPRY proved its attitude by deeds for it was always guided by the principle of close economic cooperation with all the above-mentioned countries.

2. For the above-stated reasons, the Government of the FPRY considers that the Member-States of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance have discriminated against Yugoslavia, and that this act of discrimination is in complete contradiction with the existing treaties, economic and other, concluded and ratified between the FPRY and the above-mentioned countries.

3. The Government of the FPRY considers that such action cannot be justified by the existing abnormal relations between Yugoslavia and

the Member-States of the Council, for if Yugoslavia had been invited to the consultation, and if her representatives had participated in them, this would have created the possibility for an easier settlement of the misunderstandings existing between the FPRY and the Member-States of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

4. The Government of the FPRY notes that the conclusions of the consultation particularly with regard to the point dealing with the equality of rights of all countries which became parties to the mentioned council — are identical with the standpoint of the Government of the FPRY. It therefore considers that, on this basis, it could participate in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance created at these deliberations.

But on the other hand, the Government of the FPRY cannot help underlining at the same time that, if Yugoslavia were to participate in such economic cooperation as is provided for in the conclusions of the Moscow consultation, it would be necessary:

Firstly, to proceed immediately to the fulfilment of all obligations assumed under, and confirmed by, the existing treaties between the USSR and the countries of people's democracy, on the one, and the FPRY, on the other hand;

Secondly, to discontinue the campaign and actions directed against the FPRY as detrimental not only to the successful building of socialism in Yugoslavia but also to mutual economic cooperation between the FPRY and the above-mentioned countries.

The Government of the FPRY considers that this is the only way to create the possibility for the consolidation and extension of the necessary cooperation and mutual assistance among all countries of socialism and of people's democracy.

Identical notes are being sent simultaneously to the Governments of the Republic of Poland, of the Czechoslovak Republic, of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, of the Rumanian People's Republic and of the Republic of Hungary.

Beograd, February 1, 1949.

DOCUMENT No. 173

ANSWER OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BY NOTE No. 36 OF FEBRUARY 11, 1949, TO THE NOTE OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT OF FEBRUARY 1, 1949, REGARDING THE CREATION OF THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN MOSCOW

"The Yugoslav Government lays down two conditions for joining the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

"First, the Yugoslav Government requests that the validity of the existing treaties on mutual assistance and friendship with Yugoslavia, allegedly violated by the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy, be restored. This request by the Yugoslav Government is completely false and aimed at deceiving the Yugoslav peoples. Actually it is the Yugoslav Government, and no one else, which has violated these

treaties and obligations, substituting the earlier policy of friendship with the USSR by a policy of hostility.

"Second, the Yugoslav Government requests the discontinuance of the campaign allegedly being waged against Yugoslavia. This request is likewise entirely untrue and aimed at deceiving the Yugoslav people, for the Yugoslav Government cannot but know that neither the Soviet Union nor the countries of people's democracy are pursuing a campaign against Yugoslavia, and that it is only the hostile policy of the Yugoslav Government towards the USSR and the countries of people's democracy that is being criticized. It is no secret at all that the Yugoslav Government is carrying out mass reprisals against, and arrests of, Yugoslav citizens who support friendship with the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy. These mass reprisals and arrests can be described in no other way than as a manifestation of the hostile policy towards the USSR and the countries of people's democracy..."

"The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance has not been set up for purposes of ordinary economic cooperation of the type that exists between the USSR and Belgium and Holland in the field of commerce, for instance. This Council was set up for purposes of extensive economic cooperation among countries which are mutually pursuing an honest and friendly policy..."

"The Soviet Government considers the participation of Yugoslavia in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as desirable. Participation in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, however, will be possible only if the Yugoslav Government renounces its hostile policy towards the USSR and the countries of people's democracy and if it returns to the former policy of friendship. The Soviet Government has no doubt that only a resolute break with the policy of hostility and a return to the policy of friendship, can correspond to the essential interests of the Yugoslav peoples, the interests of their economic prosperity and the independence of the Yugoslav State."⁽¹⁾ ⁽²⁾

Beograd February 11, 1949

(1) Note given in excerpts.

(2) The cited note of the Soviet Government was a model which the member-governments of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance simply repeated in their replies to the Notes which were addressed to them by the Yugoslav Government in connection with the establishment of this Council. The Czechoslovak Government replied in note No. 267 of February 16, 1949; the Hungarian Government in note No. 439 of February 14, 1949; the Rumanian Government with note No. 87/I of February 16, 1949; the Bulgarian Government in note No 15/VI of February 17, 1949. The Polish Government's reply, however, copied the Soviet Government's note word for word, even quoting the example given in the Soviet note on the USSR's economic cooperation with Belgium and Holland, which had no bearing on the relations between Poland and Yugoslavia.

2. CANCELLATION OF VALIDLY CONCLUDED CONTRACTS WITH YUGOSLAVIA BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE

DOCUMENT No. 176

LETTER FROM THE YUGOSLAV COMMERCIAL ATTACHE IN VIENNA TO THE CHIEF OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF SOVIET PROPERTY IN AUSTRIA REGARDING THE NON-DELIVERY OF TURBINES FOR POWER PLANTS

No. 56/49

M. Tihomirov
Director of USIA
Trattnerhof 1
Vienna

April 2, 1949

Re: Delivery of turbines to Yugoslavia.

According to contract between USIA and the Yugoslav Ministry of Electricity, 6 turbines for Yugoslavia were ordered from the Voith factory, to wit:

1. Contract No. 53 dated November 30, 1947, for two hydraulic turbines "Kaplan" Model, amounting to 888,785 US Dollars.
Date of delivery under the contract:
For the first turbine November 30, 1948,
For the second turbine December 30, 1949.
2. Contract No. 52 dated November 30, 1947, for two hydraulic turbines "Francis" Model, amounting to 156,030 US Dollars.
Date of delivery under the contract:
For the first turbine February 28, 1949,
For the second turbine May 30, 1949.
3. Contract No. 2 dated January 17, 1948, for two hydraulic turbines "Pepton" Model amounting to 310,000 US Dollars.
Date of delivery under the contract:
For the first turbine January 17, 1949,
For the second turbine July 17, 1949.

The contracts were signed by the Chief of USIA, M. Tihomirov, and the dates of delivery were guaranteed by USIA.

The dates of delivery for three turbines have already expired and according to the Voith factory report, the situation regarding the delivery of turbines is the following:

(a) According to Voith factory letter, Tu-Pe of January 27, 1949, the delivery date for the first turbine under contract No. 53 was postponed from November 30, 1948, to February 1950;

(b) According to Voith factory letter, Tu-S of January 28, 1949, the delivery term under Contract No. 52 was postponed for the first turbine from February 28, 1949, to May 30, and for the second turbine from May 30, 1949, to July 30, 1949, i. e. more than twice the time contracted for.

We had scheduled the building of some of our big power plants on the basis of the delivery dates of the turbines contracted with USIA. The terms of the contract for the delivery of certain turbines, however, were not kept. This has upset the construction plan of these projects and, if the new dates are really postponed for more than a year, these big power plants will not be built on schedule at all.

As this question is a very important one for us, I should like to acquaint you with the situation, to ask you to inform us if you and the USIA Administration, with which we concluded the contracts, know about this postponement of delivery, whether you agree to it and why such a postponement occurred.

We underline that we are not in a position to agree to such postponement and request that the new dates for the delivery of the turbines, which should have been ready by now, be as short as possible. We should also like to receive assurances to the effect that the dates of delivery of the turbines which are approaching expiry, will be adhered to in conformity with the existing contracts.⁽¹⁾

We should like to mention that we have fulfilled our obligations under the contract.

Respectfully yours
(Sgd) M. Ljubišić
Commercial Attaché

⁽¹⁾ Three agreements were concluded between the Administration of Soviet Property in Austria, the headquarters of which is in Vienna, and the Yugoslav Ministry of Electro-Industry on November 30, 1947, and on January 17, 1948, under which the Administration of Soviet Property in Austria promised to deliver six turbines to Yugoslavia totalling 1,363,815 US dollars. The dates of delivery were established as follows: November 30, 1948, January 17, 1949, February 28, 1949, May 30, 1949, July 17, 1949, and December 30, 1949. Although Yugoslavia fulfilled in their entirety its commitments arising from the above-mentioned agreements and paid the whole of the advance as well as the outstanding installments amounting to 773,650 US dollars, of which sum 98,360 were in free dollars and 675,270 US dollars were paid out in copper, lead and pyrites, the Administration of Soviet Property in Austria did not fulfil a single one of its commitments arising from any of the afore-mentioned agreements. It has not, to this day, despite numerous verbal and written reminders by the Yugoslav representatives, permitted the delivery of three turbines, which had been completed with delay, nor did it allow the shipment of parts of the fourth turbine which had been completed in the meantime.

ANSWER FROM THE CHIEF OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF SOVIET PROPERTY IN AUSTRIA TO THE LETTERS OF THE YUGOSLAV COMMERCIAL ATTACHE IN VIENNA, OF APRIL 2, 1949, AND JULY 29, 1949

The Commercial Attaché of the Yugoslav Political Mission in Vienna
Your reference No. 970/49

We have referred to the competent institutions all questions brought forth in your letters.

Until the receipt of an answer, we shall not be in a position to enter upon any negotiations.

For the Chief of the Administration of Soviet
Property in Austria
(Signature illegible)

August 18, 1949.

NOTE OF THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN BUCHAREST, No. 1661 OF DECEMBER 4, 1948, TO THE RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION WITH TRADE AGREEMENT VIOLATIONS BY THE LATTER

"The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Bucharest has the honour to inform the esteemed Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Rumanian People's Republic of the following:

"Under the Trade Agreement on the Exchange of Goods and the Regulation of Payments between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Rumanian People's Republic of April 15, 1948, and its component parts, and under other trade agreements concluded pursuant to Article 6 of the same Agreement, both Governments bound themselves to fulfil the afore-mentioned Agreement and its component parts.

"During the past several months, however, on the basis of various unjustified pretexts by the responsible institutions, shipments of goods from the Rumanian People's Republic to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia provided for under the Agreement have been discontinued, as is evident from the following:

"1. — The regular shipment of oil derivatives has been discontinued altogether since the first half of August this year, while no new schedules for the shipments provided for by the Agreement are being made.

"Towards the end of August this year, 475 tons of 16/18 E oil were ready for delivery under the Trade Agreement for which an export permit had even been granted. At the moment when the tank cars were brought up to load the oil, however, the refinery declared that it was stopping shipment at orders from the Ministry of Trade of the Rumanian People's Republic.

"2. — In accordance with Article 6 of the existing Trade Agreement between the Rumanian People's Republic and the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav state enterprise, Jugonaftra, and the Rumanian enterprise, Petrolexport, concluded an agreement on

the shipment of petrol for free exchange. This Agreement was also approved by the Ministry of Trade of the Rumanian People's Republic.

"Pursuant to the aforesaid agreement, two tankers were loaded with 1,400 tons of petrol at Giurgiu on August 31 this year. The issuance of an export permit was delayed under various pretexts, and verbal notification was given to the effect that the export permit would not be issued at all. Thus the loaded tankers of oil remained in Giurgiu over a month. After that the petrol was unloaded by order of the Ministry of Trade of the Rumanian People's Republic and delivery was not effected at all.

"3. — Under the Trade Agreement between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Rumanian People's Republic, the shipment of a certain quantity of steel plate and tin plate had been provided for. To this end a commercial contract had been concluded between the Yugoslav commercial enterprise, Tehnopromet, and the Rumanian state enterprise CIS (Centrala Industriala Siderurgica).

"During recent months there have been delays in this connection and shipments of steel plate and tin have not been made.

"On October 6 this year, the Rumanian enterprise, CIS, asked the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Rumanian People's Republic for an export permit for 200 tons of tin plate and 450 tons of steel plate. The Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Rumanian People's Republic refused to grant the requested export permit for the above-mentioned quantities of plate for over a month, with the explanation that it was not permitting attainment of the ceiling by the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia although that ceiling had been provided for under the Trade Agreement of April 15 this year. It was only on November 14 this year that the export permit was granted for only 100 tons of tin plate valued at about 32,000 dollars, while the balance under the Trade Agreement amounted to over 240,000 dollars to the credit of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

"Notice should be taken of the fact that, despite all this, even the quantity of tin plate for which a permit had been issued has not been delivered.

"4. — At the same time, in addition to delays and discontinuance of shipments of goods from the Rumanian People's Republic to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, difficulties are being caused by the competent trade organs both in connection with contracting and taking deliveries of goods from the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia for the Rumanian People's Republic.

"For example, according to provisions in the Trade Agreement, negotiations began more than three months ago for the conclusion of a contract on the shipment of tobacco. A contract has still not been concluded, however, even though agreement was reached on price and quality, because the CAM (Casa Autonoma Monopolurilor) refuses to inspect the quality of the goods at the point of shipment, although this is a

commercial custom and is applied by all countries especially in the case of tobacco shipments.⁽²⁾

"5. — The Trade Mission of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Bucharest informed the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Rumanian People's Republic by letter No. 106/48 of September 30 this year, that the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was prepared to begin negotiations between representatives of both countries between November 1 and 10 this year on the establishment of new goods quota lists for 1949, as provided under Article 11 of the Trade Agreement of April 15, 1948, which was also valid for 1949, since neither of the contracting parties had renounced it within the specified term.

"Not only have negotiations not begun for the establishment of new quota lists, but no answer has been given so far."⁽³⁾

"It clearly follows from the foregoing:

that the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the People's Republic of Rumania, by unilateral and arbitrary action, is not allowing attainment of the ceiling provided for under the Trade Agreement;

that all shipments of oil derivatives have been discontinued by the Rumanian People's Republic since mid-August this year;

that the delivery of plate has been delayed and stopped under various unjustified pretexts;

that the fulfilment of the Trade Agreement is being made difficult for the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia by unjustified procrastination in the conclusion of contracts for Yugoslav shipments;

that the opening of negotiations for the establishment of new quota lists for 1949 is obviously being evaded although the existing Agreement remains valid.

"The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Bucharest underlines that the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia considers all this as an infringement and overt violation of the clear provisions of the Trade Agreement of April 15, 1948, which exists between our two countries and by which both governments should abide..."

"At the time of the delivery of maize which the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia lent the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic in 1946, as well as at the time of the return of the maize to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia advanced all transport expenses so that the maize could be delivered on time. On this occasion, the Government of the People's Republic of Rumania undertook

(2) The Rumanian Government, contrary to the established trade customs for the delivery of tobacco, requested that inspection of the quality of the tobacco be made in Rumania and not in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was exposed to the danger of having its shipments of tobacco — an extremely perishable commodity — returned, instead of having the Rumanian representatives select the tobacco themselves in Yugoslavia.

(3) The proposal of the Yugoslav Government to start negotiations for the determination of new quota lists was never answered by the Rumanian Government despite several intercessions by the Yugoslav Government, in consequence of which all trade between Yugoslavia and Rumania ceased completely in 1949. In this way, Rumania actually broke off all economic agreements with Yugoslavia.

the obligation to pay all the expenses connected with the shipment and return of the maize.

"In order to settle the debt of the Rumanian People's Republic arising out of the maize loan, the Commercial Attaché of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Bucharest began negotiations with the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Mr. Giali, back in July this year.

"Our proposal to settle this debt by shipment of goods was turned down while our subsequent proposal to transfer this debt to the credit of the account for non-commercial payments received no reply and so the debt remains unsettled to this day.

"The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Bucharest emphasizes that the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia considers that the non-settlement of the above-mentioned economic questions as well as the violation of the Trade Agreement has resulted in the destruction of economic relations between our two neighbouring and friendly countries and has thus damaged the economies of both countries.

"The Embassy is of the opinion that the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic will undertake the necessary measures to solve the foregoing questions, since this is enjoined by the interests of both countries."(4)(5)

(4) Note given in excerpts.

(5) Cancellation of validly contracted business, postponement of contracted deliveries and prevention of the conclusion of new contracts on the grounds of existing treaties and agreements, were typical forms of economic aggression which the governments of the USSR and the Eastern European countries used before completely severing all trade and other economic relations with Yugoslavia. This is, inter alia, borne out by the following examples:

The Czechoslovak Government failed to deliver to Yugoslavia all the installations for the production of automobiles, ordered back in 1945 and 1946. Only about 60% of the value of the orders placed by Yugoslavia were executed, and in such way that it was impossible to assemble these installations because of missing parts. Under the Capital Goods Agreement the Czechoslovak Government was to have delivered four hydro-power plants and two thermal-power plants. The terms of delivery were set for 1950 and 1951. The Czechoslovak Government subsequently postponed the fixed terms of delivery for 7 to 12 months. This postponement in itself meant a loss of 560 million KWHs of power for the Yugoslav economy. The Czechoslovak Government did not deliver a single one of these power plants. The same thing happened with the delivery of ore-excavating machines which were designated for the copper, lead and coal mines.

Czechoslovakia's delay in delivering material for capital construction back at the time when the Czechoslovak Government still maintained economic relations with Yugoslavia, can be illustrated in terms of figures in the following way: under the Capital Goods Agreement, Czechoslovakia was to have delivered to Yugoslavia by June 1, 1949, 1,321,000,000 dinars worth of capital goods, while it failed to deliver 536,000,000 dinars or 40% worth of the goods.

Poland unilaterally broke off the agreement for the delivery of a plant for which Yugoslavia had already paid an advance of over 1,200,000 dollars. During the shipment period in 1948-1949, Poland was very late with its deliveries of ingots, white and gray pig iron, rolled goods and electromaterial (cables). In reply to an inquiry by the Yugoslav Government on this question, Poland's Commercial Attaché, Mr. Polak, at a meeting with the Yugoslav Assistant Minister for Foreign Trade, Pavlič, on November 5, 1948, declared that the delay in Polish deliveries was due to the atmosphere which had been created by the Cominform Resolution.

Hungary, too, was also very late in its implementation of the Capital Goods Agreement. Especially marked was the delay in the shipment of deep-drilling sets and their parts, pit wagons, machines, ship plate, pipes, etc. In terms of figures, this

3. CIRCUMVENTION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH YUGOSLAVIA BY THE SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS⁽¹⁾

ON THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE OF THE USSR, KRUTIKOV, HINTING AT A DECREASE IN TRADE BETWEEN THE USSR AND YUGOSLAVIA FOR POLITICAL REASONS

DOCUMENT No. 179

FROM THE LETTER BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA TO J. V. STALIN AND V. M. MOLOTOV, DATED APRIL 13, 1948

"There are certain things in our trade relations which should be eliminated if the latter are to develop correctly. We do not deny that there have been certain shortcomings on our side in the trade exchange, but we cannot believe that this would be a sufficient reason to weaken our trade cooperation. We cannot believe that the case of Krutikov and our foreign trade representatives was nothing but a sheer misunderstanding. Krutikov told our representatives quite clearly that our trade delegation, which was waiting in Beograd to leave for Moscow, need not come, since the Soviet Government would not be able to sign a protocol on

⁽¹⁾ In September and October 1948, the Yugoslav Government invited the Government of the USSR and the governments of the Eastern European countries to start negotiations for new trade agreements, namely, to determine new lists of export and import quotas for 1949. This invitation was accepted by the Soviet Government, and then by the governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, while the Rumanian Government did not reply at all. The Bulgarian Government accepted the invitation but kept postponing the meeting of the delegations under the pretext of being too busy, so that the terms of the meetings were shifted from December 1948 to June 1949. It was then that the Government of the FPRY told the Government of the PR of Bulgaria that the Bulgarian delegation was expected in Beograd with the purpose of starting negotiations and that it could come whenever the Bulgarian Government desired. The Bulgarian delegation never came to Beograd.

delay can be illustrated in the following way: according to the payments plan for the first quarter of 1949 alone, Hungary, in its capital goods deliveries to Yugoslavia, was in arrears by a sum of 2,733,000 dollars. Hungary, at the time it unilaterally broke off the Five Year Economic Agreement in June 1949, owed Yugoslavia 24,934,000 dollars, which it had received in advance and for which it had sent no counter-deliveries.

further exchange of goods for 1948, and talks on this question could be resumed only towards the end of 1948. Krutikov made this statement to our Assistant Minister for Foreign Trade, Comrade Crnobrnja, and to our commercial attaché in Moscow. Replying to the question of our trade representatives as to whether that was the attitude of the Soviet Government, Krutikov replied that it was.

"We think that if there has been any incorrectness on the part of our trade officials — and we believe there might have been with respect to the delivery of goods and to trade relations generally — a way could have been found to reach an understanding and eliminate the obstructions to the proper development of trade relations between our two countries.

"We consider that everything hampering the proper functioning of economic cooperation between the two countries should be jointly examined and eliminated."

DOCUMENT No. 180

FROM THE LETTER BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS) TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA, OF MAY 4, 1949

"In their letter dated April 13, Comrades Tito and Kardelj returned to the question of trade relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, to the alleged refusal by Comrade Krutikov to continue trade negotiations with the Yugoslav representatives. We have on several occasions already explained to the Yugoslav comrades that Comrade Krutikov rejects the statement which is ascribed to him. We have also explained that the Soviet Government has not raised the question of breaking off trade negotiations and trade with Yugoslavia. We, therefore, consider this question exhausted and have no intention of taking it up again."

DOCUMENT No. 181

SOVIET PRESS COMMUNIQUE ON THE SIGNING OF THE MUTUAL TRADE EXCHANGE PROTOCOL BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE USSR FOR 1949 WHICH REVEALS THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS REDUCING ECONOMIC EXCHANGE WITH YUGOSLAVIA FOR POLITICAL REASONS

A Protocol on the mutual delivery of goods for 1949 was signed on December 27, after the negotiations had ended between the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR and the Yugoslav trade delegation, which had come to Moscow.

Owing to the hostile policy of the Yugoslav Government towards the Soviet Union, in consequence of which it is impossible to maintain large scale economic exchange between the USSR and Yugoslavia, the Protocol provides for reduced exchange of goods between the USSR and Yugoslavia for 1949. This exchange of goods will be reduced by 8 times as compared with 1948.

The Yugoslav trade delegation headed by the Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Trade, Mr. M. Popović, left Moscow on December 30.

The delegation was seen off at the Byelorussian railway station by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR, I. F. Semichastnov, by the Soviet trade representative to Yugoslavia, I. M. Lebedev, and by the head of the Protocol Department of the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR, N. I. Kuzminski.

(PRAVDA No. 366, of December 31, 1948.)

DOCUMENT No. 132

SOVIET GOVERNMENT VIOLATES CAPITAL GOODS AGREEMENT WITH YUGOSLAVIA, CONCLUDED ON JULY 25, 1947, AND BY DEVIOUS METHODS SEEKS YUGOSLAV ASSENT FOR ITS FORMAL DISRUPTION(*) (*)

"At today's meeting with Mr. Vasiliev who came to hear our reply to their proposal of last week about determining the method of settling our debts for deliveries under the Agreement of July 25, 1947, I advanced our views according to the instructions received in the following way:

"As provided for by Paragraph 3 of Article 8 of the Agreement of July 25, 1947, we (Ministry of Finance) agree to establish with the USSR Gosbank a technical method for the balancing of accounts under the

(*) From the notes made by the Yugoslav Assistant Finance Minister, Kiro Gligorov, on the talks with the Trade Envoy of the USSR to Yugoslavia, I. M. Lebedev, and his deputy, L. I. Vasiliev, in the period from February 1 to April 13, 1949.

(*) The agreement of July 25, 1947, concluded between the Yugoslav Government and the Government of the USSR on the delivery of industrial machines and installations to Yugoslavia on credit, provided, inter alia (in Art. 8 of the Agreement), that the Yugoslav Ministry of Finance and the Soviet Gosbank would jointly establish the technical method for the balancing of accounts for the deliveries and determine the method of settling Yugoslavia's debt. Under the Agreement, Yugoslavia was to have received on credit capital goods totalling 135 million dollars. According to Soviet estimates, the USSR delivered only 765,206.93 dollars' worth of goods from the total amount of credits, or a little over one half of one per cent.

At the beginning of 1949, the Soviet Government asked Yugoslavia to determine the method of settling its debt for the above-mentioned sum of 765.2 thousand dollars, avoiding and refusing to conclude an arrangement on a general method of balancing delivery accounts as provided for by Article 8 of the Agreement. The Deputy Trade Attaché of the USSR, Vasiliev, to this end, submitted draft letters to the Yugoslav Ministry of Finance, which letters should have been exchanged between the Yugoslav Ministry of Finance and the Soviet Gosbank in order to settle this question in the manner proposed by the Soviet Government.

From the notes on these talks, conducted over this issue between the Yugoslav Assistant Finance Minister, Kiro Gligorov, and the Soviet Trade Representative, Lebedev, or his deputy Vasiliev, it can be seen that the Soviet Government unilaterally violated the above-mentioned Agreement of July 25, 1947, and stopped all deliveries of capital goods to Yugoslavia. By safeguarding the payment of a minimum delivery, it was in effect endeavouring to obtain by a devious way the Yugoslav Government's consent for the formal breach of the agreement.

During trade talks in Moscow towards the end of December 1948, the then Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, A. J. Mikoyan, answering a direct question asked by the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Trade, Milentije Popović, as to whether the USSR Government would fulfil the Capital Goods Agreement, replied: "The fulfilment of the Agreement has been discontinued because conditions have changed."

Agreement. This method of settlement should be established in principle — it should apply to the settlement of accounts of deliveries under the Agreement generally and not to settlement with respect to certain concrete deliveries alone. Hence, our first objection to their proposal refers to the introductory part of the draft letter. The mutual exchange of this letter was to have settled the question of the accounts. According to the formulations in this introductory text, the draft letter regulates the method of balancing of accounts only with respect to certain definite deliveries, namely those that have already been carried out. For this reason, the introductory text should be altered so that the letter establishes the technical method of balancing accounts with respect to the Agreement generally. We stand by the Agreement.

"Mr. Vasiliev replied that he had been authorized by the USSR Gosbank to regulate the method of balancing of accounts only with respect to the concrete sum of 765,206.93 US dollars — the equivalent of industrial installations and machines so far delivered to Yugoslavia under the Agreement of July 25, 1947. He had no authorization to negotiate the establishment of a method of balancing of accounts generally. 'If you retain the view you have adopted,' he continued, 'I shall have to inform Moscow of this, and shall let you know later what reply I have received. We are uncertain as to the outcome of this Agreement of July 25, 1947, generally. No shipments are being made now. So far, deliveries worth only 765,000 dollars have been made. We still do not have all the contracts on the deliveries between the consignor and consignee'."

(From the notes on the second talk, held on February 1, 1949.)

"Mr. Vasiliev informed me that, after our first meeting (February 1 this year), he had notified the Gosbank of the USSR that we cannot accept his proposal. He has now received an answer from Moscow to his report. Moscow (the Gosbank) rejects our proposal to regulate the question of the accounts under the Agreement of July 25, 1947, in a general way. 'The Ministry of Finance surely knows (or it should surely know) that, with the change in relations between the USSR and the FPRY, the Agreement has now in fact lost validity.' Owing to this the Gosbank stands by its proposal for the signing and mutual exchange of its draft letter. There can only be talk of the balancing of accounts for the goods which have already been shipped.

"The first time, I corrected Mr. Vasiliev to the effect that we had not rejected the proposal of the Gosbank. The last time I declared to him that we acknowledged the debt and wanted to determine the method of settling it pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement of July 25, 1947. Since it makes provision for the settlement of the accounts generally, I proposed that we proceed along these lines and that the method of settling this concrete debt be determined in this general manner.

"Then I stated that we considered the Agreement of July 25, 1947, as being in force, that it had not lost validity. I repeated that we do not refuse to regulate the question of our debts. The afore-mentioned Agreement is a long-term one and it makes provision for the establishment of a general method of balancing accounts during the term of its validity. The general method must first be established and then the concrete debts

issuing from already completed deliveries can be settled in accordance with this general method of settlement.

"Mr. Vasiliev then replied that for the present the establishment of a general method of settling the debt was unnecessary. The separate settlement of the debt issuing from hitherto completed deliveries of material does not run counter to Article 8 of the Agreement. In fact, at the present time, the Agreement has lost validity. 'What will happen in the future — I do not know. As far as I know, Mr. Milentije Popović was informed of this in Moscow.'

"Then Mr. Vasiliev declared that this question should not be linked up with the question of whether or not the Agreement is valid.

"I replied that this link nevertheless exists: the Soviet side requests us to determine the method of settling our debt, namely, to fulfil one of our commitments provided for by the Agreement, while, on the other hand, it maintains the view that the Agreement is not valid.

"Mr. Vasiliev said that they requested establishment of a method of settling our debt only for those things which they had delivered to us.

"To this, I observed that the amount of the debt for what they had delivered to us is also not an undisputed issue. In many cases, only one part of the installations had been delivered to us while the other had not, and we had suffered damage owing to this fact, damage which occasionally exceeded even the value of the part that had been delivered. Hence, we cannot unconditionally acknowledge as our debt the amount of the invoices which were prepared to be presented for our acceptance by the Soviet foreign-trade organizations. Finally, the amount of our debt should represent an adjustment between the invoice values and the amount of damage we suffered owing to the discontinuance of further deliveries."

(From the notes on the third talk, held on February 21, 1949.)

"I informed Mr. Vasiliev that, in principle, we agree with the Gosbank of the USSR in the matter of determining the method of settling our debt for Soviet deliveries under the Agreement of July 25, 1947, in the proposed manner.

"We had certain objections to the text itself.

"Our version of the relevant text was then communicated to him.

"Mr. Vasiliev replied that, in his opinion, the alteration was unnecessary, because the Soviet draft also invoked Article 8 of the Agreement.

"I confirmed the fact that the Soviet draft invoked Article 8 of the Agreement, but I stated that I considered our proposed alteration necessary because it specified matters, leaving no place for doubt as to the meaning of the present settlement of our debt. A certain departure from Article 8 was involved here. That is why we proposed the new formulation of the introductory text saying that the method of settlement of our debt was being implemented in the above-mentioned way 'up to the time of the establishment of the general technical method of balancing accounts under the Agreement of July 25, 1947.'

"Mr. Vasiliev replied that during the previous talk he had stated that the Agreement in fact was not valid. He added that this was why he considered our alteration could not be accepted. He repeated that, on the other hand, Article 8 of the Agreement had been invoked in

their draft, and that the thing referred to by our objection (alteration) had already been included in the text as proposed by the Gosbank.

"I replied that if the matter of our objection was, as he had said, included in their formulation, then our alteration did not involve any principle and could therefore be accepted. 'If it is, however, a question of our altering its character in principle, then what alteration is involved?'

"Mr. Vasiliev explained that such an alteration was included in our proposed wording 'up to the time of establishment of a general technical method of balancing of accounts. The Agreement,' he continued, 'is no longer in force.'

"I observed that he had until then been saying that the Agreement in fact was not in force. Its legal existence was another matter. 'You, too, do not deny that the Agreement has not been renounced, and that legally it is valid.'

"Mr. Vasiliev then asked me: 'Do you, by your objection (alteration), want to say that you consider that the Agreement is valid?' I replied: 'Yes, I do. Incidentally, you yourself declared the last time that the Agreement "at the present time in fact" was not valid, that you did not know what would happen in the future. The Agreement has not been renounced by either side.'

(From notes on the fourth talk, held on February 28, 1949.)

"Mr. Lebedev replied that the Agreement indeed existed, but that 'in fact it has lost validity at this moment.' Hence, there is no sense in establishing a general method of balancing accounts.

"I observed that in this case one side was being requested to honour the Agreement, (to determine a method of settling the debt) while the other considered itself freed of the commitment to fulfil it — which is legally untenable. The proposed alteration in the Gosbank text would mean taking into account the fact that the Agreement is legally valid."

(From the notes on the fifth talk, held March 22, 1949.)

"We cannot depart from our views expressed at the fourth meeting, that is, on February 28, 1949. The adoption of the Soviet text, without our alterations might mean that we tacitly accepted the Soviet thesis that the Agreement of July 25, 1947, had 'actually lost validity at the present time,' whereas we, in effect, adhere to the Agreement. Our proposed alteration of the Soviet text, therefore, is intended only to avoid prejudicing the matter in another sense.

"If the Soviet side insists upon the adoption of the unaltered text of the Gosbank of the USSR, Lebedev should refer to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Finance is not authorized to depart from the Agreement. Regardless of the fact that its cause is a concrete case, this is a matter of principle, one which can be solved only by the two governments.

"The meeting ended by Lebedev declaring that he would inform the Gosbank of the USSR of our views."(*)

(From the notes on the sixth talk, held on April 13, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 183

LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE POLISH DELEGATION IN THE
PERMANENT POLISH-YUGOSLAV COMMISSION POSTPONING
INDEFINITELY THE MEETING OF THE PERMANENT
COMMISSION(†)

Mr. Tadija Popović
President of the Yugoslav Delegation
to the Polish-Yugoslav Permanent Commission

Warsaw, October 6, 1948.

No. 5/48

In view of the fact that the work in the different sub-commissions, namely in the technical sections, has not yielded results which would make a meeting of the Permanent Commission necessary, and that at present I do not see that there are any matters of cooperation which might be of real benefit to both parties and which would require immediate solution, I beg to postpone the next meeting of the Permanent Commission to a later date, on which we shall agree at an opportune moment.

President of the Polish Delegation to the
Permanent Commission
(Sgd.) Z. Majevski

DOCUMENT No. 184

REPLY FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE YUGOSLAV DELEGATION TO THE
PERMANENT YUGOSLAV-POLISH COMMISSION, BY LETTER No. 42 OF
NOVEMBER 2, 1948, TO THE LETTER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE POLISH
DELEGATION, NOTING THAT THE INITIATIVE FOR THE POSTPONE-
MENT OF THE MEETING OF THE PERMANENT COMMISSION DID NOT
COME FROM THE YUGOSLAV DELEGATION

To the Honourable President
Sir,

I received your letter No. 5/48 from which I learned of your opinion that the meeting of the Permanent Commission for Economic Cooper-

(*) The Soviet Government did not again raise separately the question of payment for effected deliveries under the Agreement on the Delivery of Industrial Machines and Installations on Credit, but on two occasions, in its notes of October 11, 1949, and September 16, 1950, it posed the general question of Yugoslavia's indebtedness under the credit agreements of 1946 and 1947. In reply to these Notes, the Government of the FPRY stated that it "acknowledged its obligations towards the USSR" and that it would "meet its obligations in accordance with its possibilities and the circumstances under which the mutual obligations arose and were discharged."

(†) An Agreement on Economic Cooperation between Yugoslavia and Poland was signed in Warsaw on May 24, 1947, as well as a Protocol attached to this Agreement. These instruments provided for a Permanent Polish-Yugoslav Commission for Economic Cooperation between Yugoslavia and Poland, with six sub-commissions.

ation between the FPR of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Poland, which was to have been held on October 15, 1948, should be postponed for a second time to a later date.

In view of your opinion and your attitude on this question, I agree to have the meeting of the Permanent Commission postponed once again, but I should, however, be glad to learn of the date you consider suitable for this meeting.

I should like to note on this occasion that the Yugoslav Delegation had great interest in the meeting of the Permanent Commission, and that matters of economic cooperation enjoined such a meeting. I should like to point out that there has been no hesitancy in Yugoslavia's attitude towards the question of economic cooperation, which is in keeping with the spirit of the joint agreement.

In view of the course of events which have taken place with respect to the meeting of the Permanent Commission, I feel it my duty to underline, that neither this time, nor on the previous occasion, was it Yugoslavia which took the initiative in postponing the meeting of the Permanent Commission.

May I take this opportunity, Mr. President, to offer you my respects.^(*)

President of the Yugoslav Delegation
to the Yugoslav-Polish Permanent Commission
(Sgd.) Tadija Popović

DOCUMENT No. 135

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE POLISH "PAP" NEWS AGENCY ON THE SUSPENSION OF SHIPMENTS TO YUGOSLAVIA

On July 6, 1949, the Secretary General of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Stefan Wierblowsky, received the Yugoslav Ambassador to Warsaw, Pribičević, and informed him of the following:

The Polish Government notes that, in contrast to Poland, for a considerable time Yugoslavia has systematically not been fulfilling deliveries of the basic types of goods provided for under the Polish-Yugoslav trade agreements. Of the 500 tons of copper nothing has as yet been delivered. This quantity was to have been shipped after the signing of the copper agreements.

Only 65% of the shipments of lead concentrate, which Yugoslavia was to have delivered within the year, have been sent so far. Similarly, only minimum shipments of zinc concentrate and other raw materials important for Polish economy, have been delivered.

Consistently pursuing a policy of sabotage of the trade agreements with Poland, Yugoslavia has recently withheld a shipment of a special type of timber, which had already been loaded and was destined for Poland.

(*) The Permanent Commission never met again.

A further manifestation of this policy is the fact that Yugoslavia has been delivering only goods of secondary importance to Poland which are not vital to Polish economy, such as grapes, wine, dried figs, prunes, sea sponges and tobacco. In view of the fact that this state of affairs has not altered despite numerous intercessions and warnings, the Polish Government, in consideration of the interests of the national economy, decided to suspend further deliveries of goods to Yugoslavia. (7)

(7) The above communique released by PAP was published in the "Tribuna Ludu" of July 7, 1949, under the heading "Poland is Stopping Deliveries to Yugoslavia Owing to the Sabotage of Economic Agreements by the Tito Government."

In connection with the PAP communique, the Yugoslav daily press published a communique by the Yugoslav TANJUG news agency, on the trade relations between Yugoslavia and Poland. This communique ran as follows:

"Trade and economic relations between Yugoslavia and the Republic of Poland were regulated by the Agreement on the Five Year Exchange of Goods and the Agreement on Economic Cooperation and Exchange of Goods, concluded May 24, 1947, as well as by a special Agreement on Exchange and Payments of November 7, 1947. Under the Agreement on the Five Year Exchange of Goods, one-year trade agreements are concluded every year with the purpose of regulating trade between Yugoslavia and Poland within the scope of the Agreement for the given period of time.

"How these agreements were carried out is best illustrated by the attitudes of Yugoslavia and Poland and by what guided them in this exchange.

"In 1947, Yugoslavia concluded two agreements with Poland. Yugoslavia completely fulfilled her commitments arising from the first one-year agreement. Poland, however, failed to fulfil its obligations according to the contracts and, what is more, failed to fulfil them with respect to extremely important commodities. Thus, it has still not delivered textile industry installations, textile machinery accessory parts, gabardine, etc. Especially important was the special agreement on exchange and payment under which Yugoslavia, realizing Poland's serious plight due to bad harvests, agreed to send Poland 100,000 tons of grain in exchange for predominantly consumer goods (about 70%). Yugoslavia fulfilled its commitment in its entirety and on schedule, while Poland has to this day not delivered the entire amount of goods she contracted to ship under this Agreement.

"Under the regular trade agreement for 1948, Yugoslavia, at the request of Poland, increased the share of the metal sector by 10% as compared with 1947. In addition, Yugoslavia undertook to send Poland considerable quantities of grain during 1948. Whereas Yugoslavia delivered 80% of the contracted goods, Poland has to date delivered only 67% of goods under the above-mentioned Agreement. Moreover, it should be noted here that Yugoslavia's shipments of the most valuable commodities were delivered in their entirety (wheat, copper, lead, zinc concentrate, etc.) whereas Poland's deliveries, with the exception of coke, consisted of less valuable merchandise (lanterns, pitchforks, hammers, pickers, chains, oil drums, etc.). As a result of the Cominform campaign against Yugoslavia, Poland deliberately protracted the delivery of goods essential for the Yugoslav economy such as transformer sheets, iron hoops (not delivered at all), cart axles (only 50% delivered), cables for high and low tension current (only 24% delivered), electric motors (less than 10% delivered), transformers (not delivered at all), insulation porcelain (about 30% delivered), locomotives, woolen yarn, etc. All Polish deliveries in 1948 arrived late, only to come almost to a complete halt in the second half of 1948, after the Cominform Resolution. A flagrant example of this attitude of sabotage towards the Yugoslav economy was the withholding of ingot deliveries. Under the Agreement and trade arrangements, Poland was to have delivered 20,000 tons of ingots. Due to non-delivery, however, the amount was reduced to 11,700 tons with the proviso that the entire amount be delivered in the course of 1948. However, only 2,288 tons have been delivered.

"The same motives, which had guided her in preventing regular exchanges with Yugoslavia, also led Poland to violate, in 1948, the Agreement on Economic Cooperation which had been concluded on the grounds of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, obstructing thereby the work of the Permanent Commission, provided for by Art. 7 of the afore-mentioned Agreement.

"Poland's negative attitude found full expression during the talks on the conclusion of a regular agreement for 1949. Whereas Yugoslavia proposed expanded trade

TELEGRAM FROM THE HEAD OF THE YUGOSLAV TRADE DELEGATION
IN PRAGUE ON THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT'S OBSTRUCTION
OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

Prague, June 11, 1949.

No. 177

"Czechoslovakia has set an ultimatum for acceptance of list "D" by June 11th. We have tried in all possible ways to get them to take a reasonable attitude. Their views have remained unaltered. List "D" must be accepted en bloc only, with the same quantities and same nomenclature they proposed, and must, moreover, be accepted today. They will hear of no discussion on list "D." We asked whether there was any possibility of making a compromise proposal. They replied "no". Despite all this, we informed them of the compromise proposal you sent. They rejected it. We asked them to forward this compromise proposal to their leadership for careful examination and then to give us a reply. They answered that this was unnecessary as they had instructions to put through the proposed "D" list in its entirety.^(*) They refuse to lift the "export

in 1949 as a basis for this Agreement, Poland was out to reduce the volume of exchange, insisting, however, on increasing the sector of ores and metals and requesting that it amount to about 70% of the value of the Yugoslav deliveries. Poland at the same time refused to deliver to Yugoslavia the usual assortment and quantity of its commodities. Poland likewise refused to deliver capital goods which had been contracted for and for which an exceptionally big advance had already been paid. Poland has to this day refused to enter into negotiations on the issue of returning this advance.

"In her desire to conclude a trade agreement, Yugoslavia agreed to increase the share of ores and metals to 50% of the value of its exports and also to receive from Poland considerable quantities of less valuable merchandise. This enabled the conclusion of a trade agreement in January, 1949.

"In implementing the trade agreement for 1949, Yugoslavia has so far exported the following percentages of the total contracted amounts: 75% lead, 50% zinc concentrate, 75% lead concentrate, 50% antimony, etc., whereas Polish exports, with the exception of coke, mainly consisted of consumer goods. It would not be amiss to add that Yugoslavia, in the course of 1948, in fact credited the Polish economy, because she had a credit balance to her account amounting to 8 million dollars. This at the same time, is another proof of how Yugoslavia fulfilled her commitments in her relations with Poland.

"The afore-mentioned facts bear out that Poland, by its unilateral and arbitrary stoppage of further deliveries of goods to Yugoslavia, announced in PAP's communique of July 6th, is violating the existing agreements. Facts also prove that PAP's allegations regarding Yugoslavia's responsibility for the non-fulfilment of this agreement, do not correspond to the truth. They furthermore prove that such and similar allegations by PAP, with their unilateral and untruthful presentation of facts, are aimed at deluding the Polish people and concealing the truth from them."

(BORBA, July 10, 1949, No. 162.)

(*) List "D" for 1949 of the goods which Yugoslavia was to deliver to the Czechoslovak Republic within three years in payment for her capital goods orders should have been fixed analogously to the list by which Yugoslavia paid for her orders in Czechoslovakia during 1947. The Czechoslovak request, however, did not take this into consideration, although the Yugoslav compromise proposal was much more favourable for Czechoslovakia, in structure and in the economic importance of the goods, than was Yugoslavia's export list for 1947 and 1948.

ban"⁽⁹⁾ and request Yugoslavia to lift the ban first and deliver goods until the working balance⁽¹⁰⁾ has been reduced to zero. It is not a question of a ban on exports but of an attack on the working balance, which they want to abolish. We refused to agree to this and asked them to lift the ban, whereby exports would start flowing from Yugoslavia automatically. After this we had nothing more to talk about. In ending, we asked once more to have the talks continued tomorrow on the questions we had been discussing today. They rejected this. We suggested that a protocol be drawn up on our talks in which the attitude of both delegations would be set forth. They replied that they would let us have an answer by this afternoon. In short, they laid down four ultimatums:

First, to have everything concluded today; second, to have their proposal of list "D" accepted without any discussion; third, that Yugoslavia be the first to lift the ban on exports, and, fourth, that the working balance be reduced to zero, in which event Czechoslovakia would lift the ban. We parted after that. In the afternoon, the Czechoslovaks telephoned to tell us they did not consider the drawing up of a protocol opportune.

Ambassador Stilinović.
Head of the Delegation Popović.

DOCUMENT No. 187

CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED IN "RUDE PRAVO" ON JUNE 11, 1949, ON THE BREAKING OFF OF YUGOSLAV-CZECHOSLOVAK TRADE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT

On June 7, 1949, negotiations on trade policy were begun in Prague between the delegations of the Yugoslav Government and the Czechoslovak Government on certain problems of mutual trade policy relations.

Yugoslavia, namely, systematically failed to adhere to the concluded agreement by obstructing the export of important goods from Yugoslavia to Czechoslovakia, on the one hand, and by selecting only those items in which she was most vitally interested when importing goods from Czechoslovakia on the other. Yugoslavia also failed to take other goods from Czechoslovakia which she had ordered, which had been manufactured for her and warehoused in considerable quantities. Yugoslavia made no effort to reduce her continuous trade debit balance, which amounted

⁽⁹⁾ In May, 1949, the Czechoslovak Republic prohibited all export of goods to the FPRY. Stating no reasons and without informing the Yugoslav Government, it did so by unilateral internal provision in contradiction with the agreements. Having thus artificially complicated and strained the situation in the exchange of goods, the Czechoslovak Government invited the Yugoslav Government to negotiations only in order to bring about a complete break in economic relations by advancing unacceptable requests and ultimatums.

⁽¹⁰⁾ The amount of the working balance totalled 350 million Czechoslovak crowns. At the time of the negotiations Yugoslavia had utilized a total of 180 million Czechoslovak crowns of this credit. With a view to settling this temporary balance, a list of items which Yugoslavia could export promptly was delivered to the Czechoslovak Commercial Attaché in Beograd, Finkl.

to over 300 million Czech crowns. On the contrary, she kept increasing it by refusing to send high-grade goods to Czechoslovakia. In order to balance the Yugoslav debit, we temporarily stopped our exports, to which measure Yugoslavia reacted by imposing a ban on the export of goods important for Czechoslovakia instead of balancing her debit balance as soon as possible.

The most important problem in these trade policy relations between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which has, more than anything else, hindered the current development of mutual trade and caused steady damage to the Czechoslovak economy, was the fact that, up to this very day, owing to Yugoslav opposition, it has been impossible to conclude forward contracts for the coming three years, for Yugoslav counter-deliveries in return for Czechoslovak capital goods being delivered, to Yugoslavia.⁽¹¹⁾ According to the agreement, these counter-deliveries were to have been established at the end of June, 1948. This infringement of the contracted agreements was all the more a heavy blow to Czechoslovakia as Czechoslovak industry had already been given the task of producing these capital goods and had been working on them intensively. After long and serious talks, Czechoslovakia finally asked that these Yugoslav counter-deliveries be determined by June 10, 1949, at latest, but the Yugoslav delegation, although it came to these talks, rejected agreement on the Yugoslav counter-deliveries in the course of the trade-policy consultations.

Czechoslovakia was compelled to draw general conclusions from Yugoslavia's negative attitude and to undertake all necessary measures, especially in the field of production, so as to prevent further damage."⁽¹²⁾

⁽¹¹⁾ Yugoslavia's counter-deliveries were contracted with the Czechoslovak trade delegation in Beograd on March 1, 1949. The Yugoslav delegation accepted the Czechoslovak proposal of the list by which Yugoslavia would pay her capital goods orders. The Czechoslovak delegation was requested only to guarantee the maintenance of delivery schedules as per the agreement between the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak enterprises. When Yugoslav-Czechoslovak trade negotiations began in Prague in June, 1949, the Czechoslovak delegation refused to take into consideration the fact that the two delegations had already agreed in Beograd on the list of Yugoslav counter-deliveries. On the contrary, the Czechoslovak delegation advanced a totally new list and in the form of an ultimatum demanded to know whether the Yugoslav side accepted that list or not. All categories had been deleted from the previous list of Yugoslav counter-deliveries for items like opium, soya, oil-seed, tobacco, hides, etc., while the categories of such highly valued export items like copper, lead, zinc, aluminium, ferro-chromium, mercury, pyrites, etc. had been enormously augmented. For instance, whereas in the previous lists the categories of lead, zinc, copper and aluminium had amounted to a total quantity of 41,000 tons, in the new list this category was augmented more than fivefold, i. e. it totalled 209,000 tons, and included provision for the export of 80,000 tons of copper and 90,000 tons of lead. The Yugoslav compromise proposal of June 10, 1949, was along the line of the maximum efforts of the Yugoslav Government to meet the requests of the Czechoslovak Government as far as possible, notwithstanding the latter's maliciously high demand for the most valued export items. This category in the Yugoslav compromise proposal amounted to two and a half times more than had been slated earlier, i. e. 110,000 tons, including 80,000 tons of lead alone.

⁽¹²⁾ In connection with the cited communique in "Rude Pravo," the Yugoslav TANJUG news agency released a communique, which was published in the Yugoslav press on June 12, 1949, and which read as follows:

"In recent months it has been observed that the competent organs in Czechoslovakia are hampering and narrowing down trade between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. This especially refers to the fulfilment of the Agreement on Capital Goods Deliveries. During the recent negotiations conducted in Beograd from November 25,

4. UNILATERAL BREACH OF ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS WITH YUGOSLAVIA BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

DOCUMENT No. 188

ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 449 OF JULY 1, 1948, RENOUNCING ALL ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS, CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS CONCLUDED BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Albania has the honour to communicate to the Legation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia the following decision of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania.

The Government of the People's Republic of Albania, expressing the feelings and aspirations of the Albanian people and inspired by genuine democratic principles of firm cooperation based on the just foundations taught by Marxism-Leninism, and respecting independence, sovereignty and equality of rights in the building of socialism — concluded a series of agreements and conventions with the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

Unfortunately, in concluding these agreements with the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, the Yugoslav Government had reprehensible objectives which were quite contrary to these principles, and it established and put these relations into effect on a capitalistic, exploitive and anti-Albanian basis.

1948, to March 1, 1949, which were to have fixed the lists for trade under the regular Agreement for 1949, the lists of Yugoslav exports to Czechoslovakia under the Capital Goods Agreement for 1949, 1950 and 1951, and certain other questions, the Czechoslovak delegation, with a view to protracting the negotiations, discontinued the talks several times without any cause on the part of the Yugoslavs.

The Yugoslav delegation proposed a volume of trade under the regular Agreement for approximately the same amount as in 1948 (2.7 billion dinars). The Czechoslovak delegation proposed a volume of trade that was 1 billion less, reducing the delivery of rolled goods, and deleting almost entirely various machines and other important supplies to Yugoslavia. The Czechoslovak delegation demanded, instead, that disproportionately high quantities of non-ferrous metals be delivered to Czechoslovakia. Agreement was nevertheless reached for 1.5 billion dinars worth of exchanges under the regular Agreement, thanks to concessions by the Yugoslav side. Immediately after this, the establishment of Yugoslavia's export lists was begun for 1949—1951 under the Capital Goods Agreement. The proposal of the Czechoslovak delegation departed from the structure fixed by the Agreement (especially with respect to non-ferrous metals). The Yugoslav side again met their request, accepting the proposal of the Czechoslovak side almost in its entirety, requesting only that the further extension of delivery schedules by Czechoslovakia be stopped. In this way the dele-

Our two peoples fought against the fascist German and Italian invaders for a better future, for the assurance of the independence and sovereignty of their countries, for cooperation in the future and forever, in a brotherly, close and sincere alliance. The Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance signed at Tirana on July 9, 1946, was and — in the view of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania — remains an important instrument which puts into a concrete form the desires of our two peoples. The Government of the People's Republic of Albania is of the opinion that this Treaty remains in force and that it is being increasingly consolidated, so as to serve as a basis for the correct development of relations between our two friendly and brotherly peoples in the future.

In the implementation of the present agreements, conventions and protocols, which followed the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has acted in a manner which is quite contrary to the aspirations of the Yugoslav people. Under the pretext of advancing credit to Albania which was valuable assistance for the Albanian people who suffered great damage during the sanguinary war, assistance which brought it closer to the peoples of Yugoslavia — the Yugoslav Government endeavoured to take over the management of our country's economy, which resulted in the taking over of political administration, in other words in loss of the independence and sovereignty of the People's Republic of Albania. Concealing itself behind demagogic phrases like "the transition to socialism", "the alliance of our two countries"; taking advantage of the great confidence of the Albanian people and of its Government in the brotherly people of Yugoslavia; altering in principle as well as in practice the formula of the coordination of economic plans — the Yugoslav Government brutally pursued a policy of domination in our country, an economic policy of colonial exploitation. It threatened the sovereignty and the independence of the Albanian State, trampled down the principle of equality and reciprocity of rights, and constantly strove to force its point of view upon Albania in open contradiction with the interests of our country. The

gations agreed on this question as well. Then the head of the Czechoslovak delegation declared he was not authorized to give any guarantees regarding the maintenance of delivery schedules, and that he would give a reply on this matter soon. The Yugoslav side has not received this reply to this day. Early in May, 1949, however, all further exports to Yugoslavia were unilaterally prohibited by the competent Czechoslovak organs in contravention of the provisions of all existing agreements. Owing to this a delay also ensued in the delivery of goods by Yugoslavia, there now being about 500,000,000 dinars worth of goods ready for delivery to Czechoslovakia, of which the Czechoslovak side has been informed. Noting the tendency of Czechoslovakia to render trade exchanges impossible, the Yugoslav side on several occasions requested the meeting of a joint commission in order to remove all obstacles.

"On May 25, 1949, the Czechoslovak Commercial Attaché presented a letter to the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Trade in which the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Trade proposed that negotiations begin already on June 1, which would settle all disputed questions by June 10 at the latest.

"Although the letter was uncustomary in character, the Yugoslav side accepted the proposal of the Czechoslovak Government on May 26, and in a very short time, already on June 3, sent a delegation to Prague prompted by the desire to have all obstacles which stood in the way of trade exchanges removed as early as possible. The delegation arrived in Prague on June 5, and the first meeting of the delegations took place on June 7. At this meeting, it was established that the Czechoslovak delegation was not abiding by the provisions of the Agreement on Czechoslovak deli-

Yugoslav Government has prevented our economy from developing and advancing towards socialism.

The Yugoslav Government has violated the clauses of these agreements and conventions by failing to fulfil the obligations in conformance with the conventions concluded between the two countries. As to the joint Albanian-Yugoslav companies, the Yugoslav Government, contrary to the principle on which they were established, made no investments in them, but on the contrary exploited the riches of our country, at the same time unjustly trying to dictate to it, thus violating the conventions. In the enclosed Annex to this Note we specify the principal violations of these agreements by the Yugoslav Government, without mentioning a large number of unjust acts committed by the Yugoslav Government to the detriment of the Albanian People by virtue of the former's anti-Albanian policy.

Under those conditions, the Albanian Government, with the approval of the Presidium of the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania, considers it impossible to continue economic relations on the basis of the incorrect and anti-Albanian policy which the Yugoslav Government has been pursuing. For this reason and for all the reasons mentioned in this Note, as well as in the Annex, the Government of the People's Republic of Albania renounces all the conventions, agreements and protocols, mentioned in Annex No. 2 to this Note, which were signed after the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance had been concluded in Tirana on July 9, 1946. It considers these conventions, agreements and protocols null and void. The Albanian people and its Government are always ready to develop new economic relations with the brotherly peoples of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, but only if these relations are based on just foundations of reciprocity, equality and strict respect for the rights of both peoples and if they do not violate the independence and sovereignty of either country.

The Albanian Government proposes the formation of an authorized commission by the Albanian and Yugoslav Governments for the settlement of all accounts relating to these conventions, agreements and protocols which have ceased to exist as of today.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Albania requests the Legation to kindly forward to its Government as soon as

veries and Yugoslav counter-deliveries of February 25, 1947, nor by the understanding concerning Yugoslav deliveries under this Agreement, reached in Beograd on March 2, 1949. In connection with the already agreed list of Yugoslav exports, the Czechoslovak side requested six times more non-ferrous metals, deleting at the same time all the other items except timber, hemp and opium, and conditioning the lifting of the export ban to Yugoslavia by the adoption of their proposal in its entirety and without discussion.

"Desirous of finding a solution for the further development of trade exchanges the Yugoslav side advanced such a counter-proposal for deliveries under the Capital Goods Agreement whereby Czechoslovakia would have received two and a half times more non-ferrous metals than had been agreed upon in Beograd in March, 1949.

"It follows clearly from all the above that the Czechoslovak Government has unilaterally been violating the trade agreements since November, 1948, and preventing normal trade exchanges between our two countries."

(BORBA No. 138, of June 12, 1949.)

possible the above-mentioned decision of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Albania thanks the Legation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in advance and avails itself of this opportunity to reiterate the assurance of its high consideration.

Tirana, July 1, 1948.

DOCUMENT No. 189

INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT TO ITS LEGATION IN TIRANA, BY TELEGRAM No. 453 OF JULY 2, 1948, TO SEEK AGREEMENT FROM THE ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE FORMATION OF MIXED COMMISSIONS TO INSPECT THE POSITION OF ALBANIAN-YUGOSLAV COMPANIES⁽¹⁾

1. Prior to the withdrawal of our specialists, please ask the Albanian Government for agreement to the formation of mixed Yugoslav-Albanian commissions which would inspect the joint companies and establish the present position by written summary of the proceedings. One copy of the summary of each examination should be made for us.

2. Please inform the Albanian Government by Note that we agree to withdraw our people under the condition that this be done in an organized manner, that it does no harm to these enterprises and that the

⁽¹⁾ On grounds of the Agreement on Economic Cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania signed in Beograd on July 1, 1946, agreements on joint Albano-Yugoslav companies were concluded between the Governments of both countries on November 28, 1946, viz.: an agreement on the founding of an Albano-Yugoslav company for oil prospecting and exploitation, an agreement on the founding of an Albano-Yugoslav company for the prospecting and exploiting of ores, an agreement on the founding of an Albano-Yugoslav company for electrification, an agreement on the founding of an Albano-Yugoslav company for import and export and an agreement on the founding of an Albano-Yugoslav bank.

The agreements themselves make provision for parity commitments, but the annexed protocols relating to the particular projects and works provide for unilateral Yugoslav commitments, which is a unique example in agreements of this kind. Under these agreements, Yugoslavia committed herself to provide the installations, machinery and other material, experts and skilled labour for the operation and development of the joint companies. What Yugoslavia's rights were in the joint companies may be seen from the example of the Company for Oil Prospecting and Exploitation. For the right to prospect and exploit oil Albania received 50% of the net profit, while the other 50% were shared in proportion to the invested nominal capital and the shares of additional invested capital in the Company. In 1947, Albania invested, as her extra share, land, buildings, the existing capital goods, tools, etc., including Yugoslavia's share (various kinds of material) which Yugoslavia ceded to Albania that year. The division of profits was in the ratio of 88 to 12 in Albania's favour. In the Company for the Construction and Exploitation of Railways in which Yugoslavia invested all the machinery, trucks, rolling stock, etc., the ratio of division of profit was 65 to 35 in Albania's favour.

Notwithstanding this, Yugoslavia in 1947 ceded her share of the profit in the joint companies to Albania.

situation in them be established by written summary of the proceedings. It should likewise be requested that the moving of our people and their families be carried out in a humane manner and that everybody be guaranteed means of transport.⁽²⁾ (1)

DOCUMENT No. 190

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF JULY 3, 1948, CONDEMNING THE UNILATERAL BREACH OF ECONOMIC TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND CONVENTIONS BY THE ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has the honour to inform the Government of the People's Republic of Albania of the following:

In its Note of July 1, 1948, the Government of the People's Republic of Albania informed the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia that it was renouncing all economic treaties, agreements and protocols and that it considered them null and void.

Upon having examined the transmitted Note and the proposals contained therein, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia notes:

1. The two fundamental economic treaties on which all the other economic treaties and protocols between the two countries are based, are the Treaty on the Coordination of Economic Plans, the Customs Union and Equalization of Currencies between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of Albania of November 27, 1946, and the Agreement on Economic Cooperation between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of Albania of July 1, 1946.

These instruments were concluded for a duration of 30 years from the date of their signature without the contracting parties having the right or possibility of renouncing them before this term. This was clearly and explicitly confirmed in Article 4 of the Treaty on the Coordination of Economic Plans, etc., and in Article 8 of the Agreement on Economic Cooperation.

The Treaty on Coordination of Economic Plans, etc., provides that, 30 years after the signature of the Treaty, its validity will be renewed by tacit agreement for new terms of ten years each except in case of a renunciation, notice of which should be given in written form by the Government of one contracting party to the other Government at least one year prior to the expiration of the Treaty.

(1) Telegram given in part.

(2) Pursuant to these instructions, the Yugoslav Legation in Tirana addressed a note to the Albanian Government under No. 391 on July 3, 1948, in which it asked, on behalf of the Yugoslav Government, for the formation of a joint Yugoslav-Albanian commission to inspect the joint companies and establish a record of their affairs. In the same note the Yugoslav Legation informed the Albanian Government of the names of the Yugoslav members of the commission. Despite repeated requests by its notes No. 421 of July 8, and No. 433 of July 12, 1948, the Albanian Government first evaded and then finally made it impossible to inspect the affairs of the joint Albano-Yugoslav companies.

The Agreement on Economic Cooperation also provides that it will remain in force for 5 years following the expiration of the 30-year term if neither of the contracting parties expresses the desire to renounce the Agreement. Notice must be made in writing one year prior to expiration of the contracted term.

All other treaties, agreements and protocols mentioned in the Note of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania simply represent the application of these two basic treaties and are, in fact, their component parts. As such, they share the same legal fate, inasmuch as there is no other explicit provision.

Accordingly, neither the People's Republic of Albania nor the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia can terminate, unilaterally and prior to the expiration of the contracted term, the relations based on the above-mentioned instruments without flagrant violation of the existing treaties which is in obvious contradiction with the basic principles of international law regarding the respect of international obligations.

Accordingly, the action of the People's Republic of Albania is a flagrant and illegal violation of the existing treaties. It not only cannot renounce them before expiration of the contracted term but even less can it consider them null and void, as all these treaties were validly concluded and ratified in accordance with the constitutional provisions of both countries and accordance with international law.

2. The allegations of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania to the effect that Yugoslavia has not fulfilled her obligations under the concluded treaties faithfully and correctly are untrue and arbitrary. On the contrary, in so far as some of these treaties have not been fulfilled completely, this was the fault of the Albanian Government alone, which either did not fulfil its obligations or even prevented the correct implementation of these treaties. The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia fulfilled all its obligations under these treaties far beyond the ratio that was realized by the People's Republic of Albania.

3. If the Government of the People's Republic of Albania considers that the implementation of the contracts by the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia so far has given cause for any possible dispute, it cannot resort to unilateral renunciation in such a case. On the contrary, pursuant to Article V of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of Albania of July 9, 1946 — binding both Governments — the Government of the People's Republic of Albania is under the obligation to use the sincere, friendly manner of solution provided in that Treaty for the discussion of all mutual problems including a dispute such as this one. The Government of the People's Republic of Albania, however, not only failed to proceed to the settlement of the alleged dispute in such a way, but did not raise any such questions at all until June 29, 1948. On the contrary, the representatives of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia have, on several occasions, in a friendly way, cautioned the authorities of the Albanian Government and invited them to remove the obstacles which were standing in the way of proper fulfilment of obligations. As for Albania, the Government of the People's Republic of Albania always emphasized its gratitude to the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia for the unselfish help the

latter extended to the People's Republic of Albania and to the Albanian people under the above-mentioned treaties.

4. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia notes that the credit balance of the Yugoslav aid extended so far to the People's Republic of Albania amounts to about 2 billion dinars and that the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, despite its promises, avoided settlement of this question in accordance with Article 4 of the Agreement on the credit of 2 billion dinars granted to the People's Republic of Albania for reconstruction and development. The relevant Article reads as follows: "The terms and conditions for the repayment of the credit will be fixed later by agreement between both Governments."⁽⁴⁾

5. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia notes that so far, of the total volume of economic cooperation, which amounts to about 3 billion 100 million dinars, only about 18.5 per cent went to the benefit of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia whereas 81.5 per cent went to the People's Republic of Albania. Accordingly, four times more was received by Albania than by the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, this fact corresponds both to the spirit and the wording of all the treaties which have now been illegally renounced by the Government of the People's Republic of Albania. It is well-known, that all these treaties were aimed at rendering effective and brotherly help to the People's Republic of Albania, keeping in mind that its economy was underdeveloped and that the country had been devastated during the war. The credit balance of the net Yugoslav aid extended to the People's Republic of Albania, amounting to about 2 billion dinars, is the best proof that the unprecedented slanders regarding the alleged Yugoslav intentions and acts of exploitation of the People's Republic of Albania are fabrications.

A proposal was submitted to the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, three months ago, to send its representatives to Beograd for the regulation and final determination, by protocol, of the above-mentioned obligations assumed and executed voluntarily by the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which thus wished to help the brotherly Albanian Republic without delay. So far, however, the Government of the People's Republic of Albania has avoided giving any guarantee or obligation whatsoever for both the material means extended under point 4 and other material means, particularly for the maintenance of the Albanian Army, which exceeds the figure of 5,500,000 dinars annually, not including armaments. It is clear that, without any guarantee or commitment on the part of Albania, Yugoslavia cannot give

⁽⁴⁾ Pursuant to the Agreement of June 12, 1947, Yugoslavia granted Albania interest-free credit, amounting in 1947 to 2 billion dinars, and, in 1948, to 3 billion dinars, which was to have been refunded in goods, material and services necessary for capital construction and work on economic reconstruction and development in Albania, as well as in consumer goods. These appropriations, which in 1947 constituted 56% and, in 1948, 48% of all of Albania's budgetary revenues, served as a basis for the drafting and adoption of Albania's economic plan of reconstruction and development in 1947 and 1948. Economic aid extended by Yugoslavia consisted of factory installations, machinery and consumer goods, of sending experts and skilled workers to Albania, etc. Besides this, Yugoslav enterprises took over the completion of all the chief projects and works provided for by the economic plan of Albania.

Albania approximately 4 billion dinars a year, which is a great material sacrifice for our peoples. From the behaviour of the Albanian Government so far one can clearly see that Albania had no intention of giving such a guarantee; on the contrary, it endeavoured by delays and silence to get as much as possible from Yugoslavia and then slandered her in the vilest manner, considering that it had thus relieved itself of all obligations.

Taking note of such a legal situation and reserving for the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia all the rights deriving from it, and in view of the fact that the Government of the People's Republic of Albania is the highest executive authority in the People's Republic of Albania, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is forced to take note of the renunciation of the foregoing treaties. It is, however, convinced that the above-mentioned treaties were a great sacrifice by the Yugoslav peoples for the benefit of the Albanian people, and leaves to the Government of the People's Republic of Albania the responsibility for the consequences of the breach of these treaties. But, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia can in no case accept the argument of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania to the effect that these treaties are null and void.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia remarks that the unilateral and illegal breach of the treaties on the part of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania is also in complete contradiction with the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the two countries, and that this breach means the de facto breach of this Treaty, too, by the Government of the People's Republic of Albania.

There is no precedent in the history of diplomatic relations for such a brutal and unilateral breach of certain of its treaties by a country against its own interests, while it hurls churlish insults against the other contracting party. Our military specialists are being evicted in a hostile manner from Albania and our Army and its leaders insulted in the crudest way. In doing this, the Albanian Government has violated the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance. At the same time, however, it underlined in its Note that the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance remained in force between the two countries. As to the tone of the Note of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, and to the inventions mentioned in it to the effect that the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia allegedly violated the Treaties and impeded the economic development of the People's Republic of Albania, that it exploited Albania, etc. — all this is part of the organized propaganda being carried on against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia emphasized that, with regard to the unsettled debts of the People's Republic of Albania to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, it stands by the request contained in the Note of July 1, 1948, and at the same time considers the Government of the People's Republic of Albania

responsible for all the consequences resulting from its Note of July 1, 1948.^(*)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to express its consideration to the Legation of the People's Republic of Albania.

Beograd, July 3, 1948.

DOCUMENT No. 121

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 410227 OF JUNE 9, 1949, PROPOSING TO THE ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATIONS ON UNSETTLED ECONOMIC QUESTIONS RESULTING FROM THE BREACH OF ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS BY ALBANIA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has the honour to notify the Government of the People's Republic of Albania of the following:

In its answer given in Note No. 418016 of July 3, 1948, to the Note of the Government of the PR of Albania, dated July 1, 1948, by which all economic treaties, agreements and protocols between the two countries were renounced, the Government of the FPRY stated that it was compelled, against its will, to take note of the renunciation of these treaties.

Simultaneously, the Government of the FPRY reiterated the request set forth in the Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, No. 417823, of July 1, 1948, to the effect that the Government of the PR of Albania send a Delegation to Beograd as soon as possible for the settlement of pending questions of economic cooperation as agreed upon in April, 1948.

On several later occasions, too, the Government of the FPRY has, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Mission in the PR of Albania, put to the Government of the PR of Albania the question of sending a Delegation for the settlement of mutual claims and debts, the last time by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note No. 43588 of March 2, 1949. In spite of all these renewed requests, the Government of the PR of Albania has given no positive answer to the request of the Government of the FPRY so far.

On the basis of all the above, the Government of the FPRY has come to the conclusion that the Government of the PR of Albania is avoiding negotiations on the settlement of mutual claims and debts as the claims of the FPRY on the PR of Albania are incomparably greater than the claims of the PR of Albania on the FPRY, as may be clearly seen from the following table:

^(*) By its note of July 1, 1948, the Yugoslav Government requested "the Government of the PR of Albania to send a delegation to Beograd as early as possible with a view to settlement of unregulated questions of economic cooperation, as agreed in April, 1948."

I. CLAIMS OF THE FPR OF YUGOSLAVIA

1. Commodities delivered and services rendered under the credit of 2 billion dinars for 1947	Din.	1,436,046,792.94
2. Commodities delivered and services rendered under the credit of 3 billion dinars for 1948	„	554,070,659.03
3. Balance under the Agreement on Commercial Exchange for 1947	„	35,405,619.35
4. Unpaid debts of the PR of Albania to enterprises and institutions in the FPRY for works accomplished and services rendered	„	55,930,807.54
5. Deliveries of the Ministry of National Defence to the Albanian Army upon subtraction of 332,490,503.68 dinars contained in point 1	„	378,636,191.10
6. Share capital paid up by the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia for six Albanian-Yugoslav companies	„	131,250,000.00
Total Dinars		2,591,340,069.96

II. DEBTS OF THE FPR OF YUGOSLAVIA

1. Commodities imported under the credit of one billion Leka for 1948	Din.	252,475,014.31
2. Goods purchased by Albanian enterprises in June, 1948, on the free market and left in Yugoslavia	„	7,715,771.35
Total Dinars		260,190,785.66

RECAPITULATION:

Claims of the FPRY	Din.	2,591,340,069.96
Debts of the FPRY	„	260,190,785.66
Balance Din.		2,331,149,284.30

This table does not include claims of the FPRY on the profits of the Albanian-Yugoslav companies under the Agreement on the companies, owing to the fact that the relevant data are in Albania.

The table of the claims and debts of the FPRY versus the PR of Albania, arising from economic treaties, discloses a credit balance of 2,331,149,284.30 dinars in favour of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. This table does not, however, contain some claims and debts arising from various mutual services rendered in 1947 and 1948 which the Delegations of both countries should discuss and regulate while settling credits and debts from economic treaties.

Keeping in mind that the Government of the PR of Albania is probably not in a position to pay off its debts to the FPRY immediately, the Government of the FPRY expresses its readiness to offer the Government of the PR of Albania certain facilities and favourable conditions of payment for the settlement of its debts.

In view of the above, the Government of the FPRY considers that all other pending economic questions can be settled only within the scope of the agreement on the foregoing questions and, therefore, again proposes that the Government of the PR of Albania send to Beograd a Delegation authorized to consider all pending economic issues between the two countries.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia expresses its consideration to the Government of the People's Republic of Albania.^(*)

Beograd, June 9, 1949

DOCUMENT No. 132

HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 13932 OF DECEMBER 16, 1949,
BREAKING THE AGREEMENT ON GOODS EXCHANGE AND THE RELATED
AGREEMENT ON QUESTIONS OF BALANCING GOODS EXCHANGE
PAYMENTS

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Hungary presents its compliments to the Legation of the FPRY and, on behalf of its Government, begs to communicate the following:

The Government of the People's Republic of Hungary renounces, as of March 18, 1950, the Agreement on Exchange of Goods concluded with the Government of the FPRY on March 18, 1948, in Budapest, pursuant to Art. 11 of the same Agreement. Owing to this renunciation, the "Agreement on the Balancing of Payments Arising from Goods Exchange," concluded in Budapest on March 18, 1948, also loses validity upon the expiry of the Agreement, i. e. March 18, 1950.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Hungary begs the esteemed Legation to notify the Government of the FPRY of the foregoing.

Budapest, December 16, 1949.

(*) To this note the Albanian Government replied with note No. 3288 of September 2, 1949, alleging that it "owes nothing to the Yugoslav Government," but that it considered it necessary for a commission of representatives of both Governments "to examine the question of claims and debts in order to establish who is the debtor and who the creditor." In the same note the Albanian Government laid down as a condition for the commencement of these negotiations that the question of claims and debts arising out of economic agreements should be examined apart from other unsettled economic questions resulting from earlier mutual services. The Yugoslav Government in its note No. 418243 of September 7, 1949, declared that the question of claims arising from economic agreements was not being linked with the other mentioned unsettled questions and proposed a date for the commencement of negotiations. Despite the repeated request of the Yugoslav Government by its Note No. 418261 of October 10, 1949, for the opening of negotiations, the Albanian Government continued to avoid sending its delegation to negotiations on the question of liquidation of mutual claims and debts arising out of economic relations.

HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 6000 OF JUNE 18, 1949, UNILATERALLY BREAKING THE AGREEMENT ON HUNGARIAN LONG-TERM DELIVERIES AND YUGOSLAV COUNTER-DELIVERIES

"By authorization of the Hungarian Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs respectfully communicates the following to the Legation of the FPRY:

"On July 24, 1947, the Hungarian and Yugoslav Governments signed a five-year economic agreement on cooperation, which the Hungarian Government signed with a view to strengthening the ties between the two countries on the basis of planned economy, both as regards production and foreign trade..."

"The attitude of the Government of the FPRY towards this question proves that the Yugoslav Government, on the one hand, is not capable of pursuing a policy of planned economy or does not desire to continue pursuing it, and, on the other hand, has a hostile stand towards the states which are proceeding along the road of socialism, and does not wish to strengthen its economic ties with us but with the imperialist powers.

"Owing to these circumstances all the prerequisites have ceased to exist on the basis of which the Hungarian Government signed the five-year Hungaro-Yugoslav economic agreement on cooperation.

"The Agreement could be carried out only if both countries were to continue along the road of socialism, but Yugoslavia has digressed from that road.

"The Hungarian Ministry notes that the agreement between Hungary and Yugoslavia, the objective of which was to consolidate the planned economy of the two countries, is being used by the Government of the FPRY as an instrument for hampering Hungarian planned economy. The Hungarian Government cannot tolerate the constant violation of the Five-Year Agreement by Yugoslavia and have it fettering and retarding the development of Hungarian economy.

"On the basis of all this, the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by authorization of the Hungarian Government, is compelled to declare that the Hungarian Government considers this agreement null and void since the Yugoslav Government has failed to honour and is not fulfilling the obligations it assumed under the Five-Year Agreement on Cooperation of July 24, 1947."(1)

DOCUMENT No. 194

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF PROTEST No. 411078 OF JUNE 22, 1949, AGAINST HUNGARY'S UNILATERAL BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT ON HUNGARIAN LONG-TERM DELIVERIES AND YUGOSLAV COUNTER-DELIVERIES

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has the honour to communicate the following to the Legation of the Republic of Hungary.

(1) The Note is given in excerpts.

On the initiative of the Government of the FPRY, the Agreement on Hungarian Long-term Deliveries and Yugoslav Counter-deliveries was signed on July 24, 1947, in Budapest.

The Preamble to the Agreement says that by this Agreement both Governments were desirous of "developing the economy of their countries as much as possible, raising the standard of living of their peoples and making it lastingly possible for their economies to complement each other."

In proposing the Agreement, the Government of the FPRY was inspired both by economic motives and by a sincere desire to offer unselfish financial and other kinds of aid to the Hungarian people, in order to encourage and strengthen the still weak democratic forces in Hungary, regardless of the fact that the peoples of Yugoslavia had sustained heavy losses in lives and material inflicted by the Hungarian invaders.

This illustrates the consistently internationalistic attitude which guided the Government of the FPRY when concluding the Agreement. The significance of such an attitude on the part of the Government of the FPRY for the strengthening of the Hungarian economy and of the democratic forces in Hungary may be seen from the following:

1. In the Agreement, the FPRY undertook the obligation to deliver to the Republic of Hungary exceptionally large quantities of the most valuable raw materials in order to ensure and promote the production of Hungarian industry, despite the fact that Yugoslavia was recovering from tremendous war devastation caused by the Hungarian fascists among others. By these deliveries, the Hungarian economy was provided with 50 per cent of its total import requirements in timber, 50 per cent in iron ore and 20 per cent in non-ferrous metals.

In comparison with such an export structure, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, upon the request of the Hungarian Republic, accepted the proposition that the Hungarian commodities for export to the FPRY should be mainly non-essential equipment, with a few exceptions, the delivery of which was avoided and delayed by the Government of the Republic of Hungary in the course of execution of the Agreement.

2. Although Yugoslavia sustained heavy losses during the war fighting against fascist invaders — the damage inflicted by the Hungarian invaders alone amounted to 1,281,161,618 dollars — upon the request of the Government of the Republic of Hungary, the Government of the FPRY, wishing to help the Hungarian democratic forces, nevertheless agreed by way of the Protocol attached to that Agreement to grant to Hungary credit without interest in the form of a super-advance of six million dollars, "with a view to raising the capacity of, and rehabilitating Hungarian industry."

3. Taking into account the financial difficulties with which the Hungarian economy had to cope, the Government of the FPRY consented to pay unusually high advances for its orders whereas, on the contrary, it made its own deliveries without any advances.

4. Apart from the above-mentioned facts, the FPRY granted considerable payment facilities to the Hungarian Republic, which actually

meant that Yugoslavia had been crediting Hungarian economy since the end of 1947 at the rate of 2—3 million dollars a month.

The Government of the FPRY was in a position to render such assistance to the Republic of Hungary, as early as 1947, thanks to the fact that the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia had already succeeded by the second year after the war in embarking upon a system of planned economy and maintaining full control over it.

In implementing this Agreement, the FPRY always used to pay for its orders in advance, thus accumulating ample resources to its account in the Republic of Hungary which were utilized by the Hungarian economy. Under the foregoing Agreement, Yugoslavia so far has ordered goods in the Hungarian Republic amounting to 22.6 million dollars and has already paid the Republic of Hungary 24.1 million dollars in advance. Accordingly, Yugoslavia has not only paid in advance for all her orders so far, but has even paid about 1.5 million dollars above them, notwithstanding the fact that Hungary was to effect delivery by 1951. This fact shows that the Government of the FPRY sincerely desired extensive and lasting economic cooperation with the Republic of Hungary. At the same time, this was proof that the Government of the FPRY had fulfilled its obligations under the concluded agreements. The Republic of Hungary, however, has delivered goods worth only 6.9 million dollars under this Agreement.

Since the coming into force of this Agreement, however, the Hungarian Government has delayed and hindered its proper implementation in various ways, whereas the obstacles created by the Hungarian Government since the middle of 1948, and particularly during the last few months, have had the character of direct sabotaging of the socialistic development of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

1. Even during the negotiations for the conclusion of this Agreement, the Government of the Republic of Hungary was constantly proposing and asking for a reduction of the volume of the Agreement, using the excuse that the capacity of Hungarian industry was below par. The Government of the Republic of Hungary maintained such an attitude even after the signature of the said Agreement, despite the fact that the Government of the FPRY granted Hungary a credit of six million dollars for the express purpose of increasing the capacity of Hungarian industry.

2. During the implementation of the Agreement, the high-price policy pursued by the Hungarian Government prevented certain purchase-sale contracts from being concluded in time and made it impossible for agreement to be reached regarding certain merchandise.

3. Continuing its obstruction, the Government of the Republic of Hungary was falling behind schedule in the delivery of capital goods, whose timely consignment was important for the execution of the plans of capital construction in Yugoslavia, particularly for the mining, ship-building and heavy industry sectors. For example, there were delays in the delivery of oil-drilling equipment and spare parts, pit wagons, ship plate, machinery, etc.

4. Moreover, it was established that Hungarian industry had been delaying the production of commodities ordered by Yugoslavia, as can be seen clearly from the execution of the payments plan.

5. It should be emphasized particularly that the Government of the Republic of Hungary refused to allow the conclusion of a contract on the delivery of equipment for a tractor factory although an agreement had been reached between the Yugoslav and Hungarian enterprises regarding technical matters and capacity.

6. In addition to the foregoing, the technical backwardness of Hungarian industry was no insignificant obstacle in the implementation of the Agreement.

The technical backwardness of Hungarian industry, the neglect of the Government of the Republic of Hungary to streamline production and enable its industries to manufacture and deliver more up-to-date technical products; furthermore, the already mentioned policy of high prices pursued by the Hungarian Government — led to a reduction of the volume of the Agreement from 120 million to 80 million dollars.

When the volume of the said Agreement had to be reduced for the above-mentioned reasons, the Hungarian Government requested that some of the most important capital goods be struck out from the fixed program of contracts, such as, for instance, the factory of agricultural machines, the factory for the manufacturing of transportation, building and mining equipment, foundry equipment, etc.

7. The quality of certain Hungarian deliveries failed to satisfy so that the delivered capital goods could not be used at all, or else did not give the performance or fulfil the technical conditions stipulated by the purchase-sale contracts, as was the case with the Sch-motors and cranes.

8. The Hungarian Government not only obstructed the fulfilment of its obligations and did not carry them out on schedule, but directly violated the foregoing Agreement by refusing to pay the amount of 1,326,000 dollars, arising from Yugoslav reparation claims, to the capital goods account of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which it had been bound to do pursuant to the Agreement and the obligations assumed.

Owing to such an irresponsible attitude towards the obligations it had assumed, the Hungarian Government is making use of the resources provided by Yugoslav economy amounting to over 23 million dollars — more than 18 million dollars under the mentioned Agreement alone — which, under the present circumstances, represents the debt of the Republic of Hungary to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

It is necessary to emphasize the attitude of the Hungarian Delegation during the negotiations which were started in March 1949 under this Agreement.

The Hungarian Government Delegation proposed and insisted that lists of commodities of Yugoslav deliveries for 1949 should not be fixed. At the same time, the Hungarian Delegation refused to consider the merits of the economic situation created by such a proposal. Such an attitude by the Hungarian Delegation clearly shows that the Government of the Republic of Hungary wants to continue using, without any foundation, the funds created by Yugoslavia in carrying out the Agreement loyally and sincerely. Such an attitude also shows the intention of

the Hungarian Government to liquidate the Agreement by evading fulfilment of its obligations.

Precisely at the moment when more intensive deliveries were to be expected from the Hungarian side, deliveries which would reduce its debt and enable it to fulfil its obligations under the Agreement, the Hungarian Government, by its Note of June 18, 1949, unilaterally, arbitrarily and unlawfully broke the Agreement on Hungarian Long-Term Deliveries and Yugoslav Counter-Deliveries of July 24, 1947. According to Article 14 of the Agreement, it was to remain in force "until the final fulfilment by both sides of obligations deriving from it, from its Annexes and from the purchase-sale contracts concluded under it."

Aware of the illegality of its acts and of its great responsibility for the establishment of such precedents in international relations, which introduce the practice of unilateral breach of treaties, the Government of the Republic of Hungary endeavours, without stating any serious reasons, to diminish its responsibility and, by presenting the facts in a false light, to impute the responsibility to the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Government of the Republic of Hungary — wanting to cause the greatest possible damage to the peoples of Yugoslavia — broke the Agreement at a moment when the time had come for the settlement of its large debts by the shipment of commodities, its actions, in the final analysis, are to the detriment of the Hungarian people's interests, because the said Agreement was of great advantage to them, as the foregoing shows.

In view of the fact that the Government of the Republic of Hungary refused to pay reparations to Yugoslavia and expelled the Yugoslav Reparations Delegation — thus violating the solemnly signed Peace Treaty — this latest unilateral breach of the afore-mentioned Agreement represents one more deliberate attack in a series of dictated illegal and unethical attacks on the FPRY. The aim of these attacks is to prevent and frustrate the fulfilment of the Five Year Plan and the building of socialism in Yugoslavia.

The Government of the FPRY warns the Government of the Republic of Hungary that such illegal actions, which have no moral or political grounds or force, cannot break the firm wish of the peoples of the FPRY to build socialism in their country. The fascist invaders, including Hungarian fascists, similarly did not succeed in breaking the will of the peoples of the FPRY in their struggle for the freedom and independence of their country, by which they created the basic conditions for the building of socialism.

The Government of the FPRY protests most vigorously against such unilateral and arbitrary breach of the Agreement on Hungarian Long-term Deliveries and Yugoslav Counter-deliveries of July 24, 1947, and notes that all the moral and material responsibility for such an illegal action rests with the Government of the Republic of Hungary.

In view of the fact, however, that the Hungarian Government broke the Agreement at a moment when it had not yet fulfilled its obligations

under it — while the FPRY, on its part, had fulfilled its obligations loyally — the Republic of Hungary is in considerable debt to the FPRY. The Government of the FPRY therefore requests that the Government of the Republic of Hungary reply when and how it proposes to settle the debts incurred by its breach of the Agreement.^(*) (°)

(*) The Hungarian Government did not answer this Note.

(°) As can be seen from the published documents on economic relations between Yugoslavia and the countries of Eastern Europe, by mid-June 1949 the governments of the mentioned countries formally or factually had severed all trade and other economic connections with Yugoslavia, and in this way had begun the most ruthless economic war against Yugoslavia, unparalleled in the modern history of international relations.

At the moment of renouncing economic agreements or arbitrarily discontinuing their fulfilment, the governments of the countries of Eastern Europe did not say a single word about the way they intended to settle mutual commitments arising from the economic agreements.

5. JOINT YUGOSLAV-SOVIET "JUSPAD" AND "JUSTA" COMPANIES AS A FORM OF THE POLICY OF UNEQUAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS⁽¹⁾

DOCUMENT No. 183

INFORMATION FROM THE YUGOSLAV MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT OF APRIL 1, 1948, ON THE INTENTION OF THE "JUSPAD" COMPANY DIRECTOR, A SOVIET CITIZEN, TO HAVE IT JOIN THE CARTEL OF SOVIET JOINT DANUBE SHIPPING COMPANIES

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Beograd

The Director-General of JUSPAD, Kononov, proposed draft agreements to the Managing Board on March 27 which he was to have concluded on behalf of JUSPAD with the following:

1. Soviet Danubian State Shipping;
2. Meshart, Soviet-Hungarian Shipping Company;
3. DDSG, Soviet-Austrian Shipping Company;
4. Sovromtransport, Soviet-Rumanian Shipping Company;

and requested that the Managing Board approve the signing of the agreements. In the absence of the Chairman of the Managing Board, I presided at the meeting and rejected the requested approval, stating that the company did not have the previous approval of the Minister of Transport to conduct such negotiations with foreign firms, which was at odds with our internal business rules. The discussion on this was bitter and heated, since Kononov requested that the conclusion of the agreement be approved. The statements of both the one and the other party were placed on record, and today on behalf of the Ministry of Transport I stated officially that an agreement could be concluded only if it was negotiated jointly by JUSPAD and our state shipping enterprise, on the one hand, and the shipping companies in question together with the respective national shipping companies, on the other.

⁽¹⁾ The Yugoslav-Soviet joint companies JUSPAD (The Yugoslav-Soviet Danubian Shipping Joint Stock Company) and JUSTA (The Yugoslav-Soviet Civil Air Transport Joint Stock Company) were founded under an agreement concluded between the Yugoslav and Soviet Governments on February 4, 1947, on the basis of the Agreement on Economic Cooperation between the USSR and Yugoslavia, signed on June 8, 1948. The proposal for the liquidation of these companies was advanced by the Yugoslav Government to the Soviet Government in its Note No. 605/49 of March 18, 1949, which said in part: "Observing the work of both companies and examining it, in so far as it had the possibility to do so, the Government of the FPRY has reached the conclusion that the existence and operation of JUSPAD

The draft agreements, bilateral in form, mean in essence the establishment of a cartel of the foregoing shipping companies with very broad cooperation in every respect (tug-boating, mutual assistance, port services, agency services, tariff consultations, etc.). It is characteristic that in case of disputes provision is made for arbitration in Moscow. It would be superfluous to emphasize how harmful such a unilateral cartel would be for our economy and that it would reduce our national shipping to an insignificant role.

Going deeper into the matter, I was able to learn the following:

During the winter (December 1947 — January 1948) all the directors general(?) (all of them Soviet citizens) met and discussed this matter. Then a kind of draft was made which the Director General of Meshart took to Moscow and probably received approval of it, since all the directors general met again in Budapest early in March and worked for 14 days on the draft mentioned above. None of us, not even our representatives in the JUSPAD administration or in the Managing Board knew anything about this.

When leaving for Budapest, Kononov told his deputy (a Yugoslav) that he was taking his child there for medical treatment. Upon his return, when presenting the draft, he said they had met quite by accident and that he had taken advantage of the fact that he was in Budapest to participate in the work of the conference.

It is obvious, or at least that is the impression I get, that the other party is striving for some kind of domination which cannot have a favourable effect on the interests of the shipping of the other riparian countries. Along the lines of our transport policy we shall endeavour to prevent such undesirable manifestations in so far as they relate to our transportation.

I received information on these preparations from Budapest. I was unable to verify it, so take it as such, except, of course, for the meeting in March this year, which Kononov himself confirmed.

and JUSTA do not contribute to 'the reconstruction and increase of the productive possibilities of Yugoslavia,' which was stated in Art. 1 of the Agreement of June 8, 1946, as one of the reasons for the foundation of the joint companies. Likewise, neither of these companies has been satisfactorily fulfilling the tasks that were entrusted to them under the agreements of June 8, 1946, and February 4, 1947." Citing a number of concrete acts in the affairs of JUSTA and JUSPAD that were contrary to the agreements upon which these companies were founded and which caused Yugoslavia economic damage, the Yugoslav Government proposed the liquidation of the mentioned companies to the Soviet Government.

By Note No. 65 of March 25, 1949, the Soviet Government consented to the liquidation of the joint Yugoslav-Soviet companies, but denied the accuracy of the facts given in the Yugoslav Note.

By Note No. 772 of April 2, 1949, the Yugoslav Government proposed the immediate liquidation of the companies and to this end simultaneously appointed its representatives. As regards the accuracy of the facts on the operation of the joint companies set forth in its first note, the Yugoslav Government in its Note of April 2 declared: "Despite the fact that it is convinced of the accuracy of the facts presented in the Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY No. 605/49 of March 16, 1949, the Government of the FPRY does not wish to enter into a discussion of this matter at present, the more so as agreement exists between the two Governments to undertake the liquidation of the companies, and the real state of affairs will be established on that occasion."

(*) The aforesaid companies.

I draw attention to the fact that preparations were proceeding at a time when it was stated that the holding of the conference proposed by us on the same matter was inconvenient.

Death to fascism-Liberty to the people!

Assistant Minister of Transport
(Sgd) A. Čeper

April 1, 1948.

DOCUMENT No. 196

STATEMENT BY THE YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVE AT THE MEETING
OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF THE "JUSTA" AND
"JUSPAD" COMPANIES ON THE VIOLATION OF THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS
AND LEGAL PROVISIONS OF THE FPRY BY THE SOVIET OFFICIALS
IN "JUSTA"(*)

"... Interpreting the Agreement arbitrarily, the Director General of JUSTA, likewise a Soviet citizen and a representative of the Soviet side, understood that JUSTA had received the right not only of commercial utilization of airports in the FPRY, but also exclusive control of the entire air-transport service in the FPRY, and even of all means of communication and radio-navigation, which constitute an essential condition for the safety of flights. In a number of cases, JUSTA exercised its control in such a way that it also assumed those rights which are the prerogatives of sovereign authority and which rights a sovereign state cannot cede in its territory either to home or foreign economic enterprises. It thus happened that the JUSTA company even neglected its duty of informing the authorities of the take-off and landing of foreign aircraft, placing the authorities of the FPRY before an accomplished fact. All friendly warnings remained without results. There are documents and records of talks between the competent officials on all this. No one disputes the fact that the FPRY was bound by agreement to render suitable radio and navigation services to the Company. On the contrary, the FPRY conscientiously fulfilled this obligation to the end, but in making use of this service, through the fault of the Soviet officials in the company, the Agreement was overstepped, its particular provisions are being flagrantly violated..."

"... The deplorable case of a serious mishap which cost our country human lives, proved the impossibility of having an air transport system

(*) Yugoslavia's representatives at the negotiations for the liquidation of JUSTA and JUSPAD were Ljubo Babić, Assistant Chairman of the Economic Council of Yugoslavia, and Jozo Gizdić, Yugoslav Assistant Minister of Transport.

The Soviet Delegation included Messrs. Sergheyev and Perederi, whose full names and functions the Soviet Government did not communicate. Despite the firm insistence of the Yugoslav delegation that joint official records be kept of the negotiations, the Soviet Delegation rejected this when refusing the proposal that the records be mutually initialled. For this reason, the quoted statements from the Commission's meetings are given from the shorthand records of the Yugoslav delegation.

without control by the responsible authorities⁽⁴⁾. Notwithstanding this, however, the practice was continued, and the instruments of the air navigation police remained in the hands of JUSTA, not as provided under the Agreement but in the sense given above..."

(Quoted from the shorthand record of the meeting held on June 1, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 197

STATEMENT BY THE YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVE ON THE ILL-INTENTIONED EXPLOITATION OF THE "JUSTA" COMPANY'S OPERATIONS FOR PUTTING PRESSURE ON YUGOSLAVIA

"... There was an eloquent example of the incorrect attitude of the Director General of JUSTA, a citizen of the USSR, towards the Yugoslav side and the Government of the FPRY in April, 1948. Brought into a difficult situation with regard to the fulfilment of its obligation of supplying JUSTA with petrol owing to the violation of an agreement by a third power⁽⁵⁾, which had committed itself by agreement to supply it, the Director General of JUSTA blamed the Government of the FPRY for not supplying JUSTA with petrol. Although it was aware of the real state of affairs, and knew that Yugoslavia had taken all steps to secure fuel, the Embassy of the USSR in Beograd, invoking the agreement with that third power, availed itself of this pretext to intercede with the Government of the FPRY on April 17, 1948, and to accuse it of placing the continued existence of JUSTA in jeopardy, leaving it only one air line. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY, by its Aide-mémoire of April 24, 1948, offered a full explanation to the effect that there was a temporary shortage of petrol in the FPRY and that the measure applying to JUSTA was commensurate with the measures of restriction applied to Yugoslav enterprises, too, including JAT (Yugoslav Air Transport). Although the Embassy of the USSR knew and could not but have known the real causes of the shortage of petrol, in its mémoire of July 1, 1948, it insisted upon the integral fulfilment of the agreement and said that it considered the explanation of the Government of the FPRY unsatisfactory..."

"... All this led to a situation whereby the work and the company policies of both companies (JUSTA and JUSPAD) showed that they were not carrying out the tasks for which they were founded. Instead of helping the economic development of Yugoslavia, instead of contributing to an extension of friendly relation between the two countries,

(⁴) The reference is to the airplane disaster of November 27, 1947, when a JUSTA passenger plane crashed on the Beograd-Titograd r.n. Seventeen passengers and 5 members of the crew were killed. The disaster resulted from the fact that the pilot could not find his bearings in dense fog and low clouds since the JUSTA Board had failed to equip its aircraft with the regulation radio-installations despite several requests to that effect by the Yugoslav authorities.

(⁵) Refers to Rumania, which had begun to stop shipments of oil derivatives to Yugoslavia already in the first half of 1948.

they simultaneously became a fetter on the development of Yugoslav economy and a source of argument and disagreement between the two countries..."

(Quoted from the shorthand record of the meeting held on June 1, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 198

REPLY OF THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE TO THE STATEMENT OF THE YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVE ON THE ILL-INTENTIONED EXPLOITATION OF THE "JUSTA" COMPANY'S OPERATIONS FOR EXERTING PRESSURE ON YUGOSLAVIA

"... That the work of these companies has caused Yugoslavia economic damage is not true. On the contrary, the decisions of the officials of the companies show that these companies were flourishing in the country, that they were working well, and that they could have worked even better, had the Government of the FPRY, or, to be precise, certain Government organs, not been constantly putting obstacles in the way of the companies, and had the steps necessary to create the conditions required to improve the work of these companies and to increase their prestige, been undertaken with good will.

"Everybody knows that aviation is impossible without petrol. Flying cannot be done without petrol. The Government of the FPRY not only did not consider it necessary to supply the required petrol as it was obliged to do but, on the contrary, having failed to give JUSTA the petrol that would have enabled it to continue its work, it asserted that the existence of the company did not correspond to the economic interests of Yugoslavia. On these grounds, it adopted the decision to liquidate the company's operations..."

(Quoted from the shorthand record of the meeting held on June 1, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 199

STATEMENT BY THE YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVE ON THE ALLEGED ADVANTAGES OF "JUSTA" AND "JUSPAD" TO YUGOSLAV ECONOMY

"... First of all, we must state that Mr. Sergheyev was extremely skillful in evading discussion of a number of facts, advanced with a mass of concrete data, on the real causes of the necessity of liquidating JUSTA and JUSPAD... Likewise, Mr. Sergheyev failed to honour the statements of the Yugoslav delegation with a reply to the question on the value of the airports built, on the amount of capital invested in the construction of the new airport, on the human lives lost owing to the badly organized air-navigation service of JUSTA. He was silent

about what the Government of the USSR had done to get petrol for JUSTA, although it knew well why the third power had discontinued shipment of it..."

(Quoted from the shorthand record of the meeting held on June 7, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 200

FROM THE STATEMENT BY THE YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVE ON THE FAILURE OF THE USSR TO PAY UP NOMINAL CAPITAL IN THE "JUSPAD" COMPANY

"... When JUSPAD was established, the Government of the FPRY invested its best river craft in this company. Unselfish in its desire to meet all its commitments completely, the Government of the FPRY allowed its partner to choose which Yugoslav river craft were to be invested in the company. The choice was such that Yugoslavia's best craft were taken for the company and that the state enterprise which was to have ensured the remaining shipping services on the rivers (Jugoslovensko Drzavno Rečno Brodarstvo) was left with less valuable and less efficient craft..."

"... On the other hand, it was expected that not only would the bulk of the shipping on the Yugoslav rivers be carried out by the joint activities of the USSR and the FPRY through JUSPAD, but that Yugoslav shipping would get effective assistance in that JUSPAD would erect a shipyard and fit the Danubian ports with installations and see to their maintenance, which the USSR was bound to do by agreement. Time passed, however, and the shipyard was not erected. The port installations, likewise, were built very slowly, and there were not enough of them..."

"The erection of shipyards was originally planned at Ada Ciganlija near Beograd. The economic development of our country and the building of socialism in it led to the growth of the capital city itself and to the necessity of laying down broad foundations for its proper construction, which was enjoined by the needs of our entire socialist advancement. Owing to this, the Government of the FPRY considered it as its duty not to erect the shipyard at Ada Ciganlija, but on some more suitable site which would not hamper the development of Beograd and would coincide with the interests of the shipbuilding industry itself. To this end, on behalf of the Government of the FPRY, the Minister of Transport, T. Vujasinović, addressed a friendly proposal to the Embassy of the USSR in Beograd on September 1, 1947, i. e. far earlier than the construction at Ada Ciganlija or even blue-prints for it had begun, for alteration of the agreement (Article 5 of the Agreement), and asked the Government of the USSR that another more suitable place for the construction of the new shipyard be agreed upon. Instead of the Soviet Government accepting the request of an allied socialist contracting party benevolently, it did not even reply to Comrade Vujasinović's proposal and the construction of the shipyard was not undertaken..."

(Quoted from the shorthand record of the meeting held on June 1, 1949, in Beograd.)

REPLY OF THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE TO THE STATEMENT BY THE
YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVE ON THE USSR'S FAILURE TO PAY UP
NOMINAL CAPITAL IN THE "JUSPAD" COMPANY

"... Mr. Babić declared that, when the company was established, the Government of the FPRY had invested (I am now reading the shorthand notes to Mr. Babić its best craft, etc., as its share. I then drew Mr. Babić's and Mr. Gizdić's attention to the fact that the Agreement showed these vessels to be extremely old. In corroboration of my past statement, I wish to mention at least two examples. The tugboat "Slovenija", a very powerful tugboat as you can see, had a considerable engine defect so that it had to be radically overhauled several months after it had been received by the company. The tugboat "Sumadija" was put out of commission as soon as it was received by the company owing to the worn condition of the boilers. After it was taken over by the company, the tugboat "Javorina" had to be overhauled repeatedly because its engine was out of order. I do not wish to enumerate any more facts on the condition of these vessels, and Mr. Babić should try to understand that I am not saying this to raise any objections to his statement or to object to the fact that Yugoslavia gave the company obsolete vessels. I only wish to point out that the Yugoslav Government was not put to making any sacrifices in delivering such old vessels. No sacrifices were required here, and what the Yugoslav Government did, was to contribute that which it considered suitable as its share in the company..."

(Quoted according to shorthand notes of the session held on June 3, 1949, in Beograd.)

STATEMENT BY THE YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVE ON THE FAILURE
OF THE USSR TO INVEST NOMINAL CAPITAL IN THE "JUSPAD"
COMPANY

"... We asserted that when JUSPAD was established the Yugoslav Government contributed as its share the best craft that it had. We assert this today, too, and are ready to prove it. Mr. Serghejev stated that the vessels delivered to JUSPAD by Yugoslavia were old. It is quite true that some of them were old, but we never asserted that they were new. Nevertheless, they were our best, chosen by the Soviet representatives, and bore all the earmarks of the rest of our craft, including their obsolescence. However, despite all this, of the 14 tugboats we pooled in JUSPAD, Mr. Serghejev was able to cite only three which had to undergo general overhauling during the period that JUSPAD was operating. He failed to recall, however, that Yugoslavia had pooled 137 craft in JUSPAD's shipping pool, 14 of which were tugboats, 103 barges and 20 tankers. The decisive fact here is not whether these craft

were old or new, but the fact, which Mr. Serghyev did not wish to dwell upon, that they were the best craft which Yugoslavia had at its disposal, and that the assertion of the Yugoslav Government is not based on the appraisal of the different craft individually, but on the general and irrefutable assertion that the Soviet experts chose the best, leaving at the disposal of the state enterprise (the Yugoslav State River Shipping) only those craft which were not in such good condition according to the estimates of the Soviet experts... It is therefore obvious that the Yugoslav contracting party consistently fulfilled its obligations, while the Soviet contracting party, on the contrary, did not invest the nominal capital it was to have invested in the JUSPAD Company, which is also borne out by the fact that it failed to undertake the construction of the shipyard..."

(From the shorthand notes of the meeting held June 7, 1949, in Beograd.)

DOCUMENT No. 203

STATEMENT BY THE YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVE ON DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES BY SOVIET PORT AUTHORITIES AGAINST YUGOSLAV STATE RIVER SHIPPING CRAFT

"... Although the fact that only a part of the Yugoslav river craft was transferred to JUSPAD meant at the same time that Yugoslav river shipping remained in existence and that there would have to be cooperation between JUSPAD and the rest of Yugoslav river shipping if help was to be given to the development of Yugoslavia, the Director-General of JUSPAD obstructed effective coordination between JUSPAD and Yugoslav State River Shipping. The JUSPAD gave priority to Soviet companies in tugboat services, thus damaging Yugoslavia's foreign exchange position. Is there a better illustration of this than the statistical data on the Company's activities in 1948? During that year, Yugoslav State River Shipping made 39,207 kilats for JUSPAD while the Soviet companies within that same year made 509,037 kilats..."

"... It was incorrectly asserted in the Soviet note No. 65 that this was due to the fact that the Yugoslav shipping did not effect tugboat services in the middle and lower course of the Danube. It is, however, an ascertained fact that JUSPAD's craft, and not only those belonging to the Yugoslav State River Shipping, sailed empty from this sector with explicit instructions to this effect by the JUSPAD administration, while the JUSPAD craft were tugged by the craft of the Soviet companies at the same time and from these same ports. We shall cite several concrete examples:

(a) The tugboat "Hrvatska," on September 16, 1947, was to have tugged the following barges from Izmail: Nos. 25587, 26636, 26752, 26306, 27310 and 26570. The Soviet port authorities in Izmail, however, did not allow the "Hrvatska" to tug these barges but assigned this job to the Soviet Danubian State Shipping, namely to its own tugboat "Briansk," while "Hrvatska" only took one barge, namely the 26555.

(b) In May, June and July 1947, the Soviet Danubian State Shipping (SDGP), without authorization, loaded 13 JUSPAD barges, i. e. barges Nos. 26713, 26646, 26784, 26583, 26550, 26404, 26711, 26545, 26782, 26808, 27903, 27501 and 27333, with iron ore for Budapest, despite the fact that these barges were at the disposal of JUSPAD for the transport of anthracite from Braila to Beograd.

Owing to the fact that Soviet Danubian State Shipping loaded empty barges with ore from Izmail for Budapest, JUSPAD had to send empty barges from Beograd to Braila, a distance of 1,000 kms — to haul the anthracite, instead of having this cargo loaded on the empty barges from Izmail which were anchored only 131 kms from Braila.

The loss sustained as a result of this by JUSPAD amounts to 1,400,000 dinars. The difference between the freight rate for the transport of ore and anthracite amounted to 972,000 dinars plus 400,000 dinars demurrage.

(c) On March 8, 1949, the tugboat "Slavonija" was prevented by the port authorities in Rema from tugging 4 loaded JUSPAD barges Nos. 26758, 26711, 26783 and 26547, and was assigned to 2 empty barges instead. Several hours after the departure of "Slavonija" the loaded barges were tugged off by a craft of the Soviet Danubian State Shipping.

I could cite many more instances, but do not think it necessary since they all point to the same thing, namely, to the fact that Soviet Danubian State Shipping, through the port authorities in Soviet harbours, even appropriated the right of disposing directly with JUSPAD craft. The responsibility for this is undoubtedly also borne by the Director-General of JUSPAD who tolerated this and made it possible..."

(Quoted from the shorthand notes of the meeting held on June 1, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 204

STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE REGARDING DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES BY SOVIET PORT AUTHORITIES AGAINST YUGOSLAV STATE RIVER SHIPPING CRAFT

"... Mr. Babić further declared that the Yugoslav State River Shipping had made 39,207 kilats for JUSPAD, while in the course of the same year the Soviet companies had made 509,037 kilats. Mr. Babić also made another inaccurate statement, as Soviet Note No. 65 set forth, saying that this was due to the fact that the Yugoslav craft did not carry out tugboat services in the middle and lower course of the Danube. As stated by Mr. Babić, facts show that the craft belonging to Yugoslav State River Shipping returned empty from these ports, while at the same time the JUSPAD craft were tugged by Soviet craft from these same ports. In this connection, Mr. Babić gives the example of the "Hrvatska," etc. These facts have been explained in the Soviet Government's note. I should, moreover, like to add that the tugging of our barges, i. e. the JUSPAD barges, by the tugboats of the Soviet Danubian State Shipping was compensated for by giving the company the barges of the Soviet Danubian State Shipping to tug, that

is for mutual tug services. That is confirmed by the fact that the mutual tug services were equalized while the Company was operating. We have thus given you the information you desire. The difference in the calculations of kilats for 1948 — 2,555 in favour of JUSPAD. The balance of the final statement in the mutual accounts for 1948 amounts to 16,293; for the first quarter of 1949 — 464, for April — 314, up to May 25, 1949, — 32: in all 19,658 ...”

(Quoted from the shorthand notes of the meeting held on June 3, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 203

STATEMENT BY YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVE ON DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES BY SOVIET PORT AUTHORITIES AGAINST YUGOSLAV STATE RIVER SHIPPING CRAFT

“... As regards tugboat services, Mr. Sergheyev did not wish to dwell on the essence of the matter, that is, on the ratio between the number of kilats JUSPAD ceded to the Yugoslav State River Shipping and to Soviet companies in 1948. This ratio, in terms of figures, is the one that we have set forth. However, Mr. Sergheyev investigated the ratio of kilats between JUSPAD and the Soviet Danubian State River Shipping. Namely, a ratio which has no connection with our assertion regarding the ratio to Yugoslav State River Shipping. The fact remains that, with respect to tugboat services, JUSPAD linked itself with Soviet Danubian State Shipping, ignoring not only Yugoslav State River Shipping but also its own craft. Mr. Sergheyev endeavours to justify this by the existence of an agreement between JUSPAD and the Soviet Danubian State Shipping on mutual tugboat services, but seems to forget that such an agreement also existed between JUSPAD and the Yugoslav State River Shipping...”

(Quoted from the shorthand notes of the meeting held on June 3, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 208

STATEMENT BY THE YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVE ON THE DAMAGE CAUSED TO YUGOSLAV ECONOMY BY THE “JUSPAD” COMPANY’S DISCRIMINATORY FREIGHT POLICY

“... Not only did all this inflict damage to the Yugoslav economy, and to the Company as a whole, but JUSPAD’s General Board had a special freight policy, and in practice, against the will of the Yugoslav organs of supervision, it formed a cartel with the other Soviet companies and ignored Yugoslav State River Shipping.

“Although all the planned tasks for the needs of Yugoslav economy were not fulfilled, the Company introduced a discriminatory freight

policy. How far these differences in freight charges went can best be proven by underlining once again that the transport of one net-ton kilometre of Yugoslav cargo in 1948 cost 0.40 dinars, while the transport of one net-ton kilometre of Soviet cargo cost only 0.19 dinars, and the freight of other countries 0.28 dinars. Yugoslavia thus paid 52% more for transport services than the Soviet Union did, and 30% more than other countries which were not members of the Company. It should be added here that the freight rates for the other countries were below the operating costs and increased the Company's losses. It is being alleged today that the Yugoslav officials approved these rates, but the question as to why the rates were applied like this has not been answered..."

(Quoted from the shorthand notes of the meeting held on June 1, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 207

REPLY OF THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE TO THE YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVE'S STATEMENT ON DAMAGE CAUSED TO YUGOSLAV ECONOMY BY THE "JUSPAD" COMPANY'S DISCRIMINATORY FREIGHT POLICY

"... It is further stated that 0.40 dinars was charged in 1948 for the transport of Yugoslav cargo while the rate for the transport of Soviet cargo was 0.19 dinars, and for other countries 0.28 dinars. Thus Yugoslavia, as the statement says, paid the company 52% more for the latter's services. The cost of one ton/kilometre, as set forth by Mr. Babić, can in no case serve as a basis to prove that the Yugoslav freight was transported to the detriment of the Yugoslav economy. There is absolutely no need to be an expert on this question to know that the greater the transport distance, the less the charge per ton/kilometre. It should be borne in mind that the distance from Budapest is 1,567 kilometres. The rate of 0.40 dinars cited by Mr. Babić applies to shorter distances and is thus completely lawful..."

(Quoted from the shorthand notes of the meeting held on June 3, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 208

THE YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVE'S ANSWER TO THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE'S STATEMENT ON DAMAGE CAUSED TO YUGOSLAV ECONOMY BY THE "JUSPAD" COMPANY'S DISCRIMINATORY FREIGHT POLICY

"... Mr. Sergheyev refused to dwell separately on the JUSPAD's freight policy but dealt with this question together with the tugboat services. Mr. Sergheyev admitted the accuracy of the freight rates and the difference in the rates charged for the transport of Yugoslav, Soviet and other cargo. He admitted that Yugoslav cargo was transported at the rate of 0.40 dinars, while the rate charged for Soviet cargoes was

0.19 dinars. He attempted to confuse us with technical matters, setting forth the well-known rule according to which freight rates are lower for longer distances, but forgot to explain whether this alone could have been the reason for such a big difference in rates, namely, why the transport of Soviet freight cost less than half of the rate charged for the transport of Yugoslav freight.

"Mr. Sergheyev asserts, on the one hand, that rates were determined objectively and that they were approved by the Yugoslav Government. On the other hand though, seemingly forgetting that the main feature of freight rates is their objectivity and equal application to all, he declared that, when it was a matter of lowering the category of certain goods exported by the Soviet Union, the rates were altered by means of telegraph agreements, whereby the rates were turned from freight rates into free bargaining. In an attempt to diminish the importance of this impermissible action, Mr. Sergheyev said that this reduction of rates was insignificant and did not deserve to be discussed at any length. However, this reduction would not have been so insignificant had Mr. Sergheyev chosen to dwell a little longer on all the commodities that had been transported and the total value of the freight charges. He will find at his disposal, should he require them, all the necessary documents on these calculations..."⁽⁴⁾.

(Quoted from the shorthand notes of the meeting held on June 7, 1949.)

⁽⁴⁾ The delegation of the Yugoslav Government endeavoured to have the joint companies, JUSPAD and JUSTA, liquidated on the basis of a liquidation balance-sheet, namely, by accountancy and other business documents to draw up a final balance-sheet for the companies. On the basis of the state of affairs established in this way, the two parties should have divided the profits or borne the losses in proportion to their share capital.

The delegation of the Soviet Government was persistent in its rejection of this proposal of the Yugoslav delegation, although it rested on the only correct and recognized principles in the business world which are employed at the dissolution of a partnership. The delegation of the Soviet Government did not agree with such a principled attitude on the part of Yugoslavia because it maintained quite different views, that is, that only the interests of the USSR should be ensured, piling all the losses of the company on Yugoslavia in accordance with the policy of inequality of economic relations which the Soviet Government attempted to impose upon Yugoslavia. Endeavouring to bring the negotiations on the liquidation of the JUSTA and JUSPAD companies to a successful conclusion, and to do so as quickly as possible because they were operating to the detriment of Yugoslav economy, the Yugoslav Government made considerable concessions regardless of the fact that certain decisions on the liquidation were to Yugoslavia's disadvantage. It was finally decided to liquidate the companies under the following conditions:

1. That all property invested by the USSR in the JUSTA and JUSPAD companies, which was in the possession of the companies on the day of liquidation, be exported to the USSR, with Yugoslavia bearing all the expenses of dismantling, packing and transportation.
2. That compensation according to accountancy prices be paid for all property which had been invested by the USSR and which had been worn out during the operation of the companies.
3. That cash invested by the USSR as share capital be refunded to the USSR.
4. That all liabilities towards third persons, except those on the territory of the USSR, be taken over by the Government of the FPRY, an exception being the case of the tugboat "Taš" in which both sides bound themselves to bear any possible liabilities connected with it on a parity basis.
5. The effectuation of liquidation and all expenses in connection with it to be borne by the Government of the FPRY.

6. THE COMPLETE STOPPAGE OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC AND POSTAL SERVICE WITH YUGOSLAVIA

DOCUMENT No. 209

RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF JANUARY 17, 1950, BREAKING THE RAILWAY CONVENTIONS BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND RUMANIA CONCLUDED SEPTEMBER 2 AND 3, 1946⁽¹⁾

On behalf of the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has acquainted the Yugoslav Government with the following:

The railway conventions concluded with the aim of regulating frontier service, transit from Yugoslavia through Rumania and back into Yugoslavia and transit from Rumania through Yugoslavia and back into Rumania, was used by the Yugoslav Government for the purposes of its hostile policy towards the Rumanian People's Republic. Agents of the Yugoslav Government committed abuses, violence and other arbitrary acts against Rumanian passengers on Rumanian trains in transit over Yugoslav territory. The Yugoslav Government attempted to infiltrate agents-provocateurs, spies and fascist propaganda material into the Rumanian People's Republic.

This shows that the Yugoslav Government, placed in the service of the imperialist circles and Anglo-American espionage, is availing itself of every opportunity to realize its provocative and aggressive policy against the Rumanian People's Republic and against the interests of friendship of the Yugoslav peoples with the Rumanian People's Republic.

In this way the Government of the FPRY met all the requests laid down by the representatives of the Soviet Government, except the requests for: 1) the amortization of machinery which had been in operation during the existence of the companies; 2) the payment for obsolescence of that part of the machinery which had not been in use, and 3) the request that all liabilities in the case of the tugboat "Taš" be borne by the Yugoslav Government. These requests were turned down as extremely unfounded and unethical because by the decisions on the liquidation of the companies the Yugoslav Government had assumed their entire business loss amounting to about 80,000,000 dinars.

(¹) The reference is to the agreement on special transit traffic from Yugoslavia through Rumania and back into Yugoslavia, on the Jaša Tomić — Ninčičevo line and on special transit traffic from Rumania through Yugoslavia and back into Rumania on the Stamura Moravita—Bazijaš line, signed on September 2, 1946, in Jimbolia, and the Agreement on the regulation of the frontier service for passenger, baggage and goods traffic between the Yugoslav state railways and the Rumanian state railways, signed at Jimbolia September 3, 1946.

The fascist policy of the Beograd Government precludes the possibility of existence and application of conventions, such as the conventions regulating special transit and frontier railway traffic between Yugoslavia and the Rumanian People's Republic.

In view of the above, the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the Rumanian People's Republic, by Decrees Nos. 4 and 5 of January 14, 1950, renounced the foregoing conventions, signed September 3, 1946, in Jimbolia.^(?)

Bucharest, January 17, 1950.

DOCUMENT No. 210

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF PROTEST No. 41303 OF JANUARY 24, 1950, IN CONNECTION WITH THE UNILATERAL BREACH OF RAILWAY CONVENTIONS BY THE RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT

Pursuing its hostile policy towards the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the Rumanian Government unilaterally broke the railway conventions regulating frontier service and transit, concluded between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Rumanian People's Republic on September 3, 1946, and as of January 17, 1950, stopped all railway and postal traffic with Yugoslavia.

By undertaking this hostile and anti-Yugoslav act, the Rumanian Government did not shrink from violating in a most flagrant manner its international obligations arising from the Barcelona and Geneva Conventions.

By cutting railway and postal traffic with the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which followed after a number of hostile and warmongering acts towards it, the Rumanian Government clearly showed the entire world public that it does not shrink from any kind of violation of the principles of peaceful cooperation among states in its endeavours to play its role in the conspiracy against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, in which it has been participating for almost two years.

Like all previous hostile acts of the Rumanian Government against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, this latest will also be justly condemned by world democratic public opinion and by the Rumanian people.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia protests most vigorously against the arbitrary and completely unfounded decision of the Rumanian Government to break the Convention on the Regulation of Frontier Service and Transit concluded between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Rumanian People's Republic and, violating international commitments, to stop railway and postal

^(?) Owing to its offensive tone, the Note was returned to the Rumanian Government. The text of the note is given according to the Rumanian press. (SCANTELA of January 19, 1950.)

service with the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. It warns the Rumanian Government that the whole responsibility for the consequences arising from this unpeaceful act lies with the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic. (*)

Beograd, January 24, 1950.

(*) The Yugoslav delegate brought out the case of Rumania's severance of railway traffic with Yugoslavia at the Fourth Session of the Sub-Committee for Railway Transport of the UN European Economic Commission, in March 1950. He pointed out that by this unilateral decision the Rumanian Government had violated international agreements, such as the International Convention on the Transport of Goods and Passengers (CIM and CIV), the Barcelona Convention on the Freedom of Transit and other international provisions from the field of railway traffic. Taking cognizance of this fact, the Sub-Committee voted Resolution No. 34 of March 20, 1950, noting among other things that this break in railway traffic was harmful to international traffic, and calling upon the Rumanian Government to explain the reasons behind its decision.

The Rumanian Government has to this day failed to reply to the request of the Secretariat of the European Economic Commission to give an explanation for the stoppage of railway traffic with Yugoslavia.

7. THE OBSTRUCTION OF FREE NAVIGATION OF YUGOSLAV VESSELS ON THE DANUBE

DOCUMENT No. 211

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S PROTEST NOTE No. 411187 OF JUNE 8, 1950, TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD IN CONNECTION WITH MANOEUVRES OF THE SOVIET DANUBIAN MILITARY FLOTILLA WHICH PREVENT THE NAVIGATION OF YUGOSLAV VESSELS

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia brings the following to the notice of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

As of May 16 this year the Soviet Danubian military flotilla has been holding manoeuvres on the Danube between the 1974th and 1988th kilometre every Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday throughout the day, during which time all passage of vessels is prohibited. On such days navigation is therefore completely impossible. Thus, Yugoslav vessels navigating in this sector of the Danube have been delayed. In addition to this, the vessel "Krivošija," on May 17 this year, having received an incorrect signal, found itself in the line of fire at the 1978th kilometre.

It was only on May 26 this year that the State River Shipping of the FPRY received official notification from the Landesregierung, No. L. A. III/1355/34 of May 23, forwarding information on the manoeuvres "until further notice." The Soviet military authorities, therefore, not only put obstacles in the way of navigation, but these manoeuvres assume such proportions that they are held four full days a week and this for an unspecified period.

By such acts, the Soviet military authorities are inflicting heavy material damage upon Yugoslav navigation and are thereby also directly violating Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention on Navigation on the Danube of 1948, which guarantee free and open navigation along the whole navigable course of the Danube from Ulm to the Black Sea.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia emphatically protests against this overt violation of the Convention by the USSR and requests that all obstacles to normal navigation in the mentioned sector of the Danube be removed forthwith.⁽¹⁾ ⁽²⁾

(1) A similar protest was sent to the Danube Commission.

(2) The Soviet Government did not answer the quoted note.

**YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S PROTEST NOTE No. 412006 OF JUNE 13, 1950,
TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE
DETAINING OF YUGOSLAV VESSELS IN AUSTRIA**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia informs the Embassy of the USSR of the following:

The Soviet military authorities in Austria have established the practice of requesting the submission of data on vessels due to pass through the Soviet sector of the Danube in Austria at least eight days before the arrival of the vessels in Vienna, after which the latter again wait for permission to proceed from the Soviet to the American zone of Austria. Owing to this practice, Yugoslav vessels suffer heavy material losses the responsibility for which lies with the Soviet military authorities in Austria. As regards Yugoslav vessels, the situation recently was as follows:

(a) Data for the "Hercegovina," with 6 barges, were submitted on May 25; she arrived in Vienna on May 28, and by June 12 the permit to proceed had still not been received;

(b) Data for the "Kopaonik," with 8 barges, were submitted on May 30; she arrived in Vienna on June 6, and by June 12 the permit to proceed had not yet been received;

(c) Data for the "Napredak," with 10 barges, were submitted on June 5; she arrived in Vienna on June 6, the permit to proceed had not been received by June 12;

(d) Data for the "Triglav," with 10 barges, were submitted on June 4; she arrived in Vienna on June 6, the permit to proceed had not been received by June 12;

(e) Data for the "Pobeda," with 8 barges, were submitted on June 9, she arrived in Vienna on June 11, the permit to proceed had not been received by June 12.

In addition to this, the Soviet military authorities have introduced limited working hours, from 7 a. m. to 8 p. m., for the inspection of vessels in the town of Au, so that Yugoslav vessels which arrive before this time or after it must wait for inspection. The usual practice on the Danube is to carry out inspection in the interests of navigation immediately upon the vessel's arrival, at any time of day or night.

By such acts, the Soviet military authorities in Austria are creating serious obstacles for craft flying the Yugoslav flag and directly violating Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention on Navigation on the Danube of 1948, which guarantee free and open navigation on the whole navigable course of the Danube from Ulm to the Black Sea, as well as Article 26 of the Convention which provides that customs, health and police procedure must be such as not to hamper navigation, and must be applied without discrimination.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia protests against the above-mentioned overt violations of the Convention

of 1948 which are causing direct damage to Yugoslav navigation, and requests that the Soviet authorities put an end to such unlawful acts.^(*)

Beograd, June 13, 1950.

DOCUMENT No. 213

REPLY OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD, BY NOTE No. 163 OF AUGUST 12, 1950, TO THE NOTES OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT OF JUNE 8 AND 13, 1950, IN CONNECTION WITH THE OBSTRUCTION OF NAVIGATION ON THE DANUBE

In connection with the notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia of June 6 and 13 this year, the Embassy of the USSR considers it necessary to state the following:

The Embassy cannot recognize that the allegations in the mentioned notes of the Ministry have any basis in fact. It is a known fact that Austria is governed by occupation authorities, which was taken into consideration at the conclusion of the Convention on Navigation on the Danube of August 18, 1948. Apart from this, a special protocol annexed to the Convention provided that Austria would join the Danubian Commission after the settlement of the question of the Treaty with Austria.

In view of this, it is indisputable that the Soviet military authorities in Austria are entitled to undertake measures in the zone of occupation in connection with the stay of occupation units there, as well as measures arising from the need of affording support to the occupation administration. Such measures, as is known, have not given rise to protests from any quarter, including Yugoslavia, although they have been practiced through the whole period of time since the Danube Convention came into force. It should likewise be observed that the Soviet occupation authorities in Austria avail themselves of their rights with relation to control and regulation of navigation in such a way as not to cause unnecessary restrictions to navigation and without any discrimination in regard to Yugoslav ships.

In accordance with the foregoing, the Embassy rejects the protest of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia as lacking foundation.
Beograd, August 22, 1950.

DOCUMENT No. 214

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 418248 OF SEPTEMBER 14, 1950, REJECTING THE POINT OF VIEW SET FORTH IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY'S NOTE OF AUGUST 22, 1950

In reply to the Note of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics No. 163 of August 22, 1950, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia communicates the following:

(*) A similar protest was also sent to the Danube Commission.

The mentioned note of the Embassy of the USSR does not deny, nor does it even deal with any of the facts stated in the notes of protest of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia No. 411187 of June 8 and No. 412006 of June 13 this year in connection with the direct violations of the provisions of the Convention on Navigation on the Danube of 1948.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia notes that shortly after the protest, the Soviet occupation authorities did actually put an end to acts such as those described in the above-mentioned notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. It, however, cannot accept the view of the Embassy of the USSR that the Soviet occupation authorities are entitled to commit these acts, because they are a direct violation of the provisions of the Convention of 1948, Articles 1, 2 and 26, which establish free navigation from Ulm to the Black Sea, simultaneously prescribing that customs, health and police measures must be such that they do not hamper navigation, and must be applied without discrimination.⁽⁴⁾

Beograd, September 14, 1950.

⁽⁴⁾ The Soviet Embassy answered this note with its Note No. 187 of September 23, 1950, reaffirming the views set forth in its note of August 22, 1950.

8. OBSTRUCTION OF THE PROPER FUNCTIONING OF THE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM OF WATERCOURSES AND LAKES

DOCUMENT No. 215

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S PROTEST NOTE No. 411296 OF JUNE 27, 1949, AGAINST THE VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT ON JOINT MEASURES REGULATING THE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM OF WATERCOURSES BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND HUNGARY

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has the honour to inform the Legation of the Hungarian Republic of the following:

Under the draft protocol on joint measures for the regulation of the hydraulic system of watercourses between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Hungarian Republic, signed March 25, 1948, in Beograd, and later approved by both Governments, agreement was reached making provision for commitments on the part of both countries to allow the hydro-technical officials of the two states, equipped with special identity papers, to cross the frontier.

Pursuant to this Agreement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, in its Note No. 524967 of May 27 this year, requested the Legation of the Hungarian Republic in Beograd to grant visas for the special identity cards of 5 Yugoslav hydro-technical officials to cross the frontier in connection with works on the Drava River.

The Legation of the Hungarian Republic, however, returned the identity cards on June 6 this year without visas, without any explanation.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia protests against this act of the Legation of the Hungarian Republic, which constitutes a new violation of the aforesaid Agreement and, in essence, prevents cooperation among the local hydro-technical officials necessary in the joint interest of both states.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia takes this opportunity to express its consideration to the Legation of the Hungarian Republic.⁽¹⁾

Beograd, June 27, 1949.

⁽¹⁾ The Hungarian Legation replied by its Note No. 450 of July 2, 1949, that it was necessary to forward these identity cards for visas through the Hungarian hydro-technical organs.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY, by its Note No. 213090 of July 30, 1949, noted the fact that the Hungarian Legation had already once granted visas for identity cards in October, 1948, and that this latest Hungarian attitude and act

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 418679 OF OCTOBER 15, 1949, TO THE RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION WITH OBSTRUCTION OF THE WORK OF THE PERMANENT YUGOSLAV DELEGATION IN THE PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE IRON GATES ADMINISTRATION

"Despite this and similar advice by the Government of the FPRY, the Rumanian Government continued to commit increasingly serious hostile and unpacific acts against the FPRY. Without any reason, it ordered the arrest and expulsion of officials of the Embassy of the FPRY in Bucharest. Upon orders of the Rumanian Government, the Rumanian authorities prohibited the further operation of the agencies of the Yugoslav State River Shipping (JDRB) at Giurgiu and Braila, which had existed in Rumania continuously since 1925, and expelled their officials from Rumania. By its acts the Rumanian Government has made the work of the Permanent Delegation of the FPRY in the Provisional Committee of the Iron Gates Administration impossible,^(*) owing to which the Government of the FPRY was compelled to transfer the seat of its delegation from Orsova to Tekija, that is, from Rumanian to Yugoslav territory. The methods employed by the Rumanian Government against Yugoslav citizens — officials of the Iron Gates Administration, and the Permanent Delegate of FPRY in the Provisional Committee for the management of affairs of the Iron Gates Administration, have never before been applied in international relations among the riparian states in navigation along the Danube. The unilaterally adopted regulations on the movements of Yugoslav citizens — officials of the Iron Gates Administration, which prevent them from discharging their duties in the general interest of Danubian navigation; the measures of the Rumanian authorities which leave these officials for days without food; their unlawful arrest by the Rumanian frontier guards, who also opened fire on them; the searching of their personal belongings and of the entire files of the Permanent Delegate of the FPRY in the Provisional Committee for the management of the affairs of the Iron Gates Administration — who is

runs counter to the provisions of the Agreement on the crossing of the frontier, which prescribes special identity cards for hydro-technical officials to be presented for visas directly to the diplomatic mission of the country into whose territory the crossing is to be made. The Hungarian Legation did not answer this note.

(*) The Provisional Committee for the management of the affairs of the Iron Gates Administration was founded on October 5, 1945, by agreement between the FPRY and Rumania. This Committee was founded with a view to managing the affairs of the Iron Gates Administration which was formerly run by the International Danube Commission. The duty of the Committee, and of the Iron Gates Administration itself, is to concern itself with the maintenance of normal conditions of navigation through the Iron Gates sector (the length of the sector is 116 km), which owing to natural obstacles, is the most difficult part of the navigable course of the Danube. According to the new Convention on Navigation on the Danube of 1948, it is necessary that the FPRY and Rumania conclude an agreement on the operation of a special river administration for the Iron Gates which would replace the Provisional Committee for the management of the affairs of the Iron Gates Administration. The Rumanian Government, however, on several occasions refused to proceed to the conclusion of the agreement notwithstanding all previous requests of the Government of the FPRY to start negotiations for this purpose.

also the Chief of the diplomatic mission of the FPRY in Rumania, and other similar acts by the Rumanian authorities, are methods by which the Rumanian Government has been endeavouring completely to prevent the participation of the FPRY in the affairs of the Iron Gates Administration, which seriously threatens the security of Danubian navigation in the Iron Gates sector.

"The Government of the FPRY notes that all these arbitrary acts by the Rumanian Government, which bear the stamp of violence, overtly violate the international commitments of the Rumanian People's Republic in the Iron Gates.

"The Government of the Rumanian People's Republic has violated its commitments arising from the Protocol regulating the crossing of the frontier by officials of hydro-technical institutions of December 31, 1948. Contrary to the provisions of this Agreement, it refused to issue visas to the Yugoslav hydro-technical officials and thus prevented all possibilities of cooperation between the hydro-technical services of the two countries in maintaining the water-systems cut by the frontier, in which way it has placed in jeopardy the personal security and property of the frontier population of both countries."^(*)

DOCUMENT No. 217

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 4501 OF JANUARY 10, 1949, INVITING THE ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT WITH YUGOSLAVIA FOR RECLAMATION OF THE SKADAR LAKE BASIN

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia presents its compliments to the Legation of the People's Republic of Albania and has the honour to inform it of the following:

In accordance with the treaties concluded earlier between the two countries, the Governments of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and of the People's Republic of Albania designated by mutual agreement a Mixed Commission of Specialists from both countries with the task of examining the possibility of regulation of the hydraulic system of watercourses, reclamation and other hydro-technical works in the Skadar Lake area, and proposed a solution which would satisfy the interests of both countries to the maximum.

After having examined in both countries the Skadar Lake area which would come into consideration for reclamation work, this Commission proposed in mutual agreement, in its minutes of July 28, 1947, the necessary measures and works to be undertaken.

The Government of the PR of Albania knows that great damage is being caused in the Skadar Lake basin on both sides of the frontier by the Drim River, which obstructs the flow of water from Skadar Lake, thereby raising the water level of that Lake. Owing to this fact, the

(*) Excerpt from the note of the Yugoslav Government No. 418679 of October 15, 1949, in connection with the unilateral breach of the Agreement on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance by the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic with its note No. 3280 of October 1, 1949.

economy of the FPR of Yugoslavia is deprived of an area of 13,041 hectares of land, whereas the People's Republic of Albania loses an area of 31,231 hectares, which makes a total of 44,272 hectares. This area will only extend in size as the turbulence of the Drim River increases.

The Government of the FPR of Yugoslavia considers that there are no obstacles to eliminating the damaging effect of the Drim River from both countries and proceeding in 1949 with reclamation of the Skadar area in the spirit of the decisions of the Yugoslav-Albanian Commission of Specialists.

For this reason, in accordance with the decision of the above-mentioned Commission, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, with the help of its specialists, has drawn up a plan for such works. The plan is based on diverting the waters of the Drim River from those of the Bojana River. According to the plans, by regulating the bed of the Drim River and by building dikes, it would be made to empty into the sea near Lješ; the Drinjača River would be closed off and the Bojana River would be regulated so as to drain Skadar Lake without any obstructions, and would at the same time be made navigable.

According to the plans, the investments necessary for the contemplated works in both countries would amount to 2,820,000,000 dinars. This large sum would already be amortized within five and a half years.

Such rapid amortization would be possible because the reclamation of the Skadar area would immediately yield great economic benefits. The melioration would transform almost all the swamps on both sides into fertile land for the cultivation of valuable products like top-grade cotton, wheat and other grains, potatoes, turnips, and fodder. This would convert these regions into a rich agricultural and cattle breeding area. By the regulation of the hydraulic system of the watercourses in the area, fishing could be organised on an efficient basis and would represent a new source of revenue. The improvement of transportation in the area of Skadar Lake would likewise be important for the economy of both countries.

Special emphasis should be placed on the great importance of the regulation of this Basin for the health conditions of the population as the draining of the marshes would cause the number of malaria cases to diminish considerably.

Adhering to the earlier joint decision and desiring to have this very important matter settled by agreement between both parties to their mutual benefit, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has the honour to propose to the Government of the People's Republic of Albania that the two countries proceed to the conclusion of a special agreement for the realization of this important project.

The Government of the FPR of Yugoslavia would be willing, under the agreement to be concluded by both Governments, to assume the obligation of regulating the Drim River with its own resources and specialists, the prospective works to include the building of a new river bed and of dams for the retention of alluvial deposits near Vaudejs, and proposes that the Government of the PR of Albania help out in this project by supplying unskilled labour. As to the expenditure of the PR of Albania on labour, the Government of the FPR of Yugoslavia is ready to meet this expenditure as well. The manner of payment, however,

would be determined in the Agreement. Other reclamation works in the PR of Albania will be carried out by the PR of Albania and the Government of the FPR of Yugoslavia would be willing to contribute, within the limits of its possibilities, to the execution of these works by placing its specialists at the disposal of the Government of the PR of Albania inasmuch as the latter should express a desire to that effect.

The Government of the FPR of Yugoslavia has the honour to request the Government of the PR of Albania to give its full attention to this matter and designate authorized representatives for the examination of the plans and for the conclusion of the Agreement on the works under reference.

As a further delay of these works would not correspond, in the given circumstances, to the economic interests of either country, the Government of the FPR of Yugoslavia would, in case of rejection of the above-mentioned project by the Government of the PR of Albania, be forced, in order to protect its territory from further damage, to proceed to the implementation of another project providing for works in the territory of the FPR of Yugoslavia exclusively. This project would be more difficult to carry out and more expensive, too, than the regulation of the Drim River and, apart from this, it probably would not satisfy the interests of the FPR of Yugoslavia completely. As regards the PR of Albania, this solution would present no advantage for it and it would put the Government of the PR of Albania into a position whereby it would have to undertake considerable works in its territory on its own.

The consequences of such a solution would, therefore, be detrimental to both countries.

In submitting this project to the Government of the PR of Albania for examination, the Government of the FPR of Yugoslavia expresses its hope that the Government of the PR of Albania will soon forward its answer in principle regarding this project, and that representatives of the PR of Albania will be authorized to conclude an Agreement. In the interests of timely execution of preparatory works and of beginning the earth works about June 1, 1949, it would be desirable for the Government of the PR of Albania to answer by the beginning of February 1949 at the latest.

The Government of the FPR of Yugoslavia has the intention of starting work on June 1, 1949, at the latest either on the basis of the attached plan, which would include work in both countries, or according to the other project, which provides for work in the territory of the FPR of Yugoslavia exclusively, and will therefore appreciate a prompt answer from the Government of the PR of Albania.

Enclosed herewith is a plan for the reclamation of the Skadar Basin with explanations of a technical and economic nature.

Beograd, January 10, 1949.

NOTE OF THE ALBANIAN LEGATION IN BEOGRAD, No. 3051 OF FEBRUARY 2, 1949, COMMUNICATING THAT THE ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT WILLING TO COOPERATE IN THE DRAINAGE OF SKADAR LAKE

The Legation of the People's Republic of Albania presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and, answering its Note No. 4501 of January 10, 1949, regarding the drainage of Skadar Lake, has the honour to inform it that the Government of the People's Republic of Albania is not willing to undertake the corresponding works and that such works are not provided for in the established plan.

The Legation of the People's Republic of Albania expresses its consideration to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

Beograd, February 2, 1949.

9. THE PREVENTION OF YUGOSLAV PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL FAIRS

DOCUMENT No. 219

PROTEST NOTE OF THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN SOFIA No. 417-I OF SEPTEMBER 6, 1949, CONCERNING THE PROHIBITION OF YUGOSLAVIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE PLOVDIV FAIR BY THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT

The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has the honour to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria of the following:

The Administration of the International Samples Fair at Plovdiv, by its letter No. 377 of March 5, 1949, addressed to the Ambassador of the FPRY in Sofia, asked him to take steps for the official participation of the FPR of Yugoslavia in the Thirteenth International Samples Fair at Plovdiv, during the period from September 4 to 18 this year. The invitation, apart from other things, stressed: "This participation will greatly contribute to even more rapid consolidation and extension of economic relations between the two brotherly peoples."

The Government of the FPR of Yugoslavia, which has always pursued, and continues to pursue, a policy of brotherly cooperation and extension of economic relations between the FPR of Yugoslavia and the PR of Bulgaria, accepted this invitation and took in good time all the necessary steps through the Chamber of Commerce of the FPRY for the participation of the FPR of Yugoslavia in the Thirteenth International Samples Fair at Plovdiv. The Fair Administration assigned a pavilion to the FPR of Yugoslavia together with the PR of Rumania — Pavilion No. 5 — in the same block with the USSR and the countries of people's democracy, but later this pavilion was withdrawn and another one allotted although the Chamber of Commerce of the FPRY had completed all the necessary preparations in accordance with layout plans of the Plovdiv Fair forwarded to it by the Fair Administration; namely, the Fair Administration notified the representatives of the FPRY of this change only on August 10 this year, which was the cause of new difficulties because another display scheme had to be made in accordance with the plan of the new pavilion in a short period of time. But, despite the lack of time and at considerable expense, the representatives of the FPR of Yugoslavia succeeded in carrying out the technical preparations in time and sent 13 railway cars full of various products of the FPRY for exhibition in the new pavilion: heavy industry, iron and steel industry, electro-economy, the automobile industry, light industry, etc.

On September 2 this year, directly before the opening of the Fair, when the pavilion of the FPR of Yugoslavia had been completed, the Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade of the PR of Bulgaria, Mr. Stefanov, informed the representative of the FPR of Yugoslavia, Franjo Recej, that "the FPR of Yugoslavia may not participate in the Fair, because the Government of the PR of Bulgaria has made a decision to that effect," and that it was necessary to close the pavilion of the FPR of Yugoslavia immediately. Asked by the Yugoslav representative for the reasons, the afore-mentioned Stefanov said that "they feared provocations," without stating who could cause the provocations and what kind of provocations they might be. At the request of the Yugoslav representative that a written document be given him to that effect, the Fair Administration issued him such a document, No. 2041 of September 2, 1949, and stated in it that "by order from Sofia the FPR of Yugoslavia will not participate in the Fair." No other explanation was given nor could any have been given since there was no reason to cancel the participation of the FPR of Yugoslavia.

This discriminatory act towards the FPR of Yugoslavia, so far without precedent in international relations, not only caused great material damage to the peoples of socialist Yugoslavia, but was also a deep insult for them, because the act of the Government of the PR of Bulgaria, which thus evaded the commitments arising from the invitation to take part in the Fair sent to the FPR of Yugoslavia by the Fair Administration — constituted further proof of the discriminatory measures against socialist Yugoslavia, which have of late become a daily practice in the policy of the Government of the PR of Bulgaria towards the FPR of Yugoslavia.

The Embassy of the FPRY cannot but observe that "economic relations between the two brotherly peoples," as was underlined in the invitation of the Fair Administration, are not consolidated in this manner. On the contrary, besides making it impossible for the Bulgarian people to see the successes of the working people of the FPR of Yugoslavia in fulfilling the Five Year Plan, and to learn the truth about socialist development in the FPR of Yugoslavia — these discriminatory acts by the Government of the PR of Bulgaria towards the FPR of Yugoslavia, which have not been committed towards any capitalist country, aggravate the existing relations between the FPR of Yugoslavia and the PR of Bulgaria.

The Embassy of the FPRY must observe that full responsibility for this discriminatory measure is borne by the Government of the PR of Bulgaria, on whose orders the participation of the FPR of Yugoslavia in the Thirteenth International Samples Fair at Plovdiv was prevented.

On the above grounds the Embassy of the FPRY, under instructions from its Government, strongly protests to the Government of the PR of Bulgaria against this discriminatory act by the Government of the PR of Bulgaria towards the FPR of Yugoslavia. It requests the Government of the PR of Bulgaria to compensate the material damage caused to the

FPR of Yugoslavia by this act. The calculation of this damage will be submitted subsequently by the Embassy of the FPRY to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Bulgaria for compensation.

The Embassy of the FPRY expresses its consideration to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Bulgaria.⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾

Sofia, September 6, 1949.

⁽¹⁾ The Government of the PR of Bulgaria did not answer this Note.

⁽²⁾ The Governments of the PR of Hungary and of the Czechoslovak Republic cancelled the participation of the FPRY in international fairs in their countries in a similar manner. The Board of the Society for Fairs and Exhibitions in Hungary, by its telegram of June 8, 1949, cancelled the participation of Yugoslavia in the International Autumn Fair in Budapest, while the Board of the Prague Fair, by its telegram of June 9, 1949, cancelled the participation of Yugoslavia in the Autumn Fair in Prague.

III

DIRECT ESPIONAGE AND TERRORIST ACTIONS BY THE SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA

1. THE ORGANIZING OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE FOR SUBVERSIVE AND HOSTILE ACTIVITY AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA

THE INVEIGLING OF YUGOSLAV OFFICERS ATTENDING SCHOOL IN THE USSR TO BETRAY THEIR COUNTRY(*)

DOCUMENT No. 220

FROM THE STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY, GAJO VOJVODIĆ, TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY ON THE ATTEMPTS TO INVEIGLE YUGOSLAV OFFICERS ATTENDING THE VOROSHILOV MILITARY ACADEMY IN THE SOVIET UNION INTO THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

"... Just before the completion of the course, a Lieutenant Colonel appeared and, according to the comrades, wanted to speak with each one individually. As far as I recall, Comrade Lekić cautioned us about this and said that we should have our wits about us while talking to him. After a day or two one of the comrades, replying to a question put by someone in the group, said: 'He is inveigling us, but he is not very skillful about it.'

"I do not remember how many preceded me. When I entered the room I found the Lieutenant Colonel alone. He was sitting at a desk with a pencil in his hand and an open notebook before him. To his offer to sit down, I introduced myself and took a seat. I was curious as to how he would begin and tried to be completely calm and collected..."

"... The Lieutenant Colonel began: 'I have come as the representative of the General Staff of the Red Army. I have been authorized to speak with the Yugoslav officers on their studying and living conditions...'

(*) A certain number of members of the Yugoslav Army were studying in military schools and academies in the Soviet Union. Organs of the Soviet intelligence service endeavoured to establish their network among the Yugoslav officers. In order to succeed in this intention, the Soviet intelligence officers often resorted to deluding the Yugoslav officers, telling them that work for the Soviet intelligence service was approved by Yugoslav military representatives in Moscow. Some Yugoslav officers consented to cooperation, but immediately upon leaving school declared that, therewith they considered they had finished their work for the Soviet intelligence service. In such cases, the organs of the Soviet intelligence service endeavoured to convince them that they should continue to work, telling them that one day someone would approach them for further work for the Soviet intelligence service in Yugoslavia or somewhere else.

"He asked me: 'Do you know the present situation in the Yugoslav Army?'

" 'How can I answer you?' I said. 'I have been away from the Army for some time. I presume that our Army learned a great deal during the final war operations. The results of those operations are the best testimony to this. Advisers from the Red Army are also over there and their presence is certainly being utilized by our comrades.'

"He went on then: 'You have been away from Yugoslavia for a long time. You are not familiar with the situation in your Army. There are leaders in your Army, high leaders — almost the highest — who have begun to say that your Army should have its own military science...' (I cannot recall exactly, but it was something about leaders who wanted to create something special, to avail themselves of the experience of the Red Army and of the experience of the English and Americans and of others, too, but to lean more towards the English and Americans.) At that moment I felt uncomfortable and tried to imagine who it could have been. It occurred to me that a number of officers who had returned from exile might have been admitted to the Army, or that some of the former officers were up to their old tricks again. Nevertheless I composed myself quickly and replied: 'I doubt that they are important people.'

" 'They are important people, and we know it.' He added something else here but I no longer remember what. The point was that perhaps the enemy was at work in this case, too. I know that I replied to this: 'If there are any such cases, they are individual ones. Our Party is so pure and so strong that it will overcome all obstacles which might stand in the way of the development of our Army and our country.'

"From the rest of the conversation, it appeared that he was warning me that there could be enemies in the Party as well.

"I replied to this: 'If there should be any they would soon be annihilated.'

"After this he began to say that we were officers, that we could talk as officers, and here we were talking as communists; that we should have ties with one another because there would be questions which we would settle together, etc. (I do not recall everything).

"I replied: 'I cannot separate myself as an officer from myself as a communist, and it is only natural that communists speak as communists among themselves.'

" 'Yes, yes' — he began — 'but there are questions which concern only us officers. There are things which might put you in a dilemma when you leave for Yugoslavia, and it would perhaps be necessary to explain them to you. You will in any case write to the Academy if you require any explanation of some theoretical question, and even our General Staff could explain things to you.'

" 'Of course, but I think we shall be able to ask the advisers for explanations, and if there is something of greater importance, then our General Staff will have to deal with it.'

" 'But, at times, the best way to get an explanation is to do it personally.'

"I think it would be unnecessary and inappropriate to write without the knowledge of the Party and General Staff. If a question is brought up, then both our General Staff and our Party should be informed."

"That is how our talk ended."

"We said goodbye without shaking hands and he asked me to call in the next person..."

Major General
(Sgd.) Gajo Vojvodić

NIŠ, April 10, 1948.

DOCUMENT No 211

FROM THE STATEMENT MADE BY MAJOR GENERAL ANTE BANINA
TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY ON THE INVEIGLING OF YUGOSLAV OFFICERS ATTENDING THE SOVIET VOROSHILOV
MILITARY ACADEMY INTO THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

"...After having completed the curriculum in the Voroshilov Academy in September 1945, and several days before leaving for home, we were informed by our instructor, Colonel Rypachenko, that a General Staff officer wanted to talk to us. He did not inform us of the subject of the talk, but only fixed the time when we were to be assembled in the Academy to await that particular officer. This officer did not keep the original appointment, which was postponed a day or two, I think..."

"... In front of the lecture room, I found several of our comrades waiting to go in. I think I was seventh or eighth in line. When I entered the lecture room, I found a Lieutenant Colonel there who introduced himself as being from the General Staff, but I do not recall his name. The first thing he did was to ask me my name. After that he continued with a brief introduction in which, as far as I remember, he said something to the effect that he had come from the General Staff to talk with us about how we had felt in the Academy and in the Soviet Union, about our observations on the curriculum, the methods of work in the Academy, and about life there in general..."

"As we talked on he continued by saying that they wanted us to let them know our opinion after we returned home because in our military units we would be applying what we had learned in school, and then we could see best what should be changed and what should be added to the new programme. Would I personally write to them in the General Staff or to the Academy as to how useful the school had been to me, and what difficulties I met with in my unit, because on the basis of these observations they would be able to correct the curriculum? On the other hand, the school would help to increase my knowledge, that is, it would give me explanations on various perplexing questions.

"I replied that I considered I would not be able to offer any observations of consequence, and that this would be unnecessary because they had direct contact with our General Staff and advisers in our Army, and their opinions would be more concrete and competent.

"He said that regardless of this contact they would like us to address ourselves freely to them or to the Academy, and to give our opinions or ask for explanations. He said they followed the same practice with their own officers who, after their return to their units, kept in touch with the Academy and offer their opinions on the school curriculum, or request explanations on various unclarified matters.

"I replied that I considered this could not be done in our case because we were in another country, and that it was virtually impossible for us to correspond with them because we had our General Staff which has continuous contact with them.

"He continued by saying that it was possible, and that it was necessary in view of the fact that we had finished school in their country. He said that the possibility existed of there being cases in which we would differ in opinion with some other officer who had not been to school in their country. I then said that they had their advisers who would advance explanations on all questions which were not clear, in so far as there would be any such case. After that he continued to convince me that it would nevertheless be necessary and useful to establish such contact between myself and them or the Academy, upon returning home.

"He went on to say he had been in Yugoslavia in some of our units as well, but he did not specify where, although I tried to learn in which ones he had been. He said that he had returned from Beograd a short while ago and that Yugoslavia was beautiful, that the situation was good. And yet in the end he underlined that there were cases in lower headquarters where their advisers differed on some instructional matters with some of our officers. They presumed that we, too, might come into such a situation in view of the fact that we had finished their Academy, i. e. that we might differ on some matters and that such contact would be necessary. I replied it was hard to believe there were any such cases, but if there should be or if there were any, they were isolated cases of no special consequence..."

"... During our talk, he jotted down notes in his book and I got the impression that he had made such notes in his talks with the previous comrades..."

April 11, 1948.

Major General
(Sgd.) Ante Banina

DOCUMENT No. 222

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY VELJKO STEFANOVIĆ, FORMER LIEUTENANT COLONEL OF THE NATIONAL MILITIA OF YUGOSLAVIA, DURING HIS TRIAL BEFORE THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL IN BEOGRAD ON JUNE 13, 1950, ON THE TASKS WHICH THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAD ASSIGNED TO HIM

"I was in Moscow in 1946, and before leaving for Yugoslavia I was summoned by the Soviet Colonel Medvedev^(*) for a brief conversation

(*) Medvedev, Colonel in the Soviet Army, head of the school in the USSR where officers of the National Militia of Yugoslavia were studying.

in his office. This is what went on in the office: he observed that we would shortly be going home, that they had endeavoured to offer us everything they could, that they had confided many things to us about their work and that he thought we would know how to appreciate this. I was at a loss as to what it was all about..."

"Earlier, he had said that the Soviet intelligence service was very capable in its work and we only spoke about what we had learned at school. But then he said that the Soviet intelligence service could not achieve its objective without the aid of various people and that the Soviet intelligence service was an organ not only of the Soviet authorities but of all peoples and that it should be assisted by all communists..."

"After that he was frank and said to me: 'Do you love the Soviet Union?' They knew my attitude towards the Soviet Union, they knew it because I demonstrated it everywhere and I talked with their people everywhere. Before he began to inveigle me, I had a talk with him and he told me that we were the first foreigners to come to the school and that they had to keep an eye on us in every respect. That was a talk about security measures in regard to the study where we worked, to the effect that the books should not be taken out of the study. I said that I would see to it that the books were not taken out of the study. On another occasion he told me that there were communists who refused to work for the Soviet intelligence service, and repeated that the Soviet intelligence service, by working in foreign countries was, as he had said, working for such countries, too. I listened to this and later he told me he hoped I would not refuse such cooperation because of my conviction that aiding the Soviet intelligence service would mean aiding the international proletariat. After that, he dictated a pledge to me which I signed saying that I would work for their intelligence service. There I saw a list of our men and he asked me whether they loved the Soviet Union, and I said that all our people love the Soviet Union and gave him my opinion of these persons, according to my own observations..."

"...The first contact man in Yugoslavia got in touch with me towards the end of October 1947. As I was going along the street, I saw two persons who looked like Russians. They nodded. Afterwards I went home. From home I went to Kalemegdan^(*) and noticed that one of them was following me. I sat on a bench in Kalemegdan and one of these persons sat next to me and asked permission to sit down. I assented and he started talking business right away, asking whether I was Stefanović — 'Petar.'^(*) I saw that he knew my alias, and he told me to be calm. Then he repeated the whole conversation I had had with Colonel Medvedev. This contact again repeated the description of the role of the Soviet intelligence service, which Medvedev had also given me. I was a bit undecided at first. I did not ask for his identity papers because circumstances were such that I was completely convinced he was my contact..."

"... After that he told me that he would find me in the same way he had this time, but he did not tell me his name. However, I saw the

(*) Kalemegdan — a park in Beograd at the confluence of the Sava and the Danube Rivers.

(*) The alias "Petar" was given to Stefanović by Colonel Medvedev while inveigling him in Moscow.

name 'Lyevashov' in his notebook. Afterwards he requested me to submit a report on the work of the Party organization,^(*) viz. how many meetings were held monthly, on discipline in connection with the meetings, on criticism and self-criticism, on who drafted the agenda and how; namely, a report which would reveal everyday Party life. Furthermore, whether the people came to the meetings regularly or late. He wanted a faithful report, without too many details, which would give a true picture of the life of a Party organization. He told me to get down to work immediately, to prepare the report, and to give it to him when he asked me for it. He especially told me he was interested and would continue to be interested in the life in our Party ..."

"... The second time I met my contact in the same way as the first, at Kalemegdan, and I talked to him about the report, which I gave him. On this occasion he told me to continue to follow the work of the Party. He also said I should give him a report on the subjects studied at courses and correspondence schools, because I was in a correspondence school. I drew up the report and gave it to him in February 1948. I gave him the next report in April 1948. In this report, too, there was reference to the efforts being made in our Party to increase discipline and democracy in the Party, and to have the communists in the institutions work more in the People's Front. After this he told me to continue to follow the life and work of the Party organizations and said that the reports should be different, more detailed... We had our next meeting in June 1948, before the publication of the Resolution. We met in Dušanova Street, walked a while and then sat down and talked ..."

"... For the June meeting I did not have time to prepare a report owing to examinations, and then my contact asked what I thought of Zujović and Hebrang. I said I condemned them, that this was correct, and that they themselves had acted the same way toward their own traitors. He smiled at this and said that this was not so because the explanation was not correct, and that things had not been going well of late in our Central Committee, that Hebrang and Zujović were opposed to the Central Committee's line and that the Soviet Union was on their side... To this he added — 'I assure you that Zujović and Hebrang are right, that the Soviet Union is on their side and that there is no need to discuss it.' He said that the conflict would be settled soon. He told me that it was important for me to see how people would comment on this and what stand they would take up in the matter ..."

"... At the June meeting he said that Marko Pucina^(*) was also an agent and told me his alias was 'Vorobyev.' I knew Pucina. At this meeting I noticed that my earlier relations with them were beginning to be abused, but I did not dare oppose them and kept silent. This was because the relationship was beginning to be official and strict. Earlier, while in Moscow, I had already begun to think of these circumstances and feared vengeance if I stopped working with them. I knew how they worked and did not dare resist them. He told me to watch everyone's attitude, especially those people who had been in the Soviet Union ..."

(*) The Communist Party organization in the Administration of the National Militia of Yugoslavia.

(*) Marko Pucina — a former captain in the National Militia, an agent of the Soviet intelligence service.

"... I got in touch with Marko Pucina and talked with him about my contact. When I told him I knew his alias, he got the point. We then talked about the situation which had arisen. He asked me what he was to do, and I told him to work along the lines of the Cominform Resolution as broadly as possible. As to what he was to do concretely, he would be told later... That is what we talked about in his office... That was towards the end of July or early in August, 1948..."

"... Early in September 1948, I submitted a report to my contact. We met and walked about Kalemegdan in the afternoon. My contact immediately asked me whether I had seen the Resolution and the letters and what I thought of the whole thing. I told him the same thing that I had said about Hebrang and Žujović, that the Party membership did not approve this, and asked why the Soviet Union had acted in such a way. To this, he rejoined very sharply that it was not for me to criticize the Soviet Union, that there were men who were responsible for that policy and that I was only to carry out orders. I told him that in future we would have to collaborate in a different way. He replied that I would have to work in the same way and that they had ways to force me to do so. After that all sorts of thoughts came to my mind — that they intended either to report me or to kill me. He wanted to be sure how things stood with me, and said that I had told him at our meetings about the organizational structure of the National Militia, that I had told him there were General Administrations and District Administrations. After that he said that I should write a report about the numerical strength of the National Militia in the country, on the social composition of the same, on military and Party conditions, on the Militia's armaments, on the special battalion,⁽¹⁾ on relations between the State Security Administration and the Militia, on discipline in the National Militia, on the behaviour of individuals after the Cominform Resolution, on the organizational structure of the Federal General Administration of the National Militia and the republican Administrations of the National Militia..."

"... When I submitted the first report, he asked who the leaders along State lines were, and I gave him the names of Božanić, Petričević and Pejović..."

"... From March onward, my contact was very insistent in his orders that I talk with people and create trios of men. He said that such trios were to spread hostile propaganda and agitate along Cominform lines, with the aim of overthrowing the system, that it was necessary to create the feeling among the masses that the Cominform line would triumph, to give publicity to the Moscow radio news and the Cominform radio stations. The prospect was that the members of these groups were to set up new groups, etc. My contact instructed me on how to behave in case of arrest and told me not to fear it. If I were arrested I was not to confess that I had worked for the intelligence service, but that I had worked along Cominform lines. I was to defend the Soviet Union everywhere, to behave in court as befits men who work for the USSR, and to say that the Soviet Union was right. I was not to complain in court if they sentenced me and was to behave as he said. I told him

(1) The Special Battalion — a battalion on duty in Federal Institutions and foreign missions in Beograd.

that I had got in touch with some men and my contact said I was to create groups in any way I knew..."

"... In April my contact told me to endeavour to create groups, and I replied that I was doing so. I must mention that my contact told me I had to work for them, to behave as I ought to, and that, if necessary, they would send me abroad."

(Quoted from the Court Record of the trial held before the Military Tribunal in Beograd, June 13, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 223

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY JOŽE SLOVENAC BEFORE THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL IN BEOGRAD JUNE 13, 1950, AS TO HOW HE WAS DRAWN INTO THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

"It is true that I entered the Soviet intelligence service in September 1946, while I was in Moscow. It was one afternoon, in the school courtyard, when Yephimenko, a lieutenant colonel, came up to me and said he wanted to talk to me about a school subject, so we went to a small house near the school. He talked to me about the USSR, about the intelligence service, about the love of all foreign nations for the USSR, and asked whether I would enter their intelligence service, since it was organized in all countries, and inform them of conditions in our country. I consented to this. He told me to send him information as soon as I got home. I was given the name 'Riko.' I returned to our country and established contacts in the way he had advised me, because before leaving the USSR for Yugoslavia I again met with Yephimenko, who told me that I would meet someone with whom I would talk in Beograd near the 'Albanija'.^(*) I also gave Lieutenant Colonel Yephimenko a written pledge, which had already been prepared; I read and signed it. Upon arriving in our country, I got in touch with my contact. He introduced himself as Vasya. That was in October 1946..."

"... My contact asked how we had travelled, and I said I was going on my vacation. We agreed to meet again in front of the 'Albanija.' At the first meeting, I was given a concrete assignment, — to inform him of conditions in the Militia, on the distribution of the Militia. I told him I had been assigned to the Administration of the National Militia in Skoplje. He did not say anything to this. At the second meeting he gave me the same assignment. In January 1947, I submitted a report to my contact on the distribution of the officers of the National Militia, on the numerical strength of the Militia, on its national and social composition, on the method of supply of the National Militia, on its leaders. All this referred to the National Militia in Skoplje. The report covered a type-written sheet. I had typed it personally. After that I met my contact five or six times and we talked about the same matter, going into detail on some questions. Not once did he state that the reports were incorrect.

(*) Albanija, an office building in the centre of Beograd.

In September 1948, I was transferred to the General Administration of the National Militia for Yugoslavia...

"... In August 1948, while I was in Skoplje, the Soviet intelligence service gave me the assignment to form enemy groups, composed of inimically inclined people from the ranks of the National Militia, with the task of spreading hostile propaganda against the FPRY on behalf of the USSR. To this end, I talked with Jože Pavel, Miloš Strbac, Stojko Jakovljević and Slavko Počkar. I talked with them because I presumed that they were hostilely inclined and dissatisfied..."

(Quoted from the Court Record of the trial held before the Military Tribunal in Beograd, June 13, 1950.)

SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHE IN BEOGRAD AND HIS ASSISTANTS ORGANIZE GROUPS OF TRAITORS AND AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE YUGOSLAV ARMY

DOCUMENT No. 24

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY, VASKO KARANGELOVSKI, BEFORE THE COMPETENT MILITARY AUTHORITIES ON AUGUST 29, 1949, ON THE ESPIONAGE ASSIGNMENTS GIVEN HIM BY THE ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD, COLONEL ZENKOVICH(*)

"... The assignment which I received from the organs of the Soviet Intelligence Service consisted of maintaining contact with the Soviet representatives after returning to Yugoslavia unbeknown to the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army. In giving me these assignments, the Soviet intelligence officers always linked them with the pending examinations at the Academy so as to impress me psychologically and thus get my consent. The Soviet intelligence service informed me that a certain Soviet lieutenant colonel would be coming to Yugoslavia who would find me and help me if I had any difficulties in my work.^(*) When given these assignments, I was told not to say anything about them to anyone, and especially not to the organs of the Yugoslav State security..."

"... One day⁽¹¹⁾ a man came to me and introduced himself as the Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Beograd. This man informed me that a good comrade and friend of mine had come from Moscow, that he had brought me some valuable things and that he wanted to see me as soon as possible. Since I requested that the things be brought to me

(*) Lieutenant Colonel Karangelovski was studying in the Voroshilov Military Academy in the USSR.

(10) The reference is to the work of the Soviet intelligence service.

(11) This was at the beginning of 1949.

where I was working, he replied that this was very inconvenient and insisted that the meeting be held in my apartment at all costs..."

"That same day, in the evening, Soviet Colonel Zenkovich, from the office of the Military Attaché in Beograd, came to the meeting in my flat. He was in civilian clothes. Actually, it turned out he was no friend of mine because I had never seen him before. He also had not brought me any parcel. He only brought me a gramophone record of the voice of a woman I had been interested in in the USSR..."

"... After an hour, during which he talked while I listened, he started getting to the point. He asked me whether I had been on a certain estate with a lieutenant colonel, while I was in Moscow in 1945. I replied in the negative, since I had not, and then he asked me whether I had gone with him to the Bolshoi Theatre. As I replied vaguely to this question, he said I should think about the matter and that we would meet again in a month's time in my flat. The Russian Colonel came to this meeting right on the dot. He requested me not to come out against the policy of the Yugoslav Government under any conditions and emphasized that the most important thing he wanted from me was information on conditions in the Yugoslav Army. To use his own words: he simply wanted to squeeze information out of me about the Yugoslav Army..."⁽¹²⁾

(Quoted from the records of the military authorities of August 29, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 223

FROM THE TESTIMONY MADE BY YUGOSLAV ARMY MAJOR, MILAN ZIVKOVIĆ, BEFORE THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN BEOGRAD, MAY 5, 1949, ON INTELLIGENCE ASSIGNMENTS GIVEN HIM BY THE ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD, LIEUTENANT COLONEL KILDISHEV

"... Kildishev gave me the job of finding out what work General Rade Hamović was doing, and who was the present commander of the Guard;⁽¹³⁾

"How many officers were there who had been demobilized because of the Cominform Resolution, and their names;

"The moral-political situation among the officers and men in connection with the Cominform Resolution;

"The difference between the earlier situation and the present one;

"My opinion on the situation in connection with the Cominform Resolution."

(Quoted from the records of the preliminary investigation on May 5, 1949.)

⁽¹²⁾ In its Note No. 420006 of November 4, 1949, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY informed the Soviet Embassy in Beograd that it considered it impossible for Ivan Iosifovich Zenkovich, Soviet Assistant Military Attaché in Beograd, to remain in Yugoslavia, because he was engaged in espionage and subversive activities against Yugoslavia.

⁽¹³⁾ The Yugoslav Army Guard Units.

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY DEFENDANT BRANKO PETRIČEVIĆ, FORMER MAJOR GENERAL OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY, DURING HIS TRIAL BEFORE THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL IN BEOGRAD, JUNE 1, 1950, ON HIS ESPIONAGE CONNECTIONS WITH THE MILITARY ATTACHE OF THE USSR IN BEOGRAD, MAJOR GENERAL G. S. SIDOROVICH⁽¹⁴⁾

Presiding Judge: "Did defendant Dapčević inform you that he had met General Sidorovich? And how they met?"

Defendant Branko Petričević: "He told me that Kolobanov had taken him by car to the Soviet Embassy and that he met Major General Sidorovich there."

"What did they talk about at the meeting?"

⁽¹⁴⁾ Former Yugoslav Army Major General Branko Petričević and former Yugoslav Army Colonel Vladimir Dapčević were tried before the Military Tribunal in Beograd from June 1—4, 1950.

The defendants Petričević and Dapčević had established contact with the Soviet Military Attaché in Beograd, Major General Gheorghiy Stefanovich Sidorovich. The defendant Dapčević got in touch with Major General Sidorovich through Soviet Assistant Military Attaché, Major Ivan Vasilievich Kolobanov, whom he met for the first time on July 14, 1948. The defendant Dapčević met Major Kolobanov eight times and Major General Sidorovich five times in the Soviet Embassy in Beograd. At these meetings, Dapčević received directives for his work from Major General Sidorovich and submitted reports to him.

Having established contact with Major General Sidorovich, the defendants Petričević and Dapčević gave him information relating to the armed forces and the defensive capacities of the FPRY. At the fourth meeting, held on August 1, 1948, Major General Sidorovich asked the defendant Dapčević for information as to whether there had been a movement of Yugoslav Army units towards the Albanian border. Through Dapčević, Petričević informed Major General Sidorovich that there had been no Yugoslav Army movements in that direction. At the meeting of August 7, 1948, General Sidorovich gave the defendants the task of investigating the state of the roads in Yugoslavia and of informing him of the same.

Apart from this military intelligence information, General Sidorovich asked the defendants for data on the stand of the highest Yugoslav Army leaders on the question of the aggressive campaign by the Soviet Government against Yugoslavia. The defendant Dapčević gave General Sidorovich information about this.

Having arrived at the conclusion that it would be impossible for them to accomplish the aims set for them in Yugoslavia because, despite their endeavours, they had been left completely isolated, the defendants decided to continue their traitorous and anti-popular activities outside the country, from abroad. On the directives, and under the guidance of General Sidorovich, they were working on getting a group of traitors ready to be smuggled abroad and on the formation of an underground centre within the country for struggle against the existing order in Yugoslavia. After the defendants had gotten in touch with former Colonel General of the Yugoslav Army, Arso Jovanović, all three of them, armed, tried to flee from Yugoslavia to Rumania in the night between August 11 and 12, 1948, when Arso Jovanović was killed in the attempt. The defendants Petričević and Dapčević hid and wandered around in the vicinity until dawn. The defendant Petričević was caught by the security forces while the defendant Dapčević returned to Beograd where he hid out until August 31, 1948. Upon arriving in Beograd, Dapčević again got in touch with the Soviet Assistant Military Attaché in Beograd, Major Kolobanov, with whom he met in the apartment of the Assistant Soviet Military Attaché in Beograd, Major Kildishev. With the help of these Soviet representatives in Beograd, who supplied him with an army map and gave him 10,000 dinars in cash, Dapčević again attempted to flee the country. On September 2, 1948, he was caught on the Yugoslav—Hungarian frontier by the Yugoslav border organs.

"As Vlado Dapčević told me, Vlado explained to him that there were comrades who did not agree with the stand of the Central Committee of the CPY."

"To what comrades was he concretely referring who did not agree with the stand of the Central Committee of the CPY?"

"He mentioned us two, that is, he told General Sidorovich that he had come in his own name and mine. On that occasion, Vlado Dapčević told him that we two did not agree with the stand of the Central Committee of the CPY."

"What did Sidorovich say to this?"

"I do not know exactly what he said. I only know that Sidorovich said that he personally thought that attitude was a correct one, as far as he was concerned at least, but as regards our further work, especially in connection with the coming Fifth Congress of the CPY, he had to ask the CC of the CPSU(B)..."

Judge-Assessor: "Did you discuss with defendant Dapčević the possibility of armed intervention against Yugoslavia? Please give me a concrete answer."

"I talked about this, saying that in case of war with the imperialist countries, the Soviet Union would occupy us."

"According to the records you said that during one of your conversations you discussed the point that the CC of the CPSU(B) would see this thing through to the end and would not yield. You also spoke about the possibility of armed intervention by the Soviet Union. In one of your talks, according to the records, you said, literally, that there was possibility of armed intervention by the Soviet Union. Is that so?"

"It is."

Presiding Judge: "Was there talk at this second meeting about what proposals should be made to Sidorovich?"

"Yes."

"What did you intend to talk about?"

"We thought that we should come out into the open together with other people of the same opinion, whom we would get in touch with through General Sidorovich. I know that Sidorovich told Vlado Dapčević at another meeting in the Soviet Embassy that the CC of the CPSU(B) considered our attitude a correct one and that we should present our views at the Fifth Congress of the CPY."

"What did Dapčević say to this?"

"He told Sidorovich that we should be put in touch with those sharing our opinion, so that we could come out together with them at the Congress, and that he should enable us to meet them."

"What did defendant Dapčević say about this?"

"We talked after that and I told Dapčević that Božo Ljumović had criticized himself and his stand before the General Committee?"

"That does not interest us. What interests us is the attitude of defendant Dapčević."

"In connection with speaking out at the Congress, Vlado asked me when we were parting what I thought, whether I would come out into

the open. I knew that he was supposed to see General Sidorovich that evening. I told him I would not. He said to me: 'I shall come out only if the Russians tell me to do so, even if I have to stand alone.'

Military Prosecutor: "What kind of information did Vlado Dapčević seek immediately before the Congress?"

"Dapčević was interested in knowing how the Congress would develop."

"Why did he need to know this?"

"He said that the Russians had asked about it several times."

"Did you give him any information?"

"I did."

Military Prosecutor: "On July 20, 1948, after Vlado returned from his third meeting with General Sidorovich, where did you and Vlado meet?"

"In the billiard-room of the Central Club of the Yugoslav Army."

"Why there?"

"The delegates to the Fifth Congress from the entire Army were in the Central Club for supper, and we wanted to be alone."

"That means you were hiding from the delegates. About how many such delegates were there?"

"About four hundred."

"And how many of them were there who shared your views?"

The defendant Petričević was silent.

"How did you feel in such a situation? You had to hide like traitors from the other delegates. Was it a pleasant feeling? How did you look upon yourselves?"

"I cannot answer the question. I do not know how to answer."

"Why can't you? Several hundred delegates of one mind and you alone among them. You did not want to stay in the billiard-room more than twenty minutes 'lest it attract attention.' You were hiding from people. Did Dapčević tell you then what Sidorovich's decision was?"

"He told me briefly that General Sidorovich agreed with our opinion."

"Did defendant Dapčević tell you that he had suggested to General Sidorovich that they should not meet in the Soviet Embassy?"

"He told me he had suggested finding a more favourable place for meeting, lest they be discovered and caught."

"Was this during the first or second day when you noticed you were alone?"

"I do not remember."

"What was General Sidorovich's reply to Dapčević?"

"He cautioned us to be careful lest we get arrested. He further told him not to be afraid to go to the Soviet Embassy, because the Soviet Union does not forget its friends."

"These underground ones! But you did not talk about those friends who gave a million seven hundred thousand lives in the common struggle against the common enemy?"

Judge Assessor: "Where did you get the idea that he was asking what else you should do? Before the Congress you did not speak about whether you should flee abroad or issue a proclamation. After the Congress you discussed what else to do. What was the decisive factor that put you in the position of asking yourselves: What now? Had you found support anywhere for your activities?"

"The Congress was the decisive factor. Because we saw we had no followers at the Congress, I proposed to Vlado that we should make our way to the Soviet Union and declare from there that we did not agree with the stand of the Central Committee of the CPY, and that we should acquaint Major General Sidorovich with this."

Presiding Judge: "And you acquainted General Sidorovich with this?"
"Yes."

"We are interested in knowing what information Sidorovich requested of Dapčević at the last, the fifth meeting?"

"He asked for information on the state of roads in Yugoslavia which run to Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria."

Military Prosecutor: "Did you discuss the Congress? You talked about being left alone and that new methods of work had to be found. Did you discuss the course of the Congress with Dapčević?"

"I did."

"How did you understand General Sidorovich when he said that one group should make its way abroad, and the other should remain in the country. What kind of a group was the second supposed to be?"

"An underground group."

"Who was to have found the men for that group, how did you understand that?"

"According to what Vlado had told me, I understood that we were to make our way to the Soviet Union, and that we were to see about the other group later. I understood there was a possibility of our getting out. Dapčević told me one group should remain in the country."

"Who was to have found the people for this group?"

"I was not informed as to whether we were to do so or if Sidorovich had already found some men. Dapčević only told me that one group had to stay in the country."

(Quoted from the Court records of the trial before the Military Tribunal in Beograd, June 1, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 227

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY VLADIMIR DAPČEVIĆ, FORMER YUGOSLAV ARMY COLONEL BEFORE THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL IN BEOGRAD, JUNE 2, 1950, ON HIS ESPIONAGE CONNECTIONS WITH THE USSR MILITARY ATTACHE IN BEOGRAD, MAJOR GENERAL SIDOROVICH

Presiding Judge: "Did you ask the Military Attaché of the USSR whether you would meet again?"

"He told me that if someone were to get in touch with them in connection with our intention to come out at the Party Congress, he would

let me know. He did not make an appointment with me, but he did say that Major Kolobanov would do so."

"What followed then?"

"I left in Major Kolobanov's car. I left the car at Čubura. In the automobile we arranged to meet three days later, that is, on July 17, 1948, or rather, I think we agreed to meet two to three days later. I do not recall the exact date. We were to meet again in front of the French Embassy."

Military Prosecutor: "This means that you, defendant Dapčević, decided to establish direct contact — with whom?"

"We were endeavouring to establish direct contact with the Soviet Embassy."

"Secretly or openly?"

"Secretly, of course."

Presiding Judge: "When did you have your second meeting with General Sidorovich?"

"I do not remember the date. I only know that at the second meeting I again moved this question. In the main, the character of the meetings, the way they were held, was the same. The meetings were private and secret, and we endeavoured to keep them so."

"When you came to the Embassy, where did you find General Sidorovich?"

"In the same room as the first time."

"What did you ask him?"

"I asked him about the matter for which I had come to the first meeting, that is whether anyone had gotten in touch with him. He said that no one had. This time I told him that in that case we would probably change our attitude respecting our stand at the Fifth Congress."

"Where did you go from there and how?"

"I went towards my flat. Major Kolobanov took me in his car."

"Did you make arrangements with the Soviet Military Attaché for a new meeting?"

"We agreed to meet on the eve of the Congress. I thought he was still being secretive towards me and that for reasons unknown to me he was procrastinating about a reply to all the questions which interested me."

"Did he warn you of the possibility of your being arrested?"

"No, he did not say anything about that. I personally considered that I would be arrested if discovered. General Sidorovich thought that I was afraid and said: 'The Soviet Union does not forget its friends'."

"Did he request you to inform him of anything?"

"We arranged to meet in five or six days."

"Were you to have informed him of anything then?"

"Of course, about feelings at the Congress."

"And did you?"

"Of course."

"Was General Sidorovich interested in knowing what our leaders intended to do?"

"Yes."

"Did he give you any assignment and request concrete data from you about any troops?"

"Yes. He asked me whether it was true that there were troop movements in the direction of Albania."

"Where did you meet on August 7?"

"At the Embassy."

"Where did you meet Major Kolobanov?"

"I met Kolobanov at the prearranged place and we went to the meeting."

"What did you propose to Sidorovich?"

"I proposed that we go to the USSR and be given the possibility of expressing our views over there."

"Why did you want to go there?"

"Because we considered that there was no possibility of our expressing our views in the country, and there were no opportunities at all for organized underground work, I mean, for the creation of an underground organization."

"Did you suggest to him who should go?"

"There was no definite proposal. I presumed that Petričević, myself and maybe Božo Ljumović would probably go. I told him that I had not talked with Ljumović about that, but that we would find the possibility."

"What did he say to that?"

"He said that he personally agreed and that he thought the CC of the CPSU(B) would probably also agree, that I was to come to the next meeting together with General Petričević and tell him concretely who would come into consideration for going to the USSR. He said that he would at the same time tell us the opinion of the CC of the CPSU(B). He also said that someone would have to remain in the country."

"Did he request any information from you at this particular meeting and did he give you any assignments?"

"When I talked to him about the question of going abroad, he asked us: 'Do you know the roads in Yugoslavia?'"

"Did you talk about this with the co-defendant Petričević?"

"Yes. He understood this as being an espionage assignment, and said they wanted to make spies out of us."

(Quoted from the records of the trial before the Military Tribunal in Beograd, June 2, 1950.)

TESTIMONY BY WITNESS VLADIMIR KOVAČEVIĆ, A MILITIAMAN, BEFORE THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL IN BEOGRAD ON JUNE 3, 1950, ON THE DEATH OF ARSO JOVANOVIĆ ON THE YUGOSLAV-RUMANIAN FRONTIER⁽¹⁵⁾

"It was pitch dark. I was at my post when I noticed some persons passing in front of me. I saw a white uniform. Rising, I heard one of them say: 'Something is moving.' I called out: 'Halt.' They said nothing but fired two shots. I fired first one and then another shot, and heard one of them saying that someone had already been killed. When I heard that, I fired a third and then a fourth shot, and the fifth jammed. I then withdrew in the direction of the village of Sočice to find my commander, Comrade Knežević. I found him at dawn and reported: 'Comrade Sergeant, I killed someone; I don't know who it is.' With rifles at the ready we went to see whom I had killed. We first found a white cap and then the corpses. That is how it was."

Presiding Judge: "Why did you shoot?"

"Because they shot at me first while I was at my post."⁽¹⁶⁾

(Quoted from the records of the Military Tribunal in Beograd, June 3, 1950.)

⁽¹⁵⁾ At the trial, the defendants Petričević and Dapčević described their unsuccessful attempt to escape in the company of Arso Jovanović. The defendant Dapčević informed the defendant Petričević that he had talked with Major General Sidorovich and had informed him of the decision to flee. Petričević learned from Dapčević about the intention of Arso Jovanović to escape from the country. All three of them left Beograd on August 11, 1948, at 3 p. m., in Arso Jovanović's car. In the small town of Bela Crkva, they failed to find Arso Jovanović's cousin, whom they had expected to help them cross the border. In the village of Sočice, they went to the State Farm there and twacked the manager, Svetolik Rabljac, who was to have shown them the way across the frontier. They had deceived him by telling him they were hunting wild boar. However, near the border they were noticed by Militiaman Kovačević, who thought they were horse thieves smuggling horses over the border. When they fired two shots from a revolver in the dark at Militiaman Kovačević, he opened fire with his rifle and killed Arso Jovanović and his guide on the spot.

In examining the evidence, the court cross-examined many witnesses, including Arso Jovanović's chauffeur who had driven the defendants to the border, the wife of the State Farm manager, the peasant who had given the fleeing men a ride in his cart, the militiaman who prevented the defendants from smuggling themselves across the border the first time, and the experts who had established the facts of the case on the spot where the killing took place.

⁽¹⁶⁾ During the trial it was established that the deceased Arso Jovanović was the first to shoot, firing two bullets from his pistol.

DIPLOMATIC, CONSULAR AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF THE USSR IN YUGOSLAVIA ORGANIZE AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

DOCUMENT No. 229

STATEMENT BY DUŠANKA PEROVIĆ TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA ON THE ATTEMPT BY SOVIET ARMY COLONEL, IVAN STEPANOV, TO INVEIGLE HER INTO THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE⁽¹⁷⁾

In the autumn of 1945, while leaving the cinema, I met two Russian officers whom I had known earlier — Lieutenant Colonel Grigoriy Haritonenko and Colonel Ivan Stepanov. After an exchange of greetings, they invited me to join them, to meet somewhere, etc. I thought it was mere politeness on their part. I told them I could not come because I was too busy, but Stepanov insisted on talking and finally he said that by all means we should meet, because there was something that we should talk about. He gave me his telephone number and asked me to call him when I had time. In a day or two I did 'phone. He asked if I could come to his house if it were not inconvenient, and if I could not, to fix the time and place where we could meet. I went to his flat in Resavska Street where we were alone. After a long talk about our common Russian acquaintances in Beograd, Yugoslavia, etc., he said they considered me one of their own people; that, regardless of the fact that I no longer worked with their mission, I was still one of them, and that he counted on me and on my possibly cooperating with him if it should be necessary. During the talk it turned out he knew where I was employed.⁽¹⁸⁾ He said that he would occasionally 'phone me to fix an appointment so that I might give him information about some things in our country and abroad which interested him and which, in view of my job, I would know. He guaranteed absolute discretion and before he got down to the point he asked me to promise and to give my word of honour that I would not tell anyone about it. When he asked for my opinion and answer, I asked him if he, as a communist, thought that it would be possible for me to agree to his proposal without informing our elder comrades, concretely Comrade Marko.⁽¹⁹⁾ He replied that I was a very good communist and that from the narrower party point of view I was right, but that in this case I had to look at things more broadly and bear in mind the higher goal and greater service which I would be contributing to our common cause. He mentioned many well-known examples of treason in the Bolshevik Party and drew the conclusion that the enemy could be found even in the

⁽¹⁷⁾ See Document No. 13.

⁽¹⁸⁾ Dušanka Perović was then an employee in the Central Department for Coding and Decoding of the State Security of the FPRY.

⁽¹⁹⁾ Marko-Aleksandar Ranković, then Organizational Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, now Vice-Premier of the Yugoslav Government, Yugoslav Minister of the Interior and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

highest leadership, that one could never be completely sure and that, in such a case, it would be better to choose the higher and better tested organization, in this instance, to choose service to the Soviet Union. If I were to agree, and asked the highest Party leaders, for instance Comrade Dimitrov, they would praise my act. I told him I did not think our responsible comrades would refuse to help them in their work and that it would be best if he were to request the approval of Comrade Marko in such matters. In that event I would be able to cooperate with him quite calmly. Then, and during the entire conversation, he spoke about our top leaders with disparagement and considerable disrespect. Of the Marshal he said that at the time there were no objections to him, that he had been working properly so far, but that the same was not the case with others. First of all, in his opinion, our leadership was incompetent and insufficiently experienced in comparison with the forces of the enemy, and this was especially true of our entire intelligence service as compared with a huge and organized machine like the English Intelligence Service. As proof that full trust could not be vested in our leadership, he mentioned that there was a certain trend which had appeared in our country, owing to distrust in the might of the Soviet Union, which wanted to seek backing even from the English, for which reason Grol,⁽²⁰⁾ obviously an enemy and traitor, had suddenly become a member of the Cabinet, although Simović had been planned for that post.⁽²¹⁾ Besides, our authorities were releasing war criminals and traitors or punishing them very leniently, as distinct from the Bulgarians who were resolutely purging their ranks. Both examples meant surrendering our positions to the enemy.

I must emphasize that the entire conversation did not leave the impression that he was a skillful intelligence officer. His methods were not at all subtle, but rather primitive. During the entire conversation he spoke highly of my abilities and of my various mental and moral qualities, stressing that I should by no means remain in Beograd but should absolutely go to the Soviet Union for training, that this was already their concern, and that they would show the utmost gratitude for that work and would know how to appreciate it. He constantly referred to some kind of friendship between us, which was no particular friendship because I knew him from the short time he was attached to the General Headquarters of Slovenia in 1944, and during that same year I met him two or three times in Italy.

When he asked for a specific answer as I was leaving, I said I would first have to think it over. He then asked me not to attach any great importance to the matter, but to consider it a personal conversation, his and mine.

(20) Milan Grol — pre-war chief of the so-called Democratic Party. During the war he was a member of the Yugoslav Government in exile. After the war, for a short while he held the post of Vice-Premier of the Federal Government of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, which he resigned before the elections for the Constituent Assembly in 1945.

(21) Dušan Simović — pre-war Army General and Air Force Commander. On March 27, 1941, when the Cvetković-Mlaček Government fell under pressure from the people of Yugoslavia because it had joined the Tripartite Pact, Simović formed a new Government. After the German attack on Yugoslavia, on April 6, 1941, Simović emigrated abroad where he was a member of the Yugoslav Government in exile.

Several days later, when I went to our Central Committee, I told Comrade Marko about it.

After that I never met him again.

Death to Fascism — Liberty to the People!

April 3, 1948, Beograd.

(Sgd) Dušanka Perović

DOCUMENT No. 230

THE STATEMENT BY BRANKO JEVREMOVIĆ, ASSISTANT MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE PR OF SERBIA, TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA ON THE ATTEMPT BY I. N. AGHEYEV, ATTACHÉ OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD, TO INVEIGLE HIM INTO THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

During the latter half of 1945, Comrade Agheyev, who was an official of the Embassy of the USSR in Beograd at the time, requested that I give him confidential information which I came upon in the course of my official duties. He emphasized that no one was to know anything about that. I asked for permission to inform our Party, but he said there was no need to do so.

For that reason I had to avoid personal contact with Comrade Agheyev. He, however, insisted that I give him confidential information. He spoke of this on several occasions. He even came to my home several times for that purpose. I found myself in the difficult situation of either refusing cooperation with officials of the USSR, although I knew that the interests of my people and my country were identical with the interests of the USSR, or of being disloyal to my Party. Comrade Agheyev continued to insist on this, saying that his comrades considered that my cooperation with them would be exceptionally useful and that he was coming to me as one communist to another and that we should trust each other. Since I could not be disloyal to my Party, I finally said openly that without the knowledge of the Party I could not give him any confidential information. After that Comrade Agheyev stopped insisting on such cooperation. I think that was somewhere at the beginning of 1947.

I also informed my Minister of this.

In refusing to give him confidential information, I asked Comrade Agheyev not to take my refusal as a lack of gratitude towards the Soviet Union, which was our second homeland when our country was enslaved. I told him I was ready to place myself at the disposal of the USSR without reserve, which I regarded as an act for my own country, subject, however, to my Party knowing about it. I also emphasized that I considered Yugoslavia had no separate interests, that her interests were identical with the interests of the USSR, but that I could not be a hypocrite before my Party.

Beograd, April 3, 1948.

Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs
of the PR of Serbia
(Sgd) Branko D. Jevremović

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY NINO RUBČIĆ, FORMER SECRETARY OF THE SABOR OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, BEFORE THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN ZAGREB, JULY 26, 1949, ON THE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET CONSUL IN ZAGREB, I. V. VLADIMIROV^(*)

"... Stanić forwarded the reports on the manpower problem in the lumber camps to Consul Vladimirov for the propaganda use of the Cominform. A report was also submitted to the Consul on the state of affairs in the Party organization in Slavonski Brod. Furthermore, I know that Stanić collected information through Mira Kurelac, the Second Secretary of the Society for Cultural Cooperation between Croatia and the USSR, which the Office of Information of the Presidium of the Government collected in the line of official duty from the economic ministries, and then he passed it on to the Consul. I did not read those reports nor do I know how much of the information and reports were used by Mira Kurelac, who worked in the Office of Information."

"... Stanić told me he had received a report on the economy in Croatia from Fumić,^(**) of the Planning Commission of the People's Republic of Croatia, which he also sent on to the Soviet Consul..."

(Quoted from the records of the investigating authorities of July 26, 1949, in Zagreb.)

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY LOJZE BRVAR, AN AGENT OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, BEFORE THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN LJUBLJANA ON FEBRUARY 21, MARCH 6 AND MARCH 19, 1949, ON HIS INTELLIGENCE WORK AND CONNECTIONS WITH THE SOVIET DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES IN YUGOSLAVIA^(**)

"... I was sent to Yugoslavia by the Soviet intelligence service on November 10, 1945. Colonel Ivanovski requested me to spread propaganda

^(*) At the beginning of November 1948, Nino Rubčić, former Secretary of the Sabor of the People's Republic of Croatia, through Milan Stanić, former Secretary of the Society for Cultural Cooperation between Croatia and the USSR, got in touch with the Soviet Consul in Zagreb, Ivan Viktorovich Vladimirov. As Nino Rubčić had not declared himself openly for the Cominform Resolution at that time, the Soviet Consul advised him not to do so, saying that there would be time for that later. After his meeting with the Soviet Consul, Nino Rubčić sent him material and reports. Apart from his connection with Consul Vladimirov, Rubčić was also in touch with Vasilie Vasilievich Kirsanov, Sovinform representative in Yugoslavia, to whom he also gave various kinds of information.

^(**) Rudolf Fumić, Chief of a section in the Planning Commission of Croatia.

^(**) Lojze Brvar, citizen of Yugoslavia, a clerk by occupation. While Brvar was one of its agents working in Slovenia, the Gestapo sent him to the Russian front, in 1944, with the task of smuggling himself among the Russian partisans and collecting information about them. He did so. However, because the situation changed, he decided not to return to the German Army but to remain with the partisans. Upon joining a partisan detachment he was inveigled by Soviet intelligence service officers and his work for that service dates from that time. Upon the termination of the war he completed an intelligence course in Vienna and worked as an agent of the Soviet intelligence service.

for the speediest incorporation of Yugoslavia into the Soviet Union. He told me that I should find the greatest possible number of collaborators for his intelligence service and, after obtaining the permit for permanent residence, to send letters to Military Post Office No. 70754 or personally to give them to Soviet officers with the Fourth Army. He referred me to Colonel Rossanov..."

(Quoted from the records of the investigating authorities of March 19, 1949 in Ljubljana.)

"... At Bled I got in touch with the Soviet Ambassador in Beograd, Lavrentiyev. He told me, apart from other things, that the Yugoslav Government was not adhering consistently to Marxism-Leninism, and later on I told other people the same thing. He asked me to call on him when in Beograd. He was interested in knowing the conditions in Yugoslavia as regards the development and the building of socialism. I had this talk with the Ambassador in August 1946..."

(Quoted from the records of the preliminary investigation of February 21, 1949, in Ljubljana.)

"... As far as I remember, I wrote an extensive autobiography and signed a statement to the effect that I wished to become a Soviet citizen, that I would never work against the Soviet Union and that I would carry out all tasks assigned to me⁽²²⁾... He told me to get information on Yugoslav exports. He furthermore questioned me on conditions in the Communist Party of Slovenia... He ordered me to get in touch with the paper 'Nova Borba' in Prague... Towards the end of October 1948, Zakourdayev told me to go to Skoplje where I would be put in touch with a Bulgarian who would help me cross the frontier illegally..."

(Quoted from the records of the preliminary investigation in Ljubljana on March 6, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 233

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY RISTA ILIĆ, ASSISTANT READER AT THE FACULTY OF ENGINEERING IN BEOGRAD, DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND AT THE TRIAL BEFORE THE COUNTY COURT IN BEOGRAD, ON THE ESPIONAGE ASSIGNMENTS WHICH HE RECEIVED FROM AN OFFICIAL OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD

"... In January, 1949, I was summoned by Ilya Andreyevich Popov, Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Beograd, to go with him to the first floor of the 'Soviet Culture Hall,' to his office for a talk. I went with him and he told me that the Soviet Union was greatly in need of even the least little work on atomic energy. He asked whether I would send him everything I knew about atomic energy. He also asked me if

(²²) The reference is to the autobiographical data, written by Brvar after the Cominform Resolution, and turned over to the Soviet Consul in Zagreb, Zakurdayev. The latter was giving Brvar espionage tasks and arranged for him to be smuggled into Bulgaria.

I would be willing to submit everything to him that I heard or read about the application of atomic energy in military science. He likewise requested that I give him all my scientific works on atomic energy.

"The conversation was finally reduced to an agreement on my part to keep him informed and report all that I learned. He warned me I should not tell anyone of this work with him, explaining the great importance of atomic energy at the present time. I signed a pledge to the following effect: 'I pledge myself to send in all works connected with the problem of atomic energy and with the process of exploitation of nuclear energy. I shall also forward all theoretical and practical works of a military nature which appear in foreign publications as unfinished works, and which, in my opinion as an expert, could be of major value, as well as all works which I myself undertake.' In conclusion, I agreed to sign all my reports with the pseudonym of 'Rote.' He dictated all this to me and I wrote it down. In signing the pledge, I also gave Popov a short autobiography. At the beginning of April 1950, Semyonov^(*) of the Soviet Embassy got in touch with me. He stopped me once while I was walking and greeted me with 'Hello, comrade Rote.'

"In April 1950, Semyonov gave me the following tasks:

- 1) What attitude have your high-ranking leaders in economic institutions adopted in relation to the Cominform Resolution?
- 2) What is the attitude of the personnel in city cooperatives and commercial enterprises?
- 3) How do the masses react to the economic measures of the Yugoslav Government?
- 4) That various members of the Soviet intelligence service in Beograd would get in touch with me and give me reports of an espionage character which I would then forward to him through contacts.

"Semyonov asked me to supply him with these data by April 20, to which I objected, saying I would not find it possible to carry out such an extensive task by that date, and asked him to postpone the date to May 20, 1950. I met the mentioned Semyonov once more on May 20 when handing him the reports on all these questions."

"...According to Popov's instructions, I got in touch with my contact in January 1949. I gave my full name and surname to the agent who came to this meeting and told him my pseudonym 'Rote.' In handing him the report, I told him it was intended for Popov. I stayed with him a few minutes, just long enough to hand him my report.."

"The reports which I handed him included my work on atomic energy in three parts. The first part was entitled 'Historical Development of Atomic Energy,' the second part 'Classical Theories of the Atomic Nucleus' and the third part 'The Relation Between Bohr's Classical Atomic Theory and the Theory of Relativistic Atomic Energy'."

(Quoted from the record of the preliminary investigation of June 12, 1950, in Beograd.)

(*) Genadiy Zotovich Semyonov, Soviet deputy trade representative in Yugoslavia.

"...As I declared during the last preliminary investigation,⁽²⁷⁾ I asked for and received strictly confidential data No. 338/50⁽²⁸⁾ from Jelisaveta Tomić, two days before I left for military service in Skoplje. I hid them in the chimney. I collected these data, as well as others for which the indictment charges me, for the purpose of drawing up reports which I was to submit to the Soviet intelligence service.

"The facts which were pointed out to me today, I must confess, are accurate."

(Quoted from the record of the Beograd County Court trial on August 30, 1950.)

INVEIGLEMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF WHITE GUARDIST EMIGRES FROM THE USSR FOR ESPIONAGE IN YUGOSLAVIA⁽²⁹⁾

DOCUMENT No. 234

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY IGOR SAVCHENKO BEFORE THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN BEOGRAD, ON AUGUST 25, 1949, ON THE TASKS GIVEN HIM BY THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

"Somewhere about May 1947, I was approached in the Soviet Culture Hall in Beograd by a Vasiliev whom I had not met before. He asked me my name and told me he was the man about whom Morozov⁽³⁰⁾ had spoken to me. He asked me to meet him in several days' time in the 'Manjež' park. During our first meeting in the park, Vasiliev told me that Leonidov⁽³¹⁾ had recommended me to him, that my work with him would be more independent than it had been with Leonidov, whom he had replaced, that we would meet from time to time, two to three times a month. When he told me we would meet again at the same place in ten days' time, he gave me 5,000 dinars and said that was the sum he

⁽²⁷⁾ The reference is to the record of the investigating authorities of June 15, 1950.

⁽²⁸⁾ Document of the Presidency of the Yugoslav Government containing confidential data on material reserves.

⁽²⁹⁾ The officials of the Soviet Embassy in Beograd, who directed the Soviet intelligence service in Yugoslavia, extended their network to a certain number of Russian émigrés, whom they succeeded in inveigling for the Soviet Intelligence Service in view of their past records and hostile attitude towards Yugoslavia during World War II. Among the closest associates of Nikolai Antonovich Vasiliev, Colonel of the Soviet intelligence service, who occupied the post of president of the Citizenship Commission in the Soviet Embassy in Beograd, was Igor Savchenko, employee of the joint Yugoslav-Soviet JUSPAD company. Immediately after the liberation he was employed as a translator of the Soviet counter-intelligence service. In 1947, he was employed by Colonel Vasiliev for whom he worked as a direct contact man. Savchenko inveigled Captain Djordje Subotički, whom he put in touch with Kirsanov, representative of the Sovinformbureau in Yugoslavia.

⁽³⁰⁾ Morozov, major of the Soviet intelligence service, attached to the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Corps.

⁽³¹⁾ Leonidov, Major of the Soviet intelligence service attached to the 1st Ukrainian Corps.

would pay me every month. Towards the end of November 1948, Vasiliev told me to go to Skoplje to enquire whether Koča Popović, Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army, was there. Vasiliev once asked me whether I knew a White Guard émigré — a Russian, who worked at the post office. I learnt that a Russian named Kir worked there and that a certain Chakarski had worked there before him. Later, I met Chakarski at the JUSTA. I informed Vasiliev of this..”

(Quoted from the record of the preliminary investigation of August 25, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 213

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY KIRILO SITARSKY BEFORE THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN BEOGRAD, ON MAY 22, 1949, ON THE TASKS GIVEN HIM BY THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE⁽³²⁾

“...After the departure of Major Leonidov and his group, towards the end of 1946, I had no contact with the Russians until June 1948. I was working at TANJUG as a Russian translator when I received a letter from the Repatriation Commission of the Soviet Embassy. When I went to the Embassy I was received by Colonel Nikolay Antonovich Vasiliev. He offered me a cigarette, said he already knew me and had read my things. He said that I worked well, had a good record, etc. He then told me that I had probably heard a lot and spoken to many people during the last year and a half, etc. He asked me where I worked, how much I was paid, and what Russians besides myself worked in TANJUG. He also asked me about a priest named Anastasi,⁽³³⁾ whom I had described as pro-German in a letter sent earlier to Nikitin.⁽³⁴⁾ He told me that Anastasi had gone to the USSR and that he was now a Metropolitan in Tula. When I enumerated the Russians who worked in TANJUG, he said Tamara Shkuta⁽³⁵⁾ interested him and asked me to write down all I knew about her, what she had been doing before and during the occupation, after the liberation, her connections, the character of these connections, etc. He then asked me whether I knew Pavlov and Sedyenko from the Russian Hall. Sedyenko is the manager of the mess-hall and Pavlov is an electrician. He told me to write all I knew about them and about Tamara as well.

“Another task he gave me was to contact Zlata Yanchinska who had just come from Africa and was the wife of an English diplomat. As I was not able to do this, I came to our next meeting empty-handed. He was

⁽³²⁾ Kirilo Sitarsky, civil engineer, arrested several times before the war by the criminal police, attended the Russian Cadet Corps (semi-military school of Russian White Guards in pre-war Yugoslavia). During the war, he signed a pledge of “loyalty” to the Germans. After the war, he became a collaborator of Colonel N. A. Vasiliev.

⁽³³⁾ Anastasi — a priest of the Russian Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia and Gestapo agent. He fled from Yugoslavia together with the Germans during their retreat.

⁽³⁴⁾ Lt. Colonel Nikitin of the Soviet Intelligence service, attached to the 1st Ukrainian Corps.

⁽³⁵⁾ Tamara Shkuta — employee of the Soviet Information Bureau in Beograd.

obviously dissatisfied but nevertheless said that I should continue endeavouring to see what her connections were, meaning her espionage activities, and he told me that her husband was a spy. He did not tell me this directly, but I felt he wished to find out whether she had come as a contact between émigrés in this country and abroad.

"He finally told me that he was aware that I knew Tamara Andre, an army clerk. He asked me how I stood with her and whether I could become friendly with her. He told me he knew that she was the fiancée of a colonel; that the marriage would not take place, however, and that she was extremely interesting for the Soviet intelligence service."

(Quoted from the record of the preliminary investigation of May 22, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 236

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY DEFENDANT ALEXEI KRISHKO AT THE SARAJEVO COUNTY COURT TRIAL ON DECEMBER 2, 1949, ON HIS WORK FOR THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE⁽⁶⁾

Presiding Judge: "What was your attitude to the USSR in 1930?"

"Anti-Soviet. I used to say that the Church was persecuted in the Soviet Union, that the clergy was persecuted, that the kolkhozes were hard on the peasants."

Presiding Judge: — "Did you know who Pavel Yeliseyev⁽⁷⁾ was?"

"I knew he was secretary or consul."

Presiding Judge: — "Did you maintain touch with the Soviet Embassy through the priest, Vladimir Nehlyudov, and did you visit the Soviet Embassy?"

"I did."

Presiding Judge: — "Did you inform the Soviet Embassy or the representatives of the Embassy of the arrest of various citizens who were guilty of criminal offenses against our people and state?"

⁽⁶⁾ There was a trial of a group of eleven Soviet spies — White Guards and Gestapo agents — in the Sarajevo County Court from December 1st to 7th, 1949. As agents of the Soviet intelligence service, these men worked against Yugoslavia.

The name of priest Vladislav Nehlyudov also figured on the list of defendants besides those of Alexei Krishko, former priest attached to the headquarters of the Russian Tsarist Army and Denikin's White Army, Vladimir Ognyev, captain in the Russian Tsarist Army and in Wrangel's Army, engineer Anatoli Polyakov, Ksenia Komad, Arsen Boremovitch, Vasili Kostryukov, Ilya Zerebkov, Vadim Gesler, Petar Sokolov and Georgi Otshevski. Vladimir Nehlyudov committed suicide in prison, two days before the trial was due to open. All the defendants had received Soviet citizenship in the course of 1947 and 1948.

Back in 1941, Alexei Krishko inveigled White Guards for the Russian Volunteer Corps to fight against the Red Army at the Eastern Front. After the publication of the Cominform Resolution and after meetings with Yeliseyev and Ivanov, employees of the Soviet Embassy in Beograd, he worked for the Soviet intelligence service. He spread defeatist and slanderous propaganda to the effect that after the Cominform Resolution "a large number of men in Bosnia and Hercegovina had taken to the forests, forming armed groups who menace the existing system..." that "wide-spread discontent and general chaos reigned in Yugoslavia in all fields."

⁽⁷⁾ Pavel Yeliseyev, secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Beograd.

"I wrote to Nehlyudov about Bernikov's arrest. That was back in October, 1947. Besides Bernikov, I also wrote about several other Soviet citizens who had been arrested..."

Presiding Judge: — "When did you start submitting reports and from when does your connection with Nehlyudov date?"

"I started writing them back in 1945."

(Quoted from the Record of the Sarajevo County Court trial on December 2, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 27

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY DEFENDANT ILYA ZHEREBKOV AT THE SARAJEVO COUNTY COURT TRIAL ON DECEMBER 3, 1949 ON HIS ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES FOR THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

"In 1946, I think somewhere about the middle of that year, a certain man by the name of Igor Savchenko, who had worked as an interpreter for the Soviet intelligence service, came to my flat and told me to go to Headquarters and to contact Captain Morozov there. I went there..."

Presiding Judge: — "What happened when Morozov left?"

"That was in 1948. He told me that another officer, whom I would know by a password, would take over where he left off. I got a job at the Soviet Information Bureau. Two months later, Latishev, who was the acting TASS correspondent, came up to me and said the password. That was about a fortnight before the Cominform Resolution.^(*)

"On one occasion towards the end, Latishev told me to get in touch with some employee of the State security, be it even a charwoman."

Public Prosecutor: — "How did you understand the task Latishev gave you when he told you to go out into the street after the publication of the Cominform Resolution and see what was happening?"

"I saw that Latishev expected some kind of pogrom. I went out the next day and saw that everything was quiet."

Public Prosecutor: — "Did you know that our laws prohibit the dissemination of illegal material?"

"I knew..."^(**)

(Quoted from the record of the Sarajevo County Court trial on December 3, 1949.)

(*) Latishev then gave Ilya Zherebkov the task of going to Sarajevo to establish contacts there. He also asked him whether he knew anyone in the Centroprom and whether there was a department for economic espionage in it.

(**) The charges were proved in their entirety at the trial. All the defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment.

EXAMPLES OF THE ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA BY DIPLOMATIC, CONSULAR AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

DOCUMENT No. 238

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY ZORAN STOJANOVIĆ, A FORMER JUDGE, MADE TO THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES ON FEBRUARY 15, 1949, IN BEOGRAD, ABOUT THE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES OF JIRI MEISSNER, SECOND SECRETARY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD

"... On that occasion we arranged to hold our third meeting which took place four or five days later at Ljubica Mišić's place in Gundulićev Venac No. 27/IV, when Ljubica and her husband Aleksandar were not at home. At that meeting, I handed him the report written in my own hand on the situation in the country after the Cominform Resolution and on the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the People's Front. As I was not able to retype this report, we decided at that meeting that he would retype it in three copies and have one sent to the 'Nova Borba' (*) editorial board, the other to the Serbian Service of the Prague Radio Station and the third to the Serbian Service of the Budapest Radio Station. The report was to be published and broadcast... At the fourth meeting, held again in Ljubica Mišić's flat, Meissner said he had sent my report to the 'Nova Borba' and to the Prague and Budapest radio stations for publication."

(Quoted from the record of the preliminary investigation held February 15, 1949, in Beograd.)

DOCUMENT No. 239

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY LJERKA POPOVIĆ, HOUSEWIFE, BEFORE THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES, ON AUGUST 3, 1949, IN ZAGREB, ABOUT THE ATTEMPTS OF STEFAN HORVAT, CZECHOSLOVAK ACTING CONSUL IN ZAGREB, TO SMUGGLE YUGOSLAV CITIZENS INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA

"...I did not want to accept his proposal at once, but later, at his insistence, I agreed. On July 29, 1949, I received from Stefan Horvat a passport as a Czechoslovak citizen under the alias of Sofia Nesladkova,

(*) Newspaper of the Yugoslav deserters in Czechoslovakia, published in Prague.

born on May 3, 1914, in Gornji Daruvar, under which I was granted permission by the Czechoslovak Consulate in Zagreb to leave for Czechoslovakia as a Czechoslovak citizen due for repatriation. He told me I could rest assured that there would be no hitch in my journey. In case I were caught, however, he said I should tell the authorities that I had stolen the passport from the woman whose name it bore, that I had removed her photograph and pasted mine in its place and had copied the stamp over the photograph. Horvat also told me he would show me how to copy stamps so that if the prison authorities happened to check on whether I really knew how to copy stamps, they would see that I did, that is, they would see that I could have done it myself.

"He also told me that, when I arrived in Czechoslovakia and started talking about Yugoslavia, I should say that I had noticed nothing wrong before the Cominform Resolution, but had started noticing things only after it, namely, that the Resolution had opened my eyes. When I remarked that I had perhaps noticed certain shortcomings even before the Resolution, he said: 'If you did, that is your own affair, but once you are there keep quiet about it and only say what I have told you to.'

"At another of our early meetings, that is, in April 1949, Horvat told me that he had informed the Soviet Consulate of Hoffmann's arrest. He then asked me whether I knew of any more arrests or similar things, and whether I would let him know about them, because that interested the Soviet Consulate.

"Horvat also told me he had instructed the Czechoslovak citizens in Yugoslavia not to participate in work-drives and on that occasion cited some laws I could use as a justification before the authorities. (*)

"Horvat told me that, before the Cominform Resolution, the Consulate had told the Czechoslovak citizens they should participate in work-drives, because this was a socialist land, but that they had now changed their course... "(*)

(Quoted from the records of the preliminary investigation of August 3, 1949, in Zagreb.)

DOCUMENT No. 240

FROM THE TESTIMONIES OF DEFENDANT A. IVANJOŠ AND OTHERS AT THE NOVI SAD COUNTY COURT TRIAL, ON JUNE 2 AND 3, 1949, ABOUT THE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES OF JOSZEF KARPATI, OFFICIAL OF THE HUNGARIAN LEGATION IN BEOGRAD (*)

Defendant Ivanjoš: "I met Nyitrai towards the end of November 1948 and told him about my group. Before leaving for Hungary, he disclosed

(*) The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, in its Note No. 411984 of July 5, 1949, addressed to the Czechoslovak Embassy, protested against the interference of the Czechoslovak Acting Consul in Zagreb, Stefan Horvat, in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia.

(*) The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, in its Note No. 414125 of August 6, 1949, protested to the Czechoslovak Embassy in Beograd against the unlawful, criminal activities of Czechoslovak Acting Consul Horvat, and asked that he leave Yugoslav territory.

(*) After the publication of the Cominform Resolution, Nyitrai Kalman, a Hungarian citizen, contacted an official of the Hungarian Legation in Beograd, an officer

the password by means of which I was to contact Karpati, official of the Hungarian Legation in Beograd. After Nyitrai's departure I took over the leadership of his group, too."

Presiding Judge: "How did you enter the Hungarian Legation?"

"With the help of a password. As soon as the doorman heard the password, he took me to Karpati without a word. We held a meeting in the building of the Legation and I told Karpati about our group and asked him for instructions. Karpati displayed a great deal of interest in the feelings of the Hungarian national minority in Vojvodina."

"Did Karpati give you any forms?"

"He gave me an option form which I was to use as camouflage when going to him. In addition to that, he told me to take down 12 questions to which we were to reply in the form of a report."

"What were those questions about?"

"I don't remember all the questions, but I know that many of them referred to the feelings of the Hungarians in Vojvodina."

"Did you arrange another meeting with Karpati?"

"I did. I was to come again on January 5, between 11 and 13 hours, and bring him the report."

"What did you do upon returning from Beograd?"

"I repeated what Karpati had told me to Vujović and Bačić. Then, at another meeting, we divided the different sectors of work between us. I was given the post of organizational leader. We divided up the territory on which we were to work. I was to work in Bačka, Vujović in Banat and Srem, and Bačić in Baranja."

"When I went to see Karpati for the third time in the Hungarian Legation, he told me that he was not satisfied with the report because it did not contain enough concrete data. He added that I should continue to collect data, strengthen the organization, and rally more members. He also told me that the material had not yet arrived."

"Karpati informed me that I could get pamphlets and issues of 'Nova Borba' from him in the Legation and the typewriters, paper and mimeographing machine in Subotica, because it would be 'unsuitable for me to be seen taking these things out of a diplomatic mission.' He then told me to bring some of my own documents besides the option form the next time I came, 'even your old birth certificate,' because my coming to him so often with only an empty option form might arouse suspicion. Judging from the fact that I was let in so easily and taken to Karpati as soon as I had said the password, some of the other Legation employees

of the AVO (Allamvédelmi Osztály — State Security Department), by the name of Jozsef Karpati. Nyitrai received instructions from Karpati for the formation of underground groups in Subotica. Acting on instructions from Karpati, Nyitrai formed an underground group composed of Janoš Marković, Jozsef Mesaroš and Janoš Corba. He held two meetings with this group at which he transmitted the instructions he had received from the official of the Hungarian Legation in Beograd, Jozsef Karpati. In October 1948, on the eve of his flight to Hungary, Nyitrai, through his cousin Janoš Sič, established contact with Aleksandar Ivanjoš, a Hungarian by birth and a citizen of Yugoslavia, who was working as a carpenter in Subotica. Nyitrai engaged him for underground work and sent him to Karpati. After Nyitrai's departure, Ivanjoš established contact with Karpati and did espionage work for him together with Ilja Vujović, a farmer from Subotica, and Lajčo Bačić, a worker from Subotica.

must have been aware of his role, too. Our next meeting was to have taken place March 5, but I was arrested in the meantime."

(The Presiding Judge summons the second defendant, Vujović).

Presiding Judge: "Were you familiar with the twelve questions which Ivanjoš brought from the Hungarian Legation to which you were to have replied?"

Vujović: "I was not."

Presiding Judge: "Defendant Ivanjoš, repeat your testimony before Vujović."

Ivanjoš: "Vujović knew, because I had told him about these questions."

Vujović: "I did not know."

Ivanjoš: "You did. One afternoon all three of us met at your place and you and I and Bačić filled in the answers to the twelve questions from the Hungarian Legation."

Vujović: "That is not true."

Ivanjoš: "We proceeded point by point and you replied to the questions on the political situation and conditions in Yugoslavia."

Vujović: "That is not true, stop making up things against me."

(The Presiding Judge summons the third defendant, Bačić).

Bačić: "At Vujović's request Ivanjoš submitted his report and all three of us together drew up a report for the Hungarian Legation according to the above-mentioned points."

(Quoted from the records of the Novi Sad County Court trial on June 2, 1949.)

Presiding Judge: — "How did you contact Kalman Nyitrai?"

Defendant Marković: "He came to me one day and told me he had declared himself in favour of the Cominform Resolution, and had decided to form an underground organization. I agreed with his intention."

Presiding Judge: "Who else was present at your meeting?"

Marković: "Čorba Janoš and Mesaroš."

Presiding Judge: "And what did you decide to do?"

Marković: "First we divided up the work. I was to have worked among the writers. We then spoke about crossing over to Hungary. Nyitrai would have presented himself as a trade union representative, Mesaroš as a youth representative, Čorba Janoš as a representative of the Cultural Federation of Hungarians and I as the representative of Hungarian writers."

Presiding Judge: "And what happened afterwards?"

Marković: "Nyitrai and Mesaroš left for Hungary, while Čorba and I did not want to go and stayed on to work here."

(Quoted from the records of the Novi Sad County Court trial of June 3, 1949.)

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY KORIOLAN LUPŠIĆ DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL IN THE BEOGRAD COUNTY COURT, ON SEPTEMBER 4, 1950, ON THE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES OF THE RUMANIAN EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD^(*)

"...My decision to take active part in this work, to flee from Yugoslavia and to agree with the Cominform Resolution generally was greatly influenced by Ambassador Rudenco,^(*) who kept telling me that the Cominform Resolution was right, that the work of the Yugoslav leadership was wrong, that I should work actively for the Cominform Resolution, and that I should escape from the country."⁽¹⁾

(Quoted from the records of the Beograd County Court trial on September 4, 1950.)

"During the Danube Conference,^(*) when I went to see Rudenco, he gave me the task of going to Banatsko Selo and holding People's Front conferences there. I was to use this opportunity for hostile activities against Yugoslavia, that is, I was to talk to Party members, explain the Cominform Resolution and persuade them that it was correct. He also told me that I was to organize the Party members with whom I spoke and whom I won over into a group and give them the material I would receive from him to read. He mentioned that the Front conferences should serve as a screen for my hostile activities..."

(Quoted from the record of the preliminary investigation of April 8, 1949, in Beograd.)

"...I had several meetings with Ambassador Rudenco's wife Ivanka, because Rudenco sent me to her for reasons of caution..."

"...For the same reason, I met and talked with the above-mentioned Ivanka in her car, and not in the street. At one of these meetings, I gave her an article I had written together with Božo Lekić. The article, as we had earlier agreed, was intended for the paper 'For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy,' although I had suspected that she thus wished to tie me to them more firmly, so that I could no longer hesitate.

"When I returned after my unsuccessful attempt to escape and telephoned the same Ivanka, she sent a car with Ambassador Rudenco's chauffeur, Gika, to fetch me. I think this was the day after my call..."

^(*) On September 4, 1950, there was a trial in the Beograd County Court of a group of spies who had been organized and directed by diplomatic representatives of the Rumanian Embassy in Beograd. The group was made up of the following: Koriolan Lupšić, clerk, Yugoslav citizen of Rumanian descent; Trajan Flor, farmer, Yugoslav citizen of Rumanian descent; Vladislav Simonov, newspaperman, Yugoslav citizen of Serbian descent.

^(*) Teodor Rudenco, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Rumanian People's Republic in Beograd from July 20, 1947, to September, 1949. He is now Rumanian Ambassador in Peking. The Rumanian Government has still not sent the Yugoslav Government official notification of his withdrawal.

⁽¹⁾ This escape through Pirot to Bulgaria was organized by Ambassador Rudenco.

^(*) The conference was held in Beograd in August 1948.

"In organizing my escape via Pirot, Ambassador Rudenco told me to report to Chisinevski."(*)

(Quoted from the Court Record of September 4, 1950)

"...I went to Ambassador Rudenco and informed him of my decision with which he fully agreed, underlining that I should escape. However, as I did not set out immediately, at our later meetings Rudenco started reproaching me for not escaping.

"...Having failed to cross into Rumania, I went to Rudenco and told him it was impossible to escape across the frontier. When he heard this he said: 'Well, since that is so, I shall organize your escape.' We met at his place on this occasion. We were on the upper floor and, after he said this, he went downstairs. After some time he returned with a man. When they entered, they stood about four metres away from me, that is, they did not come into the room where Rudenco's wife and I were sitting, but remained standing at the door. Rudenco, turning to me, said: 'Just keep looking that way.' I understood that this meant that I was not to see who the man was, and so I looked straight ahead, not turning my head in their direction and keeping my face turned away from the newcomer. The two of them spoke in whispers, with Rudenco repeating what was being said aloud in Russian to his wife, who was sitting next to me, and she translated it into Rumanian for me. What they told me was as follows: 'On that day — I don't remember the exact date — you shall leave by the Beograd—Sofia express. In the train, up to Niš, you can behave as you like, but from Niš to Pirot you must go into a first-class compartment in the Pullman cars, and if possible be alone in the compartment. Talk only in Serbian, undo your shoe-strings and see to it that this can be noticed easily. Also, walk once along the corridor of the car in which you are travelling.' He also told me that I was to travel in the suit I had on at the moment..."

"When Rudenco returned for the second time, he repeated the same things I have stated above, adding: 'When you get to the station in Pirot, go out on the platform and stand facing the station and tie your shoes.' While tying up my shoes, he said, I would be approached by a person, who would look me straight in the eye, bow and greet me. I would then have to ask: 'Where can one sleep?' The person should answer: 'I will show you.' Having exchanged these words, we should leave the station and on the way I should ask whether it was far to the centre and the person should reply: 'About 100 metres.'"

(Quoted from the record of the preliminary investigation of June 22, 1949, in Beograd.)

DOCUMENT No. 142

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY TRAJAN FLOR, AT THE BEOGRAD COUNTY COURT TRIAL, ON HIS ESPIONAGE CONNECTIONS WITH THE RUMANIAN EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD

"...I received the entire material, including this anti-Yugoslav propaganda, at the Rumanian Embassy in Beograd, from Tudor Bugnariu, the Embassy press attaché..."

(*) Iosif Chisinevski, Vice-Premier of the Rumanian Government.

"... On January 27, Simonov and I went to the Embassy to hand in the letter which Simonov had written..."

"... I went to the Embassy on December 30, 1948, to attend the celebration of the Day of the Republic, at the written invitation of the Ambassador himself, which I received through the defendant Lupšić. The Ambassador then advised me not to flee if I noticed no danger..."

(Quoted from the Court record of September 4, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 243

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY VLADISLAV SIMONOV, AT THE BEOGRAD COUNTY COURT TRIAL, ON HIS ESPIONAGE CONNECTIONS WITH THE RUMANIAN EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD

"... About a fortnight before going to the Rumanian Embassy in Beograd to hand in the articles for 'Nova Borba,' I spoke with defendant Trajan about contacting the Embassy directly. He promised he would look into the matter and then informed me there was a possibility for this. We therefore went to the Embassy on the day I mentioned."

"... I remember several articles which we mimeographed. One of them dealt with the bourgeois nationalism of the Yugoslav leaders, another was about the organization of groups and circles to fight against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia..."

(Quoted from the Court record of September 4, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 244

FROM THE ESPIONAGE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN LIUBOMIR PENETIYEV, COUNSELOR OF THE BULGARIAN EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD, AND ONE OF HIS INTELLIGENCE AGENTS

"Dear Viktor,⁽¹⁰⁾ I must see you right away. If you can manage it, come to Beograd immediately. The matter is urgent and cannot be postponed. Please do everything you can to come. You will receive this letter tomorrow (the 23rd of this month), and can leave on the same evening at 7:45. The business at hand will be very short. Please do your best to come as soon as possible. Greetings from your friend Liuba."⁽¹¹⁾

(Letter of L. Penetiyev in Beograd to V. Aćimović in Skoplje, dated June 22, 1948.)

⁽¹⁰⁾ Viktor Aćimović, born 1915 in Tetovo, Macedonian by nationality, Yugoslav citizen and a newspaperman by profession.

During the Bulgarian occupation, he established contact with Lyubomir Penetiyev and worked for the Soviet intelligence service. After the Liberation, upon orders from Penetiyev who had come to Yugoslavia as Counselor of the Bulgarian Embassy in Beograd, he formed a group of spies which carried on espionage and subversive activity against Yugoslavia.

⁽¹¹⁾ The letter was written at the time when Penetiyev was Acting Counselor of the Bulgarian Embassy in Beograd, and was Aćimović's intelligence officer with whom he often met.

FROM THE LETTER BY V. AČIMOVIĆ ADDRESSED TO THE YUGOSLAV
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR ON OCTOBER 19, 1948⁽¹³⁾

"...During my meeting with Penetiyev in Beograd, he was cross because I had not come at once and told me he had called me to inform me that the Cominform Resolution against Yugoslavia was to be published. But since the Resolution had been published in the meantime there was no longer any need to explain things. Regarding me as his subordinate, he then asked me to go to Macedonia and to work there along the lines of the Resolution. We were then to meet again after a short time and I was to tell him what I had done... At this meeting in his house, Penetiyev presented me with a Soviet decoration. On the same occasion he also gave me 2,500 dinars."

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY PIROŠKA LEVINGER BEFORE THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN BEOGRAD, ON OCTOBER 20, 1948, ON PENETIYEV'S PARTICIPATION IN THE ORGANIZATION OF V. AČIMOVIĆ'S ESCAPE

"...At V. Ačimović's request, I took a letter he had written to Penetiyev (I did not know its contents). When I arrived at Penetiyev's flat and gave him the letter, he read it and said: 'All right'. He then took my address and my telephone number in Novi Sad, and gave me the address of the Legation where I was to let him know whether Ačimović had crossed the frontier. I then asked him what he thought about Ačimović's plan to cross the frontier. He replied that Ačimović should leave the country..."

(Quoted from the record of the preliminary investigation of October 20, 1948, in Beograd.)

⁽¹³⁾ Feeling that his work would be discovered, Ačimović sent the Yugoslav Ministry of the Interior a written statement against Penetiyev. However, he regretted this later and told Penetiyev about it. Penetiyev ordered him to leave Yugoslavia immediately and to use his mistress, Piroška Levinger, for this purpose.

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY SALIH LISI⁽¹³⁾ TO THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN SKOPLJE ON JUNE 18, 1949, ON THE TASKS GIVEN HIM BY RIZA HOXHA, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE ALBANIAN LEGATION IN BEOGRAD, FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUBVERSIVE AND ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN YUGOSLAVIA⁽¹⁴⁾

"... My anti-popular activities on the disruption of national unity and the spreading of chauvinistic hatred between the Albanians and Macedonians became especially manifest after I had established contact with Riza Hoxha, official of the Albanian Legation in Beograd... In the main, he explained certain passages from the Resolution to me, and when he saw that I was in complete agreement with him, he told me that it was now necessary to convince various individuals, to rally the 'healthy forces'...⁽¹⁵⁾ When we met in Skoplje three months ago, he arranged for us to see each other in the Macedonia Hotel where he was staying and where I was also residing... As far as our future work was concerned, he gave us the task of rallying people regardless of their social or political affiliations, only on the basis of their being inimically inclined towards the people's government.

"After that I went to Gostivar and met my friends there... We held a meeting in the home of Ahmet Pere.⁽¹⁶⁾ At this meeting we discussed the question of how to establish permanent contact with the Albanian Legation. This contact was necessary because we were thinking of rallying people and of winning them over for a possible armed struggle when the need for that arose. Before this meeting, we talked with the Director of the Albanian High School in Gostivar, Prekor Koreta, who was going to Albania in a few days and was waiting for his passport. We talked with him about the possibility of his writing to us and of sending directives from there, and we decided to take advantage of his departure for Alba-

⁽¹³⁾ Salih Lisi, born July 15, 1923, in the village of Dobri Do, Gostivar District, Yugoslav citizen of Albanian descent. During the occupation he worked underground for a time in the Gostivar district for the National Liberation Movement. In 1943 he got in touch with Gestapo leader Berger and began working for him. Before the liberation took place, he succeeded in covering up his treason. In the middle of 1948, Lisi got in touch with the then Secretary, and later Chargé d'Affaires of the Albanian Legation in Beograd, Riza Hoxha, from whom he received directives for subversive activities.

⁽¹⁴⁾ Immediately after the Cominform Resolution, the Albanian diplomatic mission in Beograd began intensive hostile activities against Yugoslavia. Outstanding in these activities were the following: Avni Verchuni, a Lieutenant in the SSSH (Albanian Department of State Security); Jovan Sema, Press Attaché of the Albanian Legation; Ill Poloska, an official of the Legation; Lazar Liv, Press Attaché; Peqo Kagjini, Chargé d'Affaires of the Albanian Legation; Riza Hoxha, Chargé d'Affaires, and others. They worked on the formation of underground groups to fight against the existing system, inveigling Albanian and Yugoslav citizens for spy work, distribution of underground material, etc.

⁽¹⁵⁾ The name used in Cominform propaganda for the people upon whom the Cominform relies in Yugoslavia.

⁽¹⁶⁾ The Commissioner of Education of the People's District Committee in Gostivar, whom Salih Lisi, as Secretary of the People's District Committee, appointed to that post. As a member of Salih Lisi's group, he was sentenced at the trial held in Skoplje, in 1950.

nia to establish contact and to set up an underground channel. In that way we would establish a channel through which we could get material and arms. Then we started talking about rallying and inveigling the people around us. We decided to talk to a lot of reactionaries and to prepare them for starting even an armed struggle if the need arose."⁽¹⁾

(Quoted from the record of the preliminary investigation of June 18, 1949, in Skoplje.)

DOCUMENT No. 14

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY HASAN MERGJUSHI TO THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN BEOGRAD ON THE ESPIONAGE TASKS WHICH WERE ASSIGNED TO HIM BY THE ALBANIAN LEGATION IN BEOGRAD⁽¹⁾

"... Thus Ili gave me the task of being the leader⁽¹⁹⁾ and of reporting regularly to the Albanian Legation every fifteen days, on everything I heard or saw in Borovo. I said that I was opposed to becoming an agent for the Albanian Legation, emphasizing that I liked to work and not to concern myself with political matters... On that occasion, when Ili gave me the above task, I again told him that I did not want to give him the reports he was asking for, to which he answered that I had to do it..."

"... That time, that is on August 17th, 1948, he first gave me the task, after I arrived in Borovo, of getting in touch with all the Polish, Bulgarian and Yugoslav pupils who were declaring themselves against Tito and other Yugoslav leaders, and of reporting to him on the feeling among the workers and pupils... I was to send him a written report on that every fifteen days or to come to Beograd to give him a verbal report. He gave me this task in the morning, and when we saw each other in the evening he gave me a package of various kinds of propaganda material, 20 brochures and 80 leaflets and ordered me to distribute this material to the workers and pupils in Borovo."

(Quoted from the record of the preliminary investigation of November 23, 1948, in Beograd.)

⁽¹⁾ By its Note No. 414 of February 11, 1950, the Yugoslav Legation in Tirana, under instructions from the Yugoslav Government, informed the Albanian Government that, in view of the hostile activity of Riza Hoxha, Secretary of the Albanian Legation in Beograd, revealed and proved at the trial of spies and terrorists held in Skoplje from January 9 to 12, 1950, his further stay in Yugoslavia was undesirable.

⁽¹⁹⁾ Hasan Mergjushi, born February 4, 1927, in Greece, of Albanian nationality and Greek citizenship, worked as an apprentice in a shoe factory in Borovo. Immediately after the publication of the Cominform Resolution he was approached by an official of the Albanian Legation in Beograd, Ili Poloska, who inveigled him into doing spy work.

⁽¹⁹⁾ The reference is to the direction of the group formed on instructions from Ili Poloska.

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY MILOVAN MILOVANOVIĆ TO THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN ZAGREB, ON MARCH 11, 1949, ON THE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES OF THE ALBANIAN LEGATION IN BEOGRAD⁽¹⁰⁾

"...When he⁽¹¹⁾ was leaving, he got in touch with the Albanian Legation in Beograd in connection with directives for future work, for material and similar things. The representatives of the Albanian Legation told me that they would keep in touch with me in Zagreb through one of their army medical students... On October 25, 1948, at about six o'clock in the morning, a man came to my apartment. I realized that he had come on orders from the Albanian Legation for the purpose of establishing contact. He introduced himself, saying that he was an Albanian, an army medical student by the name of Andrej Konomi, that he was studying in Zagreb, and that Spiro had told him to get in touch with me. He told me that he had propaganda material and that I could come to his apartment for it, that the material had been brought to Zagreb by Shehu⁽¹²⁾ and one other person from the Legation. He told me that the people from the Legation maintained all contacts personally and that they were reluctant about turning them over to others because they wanted to avoid being discovered."

(Quoted from the records of the preliminary investigation of March 11, 1949, in Zagreb.)

⁽¹⁰⁾ Milovan Milovanović, a student of shipbuilding, born in Milatovac, Kragujevac District, October 1, 1923.

⁽¹¹⁾ The reference is to Spiro, alias "Piro", an intelligence agent of the Albanian Legation in Beograd, student of engineering at Zagreb University, Albanian citizen, who left Yugoslavia in 1948.

⁽¹²⁾ Gjulanj Shehu, for some time Second Secretary of the Albanian Legation in Beograd and later Chargé d'Affaires.

3. SYSTEMATIC SMUGGLING OF SPIES AND TERRORISTS INTO YUGOSLAVIA FROM NEIGHBOURING EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FOR SUBVERSIVE AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES(*)

HOSTILE ACTIVITIES BY INTELLIGENCE CENTRES IN ALBANIAN TERRITORY FORMED FOR FIGHTING AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA(*)

DOCUMENT No. 20

FROM A LETTER BY HAXHI LESHİ, MAJOR GENERAL OF THE ALBANIAN ARMY AND CHAIRMAN OF THE ALBANIAN CONTROL COMMISSION, TO AKIF LESHİ, (*) CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE IN DEBAR (YUGOSLAVIA), CONTAINING INSTRUCTIONS FOR WORK ON THE FORCIBLE OVERTHROW OF THE EXISTING ORDER IN YUGOSLAVIA

"... You must agitate and conduct a struggle against that clique, and in favour of friendship with the Soviet Union and the other democratic countries which are fighting against Tito's clique. Fight, and form a party of Communists and non-Party members to save the Yugoslav people from Tito's clique, which is leading them to certain death at the hands of the imperialists in England and America. Organize yourselves and unite with all the Communists, non-Party members and the rest of the people and lead them onto the proper road which is being followed by the working class of the whole world. The comrades who are working and fighting against Tito's clique should explain how Trotskyists and imperialist agents should be fought. I ask you and all your comrades to please write a report about all the following, which you should send as soon as possible: on the attitude of the army, the political and economic situation,

(*) Over 20 centres have been established in the neighbouring countries of Eastern Europe which are engaged exclusively in organizing espionage and diversionist groups, and smuggling them into Yugoslavia.

(*) With a view to organizing and carrying out espionage and subversive activities against Yugoslavia, the Albanian Government founded special intelligence centres in the frontier towns of Albania, which are directed by prominent officers of the Albanian State Security — SSSH (Seksioni Sigurimit i Shtetit — Department of State Security). One such centre has been established at Pishkopia (a town in northern Albania) which is directed by Haxhi Leshi, a Major General of the Albanian army and Chairman of the Control Commission of Albania. Captain Gjeladin Krive, Chief of the SSSH section for Yugoslavia, also works in the Pishkopia centre.

(*) Akif Leshi, a citizen of the FPRY of Albanian descent, former president of the People's Committee in Debar (in Yugoslavia), fled to Albania in September, 1950.

on what the Trotskyists are saying, and what kind of propaganda they are carrying on against Albania and against the building of socialism in our country. Don't be afraid but fight just as you fought earlier against the fascists. Produce and put out propaganda material against Tito, propaganda which should be extensive, realistic, concrete, so that we can fight against them and show them up in practice. In the first place, try to carry on propaganda among the people, and remember that a struggle like the one that was conducted against Hitler and Duce has now been launched..."

June 29, 1949

DOCUMENT No. 251

LETTER BY GJELADIN KRIVC, CAPTAIN OF THE SSSH, SENT FROM ALBANIA ON AUGUST 5, 1949, TO AGENT ESHREF PALIKUCHA IN DEBAR (YUGOSLAVIA), CONTAINING INSTRUCTIONS FOR ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA(*)

"... You should contact all communists and people from the other parties... Study and analyse this letter according to the present situation in Yugoslavia and get people to take an active part in this work. The organization of this work should be efficient and strictly secret and we shall send you propaganda material at all times. Propaganda material should pass from hand to hand, to all the friends who are your followers. This work should be broadened day by day. The job should be done in your town first and then, through friends, it should be extended to other towns and villages, but, as I mentioned above, from hand to hand. As soon as you complete this work, inform me immediately of every point separately."

"... You should send us reports on your work as quickly as possible according to the following points:

"The political situation: Draw up a list of all those persons who are being arrested, interned, etc., the names of the members of Party Committees and People's Committees. Send us the biographies of all these persons. Similarly, send us a list of names of the persons working actively for Tito. Form terrorist groups on that basis and speak in our name. If possible, include persons from Greece, Italy and elsewhere in your work, who could be used to this end.

"The economic situation: What is the economic situation of the peasants and workers and of people in general? How high are the salaries and wages of the employees and workers and are they satisfied? How many and what kind of workers-inventors are there in the trade enterprises, state institutions and cooperatives, what do they talk about and how are they disposed?..."

"The army: What is the army taught, what is its strength, where and how does it move, where is it stationed, names and numerical strength,

(*) Eshref Palikucha, alias "Radika," an agent of the Albanian Intelligence service in the town of Debar, Yugoslavia, near the Albanian frontier. In due course he fled to Albania. Gjeladin Krivc signed the letter with his alias "Kasap Kasapi."

with what arms is it equipped? The exact location of army headquarters, detachment commands, etc. The economic situation of the army and the officers, what kind of food do they get and how, to what posts are they assigned, what are the names of all the members of the headquarters and their exact addresses, their numerical strength. Enquire about and send us information on Macedonian comrades in the towns as well, who are not disposed towards the government. You shall receive instructions from us on how to go about this work..."

DOCUMENT No. 23

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY JUSUF SELADIN KURTISH, MEMBER OF AN ARMED GANG SMUGGLED FROM ALBANIA INTO YUGOSLAVIA, TO THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN SKOPLJE, ON OCTOBER 17, 1949, ON THE TASKS GIVEN THIS ARMED GANG BY THE LEADERS OF THE ALBANIAN CENTRE IN PISHKOPEA BEFORE THEY WENT TO YUGOSLAVIA(*)

"... We had two sergeants who escorted the group to the frontier. Upon the return of Asim Toplica's(*) group from its assignment in Yugoslavia, a captain, whose name I did not know, came from Tirana. This captain was responsible for sending these armed groups to Yugoslavia. When he arrived from Tirana, he told Bajram to choose the men who were to accompany him to Yugoslavia, and to prepare for the journey to Yugoslavia. This group included myself, Rahim from Gorjan, Idriz from Celopek, Jusuf from Dobri Do, Sabri from Gostivar, Ganija from Traljan, Satkij from Gostivar. The leader was Bajram from Dobri Do. Half an hour before our departure, the captain assembled us in a room and gave us the following tasks: we were to take across propaganda material which we were to give to the friends we knew well and not disseminate it along the roads as we had done earlier. This time he instructed us to kill the followers of Tito's clique and especially the State Security Administration officers, to organize men for escape to Albania, to carry out sabotage on railway lines, etc. He stressed that we would receive rewards for carrying out big jobs, such as killing the State Security Administration officers..."

(Quoted from the record of the preliminary investigation in Skoplje, on October 17, 1949.)

(*) A gang of 9 terrorists was organized in the intelligence centre of the SSSH in Pishkopea and smuggled into Yugoslavia. It was composed of terrorists who had fled from Yugoslavia into Albania. They assassinated seven and wounded three representatives of the people's government, plundered and maltreated the population in the frontier regions of Yugoslavia. The members of the gang were later killed, or caught, or they surrendered to the Yugoslav authorities. The gang was led by the notorious terrorist, Bajram Dobri Doll, from the district of Gostivar (Yugoslavia), during the war a battalion commander of the Albanian fascist organization, "Ball Kombetar," and an agent of the Gestapo. After the liberation of Yugoslavia he led a gang of thieves in the FPRY and from time to time crossed into Albania.

(*) A member of the Ballisti (Ball Kombëtar) gangs during the occupation of Macedonia. After the Cominform Resolution, he fled to Albania where he worked against Yugoslavia as a very confidential agent in the Albanian intelligence service.

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY NESHAD FEIM AMZA, A MEMBER OF THE ARMED GANG SMUGGLED FROM ALBANIA INTO YUGOSLAVIA, TO THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN SKOPLJE, ON OCTOBER 17, 1949, ON THE ACTIVITY OF THE ESPIONAGE CENTRE IN PISHKOPEA AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA

"... After that they sent me to live in a hotel in Pishkopea and also told me where I was to take my meals. For two months I did no work at all, but just sat around, was lodged and fed free of charge, and every ten days received 20 leka for my personal requirements... As mentioned earlier, I was moved from the hotel to a house situated in front of the first-aid station in Pishkopea, where the gang had its headquarters. Bajram from Dobri Do was there with six other men whom the SSSH had also smuggled into Yugoslavia for the same purpose... Most of the men in the group headed by Bajram were old Ballisti and bandits. They are all being engaged by the Albanian State Security Service and smuggled into Yugoslavia to carry out the tasks mentioned above. During the time I spent in that house, in the course of one month, Bajram from Dobri Do was twice sent to Yugoslavia with his group and returned after completing his work... In the house where I lived there were no other members of the gang, they were housed in other places.

"Azir Tenova, who was going to Yugoslavia with a group, was in one of these houses... This canteen was set up for us, that is, for all those who were being smuggled into Yugoslavia... I also overheard conversations to the effect that such groups being smuggled into Yugoslavia by the SSSH existed also in Shupenza and in the village of Machlar, but I am not familiar with their work..."

"... Ten days ago, Captain Gjeladin⁽¹⁾ from the Albanian State Security came to the house where I had been billeted with the other men being sent to Yugoslavia. I had lived in that house since the time when Gjeladin told me I would join the gang... We transported the material up to the frontier by a pack horse given us by the SSSH. We were escorted to the frontier by a sergeant named Sabri from the State Security in Pishkopea, who organized our crossing... We were to have committed these murders so that the people would revolt against the present leadership in Yugoslavia, so that the authorities in that region would be intimidated, so that they would be prevented from carrying out their duties, and also so that as many people as possible would be persuaded to flee from Yugoslavia to Albania... In the State Security in Pishkopea they gave me a Serbian rifle and two Italian hand-grenades, Ayet⁽²⁾ received a German rifle, binoculars, two Italian and one Serbian hand-

(1) The reference is to Gjeladin Krivc, a Captain of the Albanian State Security.

(2) A member of the Ballisti gangs during the war. After the war he fled to Albania. Following the publication of the Cominform Resolution, he entered the service of the Albanian State Security which smuggled him into Yugoslavia for diversionist and terrorist actions.

grenade, while Ramadan^(*) got a Serbian rifle and two Italian hand-grenades. With these weapons we were to have committed the murders as we had been ordered... Gjeladin from the State Security in Pishkopea and Captain Sabria, who also prepared and sent such groups to Yugoslavia, used to come to the house where I was billeted with the other members of the gang. I saw him come several times... Haxhi Leshi also used to come. I think he was a general in the Albanian army. He also held meetings with the leaders of the groups, when they used to send us to the cinema. He had no connections with us, only with the leaders..."

(Quoted from the records of the preliminary investigation in Skoplje, October 17, 1949.)

HOSTILE ACTIVITIES BY BULGARIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTRES IN BULGARIA, FORMED FOR FIGHTING AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA⁽¹⁾

DOCUMENT No. 24

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY BORIS NIKOLOV PALAZOV BEFORE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN SKOPLJE, APRIL 4, 1949, ON THE ESPIONAGE AND TERRORIST ASSIGNMENTS GIVEN HIM BY THE LEADERS OF THE BULGARIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE⁽¹⁾

"... As soon as I consented to go illegally to Macedonia, Uzunov gave me the following tasks: upon entering Macedonia, I was to endeavour by all means to live in Skoplje and to find employment as an ordinary worker, because that way I would not attract the attention of the authorities. I was to work on demoralizing the workers, to discourage them in their work, telling them that the wages were low, that their life was hard, that the authorities did not concern themselves with the workers' welfare, etc. I was to commit sabotage everywhere. To this end he told me to get in touch with Bulgarian exiles and to make friends with discontented Mace-

(*) A member of the Ballisti gangs during the war. After the war he fled to Albania. Following the publication of the Cominform Resolution he entered the Albanian State Security, which used him for diversionist and terrorist activities in the FPRY.

(1) Shortly after the publication of the Cominform Resolution the Bulgarian intelligence service established espionage centres in Dragoman, Gornya Djumaya, Chustendil and Sveti Vrach, in Bulgaria, from which spies, diversionists and terrorists were smuggled into Yugoslavia. They were recruited from the ranks of Yugoslav traitors and criminals by the Bulgarian State Security.

(1) Boris Nikolov Palazov, worker, a Bulgarian citizen of Macedonian descent, inveigled in December 1948, by an agent of the Bulgarian State Security named Dimitar Uzunov, who was connected with Colonel Nikola Rachev, Chief of the Regional Militia in Gornya Djumaya. He was smuggled into Macedonia on March 14, 1949. During the Bulgarian occupation of Macedonia, Palazov was a soldier in the Bulgarian fascist army of occupation and took part in the murdering of Macedonian people.

donlans. After that he told me to obtain dynamite and weapons with the aid of these connections for sabotage, for the assassination of Party and state leaders at some public meeting, for assassinations in cinemas or in the theatre so as to cause confusion among the people. Our press, upon learning of this, would then write that this was the work of the Macedonian people themselves who did not tolerate the present Government. Besides this, he told me to find employment later in a big factory with plenty of expensive machinery. I was to learn which parts of the machines were the most important and if possible to remove and destroy them, and if this was not possible, to destroy them on the machines themselves so as to stop their operation, to set fire to some warehouses and magazines, and to collect various kinds of information on conditions in Macedonia. I was to have carried out these tasks with the persons whom I got in touch with, either Bulgarian citizens who had come from Bulgaria, or Macedonians who were discontented with the present state of affairs and leadership. After he had given me my assignments we agreed on a password for correspondence, which was: 'What is the plan, Asen?' "(12)

(Quoted from the records of the preliminary investigation in Skoplje, April 4, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 253

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY BULGARIAN SPY, DINO PALAMUTOV, BEFORE THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN SKOPLJE, NOVEMBER 5, 1949, ON THE PREPARATIONS BEING MADE BY BULGARIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTRES FOR SMUGGLING ARMED TERRORIST GROUPS INTO YUGOSLAVIA⁽¹¹⁾

"...After the signing of this declaration⁽¹⁴⁾ Ruyanov⁽¹⁵⁾ told me that I was to leave that same evening for the village of Jakovo, from where I would go to Yugoslavia to distribute material against the Yugoslav Government and authorities... This time I went without arms. I found Sande⁽¹⁶⁾ on Sitnica Mountain, and gave him the material. What happened to this material I do not know. I never saw Sande again as he was arrested later. Upon returning to Sveti Vrach, I met Ruyanov and acquainted him with the details of my trip to Yugoslavia... After the winter season, in May 1949, Ruyanov called me and told me to go to Yugoslavia again to get some books to Sande. In addition to this, he told me to tell

⁽¹¹⁾ Palazov crossed the Yugoslav frontier on March 14, 1949, and was caught immediately.

⁽¹²⁾ As Chief of the Regional State Security in Petrich (Bulgaria), Anto "Graf" sent one of his agents, Dino Palamutov, to Yugoslavia on several occasions with the assignment of distributing material of hostile contents, which the latter did. Dino Palamutov is a peasant, a Bulgarian citizen, sentenced before the war to imprisonment for murder.

⁽¹³⁾ A written pledge to collaborate with organs of the Bulgarian State Security.

⁽¹⁴⁾ According to Palamutov's statement, Atanas Ruyanov is the Chief of the State Security in Sveti Vrach in Bulgaria.

⁽¹⁵⁾ Sande Arizanovski, Yugoslav citizen of Macedonian descent, arrested for distributing illegal anti-Yugoslav material, obtained from Bulgaria.

those men who wanted to fight against Yugoslavia that they were doing a great deed by overthrowing the existing Government in Yugoslavia, and that they should organize people who would fight against the FPRY. He also told me to inform people that if they did not fight now for the incorporation of Macedonia into Bulgaria, they would later be held responsible for not carrying out orders when the Bulgarian authorities came to these regions... I neglected to say that in a talk, in March 1949, which was attended by Anto 'Graf,' Ruyanov and Captain George, I asked why they didn't let me go to Yugoslavia with an armed group of 5 to 6 men to carry out better and bigger tasks, instead of bothering only with the distribution of material. 'Graf' replied to this: 'There will be plenty of that, too, in time. Now it is necessary to convince the people of Yugoslavia with propaganda material that Yugoslavia has betrayed the democratic front, and later armed groups will be organized of all the exiles from Yugoslavia for struggle in the country and for the overthrow of the present government. Armed groups will be sent to Yugoslavia simultaneously from Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Albania, so that the blow would give the best results'...

(Quoted from the records of the investigating authorities in Skoplje, September 5, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 25

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY DINO PALAMUTOV AT THE COUNTY COURT TRIAL, SKOPLJE, JANUARY 27 AND 28, 1950

Presiding Judge: "How many times did you cross the frontier?"

Palamutov: "I crossed the frontier three times. The first time in 1948, when I took over the material which I received from Atanas Ruyanov from Sveti Vrach."

"Who is he?"

"Chief of the State Security in Sveti Vrach."

"Did he summon you to carry out this task?"

"No. I was in jail in Sofia."

"Why were you in jail?"

"Because I had been underground. The Regional Chief of the State Security, Anto 'Graf,' took me from jail to Sveti Vrach. There I met Ruyanov."

"That means you were released from jail so as to take illegal material to Yugoslavia."

"Yes. I signed a statement that I would serve in the State Security."

"Now explain to the Court why you were in jail."

"Considering me an enemy of the people, the Bulgarian authorities interned me in Haskovo District, in 1944. They released me on August 25, 1948, so I could vote in the elections. I took advantage of this and fled to the woods. I was underground for three months. I crossed to Yugoslavia and then I returned to Bulgaria. I was arrested after that."

"Did the State Security know you and your underground work?"

"Yes. After being released from jail, I constantly received assignments from the State Security."

"What kind of assignments did Atanas Ruyanov, the Regional Chief of the State Security in Sveti Vrach, give you?"

"To find people in Yugoslavia who would distribute material and letters. I was to have linked such persons with Ruyanov."

(Quoted from the records of the trial in the Skoplje County Court, January 27, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 257

NOTE OF PROTEST OF THE YUGOSLAV MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS No. 41992 OF FEBRUARY 2, 1950, TO THE BULGARIAN EMBASSY IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRIAL OF A GROUP OF TERRORISTS AND SPIES SMUGGLED INTO YUGOSLAVIA FROM BULGARIA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY informs the Embassy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria of the following:

At a public trial before the County Court in Skoplje, held from January 26 to 29, 1950, it was established that members of the Bulgarian State Security gave arms to and smuggled a group of diversionists, terrorists and spies into the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia with the task of developing terrorist and subversive activities against the socialist order in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The Bulgarian authorities entrusted the commission of these crimes to various criminals, members of the former fascist organization VMRO, such as Dino Palamutov, Arso Pankovski, and to traitors and deserters from the front of socialist construction in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, to whom the Bulgarian state organs issued false documents. The Bulgarian authorities could have relied only on such persons in this base work, because all hopes were shattered that the counter-revolutionary activity directed against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia would meet with support in socialist Yugoslavia itself.

The afore-mentioned trial has proved once again that, after the complete failure of the warmongering propaganda campaign, the Bulgarian Government, in its hostile conspiratorial policy against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, has taken to direct action aimed at preventing socialist construction, and at forcible seizure of territory from the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, with a view to accomplishing the old Pan-Bulgarian chauvinistic plans.

These hostile acts by the Bulgarian Government are a component part of the general plan, directed from the same centre, against the freedom and independence of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and, as such, constitute not only a threat to international peace and security in this part of the world but also open acts of aggression.

Such a policy of the Bulgarian Government is aimed against the basic principles of the United Nations Charter, which all states are bound to respect and upon the basis of which peace-loving peoples are struggling

for the development and safeguarding of peace in the world, and for the preservation of mutual good-neighbour relations.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia protests most vigorously to the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria against the organization of terrorist and subversive gangs by Bulgarian state organs and their infiltration into the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia with the aim of realizing aggressive intentions against socialist Yugoslavia, and requests that the Bulgarian Government immediately put an end to this hostile activity.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, under instructions from its Government, draws the attention of the Bulgarian Government to all the consequences which might arise therefrom, the full and exclusive responsibility for which would fall on the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.⁽¹⁷⁾

Beograd, February 2, 1950.

DOCUMENT No. 23

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY VELIBOR NEŠIĆ BEFORE THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN BEOGRAD ON THE ORGANIZING IN BULGARIA OF ARMED TERRORIST GROUPS OF YUGOSLAV TRAITORS, FOR DIVERSION AND ESPIONAGE AND THEIR SMUGGLING INTO YUGOSLAVIA⁽¹⁸⁾

"... On February 28, 1950, in the afternoon, I left Hotel No. 9 in G. Dimitrov Street and went to the faculty to file my application for an examination in historical geology. Not far from the hotel I was stopped by a man who introduced himself as an instructor of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, but did not give his name. He asked to talk to me. We first talked about my personal life, the situation among the exiles, and then we got down to talking about the newspaper 'Napred.' He asked me whether I realized the purpose of the newspaper, to which I replied that I knew it was not being published for the exiles but to be sent to Yugoslavia. He agreed and said that someone would have to take the paper there if we were to reach our goal. He then asked whether I would go to Yugoslavia to take the material there. I consented and we drove off in a jeep that was waiting nearby. On the way he told me he was taking me to a comrade of his who knew me and was getting ready to do the same job. He took me to Vitosh⁽¹⁹⁾ above Kniazhevo, to a villa in Liuti Dol Street..."

"... The second part of the preparations consisted, in the main, of lectures by 'Cvetko' on underground methods of work in general, which he illustrated with many things from his own experience... Another

⁽¹⁷⁾ The Bulgarian Embassy in Beograd returned this note on February 3, 1950, without an answer.

⁽¹⁸⁾ Velibor Nešić, an engineering student, born November 24, 1926, in Leskovac, a Yugoslav citizen.

⁽¹⁹⁾ A Sofia suburb of villas and summer residences lying in the foothills of Mount Vitosh.

subject was how to get about and how to disguise oneself. He spoke about channels through which men and material could be sent. To this end it was necessary to set up several points along the frontier which would receive the men and material coming through those channels, and take them from such points to centres where an apparatus would be set up for the distribution of the material... During this part of the preparations Minin came and gave us the code which would be used in correspondence with us... We received concrete assignments from Minin who introduced himself as a member of the CC of the BCP. He instructed us to cross to Yugoslavia illegally with their help, to contact certain people there, to win them over for underground work along Cominform Resolution lines, to set up bases with them for our future visits and for the reception of material and men sent by us from other places in Bulgaria... We were to take information which we gathered on the economic and political situation with us to Bulgaria when we left Yugoslavia, or to send it in code..."

"... We tested all the firearms during our stay in the villa. At first we shot at a target in the villa courtyard and then they drove us off into the mountains where we shot at the same target from tommyguns and pistols. 'Cvetko' was present. We fired pistols at 25 metre and tommyguns at 50 metre range. We went by jeep for target-practice twice. 'Cvetko' was not present at the second try-out. On this occasion a forest-warden came along and asked us how we dared shoot. The chauffeur took him aside and showed him his identity card, and the warden went off immediately. I do not know what kind of a card the chauffeur showed the warden..."

"... We were to have crossed the frontier with the aid of Bulgarian frontier guards, and in case of being noticed we were to have opened fire on the Yugoslav frontier guards and withdrawn to Bulgaria. Minin said that in case of a fight at the frontier the Bulgarian guards would also open fire on the Yugoslav frontier guards in order to cover our withdrawal. He added: 'We shall be behind you with something heavier.' (He was perhaps alluding to heavier arms)..."

"... During a talk about our crossing the frontier, Minin observed that this would also be carried out during an incident which the Bulgarian frontier organs would provoke on the frontier to distract the attention of the Yugoslav frontier guards from the place where we intended crossing. This, however, was dropped..."

"... Before our departure, 'Cvetko' went to the frontier to make arrangements for our crossing and reached an agreement to have the commander of the frontier post waiting for us near the frontier on the morning of May 19. We had already determined the place where we would cross. We chose Ravna Shuba Hill, between the gorge and Božica. On this occasion 'Cvetko' also went to the village of Strazimirovce to the Party cell secretary, Stojan, and arranged with him to receive men who would be coming from Yugoslavia. He would give them material received from 'Cvetko.'

*Several days before our departure we got food, clothing and material, having already received the weapons which we had tested at the villa. While going for walks, we took our pistols with us and practiced firing at various distances.

"In the evening of May 18, 1950, we supped together in the villa, where Minin was also present. At about 2300 hours we set out by jeep: 'Cvetko,' the chauffeur and a civilian who 'Cvetko' said was a member of the Town Committee of the BCP for Plovdiv..."

(Quoted from the records of the preliminary investigation in Beograd, July 31, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 259

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY ČEDOMIR PETROVIĆ TO INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN BEOGRAD, ON THE ORGANIZING IN BULGARIA OF ARMED TERRORIST GROUPS OF YUGOSLAV TRAITORS FOR DIVERSIONS AND ESPIONAGE AND THEIR INFILTRATION INTO YUGOSLAVIA⁽²⁰⁾

"... We were met in Sofia by a member of the State Security with a jeep. Sitting in the jeep was a civilian who introduced himself as an instructor of the CC. On our way through Rusa the State Security agent who was escorting me told me to go to Sofia because the editorial office was asking for me.⁽²¹⁾ From the station we went off to Kniázhevo to a villa. Upon arriving at the villa, the civilian took me to a room and informed me there of the real reason of our coming... He explained the whole matter and said that now was the most favourable moment to create a new communist party in Yugoslavia, that this was the decision of the Cominform and that I was to go to Yugoslavia with some other comrades for this purpose. He told me that he would train me for this work before we left and that we would have the support of all the Cominform communist parties..."

(Quoted from the records of the preliminary investigation in Beograd, of August 28, 1950.)

"... We were to have carried on the following activity in Yugoslavia: to agitate for the non-fulfilment of production plans and thus to cause dissatisfaction among the workers; to expose Yugoslavia as an aggressive country; to praise the might of the USSR and the democratic countries and the aid which they would extend to the peoples of Yugoslavia. We were to distribute propaganda material which we had brought with us... During preparations we were told that we had to investigate economic and political conditions in Yugoslavia, that is, to collect information of that nature..."

(Quoted from the records of the preliminary investigation in Beograd, of August 27, 1950.)

"... We left for Yugoslavia on May 19, 1950..."

"... 'Cvetko' and one more civilian whom I saw that evening for the first time went with us. Petar Minin then told us that this civilian

(²⁰) Čedomir Petrović, worker, a former officer in the Yugoslav army, born February 20, 1925, in the village of Drčevac, Leskovac District, a Yugoslav citizen.

(²¹) The reference is to the editorial office of the newspaper of Yugoslav deserters in Bulgaria, "Napred."

who was going along with us to the frontier and who had just come from Rusa, would be responsible for all groups in Yugoslavia ..."

"... When we were going over the border, a second lieutenant of the border patrol stood at the frontier with 'Cvetko' and the above-mentioned civilian in order to open fire in case something happened and make it possible for us to return..."

(Quoted from the records of the preliminary investigation in Beograd, of July 27, 1950.)

"... I personally saw the Bulgarian frontier organs set up ambushes on both sides of the place where we were to cross. They were sent there by the mentioned second lieutenant, who was present while we were crossing the frontier..."

"... In the field we collected information from the persons to whom we had been sent, while talking to them. Some of the more important and interesting details we put down in writing immediately. Veljković took these data to Bulgaria where the editorial office of the paper 'Napred' used them for slanderous writing against Yugoslavia..."

(Quoted from the records of the preliminary investigation in Beograd, of August 25, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 260

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY "DIMKO"-STOJADIN VELJKOVIĆ BEFORE THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN BEOGRAD, ON THE ORGANIZING IN BULGARIA OF ARMED TERRORIST GROUPS OF YUGOSLAV TRAITORS, FOR DIVERSIONIST AND ESPIONAGE ASSIGNMENTS AND THEIR INFILTRATION INTO YUGOSLAVIA⁽²²⁾

"... After the talk Tosha called the CC of the Bulgarian Communist Party by telephone and said I had arrived in Sofia. Shortly afterwards a comrade came to the editorial office. Later I learned that he was an instructor of the CC. He took me to a villa which was the property of the CC, and was intended for exiles. The villa is in the Sofia suburb of Kniazhevo... Upon arriving at the villa the instructor of the CC told me that, in view of the tasks which awaited me, I was not to make acquaintances among the civilians living near the villa where I was put up..."

"... We left Sofia by jeep in the evening of May 18. The instructor of the CC of the BCP and another person whom I did not know left with us. We went by jeep up to the place called Ravna Shuba, where we hid in a wood and sat there the whole day. In the evening of May 19 we crossed the frontier near the village of Kalunica. Our escorts stood about 50 metres from the frontier while we were crossing, and watched us go over. On May 19, before crossing, after we had spent the day in the woods, a patrol of Bulgarian frontier guards came upon us. Our escorts talked with the guards and they withdrew immediately. As I said, each of us received a 'Schmeisser,' about 200 rounds of ammunition

(22) Stojadin Veljković; a worker, born April 5, 1921, in the village of Alakincl, Južna-Morava District, a Yugoslav citizen.

each, a pistol each with about 100 rounds of ammunition, two hand-grenades each — one offensive and one defensive, a pair of binoculars, a pocket watch, some sandwiches, section maps, 1,000 dinars apiece, knapsacks, tent parts, a compass and perhaps some other odds and ends..."⁽²²⁾

(Quoted from the records of the preliminary investigation in Beograd, of August 7, 1950.)

HOSTILE ACTIVITIES BY THE HUNGARIAN STATE SECURITY CENTRE IN SZEGEDIN AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA⁽²³⁾

DOCUMENT No. 281

FROM THE STATEMENT BY PETER HUSTA BEFORE THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES IN NOVI SAD, ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1949, ON THE ANTI-YUGOSLAV ACTIVITIES OF THE ESPIONAGE CENTRE IN SZEGEDIN⁽²⁴⁾

"After the capitulation of the former Yugoslavia, I volunteered for the Hungarian army. On January 15, 1945, I was taken prisoner by the Red Army in the town of Krasnogorsk. I served as an interpreter for a Russian officer who later, at Miskolc, let me go home..."

"While I was at my grand-father's home, during the morning of January 18, 1949, in the town of Arokhaz, a car with a chauffeur and a policeman drew up to the house. The policeman brought me a summons from the Hungarian AVO in Szegedin. There I was sent to the AVO Second Lieutenant Sandor Szabo, who took me to a separate room and told me the following: 'You fled from Yugoslavia as a soldier and if you want us to protect you, you must work for us.' He observed that the work would not be hard, that it would be nice and easy, that there was nothing to be afraid of, that they would supply me with a Yugoslav

⁽²²⁾ After vain attempts by the members of Veljković's group to carry out in Yugoslavia the orders received from the CC of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Bulgarian intelligence service, all of them except Veljković were caught on June 9 by the authorities with the aid of the local population. Veljković succeeded in getting back to Bulgaria. There he was received by the Bulgarian frontier authorities and State Security, who again put him in touch with Minin and "Cvetko" to whom he submitted an extensive report. On July 27 they again smuggled him into Yugoslavia, together with Georgije Hristov, in the same way as the first time and with the same assignment.

They were caught on Yugoslav territory two days later by the authorities with the aid of the people. This terrorist spy group was put on trial before the County Court in Niš on September 11, 1950.

All the defendants were sentenced to imprisonment.

⁽²³⁾ The centre of the Hungarian intelligence service (AVO) in the Hungarian town of Szegedin, near the Yugoslav frontier, inveigled Yugoslav citizens, who had fled to Hungary on account of such past misdeeds as collaboration with the enemy, treason and other crimes, for spy work against Yugoslavia.

⁽²⁴⁾ Peter Husta, a peasant, born September 5, 1924, in Martonoš, Senta District, Yugoslavia, a Yugoslav citizen of Hungarian descent.

identity card with which I would be able to move about freely in Yugoslavia. I told Szabo that I was afraid of such tasks, to which he said that I should be able to carry out the job easily..."

"... This house is in Hodmezövasarhely Street in Szegedin. While I was in that house, I was locked up in a small room and I never went out anywhere. They brought me my food, beer and cigarettes. There are eighteen rooms in it, and, as I learned later, people trained there are smuggled from Hungary into Yugoslavia by the AVO..."

"About 6 o'clock in the evening a jeep arrived in front of the house occupied by Szabo, Captain Istvan Gobbi and a Second Lieutenant.

"Szabo again visited me and asked whether I had learned the text of the identity card.⁽²⁶⁾ I told him I had, which he later verified. Then he told me: 'Tonight you are to go over into Yugoslavia and your job will not be hard. You are to take with you 25 copies of a paper which you are to distribute in various places. You are also to take 30 letters which you will drop in mail-boxes in Beograd.'

"They gave me 4,000 dinars and we set out towards the frontier.

"On the third day about 6 o'clock Szabo came to me again with Captain Istvan Gobbi and with another officer, Janos Olah. He told me I was to go to Yugoslavia again. This time he gave me 100 copies of the paper 'Nova Borba' and 30 letters addressed to various persons in Yugoslavia, with the instructions to distribute this material in Red Army Street and Marshal Tölbukhin Street in Novi Sad. After I took the material, they also gave me 2,800 dinars for travelling expenses and then Szabo, Gobbi, Olah and I drove to the frontier, where they smuggled me over..."

"... Another time, when I was to go to Yugoslavia again, Second Lieutenant Janos Olah told me I was to collect information on leaders of the State Security Administration, on the Army, its armaments, on factories and other things. They did not tell me where to go, but to see where the best possibilities were. They told me to contact certain confidential people and through them to create the possibilities for the collection of such information..."

(Quoted from the records of the preliminary investigation in Novi Sad, September 1, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 262

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY DEFENDANT DJORDJE RADEK, AT THE TRIAL OF A GROUP OF HUNGARIAN SPIES IN THE COUNTY COURT IN NOVI SAD, APRIL 13, 1949, ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ESPIONAGE CENTRE IN SZEGEDIN AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA⁽²⁷⁾

"I went to the police at the determined hour. After I entered the afore-mentioned room, an AVO officer told me: 'You are a Yugoslav

(²⁶) Szabo gave Peter Husta a forged identity card bearing the name of Vladislav Kubičak, a peasant from Senta (Yugoslavia).

(²⁷) Djordje Radek, born May 28, 1925, in Velika Kikinda, a student of theology in Szegedin, Yugoslav citizen of Hungarian descent. After the liberation, Radek was sentenced by the Hungarian authorities for hostile activities to eight months' imprisonment and to five years' loss of civic rights.

citizen, do you speak Yugoslav?' ... He told me there was something to be taken to Yugoslavia, to Subotica, and that he had selected me for the job ... He told me if I did not do the job, they would intern me in a camp for six months ..."

"... On that occasion, in the AVO centre, where I had come for orders and instructions for work in Yugoslavia, I saw six Yugoslav identity cards on the desk of the above officer. He took one, glued my photograph on it and impressed a seal upon it. He then brought me a rather big parcel and two smaller ones and gave me 1,500 dinars, telling me that I was to take all three parcels to Subotica, to buy stamps for about 120 dinars, stick them on the letters he had given me and drop them into mail-boxes ... He told me to slip about 40 booklets, which were not addressed, under doorways ..."

(Quoted from the records of the trial in the County Court in Novi Sad, April 13, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 23

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY DEFENDANT PETAR ANDJEL AT THE TRIAL OF A GROUP OF HUNGARIAN SPIES IN THE COUNTY COURT IN NOVI SAD, ON APRIL 13, 1949, ON THE ANTI-YUGOSLAV ACTIVITIES OF THE ESPIONAGE CENTRE IN SZEGEDIN^(*)

"... They offered me a pistol and a hand-grenade, too ... While I was crossing the frontier from Hungary to Yugoslavia, two State Security agents from Szegedin, one of whom was armed with a pistol and the other with an automatic rifle, crossed with me about half a kilometre into Yugoslav territory ..."

(Quoted from the records of the trial in the County Court in Novi Sad, April 13, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 24

FROM THE TESTIMONY BY ANTAL SURANYI AT THE TRIAL OF A GROUP OF HUNGARIAN SPIES IN THE COUNTY COURT IN NOVI SAD, ON APRIL 13, 1949^(**)

"... After five days of interrogation and flogging, Tomas, an officer of the AVO, asked me whether I would be willing to go to Yugoslavia to carry out a job which they would give me. I consented to everything. Tomas then gave me the following statement to sign: 'I declare that I will work according to instructions and that after completing the assignment I shall return to the AVO in Szegedin ...' Having signed this state-

(*) Petar Andjel, born February 21, 1928, in Čantavir, a peasant, Yugoslav citizen of Hungarian descent.

(**) Antal Suranyi, born February 18, 1929, in Čantavir, a peasant, Yugoslav citizen of Hungarian descent.

ment, I went to room No. 8 where I signed a receipt for 1,800 dinars. After that they sent me to another room where I received a parcel with 250 to 300 pamphlets which were to be taken to Yugoslavia. After I had been given the assignment, Tomas told me that when I completed the job in Zagreb, I was to go to Sombor and to find one Sandor Ilos..."

"...I was again interrogated by Tomas and beaten horribly...⁽⁸⁹⁾ Tomas tortured me in the following way. I had to sit on a chair without a back support, with my arms and legs in the air and to smoke cigarettes, one after the other. When I was no longer able to stand it, I fell from the chair and he began to kick me in the chest..."

(Quoted from the records of the trial in the County Court in Novi Sad, April 13, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 265

NOTE OF PROTEST OF THE YUGOSLAV MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS No. 416550 OF OCTOBER 26, 1949, TO THE HUNGARIAN LEGATION IN BEOGRAD, IN CONNECTION WITH THE SMUGGLING OF DIVERSIONISTS AND SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS INTO YUGOSLAVIA FROM HUNGARY

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia notifies the Legation of the People's Republic of Hungary of the following:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY, in its Notes No. 44460 of March 16 this year, and No. 415025 of September 8 this year, protested to the Government of the PR of Hungary against the smuggling of various spies, diversionists and subversive elements into the FPRY by the Hungarian authorities. The Government of the PR of Hungary, however, took no steps to have the Hungarian authorities discontinue these hostile acts towards the FPRY. On the contrary, the Hungarian state organs, together with the organs of the Hungarian intelligence service, continue to commit various provocations and to smuggle spies and other hostile elements into the FPRY, especially trained for diversions, espionage and other destructive work, calculated to undermine the system in the FPRY and to prevent peaceful socialist development by the Yugoslav peoples.

To this end, the Hungarian authorities organized a special espionage centre against Yugoslavia in Szegedin, on Vasarhely Boulevard, in which various recruited criminals and fascists are being trained in diversions and espionage, later to be smuggled illegally into Yugoslavia with the purpose of carrying on destructive hostile activities against the FPRY. The work of training these spies, agents of the Hungarian intelligence service, is directed by specially appointed Hungarian officers, such as Lieutenant Colonel Janos Dregeli, Captain Tomasi, Lieutenant Olah-

⁽⁸⁹⁾ This occurred after Suranyi returned to Hungary from his first trip to Yugoslavia, without having completed his assignment.

Juhas, Second Lieutenants Sandor Szabo, Kecskemeti and others who also personally organize the smuggling of these criminals into the FPRY.

The type of people the Hungarian authorities rely upon in their extremely hostile activities against the order in the FPRY and against the peoples of Yugoslavia, is best illustrated by the statements made by some of them at the trial before the County Court in Novi Sad, from September 12 to 15, 1949.

Peter Husta, a Yugoslav citizen of Hungarian descent, volunteered for the Horthy fascist army, in 1941, in which he served until 1944, when he was taken prisoner by the Red Army. Since 1945, he has been residing permanently in Hungary. In January 1949, he crossed into the FPRY illegally for purposes of smuggling, and upon returning to Hungary he was arrested as a smuggler. The officers of the Hungarian intelligence service then informed him that he would not be punished for smuggling if he consented to go to Yugoslavia to take some anti-Yugoslav propaganda material there, and collect information on the plans of economic enterprises, the names of Party and state leaders, on the numerical strength, armaments and movements of army units, as well as other espionage information. After supplying him with a forged identity card bearing the name Lajos Horvat, the same officers of the Hungarian intelligence service, on January 22 this year, took him by car to the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier, near Bački Vinogradi, and smuggled him into the FPRY. Up to August this year, Peter Husta crossed the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier four more times on espionage assignments received from the intelligence centre in Szegedin.

Janos Szabo, a Yugoslav citizen of Hungarian descent, engaged in theft and smuggling since 1945. When he was jailed for this in Hungary, in January, 1949, Lieutenant Olah-Juhas informed him he would be severely punished for these crimes if he did not consent to do espionage work against the FPRY. After that, Janos Szabo crossed the Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier several times with forged documents received from officer Olah-Juhas, taking anti-Yugoslav propaganda material to the FPRY and collecting intelligence information.

Sandor Sudolski, a Hungarian national, a citizen of the PR of Hungary, took part in battles on the Eastern Front against the Red Army from 1942 onwards. He deserted from the Hungarian Army owing to embezzlements and has since then lived under an assumed name, engaging in thefts and robbery as a member of a gang of thieves. After his arrest, officers in the Szegedin intelligence centre informed him he would not be punished if he consented to go to Yugoslavia and to collect information on Yugoslav economic enterprises for the Hungarian intelligence service.

Karlo Szabados, a Yugoslav citizen of Hungarian descent, who had been a smuggler; Djula Djuričin, a Yugoslav citizen of Hungarian descent, who was given the task of agitating against the peasant work cooperatives in Yugoslavia and committing sabotage in them, as well as others, became spies of the Hungarian intelligence centre in a similar way.

It follows from the foregoing that in the attacks against the socialist system in the FPRY, the Hungarian authorities do not shrink even from

the basest means which in no way differ from the terrorist methods used at the time of the Horthy fascist regime.

Protesting most vigorously against these hostile activities which the Hungarian organs, using fascist methods, are carrying on in their struggle against the peoples of Yugoslavia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests that the culprits be taken severely to task, and that an end be put to such anti-Yugoslav activities.⁽²¹⁾

Beograd, October 26, 1949.

⁽²¹⁾ The Hungarian Government did not answer this note.

IV

THE USE OF MILITARY POWER ON THE
YUGOSLAV FRONTIERS AS A MEANS IN
THE POLICY OF AGGRESSIVE PRESSURE

SYSTEMATIC PROVOCATION OF BORDER INCIDENTS ON YUGOSLAV FRONTIERS BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF ALBANIA, BULGARIA, HUNGARY AND RUMANIA, AS ONE OF THE FORMS OF MILITARY PRESSURE AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA(*)

DOCUMENT No. 288

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 42575 OF FEBRUARY 23, 1949, REGARDING INCIDENTS PROVOKED BY HUNGARIAN FRONTIER AUTHORITIES ON THE YUGOSLAV BORDER

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia presents its compliments to the Legation of the Republic of Hungary and, under instructions from the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, has the honour to communicate the following:

In the course of December 1948 and January 1949, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary addressed several Notes to the Legation of the FPRY in Budapest dealing with "incidents" on the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier.

Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, by its Note No. 02102, dated December 9, 1948, protested that, allegedly, a shot had been fired from a rifle in Yugoslav territory, on August 9, 1948, the bullet from which fell on Hungarian territory, 270 metres away from a Hungarian citizen named Horvat. Four months later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary qualified this alleged firing of a rifle shot as an "armed act of violence."

On December 29, 1948, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary sent the Legation of the FPRY in Budapest Note No. 02129, protesting against the arrest of a Hungarian citizen, Ferenc Lengyel, who crossed into the FPRY, on October 26th, 1948, with a permit issued to persons whose property is cut by the frontier line. From the answer of the Legation of the FPRY regarding the case it is well known

(*) From September 25, 1948, to October 15, 1950, the Yugoslav Government addressed 97 notes of protest to the Albanian, Bulgarian, Rumanian and Hungarian Governments regarding armed incidents the frontier organs of these countries were systematically provoking on the Yugoslav borders. Of this total 30 notes were sent to the Albanian Government, 26 notes to the Bulgarian Government, 13 to the Rumanian and 28 to the Hungarian Government. In the period between July 1, 1948 and August 31, 1950, there were 896 frontier incidents provoked by the organs of the above-mentioned countries on the Yugoslav border.

that Ferenc Lengyel is a Yugoslav citizen who crossed into Yugoslav territory, on October 26, 1948, with a false permit under the name of Franjo Kudelj. Upon arriving at his home town Draza, Beli Manastir District, Lengyel was recognized by the inhabitants who reported him to the authorities of the FPRY for a murder he had committed in 1941. Because of this murder, Ferenc Lengyel had gone to Hungary illegally after the liberation in order to evade responsibility for the committed crime, and settled down at Lanchug. Apart from this, in 1941 and 1942, during his imprisonment in Sombor, Ferenc Lengyel was used by the Hungarian fascist police as an agent provocateur. In this capacity he betrayed several imprisoned communists who were later shot. For these crimes, and for the use of a false permit for crossing into Yugoslavia, Ferenc Lengyel was arrested by the authorities of the FPRY. He succeeded, however, in escaping while being conducted to the People's Court.

In this case, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary protested against the arrest of a criminal by the Yugoslav authorities. In its Note it also mentioned that it "reserves the right to take into consideration what measures would be deemed necessary."

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary protested, by its Note No. 02147 of January 10, 1949, against the alleged firing of rifle shots from Yugoslav territory on December 6, 1948, the bullets of which fell near the village of Belavar. In this Note, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary stated that the Government of the Republic of Hungary considered the situation in the frontier area as "untenable" and that it would be compelled to take the necessary measures into consideration.

Detailed investigation of the case showed that on the above-mentioned day, December 6, 1948, along the frontier near Novo Varje, Djurdjevac District, two civilians coming from Hungary crossed the Yugoslav border. After they had gone 30 metres in Yugoslav territory, the Yugoslav soldier who was on sentry duty on the right bank of the Drava River, ordered them to stop. Since these persons did not want to stop after another call to halt, the soldier fired a shot which was not aimed at them, in order to bring them to a stop. As this happened near a Hungarian frontier post, two Hungarian soldiers, having heard the shot, also crossed the frontier, and made their way towards that spot. The Yugoslav soldier called upon them to turn back. As they did not do so, he fired a shot in the air in their direction. After that the Hungarian soldiers and the two unidentified civilians withdrew to Hungarian territory.

The Yugoslav soldier did not, therefore, fire without reason at the Hungarian citizens who were in Hungarian territory, as alleged in the Hungarian Note. On the contrary, he was doing his duty on the frontier and made use of his firearms in connection with persons who were trespassing on the territory of the FPRY and did not stop at the usual call to halt.

Finally, on January 27, 1949, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary again took as a subject of its Note a rifle shot allegedly fired on December 23, 1948, from Yugoslavia towards Hungarian territory in the Reska frontier section.

Accordingly, in the course of December 1948 and January 1949, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary protested on two occasions because of an allegedly fired rifle shot from the Yugoslav territory. This was done several months after the shot had supposedly been fired. The higher competent authorities of the FPRY nevertheless investigated the allegations contained in the Notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary regarding the firing in both cases but found the allegations to be groundless. The protest of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary regarding the case of Ferenc Lengyel has also been proved to have been out of place. As stated above, Ferenc Lengyel had been arrested quite rightfully by the authorities of the FPRY as a criminal with a false permit under the name of Franjo Kudelj. The incident which happened near the Hungarian village Belavar, as proven above, was not described accurately in Note No. 02147 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary. Had the facts been established with good intentions, there would have been no reason for the aforesaid Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary.

The foregoing clearly shows that the Notes of protest of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary were not justified, that they were based on unfounded or unchecked information. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, however, made extremely severe and incomprehensible remarks in its Note to the effect that the situation on the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier was "untenable" for which the Yugoslav frontier organs were blamed, and that "unless the Yugoslav Government puts an end to such offences, the Hungarian Government will be forced to consider the application of the necessary measures."

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY does not consider the situation on the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier to be satisfactory, but the frontier authorities of the FPRY are not responsible for this situation. The responsibility rests exclusively on the authorities of the Republic of Hungary. In its Note addressed to the Legation of the Republic of Hungary in Beograd, or in the Notes from the Legation of the FPRY in Budapest addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY had already pointed out the following incidents which had occurred on the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier and which had been provoked by the attitude and actions of the Hungarian frontier authorities.

(The Note goes on to describe nineteen incidents which took place between October 20, 1948, and January 31, 1949, on the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier.)

Although the violations of the territory of the FPRY by the Hungarian organs are numerous, as can be seen from the above, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY did not consider it necessary to inform the Government of the Republic of Hungary of each concrete case, nor to protest, because it felt certain that these incidents would cease. The violations of the territory of the FPRY and the incidents

provoked by the frontier authorities of the Republic of Hungary have not only not stopped, but, on the contrary, they have become more frequent. Without any reason or cause the Government of the Republic of Hungary is shifting the responsibility which actually rests with its border authorities upon the frontier organs of the FPRY, blaming the Government of the FPRY for such incidents. The frontier organs of the FPRY have not, in a single case, abused their rights in the performance of their duties on the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier, being cognizant that they were on the border of an allied country. Bearing in mind the fact that there has not been one single violation of the territory of the Republic of Hungary by the frontier organs of the FPRY, whereas it has been established that there were several serious violations of the territory of the FPRY by the border authorities of the Republic of Hungary, it must be concluded that the Notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary — and particularly the unfounded and serious charges blaming the Government of the FPRY for an "untenable" situation on the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier — have the sole aim of representing the FPRY and its Government to Hungarian public opinion and to others as enemies of the Republic of Hungary and the Hungarian people. Apart from this, the above-mentioned Notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary are aimed at justifying the undertaking of "certain" unusual measures against the FPRY on the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier, hinted at in the Notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Legation of the Republic of Hungary. Furthermore, these Notes are aimed precisely at creating such an untenable situation on the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier, that it would undoubtedly be detrimental to the interests both of the FPRY and the Republic of Hungary. Such methods of artificial provocation of misunderstandings and conflicts, employed by the Government of the Republic of Hungary in its relations with the FPRY, do not lead to improvement of mutual relations but, on the contrary, to increasing tension and differences between the FPRY and the Republic of Hungary.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia informs the Government of the Republic of Hungary that the responsibility for the present situation on the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier rests exclusively with the Government of the Republic of Hungary, as does the responsibility for the situation which might arise if the new special measures against the FPRY, hinted at in the Notes, are undertaken on the Yugoslav-Hungarian border by the Hungarian authorities, measures for which the Government of the FPRY is blamed for in advance without foundation.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY avails itself of this opportunity to renew the expression of its consideration to the Legation of the Republic of Hungary.^(*) ^(*)

Beograd, February 23, 1949.

^(*) Note given in excerpts.

^(*) The Legation of the Republic of Hungary in Beograd returned this Note on March 2, 1949, without an answer.

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF PROTEST No. 418456 OF OCTOBER 11, 1949, ON THE MURDER OF A YUGOSLAV FRONTIER GUARD BY ALBANIAN BORDER AUTHORITIES

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia communicates the following to the Legation of the People's Republic of Albania:

In its Note No. 416250, of September 5, 1949, the Government of the FPRY proposed to the Albanian Government that mixed Yugoslav-Albanian commissions be established, in order to eliminate all frontier incidents on the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier, and to avoid all undesirable consequences which arise therefrom. For this purpose, the Government of the FPRY proposed in the same Note that delegations of both countries meet at Cetinje, (*) on September 20 of this year, in order to negotiate and conclude an agreement. Further, on September 29, 1949, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY through the Albanian Chargé d'Affaires in Beograd requested an answer to the foregoing Note.

The fact that the Albanian Government has still not answered the proposal of the Government of the FPRY proves that the Albanian Government is not willing to have a normal situation established on the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier. The absence of all good will on the part of the Albanian Government to put an end to the abnormal situation on the frontier has been attested to clearly enough by the frontier incidents which the Albanian border authorities are continuing to provoke. Thus, on October 7, 1949, at 2:30 p. m. near the locality of Čaf-Stoberce, 14 kilometres northwest of Djakovica, Albanian soldiers from ambush opened fire from an automatic weapon upon Yugoslav guards who were on duty in Yugoslav territory and, on that occasion, killed a member of the Yugoslav Army, Mitar Vojnović, on the spot.

The assassination of Yugoslav frontier guard Mitar Vojnović, which was deliberately perpetrated by the Albanian frontier authorities and for which the Albanian Government is responsible, reveals the unpacific and hostile character of the policy of the Albanian Government towards the FPRY. The Albanian Government is pursuing such a reckless policy despite warnings and protests by the Government of the FPRY, although it is clear that such a policy is primarily directed against the vital interests of the Albanian people.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY protests most vigorously against the assassination of Mitar Vojnović, a member of the Yugoslav Army, which was carried out deliberately by the Albanian frontier authorities, and again draws the attention of the Albanian Government to the fact that it is high time to put an end to the provocation of incidents on the Yugoslav frontier.

In connection with the assassination of Yugoslav frontier guard, Mitar Vojnović, the Government of the FPRY requests:

1. that the Albanian Government take to task and punish the perpetrators of the base assassination of Yugoslav frontier guard, Mitar

(*) Cetinje — capital of the People's Republic of Montenegro.

Vojnović, and inform the Government of the FPRY of the sentences passed;

2. that the Albanian Government pay, by way of compensation, the amount of 500,000 dinars to the family of the assassinated Yugoslav frontier guard, Mitar Vojnović.^(*)

Beograd, October 11, 1949.

DOCUMENT No. 222

REPORT DATED OCTOBER 8, 1949, ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE MURDER OF A YUGOSLAV FRONTIER GUARD ON THE YUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN BORDER

The Commission set up by order of the National Defence Brigade Headquarters in connection with the murder of Private Mitar Vojnović, member of a detached company of the above-mentioned Brigade, by the Albanian frontier authorities 10 metres within Yugoslav territory, met on October 8, 1949, from 1 to 3 p. m. The Commission complied with the provisions of International Law on frontier incidents and sought to investigate the case jointly with the Albanian frontier authorities. With that purpose in mind, the Commission kept signalling from Čaf-Prusit to the Albanian frontier authorities from 10:30 a. m. to 12 noon of the same day. It also approached the Albanian frontier post for that sector, inviting representatives of the Albanian frontier authorities in their own tongue for half an hour to come and constitute a mixed Commission. After more than 15 minutes, however, the ringing of a bell was heard at this post. This was the Albanian signal of alarm and at this signal all soldiers were to take firing positions. Although they heard and understood what we wanted — this was proved by the fact that the bell rang 3-4 times — a half hour after the ringing not a single representative of the Albanian frontier authorities had yet appeared at the border. The Commission then decided to proceed to an investigation without the representatives of the Albanian frontier authorities, since the latter failed to show up. The findings of the Commission on the spot were the following:

1. On October 7, 1949, at 2:30 p. m., Private Mitar Vojnović was killed by the Albanian frontier authorities 10 metres within Yugoslav territory. The same day, at 12 noon, Private Mitar Vojnović and Sergeant Tomislav Spasić were sent from frontier post Čaf-Stoberce to a place where soldiers from this post had been working for three days to clear up the area along the frontier. At 2:30 p. m. Sergeant Tomislav Spasić went back to the frontier post (about 70 metres away) to drink water, while Mitar Vojnović remained outdoors alone. At that time, short bursts of fire from an automatic weapon were heard coming from Albanian territory, quite close to the frontier line. The Albanian territory up to the frontier line is forested. Private Mitar Vojnović was hit by an

^(*) The Legation of the People's Republic of Albania returned this Note on October 15, 1949, without an answer.

Albanian bullet and fell dead on the spot, 10 metres from the frontier line.

(a) The place where the murder was committed is 70 meters south-east of Yugoslav frontier post Caf-Stoberce, i. e. 10 metres within Yugoslav territory and in the direction of boundary post No. 10. The forest on the Yugoslav side had been cut down up to the frontier line, whereas on the Albanian side it grows up to the very edge of the border. This unfelled forest offered the murderers, i. e. the Albanian frontier organs, the possibility of drawing unnoticed quite close to the frontier line and opening fire.

(b) At the same time, at 2:30 p. m., when Private Mitar Vojnović was killed, bursts of machine gun fire were heard coming from the Yugoslav frontier post and the bullets fell all around the post, around Albanian frontier post, 450 metres away from the place of murder. The machine gun fire, which lasted more than 4 minutes, was directed towards the sentry at the post and over into Yugoslav territory. Simultaneously, in addition to the machine gun fire, rifle volleys were fired from the Albanian frontier post in the direction of the Yugoslav sentry near the post and around the frontier post itself. As the sentry saw that his comrade Mitar Vojnović had been shot, and since bullets were falling all around him, he leapt from his post and lay down with the other guards who took up position around the frontier post and guarded the corpse.

(c) After the murder, Albanian patrols, including officers, were noticed moving along the frontier.

(d) At 11 p. m. another shot was fired by the Albanian frontier organs in the direction of our frontier post.

(e) The soldiers who had been sent to cut wood had only hand-grenades with them. But since Mitar Vojnović was shot in the head and died on the spot he could not make use of his hand-grenade.

2. — Medical findings.

At the place described above, where the murder was committed, still visible traces of blood were found on the grass. The head of Private Mitar Vojnović was lying in the direction of the Yugoslav frontier post, while his legs were towards the Albanian frontier post. The body was lying on its back.

Rigor mortis had already set in. Death spots were clearly noticeable particularly on the lower parts of the body.

On the neck, 2 centimetres below the protuberantia occipitalis, was the opening of the wound, 1 cm in diameter, with smooth edges, and coagulated blood around the wound. The bullet left the neck in the region of the Adam's apple, leaving an opening with rough edges 4 cm in diameter; muscle tissue and throat cartilage had been shattered.

Diagnosis: *Vulnus sclopetarium capitis regionem occipitalis, cum perforatio cerebri occipitalis et fractura ossis occipitalis.*

Wound caused by a firearm in the back of the neck, accompanied by the breaking of the occipitalis bone and perforation of the lower part of the brain.

Causa mortis — cause of death: *haemorrhagis cerebri occipitalis* — brain hemorrhage.

Opinion: The death under inquest was a violent one, caused by a firearm, probably a sub-machine gun. Judging from the height of

the entry and exit of the bullet, the deceased was probably kneeling or was just about to stand up because the place of entry was higher than the place of exit and, in view of the surrounding ground, there should not have been such a difference if the soldier had been standing upright.

Opinion and Conclusion of the Commission.

On the basis of the foregoing findings, the Commission is of the opinion and concludes that this was a thoroughly prepared and organized provocation, and does so for the following reasons, which have already been mentioned above.

The soldiers of the aforesaid frontier post had been clearing the ground in the vicinity for three days, and while they were working the Albanian soldiers were on the lookout to see if one happened to remain alone, so that they could kidnap or kill him, as was the case here.

The second reason in support of the Commission's opinion is the fact that the moment the murder of Private Mitar Vojnović had been committed, fire from rifles and machine guns was opened from the Albanian frontier post in the direction of the Yugoslav frontier post. The aim of the Albanian frontier authorities in doing this was to drag the body into their own territory, i. e. by firing from the flank to pin down the soldiers at the Yugoslav frontier post and make it possible for them to haul away the Yugoslav soldier.

After the murder, the patrols wanted to see whether the assignment had been carried out and attempted to provoke new incidents.

The Albanians took advantage of the forest on the Albanian side to creep up slyly and to carry out their assignment.

Death to Fascism — Liberty to the People!

Members of the Commission:

(Sgd.) Captain Dr. Gjošo Kamčevski
Chief of the Medical Division of the National
Defence Brigade.

(Sgd.) Second Lieutenant Mišin-Sanja

(Sgd.) First Lieutenant Mile Mandić

(Sgd.) Ensign Mišo Petrović

DOCUMENT No. 269

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 44061 OF MARCH 3, 1950, ON THE FALSE INculpATION OF YUGOSLAV FRONTIER ORGANS FOR THE MURDER OF TWO BULGARIAN FRONTIER GUARDS

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia informs the Embassy of the PR of Bulgaria of the following:

On February 27, 1950, the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Sofia a Note, in which it protested on behalf of the Bulgarian Government against the alleged murder of two Bulgarian frontier guards, supposedly

committed by Yugoslav frontier organs on February 25, 1949, on Bulgarian territory, in the area of the village of Glushevo.

Through detailed investigation and interrogation of Yugoslav frontier guards who were on duty in the above-mentioned section of the frontier on February 25, 1950, it has been established that not a single Yugoslav frontier guard had crossed into Bulgarian territory nor had a single shot been fired by the Yugoslav frontier guards on that day. The investigation further established that, on February 25, 1950, about 4 p. m., rifle fire was heard coming from Bulgarian territory about 500 metres from the frontier, and one bullet shot from Bulgarian territory fell in Yugoslav territory near Private Dragomir Vitanović, who was on duty at the Yugoslav frontier post of Ravna Njiva. After that, the Yugoslav frontier organs several times heard single shots and volleys of rifle fire coming from Bulgarian territory.

The investigation proved beyond a doubt that the accusations against the Yugoslav frontier organs set forth in the above-mentioned Note of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been completely invented.

It clearly follows from the above that the Bulgarian Government's Note attempts to conceal the real causes for the disorder and murders in the Bulgarian frontier area and to shift the responsibility from the Bulgarian authorities to the Yugoslav frontier organs. This Note is another hostile act by the Bulgarian Government against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. It is aimed at slandering the Yugoslav frontier organs by distorting the facts on incidents in Bulgarian territory. Thus the Bulgarian Government is artificially creating an atmosphere of tension and frontier provocations in order to find justification for its hostile policy towards the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia rejects in its entirety the Note of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of February 27, 1950, as slanderous, and cautions the Bulgarian Government that by such false accusations it cannot relieve itself of the responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of affairs on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier.^(*)

Beograd, March 3, 1950.

DOCUMENT No. 276

STATEMENT BY YUGOSLAV PRIVATE JOVAN STOJŠIĆ, CONCERNING THE SHOOTING ON BULGARIAN TERRITORY ON THE DAY WHEN TWO BULGARIAN FRONTIER GUARDS WERE ALLEGEDLY KILLED BY YUGOSLAV FRONTIER ORGANS

Statement

I, Jovan Lazar Stojšić, born on March 25, 1928, in the village of Bačinci, Šid District, PR of Serbia, M.P.O. 7573, Kriva Palanka, state the following:

On February 25, 1950, I was assigned to patrol duty and while on duty I neither noticed nor heard anything. I returned from duty at approximately 1 p. m.

^(*) The Bulgarian Government did not answer this Note.

At approximately 4 p. m. I was in the Ravna Njiva frontier post and at that moment the sentry rang the signal bell. I and my comrades took our arms, left the post and ran towards the sentry, who informed us that there were one Bulgarian officer and three soldiers near our frontier, 70—80 metres within Bulgarian territory.

I immediately took the field glasses from the sentry and observed the Bulgarian territory. In the group of Bulgarian soldiers, I noticed an officer in grey uniform who held his cap in his hand and was armed with a pistol, waving and giving signals to his soldiers. At these signals, three of the soldiers and an officer wearing a plain soldier's uniform with officer's epaulettes came up to him. They all gathered together, hid behind bushes, where they remained a few minutes, and then went off in the direction of the village of Giushevo in Bulgarian territory. The officer who was signalling wore a uniform that was different from the uniform of the other officer and did not look like a Bulgarian uniform. I saw all this with field glasses from the Ravna Njiva frontier post, from a distance of 60 metres.

I then returned to the frontier post — a few minutes after 4 p. m. — and heard shooting from Bulgarian territory, but did not go out to ascertain in which direction the shots were being fired.

At a quarter to 6 p. m., accompanied by Rista Kostić, I left for duty as leader of a patrol. Darkness set in while we were on our way toward the place called Božidarnica and we could not notice anything. When we reached the vicinity of Božidarnica and were about one thousand metres away from it, we heard shooting. At first single shots were fired, and then two or three bursts. We immediately withdrew and the shooting became more distant. In the meanwhile we were on the lookout to see if anybody was approaching us. Shooting was heard from Bulgarian territory.

The above statement is true and I am morally and materially responsible for any inaccuracy.

(Sgd.) Private Jovan Stojšić

M. P. O. 7573 — Kriva Palanka, February 28, 1950.

DOCUMENT No. 271

STATEMENT BY PRIVATE STJEPAN I. KENGJEL, CONCERNING THE SHOOTING IN BULGARIAN TERRITORY ON THE DAY WHEN TWO BULGARIAN FRONTIER GUARDS WERE ALLEGEDLY KILLED BY YUGOSLAV FRONTIER ORGANS

Statement

I, Private Stjepan Imre Kengjel, born on February 3, 1928, in the village of Lujinkovac, Varaždin District, PR of Croatia, M.P.O. No. 7573, Kriva Palanka, state the following:

On Saturday, February 25, 1950, at approximately 4 p. m., I was on sentry duty from 4 till 6 p. m.

At approximately 4 p. m. I noticed that an officer in a grey uniform was walking along the Bulgarian border-patrol path, which is inside Bul-

garian territory at a distance of 30 to 40 metres from our frontier. The officer went from Deve Bair on Bulgarian territory in the direction of the place called Božidarnica and again returned whence he had started from. Before returning he waved his cap and his hands in the direction of the Bulgarian Deve Bair frontier post. I also heard a whistle. At this signal from the officer, a soldier appeared in the vicinity of the Bulgarian Deve Bair frontier post and went towards the officer. When the soldier reached the officer, they talked for about 10 to 15 minutes. While they were talking, an officer and two soldiers appeared from bushes located in the valley at a distance of 60 metres. They waited for a short time while the officer and soldier talked, and then they came out of the bushes and went up to them. All five of them talked for about 30 minutes and then went deeper into Bulgarian territory towards Giushevo.

Before going on duty, while resting in the frontier post, I heard shooting from Bulgarian territory. The shooting was coming from the Bulgarian frontier post near Božidarnica. I cannot state the exact distance where the shooting came from, but it was approximately 500 metres. The shooting lasted while I was in the frontier post, and by the time I came out it had already stopped.

The above statement is true and I am morally and materially responsible for any inaccuracy.

(Sgd.) Private Stjepan Kengjel

M.P.O. 7573 — Kriva Palanka, February 28, 1950.

DOCUMENT No. 27

NOTE OF PROTEST OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT No. 46062 OF
MARCH 30, 1950, REGARDING THE INCIDENT PROVOKED BY THE RU-
MANIAN FRONTIER ORGANS ON THE YUGOSLAV-RUMANIAN BORDER
ON THE DAY OF ELECTIONS FOR THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia informs the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Rumanian People's Republic of the following:

At 6:15 in the morning of March 26, 1950, election day for the People's Deputies to the National Assembly of the FPRY, in the Yugoslav-Rumanian frontier sector between the villages of Radojevo and Hetin, Rumanian army units opened rifle and machine gun fire upon Yugoslav territory, from Rumanian territory. The machine gun fire, with short interruptions, lasted until 9:00 a. m. Dumdum bullets exploded 200 to 300 metres inside Yugoslav territory. The position of the Rumanian machine gun was 400 metres south of the village of Kece, and 500 metres inside Rumanian territory. For almost three hours, Rumanian soldiers at that position machine-gunned Yugoslav territory in the direction of the villages of Radojevo and Hetin and in the direction of the Yugoslav frontier post south of Hetin village.

The same day, one kilometre east of the village of Klarija, Rumanian soldiers fired over 30 shots from a machine gun into Yugoslav territory.

That day, in the frontier section north-east of the village of Veliko Središte, Rumanian soldiers fired rifles and automatic weapons in the direction of Yugoslav territory. On that occasion, 10 bullets fell in Yugoslav territory. Ten shots were also fired in the frontier section east of the village of Kuštilj, the bullets falling in the territory of the FPRY.

These latest armed provocations by Rumanian army units on the Yugoslav-Rumanian frontier, deliberately carried out on the very day the peoples of the FPRY were electing their representatives to the National Assembly of the FPRY, once again show that the Rumanian Government in its hostile policy towards the FPRY does not shrink even from serious armed incidents and the provocation of disorders in the frontier area, in order to realize its anti-Yugoslav shemes.

When it became evident that all the anti-Yugoslav press and radio propaganda in the countries of the Eastern bloc, aimed at disrupting the unity of the Yugoslav people, had completely failed, the Rumanian Government decided at the last moment to try this latest provocation in order to cause trouble and unrest in the frontier area on the election day itself. It thus thought to influence the population of the frontier area and disturb the normal and peaceful course of the elections. This is a most flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the FPRY.

The armed provocation by the Rumanian frontier organs did not, however, succeed in provoking the Yugoslav border patrol, which did not return the fire from the Rumanian side of the border. The inhabitants of the villages along the frontier were justly revolted and indignant at this provocation and at the perpetrators and organizers of disorders on the Yugoslav-Rumanian frontier.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY protests most vigorously against these openly hostile acts by Rumanian army units on the Yugoslav-Rumanian frontier, and requests the Rumanian Government to investigate the matter, punish the offenders and take measures to prevent the recurrence of such and similar armed provocations on the Yugoslav-Rumanian frontier.(¹)

Beograd, March 30, 1950.

DOCUMENT No. 273

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF PROTEST No. 412333 OF JUNE 17, 1950, REGARDING THE INCIDENT PROVOKED BY THE BULGARIAN FRONTIER ORGANS ON THE YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN BORDER AND THE WOUNDING OF A YUGOSLAV FRONTIER GUARD

In the night between June 14 and 15, 1950, a Bulgarian military unit of about 20 soldiers organized and carried out an attack on Yugoslav frontier guards along the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border, in the sector

(¹) The Rumanian Government did not answer this Note.

of the village of Mazgoš, eleven kilometres northeast of Dimitrovgrad,^(*) and one kilometre northeast of hill 698. That night, at about 1 a. m., two Bulgarian soldiers armed with sub-machine guns and hand-grenades crossed the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border at the above-mentioned point, went 110 metres into Yugoslav territory, and lay in ambush. The other Bulgarian soldiers, divided into three groups consisting of 5 to 8 soldiers each, lay in ambush along the border, in order to cover the two soldiers in our territory.

When the Yugoslav border patrol, on its regular beat, came within 20 metres of the two Bulgarian soldiers ambushed inside Yugoslav territory, the Bulgarian soldiers along the frontier and the two Bulgarian soldiers in Yugoslav territory opened fire on the patrol from automatic weapons. When the Yugoslav patrol took up defence positions against this attack and started to return the fire, firing six bullets, the two above-mentioned Bulgarian soldiers threw five hand-grenades at the patrol, of which four exploded, lightly wounding the Yugoslav border guard Džemo Ametovski.

The Bulgarians in ambush kept up the fire against the Yugoslav border guards for a whole hour, firing more than 400 bullets. The two Bulgarian soldiers withdrew to Bulgarian territory, under cover of fire from the other Bulgarians on the border, only after nearby Yugoslav patrols had signalled by rifle fire that they were aware of the attack by the Bulgarian soldiers. Left in Yugoslav territory were more than 40 German 9 mm. sub-machine gun cartridges, Model 42, and an unexploded Bulgarian hand-grenade.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia protests most energetically against this latest deliberate and arrogant armed provocation by the Bulgarian military authorities, and the flagrant violation of Yugoslav territory by Bulgarian soldiers. It considers the Bulgarian Government responsible for this premeditated and insolent attack on Yugoslav border guards, as well as for all the frontier provocations and incidents that the Bulgarian frontier organs are continuing to carry out on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia requests that the Bulgarian Government take to task and punish the perpetrators of this base attack on Yugoslav border guards, which was planned in advance, and that it take the urgent steps necessary to prevent the repetition of similar provocations and incidents on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border.^(*)

Beograd, June 17, 1950.

^(*) Dimitrovgrad, formerly Caribrod, a town in Yugoslavia near the Bulgarian border. It was renamed Dimitrovgrad in memory of the famous revolutionary and anti-fascist fighter, Georgi Dimitrov, after his death.

^(*) By its Note No. 33449-16-I of June 30, 1950, the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry returned this Note unanswered.

COMMISSION FINDINGS CONCERNING THE INCIDENT ON THE YUGO-SLAV-BULGARIAN FRONTIER ON JUNE 15, 1950

Summary of Proceedings

of the on-the-spot investigation of the incident provoked near the village of Mazgoš by Bulgarian frontier organs, with the aim of capturing our border patrol. The Commission is composed of the following:

1. Captain Rade Damjanović, Battalion Commander;
2. Captain Milorad Simeunović, Battalion Commissar;
3. First-Lieutenant Vasko Bataković, Company Commander.

On June 15 this year, at 11 a. m., the foregoing commission arrived on the spot where the above-mentioned incident had occurred, viz. 1 km. northeast of Hill 698, and 700 metres southeast of the solitary cross standing in the eastern part of the village of Mazgoš, right on the cart road leading from the village of Mazgoš across the frontier to Bulgaria. (Map: Piroš, 1 : 50,000.)

According to the exact findings of the Commission, the Bulgarian soldiers organized the would-be capture of our patrol in the following manner: three Bulgarian ambush parties were hidden in the underbrush along the frontier line itself. At the same time, one ambush party, consisting of two soldiers armed with automatic weapons, went 110 metres into our territory, and took up positions on both sides of the road leading from the village of Mazgoš across the frontier into Bulgarian territory. This road is used for crossing the border by persons having property on both sides of the frontier. One Bulgarian soldier was on the left-hand side of the road, hidden in a wheat field 3 metres from the road, while the second Bulgarian soldier was 2 metres from the road and 20 metres behind the soldier who was to the left of the road. When our patrol, following the border-patrol path, came within twenty metres from the road, a member of the patrol, Private Džemo Ametovski, noticed the Bulgarian ambush within our territory, 110 metres from the frontier line. He immediately signalled to the patrol leader whereupon the Bulgarians in ambush both on our territory and in Bulgarian territory, opened fire from automatic weapons. Simultaneously they threw five hand-grenades which fell in the vicinity of our patrol, one falling 3 metres from the leader of the patrol and his escort, and the others 5 to 8 metres from the patrol. As soon as the Bulgarians started firing, our patrol threw itself upon the ground and returned the shots, firing six bullets. At the same moment, one of our parties in ambush which was 200 metres to the south of the patrol, fired 3 shots and ran to the assistance of our patrol. By the time it reached the patrol, the Bulgarians in ambush in our territory had already fled to their own territory. The other Bulgarian ambush parties also retreated under cover of heavy fire from automatic weapons. They fired approximately 400 bullets into our territory, the bullets penetrating to a depth of 1 km into our territory. Our patrol, which had come upon the Bulgarian ambush in our territory, found itself between the Bulgarian ambush in Bulgarian territory and the one in our territory, i. e. it was subjected to the crossfire of the Bulgarian

ambush parties which were separated by only 100 metres. One of the hand-grenades, thrown by the Bulgarians who were in our territory, slightly wounded patrol leader escort Private Džemo Ametovski.

At the spot where the Bulgarians in ambush had fired 40 bullets from automatic weapons, we found 40 empty cartridges and one frame for an M-24 German sub-machine gun which the Bulgarians left behind, and one unexploded Bulgarian hand-grenade with handle.

The Commission has come to the conclusion that the aim of the Bulgarians was to capture our patrol because one of the ambushes was laid on the frontier line and the other in our territory. They allowed our patrol to approach the ambush so that their ambush on the frontier line could fire at our patrol first. At that moment their men in ambush in our territory were to fall upon our patrol and capture it. The Bulgarian ambushes were laid according to plan, which proves that the Bulgarian soldiers had the aim of capturing our patrol, and had prepared everything in advance. Had this not been so, there would have been no reason for laying the ambushes.

Death to Fascism — Liberty to the People!

Members of the Commission:

(Sgd.) Rade Damjanović, Captain

(Sgd.) Milorad Simeunović, Captain

(Sgd.) Vasko Bataković, First Lieutenant

Mazgoš, June 15, 1950.

DOCUMENT No. 773

STATEMENT BY A YUGOSLAV SOLDIER ON THE ATTEMPT BY BULGARIAN FRONTIER ORGANS TO CAPTURE A YUGOSLAV PATROL

Statement

On June 15, 1950, the commander of the frontier post ordered me to assist Ljubo Martin, leader of the patrol, from midnight till 6 a. m. We left the frontier post and went to the sector of Hill 698, where patrols are relieved. We relieved the patrol and continued along our way, following the patrol path from Hill 698 towards the shed near the frontier line, where we stopped for about five minutes to listen. Then we went along the patrol path towards the former frontier post. When we came near the former frontier post we stopped again for ten minutes, listening and observing both the Bulgarian and our own territory. After that we went back towards the shed, moving slowly and listening all the time. When we approached the road leading from Mazgoš toward Bulgaria, I noticed something dark moving in my immediate vicinity, in our territory, to the left of the road. I signalled to the patrol leader, whereupon the Bulgarians in ambush opened fire on us. We immediately threw ourselves on the ground, took shelter and opened fire on them. At that moment, three Bulgarian ambush parties along the frontier line, in Bulgarian territory, opened fire on us, so that we found ourselves under fire from both sides of the frontier line, from our own and from Bulgarian territory. Thus we found ourselves under crossfire between the Bul-

garians ambushed on Bulgarian soil and those ambushed in our territory. When the Bulgarians opened fire on us, they also hurled hand grenades at us and we heard four explosions, while the fifth hand-grenade, which was found later, did not explode, which means that they had thrown altogether five hand-grenades. One hand-grenade fell between me and the patrol leader, three metres from both of us, wounding me in the head, while the other three hand-grenades fell from five to eight metres from us. At that moment one of our ambush parties, which was near the old frontier post 200 metres from us, fired three shots and all the soldiers from that ambush party and the frontier post came to our help. However, the Bulgarians fled to their own territory before the arrival of this help, and opened fire on our territory from automatic weapons. In our opinion, there were six Bulgarian ambushes both along the frontier line and on our soil. Approximately 6 to 8 sub-machine guns opened fire on our territory from Bulgarian territory along the frontier line, while several sub-machine guns and light machine guns opened fire from points deeper in Bulgaria:

I have nothing else to add and confirm all the above with my signature.

(Sgd.) Džemo Ametovski

Mazgoš, June 15, 1950.

In confirmation of the above

(Sgd.) Ljubo Martin

2. MISUSE OF PERMITS TO FLY OVER YUGOSLAV TERRITORY AND VIOLATION OF AIR TRAFFIC REGULATIONS

DOCUMENT No. 278

NOTE OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT No. 49179 OF MAY 13, 1950, TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE VIOLATION OF AIR NAVIGATION REGULATIONS AND RULES ON THE FLIGHT OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT OVER YUGOSLAV TERRITORY BY THE CREW MEMBERS OF "AEROFLOT" AIRPLANES

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia informs the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the following:

Lately, there have been frequent cases of pilots of "Aeroflot"⁽¹⁾ planes who do not report regularly to the Territorial Flight Control on their flights over the territory of the FPRY en route for Tirana and back. They thereby violate the Regulations on Air Navigation and the Rules on the Flight of Civil Aircraft over the Territory of the FPRY. Although the Air Navigation Board warned the "Aeroflot" officials on the occasion of every case of violation of the above mentioned Rules and Regulations that such acts were impermissible, they still very often do not to report to the Territorial Flight Control.

Thus on January 4, 1950, an "Aeroflot" aircraft, bearing the number 4753, did not once report to the Territorial Flight Control during the whole of its flight over the territory of the FPRY.

Likewise, the following Soviet airplanes did not report to the above-mentioned Flight Control: aircraft number 4752, on January 12; aircraft number 1816, on January 31; and aircraft number 1815, on March 4, 1950.

In addition to the foregoing there are also frequent cases of the "Aeroflot" planes reporting only once to the afore-mentioned Flight Control while flying over the territory of the FPRY, although they must maintain uninterrupted contact with it during the whole time of flight over Yugoslav territory.

Thus, during their flight over the territory of the FPRY the following "Aeroflot" airplanes reported only once to the Flight Control: aircraft number 4753, on January 5; aircraft number 4752, on January 13; aircraft number 4743, on January 27; aircraft number 1816; on March 1, and 2; aircraft number 1815, on March 5; while an aircraft flying on April 20,

(1) Soviet Air Transport Company.

1950, reported only after 35 minutes of flight over the territory of the FPRY and did not keep within the prescribed flight corridor.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY notes that such frequent acts by the pilots and crews of "Acroflot" planes are not the result of the forces of nature, but constitute a deliberate violation of regulations on air navigation, which cannot be allowed by the authorities of a sovereign country.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY draws the attention of the Embassy of the USSR to these cases, and requests the Embassy to intercede with the competent Soviet authorities to take immediate steps to put an end to such and similar violations of the legal regulations of the FPRY by Soviet air transport officers. Simultaneously the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs the Embassy of the USSR that the competent Yugoslav authorities will, in the future, be compelled to apply legal measures against those breaking these regulations, and that the repetition of such arbitrary violations of regulations on air navigation by the "Aeroflot" officers might bring into question the possibility of flights by the afore-mentioned airplanes over the territory of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.^(*)

Beograd, May 13, 1950.

DOCUMENT No. 277

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 48570/I OF MAY 24, 1950, IN CONNECTION WITH THE SYSTEMATIC AND DELIBERATE VIOLATION OF AIR NAVIGATION RULES OVER YUGOSLAV TERRITORY BY OFFICERS OF THE "MASZOVLET" COMPANY

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia draws the attention of the Legation of the People's Republic of Hungary to the following:

Airplanes of the "Maszovlet" Hungaro-Soviet Air Transport Company which fly the Budapest—Beograd—Tirana route, on their flight over the territory of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia avoid the obligation of reporting to the Territorial Flight Control and fail to keep within the prescribed flight corridor, thereby violating the provisions of the Rules on the Flight of Civil Aircraft over the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Regulations on Air Navigation.

Thus on March 18, 1950, a "Maszovlet" airplane under the command of Leonid Alexeyevich Alexeyev did not report to the Territorial Flight Control during its whole flight from Beograd to Titograd. It thereby violated Art. 40 of the Rules on the Flight of Civil Aircraft over the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and Art. 21 of the Regulations on Air Navigation.

During its flight over Titograd, the mentioned aircraft circled downward three times over the town and only then continued its flight in the prescribed corridor.

(*) The Soviet Government did not answer this Note.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia notes that pilot Alexeyev has already committed similar breaches in the past. Thus on May 5, 1949, counter to the orders of the Yugoslav Flight Control officers to land in Beograd, he returned to Budapest although he was already over the territory of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. On July 14, 1949, while flying the Tirana—Beograd route, he left the prescribed corridor and on this occasion deliberately refused to increase the power of his transmitter. In addition to this, he did not give precise data on the estimated time of his arrival in Beograd.

On January 11, 1950, the aircraft HA-LIH, did not report at all to the Territorial Flight Control during its flight over the territory of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

On January 14 this year, an airplane marked HA-LIH failed to give its position and flight over Titograd.

On January 21 this year, an airplane marked HA-LIE failed to report from Beograd to Titograd.

On January 29 this year, an airplane marked HA-LII failed to report at all.

On February 8 this year, an airplane marked HA-LIE failed to report from Beograd to Titograd.

On February 22 this year, an airplane marked HA-LII failed to report from Titograd to Beograd, nor did it report its flight over the frontier near Subotica.

On March 4, 1950, an airplane marked HA-LII failed to report its flight over Titograd and the frontier near Podhum.

On April 22, 1950, the captain of the aircraft HA-LIC, the aforementioned Alexeyev, refused to continue his flight to Budapest because the Yugoslav organs at the airfield in Beograd requested passengers whose documents were not in order to leave the aircraft. Pilot Alexeyev not only violated the regulations of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia by admitting into the aircraft passengers without visas, but encouraged these passengers not to abide by the orders of the Yugoslav authorities. At the same time, he ignored in an offensive manner the orders of Yugoslav officials to remove his aircraft from the air-strip and to taxi it to the tarmac.

In these inadmissible acts, which ran counter to the customary rules of international air service, Pilot Alexeyev was supported by radio-operator Kudayev and by aero-mechanic Sklarenko.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia vigorously protests against the systematic and deliberate violation of rules and regulations on air navigation over the territory of the FPRY, and against the violation of legal provisions of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia by officers of the "Maszovlet" Company. It requests that the competent Hungarian authorities immediately take all the necessary steps to prevent similar violations by aircraft of the "Maszovlet" in the future, because international law and custom make it binding upon the captains of aircraft and their crews to abide by the legal provisions of a state during flights over its territory.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia at the same time informs the Hungarian Legation that the

competent Yugoslav authorities prohibit pilot Leonid Alexeyevich Alexeyev from flying over the territory of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in view of the fact that he deliberately and repeatedly violated regulations on air navigation, that he did not abide by the legal provisions of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and that his behaviour towards the Yugoslav authorities on April 22, 1950, was intolerable and offensive. The Yugoslav authorities likewise prohibit radio-operator Kudayev and aero-mechanic Sklarenko from flying over the territory of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in the future.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia draws the attention of the Legation to the fact that, in the event of repeated violations of the rules and regulations on air navigation over the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia by "Maszovlet" aircraft, the competent Yugoslav authorities will take steps against those violating the existing legal provisions. At the same time it underlines that the repetition of similar violations will bring into question the issuance of permits to "Maszovlet" aircraft to fly over the territory of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.^(*)

Beograd, May 24, 1950.

^(*) The Hungarian Government did not answer this Note.

3. REFUSAL OF YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS TO EXAMINE AND SETTLE JOINTLY AND PEACEFULLY THE DISPUTES RESULTING FROM BORDER INCIDENTS

DOCUMENT No. 171

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 416250 OF SEPTEMBER 5, 1949, PROPOSING TO THE ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF FRONTIER INCIDENTS

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia informs the Legation of the People's Republic of Albania of the following:

1. In order to avoid incidents on the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier and to eliminate all the undesirable consequences of such incidents, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia proposes the establishment of mixed commissions to be appointed by the Yugoslav and Albanian frontier authorities. These commissions would immediately investigate each incident on the spot and ascertain the facts as well as the circumstances in which the incident occurred.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is of the opinion that the work of such commissions could yield satisfactory results only if their activities were to be based on rules established and accepted by mutual agreement. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposes therefore that the Government of the PR of Albania send a Delegation to the FPRY which would elaborate together with the Yugoslav Delegation an agreement on the duties of mixed commissions for the investigation and ascertainment of frontier incidents.

As the elaboration of such an agreement and the creation of commissions in the manner provided for by such an agreement could be of mutual advantage, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expects that the Government of the PR of Albania will accept the proposal of the Government of the FPRY for the establishment of mixed commissions to investigate and ascertain frontier incidents, and the proposal that it send a Delegation to the FPRY for the purpose of elaboration and conclusion of an Agreement on the duties of such commissions.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY informs the Government of the PR of Albania that the Government of the FPRY and the Government of the Republic of Hungary have already concluded such an Agreement.

2. In the course of the Second World War, during the fascist occupation of both countries, numerous boundary-marks on the Yugoslav-

Albanian frontier were destroyed, removed, damaged or erased altogether with the result that the frontier line between the FPRY and the PR of Albania, on many sectors of the boundary, is not accurately and clearly marked.

In order to have the frontier line clearly marked out by boundary-posts, the Government of the FPRY proposes that the same commission, which would conduct negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement on the duties of mixed commissions for the investigation and ascertainment of frontier incidents, be authorized by both Governments to examine the state of the boundary-marks on the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier and to place new boundary-marks on all the sectors of the boundary where they do not exist owing to the afore-mentioned reasons, or where they are not clearly and accurately marked.

As the clear demarcation of the frontier line would be of mutual interest, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY trusts that this proposal of the Government of the FPRY will be favourably met by the Government of the PR of Albania and expects that the Albanian Government will communicate its answer as soon as possible.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY proposes that the Delegations of the Governments of the FPRY and of the PR of Albania for the negotiation and the conclusion of an agreement on the duties of mixed commissions for the investigation and ascertainment of frontier incidents, and for the examination of boundary posts and the marking of the frontier line, convene at Cetinje on September 20, 1949.

As soon as the Government of the PR of Albania communicates its acceptance of these negotiations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY will inform the Government of the PR of Albania of the composition of the Yugoslav Delegation.⁽¹⁾

Beograd, September 5, 1949.

DOCUMENT No. 279

**YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 422347 OF DECEMBER 14, 1949,
PROPOSING TO THE RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT THE FORMATION OF
MIXED YUGOSLAV-RUMANIAN COMMISSIONS FOR THE INVESTIGATION
AND ASCERTAINMENT OF FRONTIER INCIDENTS**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has the honour to inform the Embassy of the Rumanian People's Republic of the following:

With reference to the undesirable consequences of the incidents on the Yugoslav-Rumanian frontier, for which the frontier organs of the FPRY are not responsible, the Government of the FPRY considers it necessary to stress its desire to avoid all incidents on the Yugoslav-Rumanian frontier.

For this purpose, the Government of the FPRY proposes to the Rumanian Government that mixed commissions composed of Yugoslav and Rumanian frontier organs be set up. These commissions would in-

⁽¹⁾ The Albanian Government did not answer this Note.

investigate every incident on the spot, with a view to joint establishment of the facts and of the circumstances under which such incidents had occurred.

The Government of the FPRY further considers that the work of such commissions would serve their purpose only if it were based on mutually fixed rules. It, therefore, proposes that the Rumanian Government appoint a Delegation which would, in concert with the Yugoslav Delegation, conclude an agreement on the duties of mixed commissions for the investigation and ascertainment of frontier incidents.

The Government of the FPRY expresses its readiness to proceed with these negotiations immediately and to consider any proposal by the Rumanian Government in this respect.

As the conclusion of an Agreement on mixed commissions for the investigation and ascertainment of frontier incidents and the joint objective examination of these incidents by mixed Yugoslav-Rumanian Commissions would be of mutual benefit and would contribute to the normalization of the situation on the Yugoslav-Rumanian frontier, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPR of Yugoslavia hopes that the Rumanian Government will communicate its answer as soon as possible.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY avails itself of this opportunity to renew the expression of its consideration to the Embassy of the Rumanian PR.

Beograd, December 14, 1949.

DOCUMENT No. 230

NOTE OF THE RUMANIAN EMBASSY IN BEOGRAD No. 50, OF JANUARY 25, 1950, REJECTING THE PROPOSAL OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MIXED YUGOSLAV-RUMANIAN COMMISSIONS FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND ASCERTAINMENT OF FRONTIER INCIDENTS

The Embassy of the Rumanian People's Republic is in receipt of the Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia No. 422347, containing a proposal for the establishment of certain mixed frontier commissions and the conclusion of an agreement on the duties of such commissions for the investigation and ascertainment of incidents on the Rumanian-Yugoslav frontier, and, under instructions from the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic, informs the Ministry of the following:

The Rumanian Government considers that the proposal of the Yugoslav Government is an attempt to conceal its full responsibility for the numerous frontier incidents it is provoking, for the violation of the airspace of the Rumanian People's Republic and for the sending of spies and saboteurs into the Rumanian People's Republic.

On several occasions the Rumanian Government pointed out the fact that these criminal actions directed against the Rumanian People's Republic were not isolated or incidental actions but a manifestation of the policy of hostility, provocations and espionage towards the Rumanian People's.

Republic being pursued by the Yugoslav Government, which is in the service of the well-known enemies of peace and democracy, the Anglo-American imperialist circles.

This policy of the Yugoslav Government is a component part of the policy and the intentions of the Anglo-American warmongers who make wide use of these frontier provocations, organized by the Yugoslav leaders, for the warmongering campaign against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the countries of people's democracy going on over the radio and in the press of the Anglo-American trusts.

It is evident that the Yugoslav Government policy completely precludes the possibility of implementing the alleged proposals contained in its Note.

These proposals are simply hypocritical manoeuvres and they cannot conceal the policy of betrayal of the interests of peace of the Yugoslav peoples being pursued by the Yugoslav Government.

Beograd, January 25, 1950.

DOCUMENT No. 281

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S NOTE No. 419788 OF NOVEMBER 21, 1949, REGARDING THE BREACH BY THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE DUTIES OF MIXED COMMISSIONS FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND ASCERTAINMENT OF FRONTIER INCIDENTS.

At the proposal of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the Agreement on the Duties of Mixed Commissions for the Investigation and Ascertainment of Frontier Incidents between the FPRY and Hungary was signed for an indefinite duration at Subotica, on August 3, 1949. By this Agreement, the Government of the PR of Hungary and the Government of the FPRY assumed the obligation that each party would do everything in its power to avoid frontier incidents. The purpose of this Agreement was not only the investigation of frontier incidents that had already occurred but, primarily, the complete avoidance of incidents through the endeavours of both Governments, as provided for in Article 1 of the Agreement which reads: "Both Governments shall take all the necessary measures, of an effective and legal nature, to remove all the causes and pretexts for frontier incidents and to ensure security on the frontier."

The Government of the FPRY trusted that this Agreement would contribute to the normalization of conditions on the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier and that frontier provocations, incidents and violations of Yugoslav territory on the part of Hungary would cease. Immediately after the signing of the Agreement, however, the Hungarian frontier organs continued with the customary provocations, incidents and violations of Yugoslav territory. Protesting by its Note No. 418825 of October 18, 1949, against a series of incidents provoked by the Hungarian frontier authorities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FPRY drew the attention of the Government of the PR of Hungary to the violation of the Subotica

Agreement and to the obligations of the Hungarian Government under this Agreement.

The Government of the PR of Hungary, however, not only failed to comply with the above-mentioned Agreement but went from the organizing of individual incidents on the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier to more serious armed provocations prepared in advance.

Thus, in the night between October 27 and 28 this year, the Hungarian frontier organs, on the boundary sector near Donji Miholjac, carried out a major armed provocation against the FPRY, by throwing hand grenades and flares in the direction of Yugoslav territory, keeping the Yugoslav frontier area under heavy fire from automatic weapons for 8 hours. The Government of the FPRY, by its Note No. 419630 of October 29, 1949, lodged a strong protest with the Government of the PR of Hungary against this action.

By continuing the provocation of frontier incidents, the Government of the PR of Hungary showed that it was not sincere in signing the foregoing agreement and that it did not wish to normalize conditions on the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier on the basis of the Subotica Agreement. Furthermore, it has been disclosed that the existence of this Agreement was an obstacle to the Hungarian Government in its further organizing of hostile acts against the FPRY on the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier. For this reason, the Hungarian Government, desirous of freeing itself entirely from the obligations assumed under the Subotica Agreement, invented the kidnapping of two Hungarian frontier guards, allegedly carried out on September 15, 1949, by Yugoslav organs. It took this as a pretext for the arbitrary and formal breach of the above-mentioned Agreement.

Although the kidnapping of the two Hungarian frontier guards was an altogether fabricated affair, the Yugoslav frontier organs accepted the invitation of the Hungarian frontier authorities for the creation of a mixed commission. The Hungarian frontier organs attempted to abuse the readiness of the Yugoslav frontier organs to proceed in complete accord with the Subotica Agreement, and submitted for their signature a record prepared by the Hungarian side, which was not the product of the joint integral work of the mixed Yugoslav-Hungarian commission. Apart from this, Article 8 of the Subotica Agreement provides that if the mixed Yugoslav-Hungarian Commission cannot reach an agreement, both Governments will resort to diplomatic channels. The Hungarian Government, however, did not even attempt to make use of this provision before it renounced the Agreement.

The Government of the FPRY notes that the unilateral breach by the Government of the PR of Hungary of the Agreement on the Duties of the Mixed Commission for the Investigation and Ascertainment of Frontier Incidents of August 3, 1949, less than three months after its conclusion, clearly proves that the Government of the PR of Hungary did not renounce its intentions of continuing with the provocation of frontier incidents against the FPRY. This breach also reveals without a doubt the intention of the Hungarian Government to organize new provocations and disorder on the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier.

The arbitrary breach of the Agreement on the Duties of Mixed Commissions for the Investigation and Ascertainment of Frontier In-

cidents is the latest unpacific step against the FPRY by the Hungarian Government; it impedes the interests of peace in the Danubian Basin and serves the warmongering campaign of the instigators of a new war.

Acknowledging receipt of Note No. 10343 dated October 31, 1949, from the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the renunciation of the Agreement concluded between the FPRY and the Republic of Hungary on the Duties of Mixed Commissions for the Investigation and Ascertainment of Frontier Incidents, signed on August 3, 1949, at Subotica, the Government of the FPRY notes that the responsibility for the consequences which might arise from the situation created by the renunciation of this Agreement rests fully and exclusively with the Government of the PR of Hungary.^(*)

Beograd, November 21, 1949.

(*) The Hungarian Government did not answer this Note.

V

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS FOR
HONOURABLE AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
OF THE DISPUTE

1. YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS FOR HONOURABLE AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT, ON THE OTHER

DOCUMENT No. 22

FROM THE ADDRESS BY THE YUGOSLAV PREMIER AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA, JOSIP BROZ-TITO, ON JULY 21, 1948, AT THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE CPY IN BEOGRAD

"In concluding, comrades, I should like to emphasize that our Party and our Central Committee will work with all their might to mend the relations between our Party and the CPSU(B). We hope that the comrades, who are in the leadership of the CPSU(B), will give us an opportunity to show them here, on the spot, everything that is inaccurate in the Resolution. We think that only in such a case and in such a way is it possible to arrive at the truth."

(Quoted from the book, "The Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia", published by "Kultura" in 1948. The above is from the Political Report submitted by Josip Broz-Tito, p. 159.)

DOCUMENT No. 23

FROM THE ADDRESS DELIVERED BY VICE-PREMIER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EDVARD KARDELJ, DURING THE DEBATE ON THE BUDGET FOR 1949 IN THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, ON DECEMBER 28, 1948

"Comrade deputies, I have dealt in detail with these questions of our relations with the countries of socialism and people's democracy, in order to show that the differences surrounding the Cominform Resolution have not been without consequences for these relations. But, despite the fact that the unprincipled campaign against our country has assumed a wide scope, we are nevertheless convinced that the differences can be solved and should be solved in the interests of socialism and progress. What is

more, they should first of all be solved now precisely along the line of consolidating mutual state relations, along the line of consolidating obligations issuing from treaties of friendship and mutual assistance, along the line of intensifying economic ties, etc. That would be the proper way to solve these differences in practice, but today these relations are developing in exactly the opposite direction.

"I shall not go into theoretical questions here, but I do want to underline that this is a matter involving a dispute along the line of socialist development, and therefore it should be solved by methods worthy of the socialist world, and not by means that are typical of the capitalist system. That, in our opinion, is the condition for the correct solution of this question. And such a solution of this question would mean not only the consolidation of the socialist front but also a far-reaching contribution to the theory and practice of socialism."

(Quoted from the Verbatim Record of the Second Joint Meeting of the Federal Council and the Council of Nationalities of December 28, 1948, during the Fourth Special Session of the Yugoslav National Assembly, held December 26—30, 1948, pp. 301—302.)

DOCUMENT No. 284

FROM THE ADDRESS DELIVERED BY VICE-PREMIER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EDVARD KARDELJ, AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY PLENARY SESSION ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1949

"...Concrete measures taken by the Government of the Soviet Union with regard to Yugoslavia, are evidence of the fact that the former does not always represent the strivings of the friends of peace and democracy. We appreciate the positive and progressive stands of the Government of the USSR in favour of peace and peaceful co-operation among nations — and, in such instances, the Government of the USSR has had and will have our support — but, at the same time, we cannot help noting the profound discrepancy between the words and deeds of the Government of the USSR in relation to a number of questions, and this is more particularly apparent in the attitude of the Government of the USSR towards the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

"One cannot speak of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries while, at the same time, pursuing a policy such as the one now being conducted by the Government of the USSR toward the Government of an independent country — Yugoslavia. One cannot profess peace-loving intentions while hurling upon Yugoslavia such threats as are being made by the Government of the USSR against Yugoslavia.

"All this acquires particular significance in view of the fact that it adopted such a policy towards the country which — as is well known both to the Government of the Soviet Union and to the world at large — does not enjoy the support of any bloc of powers, which has neither concluded secret pacts nor entered into military alliances with any oppo-

ment of the USSR. It is obviously for this very reason that the Government of the USSR considers that it is justified in applying, in these relations with Yugoslavia, 'diplomatic' methods unprecedented in history, the exposure of which does but small credit to the Government of the USSR.

"But the peoples of Yugoslavia, which achieved their national and social liberation with their own forces and at the cost of extremely heavy sacrifices in World War II, wish to organize their socialist life in their own country along their own lines, because they are convinced that they will thereby be serving not merely their own interests but also those of co-operation among nations on a basis of equality, the interests of peace and human progress. They wish to do so because they respect all other nations, their history and culture, their right to live and develop on a basis of equality, their right to contribute to the general cause of human progress..."

"...In thus asserting their independence and struggling for the establishment of independent relations among nations on a basis of equality, the peoples of Yugoslavia are, in fact, fighting for conditions essential to human progress — for the right of every nation to an unfettered development of its own creative resources. In this Yugoslavia is guided neither by selfish and narrow-minded nationalism, nor by any lack of a desire to co-operate with other nations, nor by the absurd belief that a nation can live isolated from the rest of mankind. The peoples of Yugoslavia are simply aware of the fact that the only course the progress of mankind can take is that of releasing, to an increasing degree, the creative energies of nations, and, further, of the fact that this can be achieved only by liberating nations from any form of foreign domination. This is, at the same time, the only course leading to international co-operation on a basis of genuine equality and to a lasting peace.

"In his speech Mr. Vishinsky sharply denounced both war-mongering and the policy of war threats. He further emphasized that the Government of the USSR had always been in favour of the equality of states. He submitted a proposal in this sense wherein particular stress was laid on the fact that the Government of the Soviet Union favoured the settlement of all disputes by peaceful means. The Yugoslav delegation, however, feels and must stress that the Government of the USSR should, in the first place, implement this announced stand which it has taken in the case in which it can do so with least difficulty, that is, with regard to Yugoslavia, a country which belongs to no bloc, which threatens no one, and which is geographically situated in the proximity of the USSR. This is all the more so in view of the fact that Mr. Vishinsky in his speech in the General Assembly again underlined the desire of the USSR to co-operate peacefully and on an equal footing with all countries willing to co-operate under such conditions. In this connexion the Yugoslav delegation wishes to say that Yugoslavia is interested in such co-operation — and such co-operation alone — and is always prepared to take part in it."

(Quoted from the official Verbatim Record of the Fourth Regular Session of the UN General Assembly, General A/PV 228 of September 26, 1949, English.)

FROM THE ADDRESS BY THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
MARSHAL OF YUGOSLAVIA, JOSIP BROZ-TITO, DELIVERED ON SEP-
TEMBER 30, 1949, AT THE TERMINATION OF YUGOSLAV ARMY
MANOEUVRES

"No matter what anyone says, our country is a peace-loving country, our country threatens no one, and our Army has never threatened anyone nor will it do so. Regardless of the fact that we fought in vain in international forums for the satisfaction of the justified claims of our country — so that what is ours could really be ours — regardless of the fact that we have not achieved what we wanted, what we are entitled to, we have not for a single moment since the end of the war, and since we started the peaceful development of our country, even contemplated taking anything by force of arms or threatening anyone. I am mentioning this because in the present stage of attacks against our country, attempts are being made by the USSR and the other Eastern European countries, to present our country as an aggressive one.

"It is impermissible for anyone, whoever he might be, to threaten such a country with war simply because the people of this country are not willing to endure in silence all kinds of insults and slanders, but defend themselves with true facts."

(BORBA, October 4, 1949.)

FROM THE ADDRESS BY THE VICE-PREMIER AND MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EDVARD KARDELJ, ON YUGOSLAV FOREIGN PO-
LICY AT THE EIGHTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE YUGOSLAV
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, DECEMBER 27, 1949

"This or that opinion of the Soviet leadership about our socialism is not essential for us at the present moment. History will pass final judgment on this. What is essential is the question of whether or not the Soviet leadership will recognize, not only in words but in practice, the right of every people to self-determination. If it is not willing to observe this principle, this means that it has taken a course of forcing its will upon other peoples, which will inevitably clash with the fundamental laws of socialist development..."

"I should like to state, first of all, that the new Yugoslavia is neither threatening anyone's national independence nor participating in any 'agressive blocs,' nor has it any hegemonistic tendencies or desires to exploit anyone economically. Accordingly, she neither is nor can she be in any imperialist camp..."

"And, finally, I should like to emphasize that the Government of the FPRY is not in any way responsible for the hostile attitude which the Government of the USSR and — under its influence — the other Gov-

ernments have taken with regard to our country. Accordingly, the solution of this dispute does not depend on us. The Government of the FPRY will not cease to emphasize that it is always ready to renew correct relations with these countries, under the condition, however, that these relations be based on the recognition of mutual equality of rights and the unconditional respect of the sovereignty of the peoples of Yugoslavia . . ."

(Quoted from the Verbatim Records of the Eighth Regular Session of the Yugoslav National Assembly from December 26—28, 1949, at the Second Joint Meeting of the Federal Council and Council of Nationalities, of December 27, 1949.)

DOCUMENT No. 27

FROM THE ADDRESS BY THE PREMIER OF YUGOSLAVIA, JOSIP BROZ-TITO, IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, ON APRIL 27, 1950

"The Government of the FPRY notes with regret that, owing to the persistently hostile attitude of the USSR and the countries of people's democracy towards the FPR of Yugoslavia, it is not, on its part, in a position to influence the improvement of relations with those countries. This regret is all the greater since the Government and the peoples of the new Yugoslavia continue to have friendly feelings towards the peoples of those countries and have a strong desire to maintain relations with these countries that are, at least to some extent, tolerable, normal relations.

"I can say here, both on behalf of the Government and on behalf of the peoples of the FPRY, that neither the Government nor the peoples of Yugoslavia have any hostile feelings towards those countries, that neither the Government nor the peoples of Yugoslavia have ever done anything with regard to those countries which might sully the name of our socialist country, nor are they doing any such thing today. All that we have been reproached for by certain leaders of those countries and all that they have asserted about us in various ways — is completely untrue and fabricated, and history will brand those who wanted to calumniate us in various ways."

(Quoted from the Verbatim Record of the First Regular Session of the Second National Assembly of Yugoslavia, April 24—27, 1950, at the Second Joint Meeting of the Federal Council and the Council of Nationalities, April 27, 1950.)

FROM THE ANSWERS BY THE YUGOSLAV PREMIER, JOSIP BROZ-TITO, TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY LOCAL AND FOREIGN NEWSPAPERMEN AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE HELD ON APRIL 28, 1950

To the question put by the "Associated Press" correspondent as to whether he considered there was any possibility of ending the difficulties with the Soviet Union and the Cominform countries, Marshal Tito replied:

"This is completely beyond our power and I cannot say how long it will last. It will probably last for a certain longer period of time but one day it must be solved in some way so that at least tolerable, normal relations can be established between us, relations such as those which exist between countries regardless of their internal policies."

To the correspondent of the "New York Herald Tribune," Marshal Tito declared:

"I said in my address that we were absolutely against any blocs or spheres of interest and that the only possible way to settle international questions was through the United Nations. Apart from this, I also said that it was the task of all — if they wished to safeguard peace — to apply to the United Nations in all cases of disputes and matters requiring a solution even if this took more time. Accordingly, this also referred to the Atlantic Pact and to all the other arrangements of the Western powers."

(BORBA, April 29, 1950.)

FROM THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE YUGOSLAV PREMIER, JOSIP BROZ-TITO, TO THE ASSOCIATION OF UN CORRESPONDENTS, ON THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY, BROADCAST BY AMERICAN RADIO STATIONS ON MAY 25, 1950

"Those elements in the relations between States which constantly lead to increasing mutual tension should be removed immediately. Foremost among these elements are the unequal relations between big powers and small countries, interference in the internal affairs of small countries, the tendency towards political and economic subjugation of economically weaker and less developed countries, the hindrance of the independent development of peoples who for one reason or another did not have their own State in the past.

"I think that in this period of high tension, it is not the question of peace or war that should be posed, but only the question of peace..."

"Only by the persistent endeavours of all countries, primarily of the Members of the United Nations through the United Nations Organization, is it possible to overcome all the difficulties, to strengthen in-

ternational cooperation and thus to prepare the ground for the solution of the question of international control of atomic energy, for the prohibition of atomic weapons and for disarmament in general."

(BORBA, No. 125, May 27, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 28

FROM THE STATEMENT BY MINISTER MILOVAN ĐILAS ON BEHALF OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT ON JULY 17, 1950, IN BEOGRAD, AT THE CONGRESS OF THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF PEACE

"Today our people, from the most backward peasant to the Government of the FPRY, are an example of open intentions and sincere struggle for peace, that is, of struggle for genuine independence — their own and other people's — and for truly equal cooperation with other peoples regardless of their internal systems. Owing to their consistent attitude, our people are at the same time the touchstone for the peace-loving and democratic statements made by certain great powers and the verification of their declarations in practice.

"Hence, it seems it was not accidental that it was precisely the peoples of Yugoslavia who were taken as a target for vehement attacks by the very men whom the world believed to have devoted all their strength and intelligence to the struggle for free and equal peoples and for peace-loving cooperation among peoples on a footing of equality.

"When they describe us as an unpacific and un-democratic force, they are actually talking about themselves and concealing their own motives.

"It should, therefore, be stated that the peoples of Yugoslavia desire and wish to live in peace with all peoples, to cooperate with them peacefully, without hindering their internal development in any way. It should further be said that our people are running their own country and that its forces — be they political, economic or military — are not threatening any people and that no alien state has, nor can it have, any means or groups in our country that could threaten some other land. And, finally, the Government, the State and the social organizations in Yugoslavia have no secret or public obligations to, or agreements with, any foreign Government or political group, nor do they have any plans which might in any way threaten some other country. All our people, from the rank and file to the very top, have devoted all their forces, both physical and intellectual, to the noble creative work of building a better life and developing new social relations, of building a new genuinely people's and genuinely socialistic democracy. That is why all of Yugoslavia's forces — both State and social — are fighting to insure the conditions for such work; for peace among peoples, viz. for full cooperation among peoples on a basis of equality, for the undisturbed internal development of peoples.

"And that is why it should be said from this platform, clearly and unequivocally, that our peoples and their state organs wish to have and

are endeavouring to have all the questions, considered by the Governments of the USSR and the Eastern European countries as disputed ones, settled by agreement in a way which would neither hurt the prestige of those countries nor the sovereignty and the equality of our country. This is what our people wish and what they have been saying."

(Quoted from the Record of the Congress of the Yugoslav National Committee for the Defense of Peace, held July 17, 1950.)

DOCUMENT No. 231

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL FOR THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON LASTING PEACE AND NON-AGGRESSION WITH EACH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRY, MADE IN THE ADDRESS OF THE YUGOSLAV VICE-PREMIER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EDVARD KARDELJ, AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION OF SEPTEMBER 25, 1950

"I should like to say a few words on the policy of the Yugoslav Government. Responsible Yugoslav representatives have declared on several occasions, and I can only reiterate this here on behalf of the Government I represent, that Yugoslavia does not belong to any bloc and that she has concluded no secret or open military alliance with any country, that no foreign power has any military bases at its disposal, either directly or indirectly, on Yugoslav soil, nor does any foreign power participate in the determination of the defence policy of the Yugoslav Government. The peoples of Yugoslavia and their Government have no aggressive intentions towards any neighbouring countries and in no way endanger, or wish to endanger their peace and their independence.

"Apart from this, I have been authorized to state the following on behalf of the Government of the FPRY: In the past, the peoples of Yugoslavia have defended their independence and the integrity of their country from all aggression and from any attempt to threaten their right to decide things for themselves in their own country, and they will defend these things in the future. But they will not take part in any kind of aggressive war and they wish to live in lasting peace and peace-loving cooperation with all peoples, particularly with their neighbours. In the spirit of this consistent, peace-loving attitude, the Government of the FPRY declares its readiness to conclude an agreement on lasting peace and non-aggression with each one of the neighbouring countries."

(BORBA, No. 231 of September 27, 1950.)

ANNEX

**SOME AGGRESSIVE ACTS BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA
IN STATISTICAL FORM**

**NUMERICAL PRESENTATION OF SOME HOSTILE ACTS BY THE USSR
AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AGAINST
YUGOSLAVIA**

	TYPE OF ACT	NUMBER
1	The number of treaties, agreements, conventions and protocols broken by the Governments of the Cominform countries	46
2	The number of diplomatic and other officials of Yugoslavia expelled from the Cominform countries in the period from June 24, 1948, to July 1, 1950	145
3	The number of frontier incidents on the Yugoslav-Hungarian, Yugoslav-Rumanian, Yugoslav-Bulgarian and Yugoslav-Albanian borders caused by the frontier organs of Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania during the period from July 1, 1948, to October 15, 1950	1,067
4	The number of notes of protest from the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Yugoslav Missions in Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania, sent to the Governments of those countries following the incidents caused by the frontier organs of the above-mentioned countries from June 1, 1948, to October 15, 1950	97
5	The number of radio broadcasts for Yugoslavia in the Serbo-Croat, Macedonian and Slovene languages beamed from the radio stations of the Cominform countries from January 1 to July 1, 1950	6,732
6	The duration of radio broadcasts for Yugoslavia in the Serbo-Croat, Macedonian and Slovene languages from the radio stations of the Cominform countries from January 1 to July 1, 1950	3,075 hours, or 4 months 8 days and 3 hours

LIST OF TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND PROTOCOLS CONCLUDED WITH YUGOSLAVIA AND BROKEN UNILATERALLY BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

ANNEX No. 2

TREATIES BROKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR

	Title of Treaty	Date and Place of Conclusion	Date of Breach	Manner of Breach
1	Agreement on Consultation	February, 1948, Moscow	April 24, 1948	Verbal notification
2	Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation	April 11, 1945, Moscow	September 28, 1949	By Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

The Government of the USSR violated all economic treaties and agreements although it did not renounce them formally.

ANNEX No. 3

TREATIES BROKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

	Title of Treaty	Date and Place of Conclusion	Date of Breach	Manner of Breach
1	Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation in Peacetime	May 9, 1946, Beograd	October 4, 1949	By Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia No. 141096/49-A-II/3
2	Convention on Cultural Cooperation	April 27, 1947, Beograd	October 4, 1949	By Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia No. 141096/49-A-II/3

In June, 1949, after unsuccessful negotiations in Prague, the Czechoslovak Government declared in a communique published in the press that it had undertaken measures so that the Czechoslovak economy would not sustain losses "owing to economic relations with Yugoslavia." The agreement on Czechoslovak deliveries of capital goods and Yugoslav counter-deliveries, signed in Beograd on February 25, 1947, was de facto broken by this communique.

The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic has broken the other economic agreements although it did not formally renounce them.

**TREATIES BROKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF POLAND**

	Title of Treaty	Date and Place of Conclusion	Date of Breach	Manner of Breach
1	Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance	March 18, 1946, Warsaw	September 30, 1949	By Note of the Minis- try of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland No. 0862/16

In a communique released through the Polish news agency, PAP, on July 6, 1949, the Polish Government announced that it was stopping further deliveries of goods to Yugoslavia. Thus the Polish Government de facto broke the Agreement on the Five Year Exchange of Goods and the Treaty on Economic Cooperation and Exchange of Goods concluded in Warsaw on May 24, 1947, as well as the special Treaty on Exchange and Payments concluded in Beograd on November 7, 1947.

The Government of the Republic of Poland has broken the other economic agreements as well as the Convention on Cultural Cooperation, although it did not renounce them formally.

**TREATIES BROKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY**

	Title of Treaty	Date and Place of Conclusion	Date of Breach	Manner of Breach
1	Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the FPRY and the Republic of Hungary	December 8, 1947 Budapest	September 30, 1949	By Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Hungary No. 10411/1949
2	Treaty on Economic Cooperation in the Aluminium Industry	May 11, 1947 Beograd	Letter of May 24, 1949; Note of June, 15, 1949	By Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary No. 40698 confirming the letter of the Minister of Industry of the Republic of Hungary addressed to Franc Leskošek, Minister of Industry of the FPRY
3	Agreement on Long-term Hungarian Deliveries and Yugoslav Counter-Deliveries	July 24, 1947 Budapest	June 18, 1949	By note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary No. 6000/1949
4	Agreement on the Exchange of Commodities	March 18, 1948 Budapest	December 18, 1949	By Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Hungary No. 13932/1949
5	Agreement on Payments arising from the Exchange of Goods between Yugoslavia and Hungary	March 18, 1948 Budapest	December 16, 1949	By Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Hungary No. 13932/1949
6	Agreement between the FPRY and the Republic of Hungary on the Work of Mixed Commissions for the Investigation and Ascertainment of Frontier Incidents	August 3, 1949 Subotica	October 31, 1949	By Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Hungary No. 10343/1949

The Government of the PR of Hungary has broken the Convention on Cultural Cooperation although it did not renounce it formally.

**TREATIES BROKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUMANIAN
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC**

	Title of Treaty	Date and Place of Conclusion	Date of Breach	Manner of Breach
1	Agreement between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Rumania on the Regime of Real Estate in the Frontier Zone	July 5, 1924 Beograd	June 30, 1949	By Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Rumanian People's Republic No. 440
2	Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the FPRY and the Rumanian People's Republic	December 19, 1947 Bucharest	October 1, 1949	By Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Rumanian People's Republic No. 3280
3	Agreement on the Regulation of Frontier Crossing of Passengers, Baggage and Goods Traffic, between the Yugoslav and Rumanian State Railways	September 3, 1947 Jimbolia	January 17, 1950	By Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Rumanian People's Republic No. 183
4	Agreement on Special Transit Traffic from Yugoslavia through Rumania into Yugoslavia again on the Jaša Tomić-Ninčićevo Line and on Special Transit Traffic from Rumania through Yugoslavia to Rumania again on the Stamura Moravita-Bazijaš Line	September 2, 1948 Jimbolia	January 17, 1950	By Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Rumanian People's Republic No. 183

All other economic agreements as well as the Cultural Convention were broken by the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic although it did not renounce them formally.

**TREATIES BROKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA**

	Title of Treaty	Date and Place of Conclusion	Date of Breach	Manner of Breach
1	Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the FPRY and the PR of Bulgaria	November 27, 1947 Evksinograd	October 1, 1949	By Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Bulgaria No. 103-VI
2	Agreement on Facilitating the Crossing of the Frontier between the FPRY and the PR of Bulgaria for Citizens of Both Countries, and on Citizenship	August 27, 1947 Sofia	October 3, 1949	By Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Bulgaria No. 40506-20-I
3	Protocol on the Provisional Regulation of the Postal and Telecommunication Services between the Postal Administrations of Bulgaria and Democratic Federal Yugoslavia	February 7, 1945 Beograd	By telegram of February 22, 1950, to take effect on March 1, 1950	The Protocol was renounced by the Bulgarian General Administration of Posts by telegram
4	Agreement on the Utilization of Properties Cut by the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Frontier Line	August 25, 1947 Sofia	June 30, 1950	By Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Bulgaria No. 29123-20-I

The Convention on Cultural and Educational Ties between the FPRY and the PR of Bulgaria, as well as the Agreement on Economic Cooperation between the FPRY and the PR of Bulgaria, were broken by the Bulgarian Government although it did not renounce them formally.

**TREATIES BROKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA**

	Title of Treaty	Date and Place of Conclusion	Date of Breach	Manner of Breach
1	Protocol on the Establishment of Frontier Traffic	February 20, 1946 Beograd	July 2, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449/II
2	Treaty on Economic Cooperation between the PR of Albania and the FPR of Yugoslavia	July 1, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
3	Agreement on Trade Exchanges and Payments between the FPR of Yugoslavia and the PR of Albania	July 1, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
4	Agreement on Credit Extended to the Government of the PR of Albania by the Government of the FPR of Yugoslavia	July 1, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
5	Protocol on the Extension of Credit in Dollars	October 3, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
6	Protocol on the Coming into Force of the Treaty on the Albano-Yugoslav Import-Export Company	October 3, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
7	Protocol on the Transfer of Dollar Credits through the Albanian State Bank to the National Bank of the FPR of Yugoslavia	October 3, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449

	Title of Treaty	Date and Place of Conclusion	Date of Breach	Manner of Breach
8	Treaty on the Coordination of Economic Plans, on the Customs Union and Equalization of Currencies between the Governments of the PR of Albania and the FPRY	November 27, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
9	Protocol Representing a Component Part of the Treaty on the Coordination of Economic Plans, on the Customs Union and Parity between the Government of the FPR of Yugoslavia and the Government of the PR of Albania	November 27, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
10	Treaty on the Formation of an Albano-Yugoslav Company for the Building and Exploitation of Railways, concluded between the Governments of the FPR of Yugoslavia and the PR of Albania	November 28, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
11	Protocol on the Building of Railway Lines	November 28, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
12	Treaty on the Formation of an Albano-Yugoslav Company for the Prospecting and Exploitation of Oil concluded between the Governments of the PR of Albania and the FPR of Yugoslavia	November 28, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
13	Protocol on the Building of an Oil Refinery in Kuchova	November 28, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
14	Protocol on the Building of a Power Plant in Kuchova	November 28, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449

	Title of Treaty	Date and Place of Conclusion	Date of Breach	Manner of Breach
15	Treaty on the Formation of an Albano-Yugoslav Company for the Prospecting and Exploitation of Ores, concluded between the Governments of the FPR of Yugoslavia and the PR of Albania	November 28, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
16	Treaty on the Formation of an Albano-Yugoslav Company for Electrification concluded between the Governments of the PR of Albania and the FPR of Yugoslavia	November 28, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
17	Protocol on the Building of a Power Plant in Tirana	November 28, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
18	Treaty on the Formation of an Albano-Yugoslav Company for Export and Import, concluded between the Governments of the PR of Albania and the FPR of Yugoslavia	November 28, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
19	Treaty on the Formation of an Albano-Yugoslav Bank	November 28, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
20	Protocol on the Paying Up of Share Capital	November 28, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
21	Protocol on Personnel	November 28, 1946 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
22	Agreement concluded between the Governments of the PR of Albania and the FPR of Yugoslavia relating to the Paying Up of Capital in the Albano-Yugoslav Stock Companies	June 12, 1947 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449

	Title of Treaty	Date and Place of Conclusion	Date of Breach	Manner of Breach
23	Protocol on the Formation of an Albano-Yugoslav Coordination Commission	June 12, 1947 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
24	Protocol on the Formation of the Albano-Yugoslav Arbitration Council	June 12, 1947 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
25	Treaty on Trade Exchange between the PR of Albania and the FPR of Yugoslavia	June 22, 1947 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
26	Protocol on the Prices of Goods in Regard to the Implementation of Provisions under Article 3 of the Treaty on Trade Exchange and Payments of July 1, 1946	June 22, 1947 Beograd	July 1, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. 449
27	Agreement on the Abolition of Visas	September 20, 1947 Tirana	July 2, 1948	Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Albania, No. N450

The Albanian Government violated, although it did not formally renounce, the Convention on Cultural Cooperation between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of Albania.

**LIST OF DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF YUGOSLAVIA
EXPELLED FROM USSR AND COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE**

ANNEX No. 9

FROM THE USSR

	Name and Position	Manner of Expulsion	Date of Expulsion
1	Karlo Mrazović, Ambassador	By Soviet Foreign Ministry Note No. 24	October 25, 1949
2	Laza Latinović, Minister, Counselor and Chargé d'Affaires	Soviet Foreign Ministry Note No. 7	November 16, 1949

Members and Officials of the Yugoslav Military Mission in the Soviet Sector of Berlin expelled by letter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the German Democratic Republic of December 8, 1949

3	Momčilo Sibinović, Lieutenant Colonel, Acting Chief of the Military Mission	By letter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the German Democratic Republic	December 8, 1949
4	Zdravko Čupović, Captain, Assistant to the Chief of the Military Mission	By letter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the German Democratic Republic	December 8, 1949
5	Mirko Pandurović, Captain, Chief of the Consular Department	By letter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the German Democratic Republic	December 8, 1949
6	Mate Malinarić, Second Lieutenant, Secretary of the Military Mission	By letter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the German Democratic Republic	December 8, 1949
7	Milislav Popović, Second Lieutenant, official of the Military Mission	By letter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the German Democratic Republic	December 8, 1949
8	Alojz Čup, Second Lieutenant, official of the Military Mission	By letter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the German Democratic Republic	December 8, 1949
9	Dane Vlaisavljević, Staff-Sergeant, attached to the Military Mission	By letter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the German Democratic Republic	December 8, 1949

	Name and Position	Manner of Expulsion	Date of Expulsion
10	Bogoljub Dimitrijević, Private, attached to the Military Mission	By letter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the German Democratic Republic	December 8, 1949
11	Obrad Varjaški, Private, attached to the Military Mission	By letter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the German Democratic Republic	December 8, 1949
12	Radiša Mirković, Private, attached to the Military Mission	By letter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the German Democratic Republic	December 8, 1949
13	Mirko Košar, Press Attaché	By letter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the German Democratic Republic	December 8, 1949
14	Milan Marjanović, Private, attached to the Military Mission	By letter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the German Democratic Republic	Arrested while being expelled and still in prison

FROM THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC

	Name and Position	Manner of Expulsion	Date of Expulsion
1	Jovan Petrović, Social Attaché	By Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Note No. 186107/II-2/48	September 16, 1948
2	Nikola Prašcević, Employee of the Social Delegation	By Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Note No. 186107/II-2/48	September 16, 1948
3	Stefan Ignjić, Employee of the Social Delegation	By Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Note No. 186107/II-2/48	September 16, 1948
4	Vlado Novak, Employee of the Social Delegation	By Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Note No. 186107/II-2/48	September 16, 1948
5	Zdenko Štambuk, Counselor of the Embassy	By verbal notification	July 15, 1949
6	Ivo Barbačić, Commercial Attaché and Economic Counselor	By verbal notification	July 23, 1949
7	Andjelka Popov, Secretary of the Trade Delegation	By verbal notification	July 23, 1949
8	Feliks Gorski, First Secretary	By Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Note No. 140813/49-A/II-3	September 30, 1949
9	Ivo Lovinčić, Second Secretary	By Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Note No. 140813/49-A/II-3	September 30, 1949
10	Oren Ružić, Acting Consul General in Bratislava	By Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Note No. 140813/49-A/II-3	September 30, 1949
11	Marjan Stilinović, Ambassador	By Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Note No. 141096/49-A-II-3	October 4, 1949
12	Žarko Žarković, Counselor of the Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires	By Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Note No. 141770/49-A-II-3	October 6, 1949

	Name and Position	Manner of Expulsion	Date of Expulsion
13	Slavko Mirković, First Secretary	By Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Note No. 141770/49-A-II/3	October 6, 1949
14	Andrej Debenak, Second Secretary	By Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Note No. 141770/49-A-II/3	October 6, 1949
15	Dragutin Todorčić, Second Secretary	By Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Note No. 141770/49-A-II/3	October 6, 1949
16	Lazar Martić, Assistant Commercial Attaché	By Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Note No. 141770/49-A-II/3	October 6, 1949
17	Radovan Alaupović, Assistant Commercial Attaché	By Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Note No. 141770/49-A-II/3	October 6, 1949
18	Milan Gledić, Employee of the Information Department	By Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Note No. 141770/49-A-II/3	October 6, 1949
19	Vukosava Krišković, Attache of the Embassy	By verbal notification	October 22, 1949
20	Milan Čorić, Employee of the Embassy	By verbal notification	October 22, 1949
21	Budimir Čalenić, Employee of the Embassy	By verbal notification	October 22, 1949
22	Leo Betner, Employee of the Embassy	By verbal notification	October 22, 1949
23	Jelena Vujnović, Employee of the Embassy	By verbal notification	October 22, 1949
24	Milka Čorić, Employee of the Commercial Delegation	By verbal notification	October 22, 1949
25	Anton Erman, Diplomatic Courier	By verbal notification	October 22, 1949
26	Gedeon Hrkalović, Employee of the Commercial Delegation	By verbal notification	October 22, 1949 (Remained temporarily owing to sickness of child, came in the middle of July)

	Name and Position	Manner of Expulsion	Date of Expulsion
27	Jozo Jelić, Employee of the Commercial Delegation	By verbal notification	October 22, 1949
28	Franjo Jeričević, Employee of the Commercial Delegation	By verbal notification	October 22, 1949
29	Slavko Pavlović, Employee of the Commercial Delegation	By verbal notification	October 22, 1949
30	Josip Grčić, Representative of Yugoslav Electro-Economy	By verbal notification	October 22, 1949
31	Franc Kalan, Member of the Investments Commission	By verbal notification	End of September — beginning of October 1949
32	Vlaško Djajić, CENTROPROM Representative	By verbal notification	End of September — beginning of October 1949
33	Hubert Kos, TEHNOPROMET Representative	By verbal notification	End of September — beginning of October 1949
34	Dobrivoje Tošić, TEHNOPROMET Representative	By verbal notification	End of September — beginning of October 1949
35	N. Čurđin, HEMPRO Representative	By verbal notification	End of September — beginning of October 1949
36	Moma Petrović, HEMPRO Representative	By verbal notification	End of September — beginning of October 1949
37	N. Milinković, Representative of a mining purchase-supply enterprise	By verbal notification	End of September — beginning of October 1949
38	N. Milunović, Representative of the Foreign Trade Committee of Croatia	By verbal notification	End of September — beginning of October 1949

	Name and Position	Manner of Expulsion	Date of Expulsion
39	Milenko Kovačić, JUGO-METAL Representative	By verbal notification	End of September — beginning of October 1949
40	N. Milinović, Representative of the Bureau for the Purchase of Electrical Supplies	By verbal notification	End of September — beginning of October 1949
41	Engineer Filip Tomanović, VOČAR Representative	By verbal notification	End of September — beginning of October 1949
42	Vladimir Radecki Mikulić Official of the Yugoslav State River Shipping Agency in Bratislava and Komarn	After being arrested twice in succession was expelled over the Czechoslovak-Austrian frontier	January 1950

FROM POLAND

	Name and Position	Manner of Expulsion	Date of Expulsion
1	Ante Rukavina, Counselor of the Embassy	By Polish Foreign Ministry Note No. 0862/16	September 30, 1949
2	Janko Sušnjer, Lieutenant Colonel, Military Attaché	By Polish Foreign Ministry Note No. 0862/16	September 30, 1949
3	Bogić Vlahović, Major, Assistant Military Attaché	By Polish Foreign Ministry Note No. 0862/16	September 30, 1949
4	Bogdanka Čiplić, Press Attaché	By Polish Foreign Ministry Note No. 0862/16	September 30, 1949
5	Panta Lukić, Commercial Attaché	By Polish Foreign Ministry Note No. 0862/16	September 30, 1949
6	Dragomir Maravić, Assistant Commercial Attaché	By Polish Foreign Ministry Note No. 0862/16	September 30, 1949
7	Miloš Božić, Captain, attached to the Office of the Military Attaché	By Polish Foreign Ministry Note No. 0862/16	September 30, 1949
8	Vlado Koder, Sergeant, chauffeur of the Office of the Military Attaché	By Polish Foreign Ministry Note No. 0862/16	September 30, 1949
9	Boris Atanasovski, Employee of the Embassy	Was refused entry visa for Poland when he wanted to return to his job after spending his annual vacation in Yugoslavia	September 21, 1949
10	Dušan Tepavac, Employee of the Embassy	Was refused entry visa for Poland when he wanted to return to his job after spending his annual vacation in Yugoslavia	September 21, 1949
11	Jelisaveta Rapajić, Employee of the Embassy	Was refused entry visa for Poland when she wanted to return to her job after spending her annual vacation in Yugoslavia	September 21, 1949

	Name and Position	Manner of Expulsion	Date of Expulsion
12	Jože Zemljak, Counselor of the Embassy	Was refused entry visa for Poland when he wanted to return to his job after spending his annual vacation in Yugoslavia	October 20, 1949
13	Krcun Strugar, Employee of the Embassy	By verbal notification	November, 1949
14	Vasko Ratković, TANJUG Correspondent	By verbal notification	November, 1949

FROM HUNGARY

	Name and Position	Manner of Expulsion	Date of Expulsion
1	Josip Blažić, Secretary of the Legation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 544	August 6, 1948
2	Vaso Jovanović, Secretary of the Legation, Chargé d'Affaires	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 676	October 26, 1948
3	Djurica Jojkić, Secretary of the Legation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 676	October 26, 1948
4	Dušan Devdžić, Secretary of the Legation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 676	October 26, 1948
5	Alojz Zokelj, Lieutenant Colonel, Military Attaché	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 774	October 28, 1948
6	Stevan Sinanović, Chief of the Reparations and Restitution Delegation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 774	October 28, 1948
7	Mihajlo Ljubić, Assistant Commercial Attaché	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 774	October 26, 1948
8	Lazar Torbica, Employee of the Legation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 774	October 28, 1948
9	Ivan Bevenja, Employee of the Legation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 774	October 28, 1948
10	Karel Gercej, Technical Clerk of the Reparations and Restitution Delegation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 774	October 28, 1948
11	Milivoj Stojković, Member of the Reparations and Restitution Delegation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 4990	May 25, 1949
12	Djordje Felbabov, Member of the Reparations and Restitution Delegation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 4990	May 25, 1949
13	Dr. Ivan Bach, Member of the Reparations and Restitution Delegation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 4990	May 25, 1949

	Name and Position	Manner of Expulsion	Date of Expulsion
14	Evgen Cernigoj, Member of the Reparations and Restitution Delegation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 4990	May 25, 1949
15	Maks Ferlan, Member of the Reparations and Restitution Delegation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 4990	May 25, 1949
16	Ferdo Hauptman, Member of the Reparations and Restitution Delegation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 4990	May 25, 1949
17	Vera Illć, Member of the Reparations and Restitution Delegation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 4990	May 25, 1949
18	Sime Jurić, Member of the Reparations and Restitution Delegation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 4990	May 25, 1949
19	Smilja Mišić, Member of the Reparations and Restitution Delegation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 4990	May 25, 1949
20	Zivko Rusmir, Member of the Reparations and Restitution Delegation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 4990	May 25, 1949
21	Eva Verova, Member of the Reparations and Restitution Delegation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 4990	May 25, 1949
22	Dragutin Leonard, Secretary of the Legation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 5544	June 4, 1949
23	Jovan Mirić, Employee of the Office of the Military Attaché	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 5544	June 4, 1949
24	Boško Srdanov, Employee of the Legation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 5544	June 4, 1949
25	Milan Purić, Employee of the Legation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 5544	June 4, 1949
26	Franc Kenda, Delegate in the Investments Commission	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 5629	June 9, 1949
27	Lazar Sudjić, Representative of the Yugoslav Timber-Industry	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 5629	June 9, 1949

	Name and Position	Manner of Expulsion	Date of Expulsion
28	Jugoslav Vrcan, TRANSJUG Employee	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 5829	June 9, 1949
29	Aleksandar Sabatka, TANJUG Correspondent	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 7707	August 26, 1949
30	Dušan Šakota, Counselor of the Legation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 10159	September 26, 1949
31	Slavko Zečević, Secretary of the Legation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 10159	September 26, 1949
32	Mihajlo Kilibarda, Lieutenant Colonel, Military Attaché	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 10159	September 26, 1949
33	Sima Milošević, Member of the Investments Commission	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 10159	September 26, 1949
34	Julija Dalmažan, Employee of the Legation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 10159	September 26, 1949
35	Ante Kovač, Employee of the Legation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 10159	September 26, 1949
36	Milan Lovrić, Employee of the Legation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 10159	September 26, 1949
37	Aleksandar Nedeljković, Employee of the Legation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 10159	September 26, 1949
38	Čedomir Totalović, Employee of the Legation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 10159	September 26, 1949
39	Avdo Duran, Chauffeur of the Legation	By Hungarian Foreign Ministry Note No. 10159	September 26, 1949
40	Ljubiša Veličković, Representative of the Yugoslav State River Shipping	By verbal notification	February 1, 1950

FROM RUMANIA

	Name and Position	Manner of Expulsion	Date of Expulsion
1	Ranko Zec, Secretary of the Embassy	By verbal notification	October 30, 1948
2	Smiljan Pečjak, Assistant Press Attaché	By verbal notification	October 30, 1948
3	Dušan Bakić, Chauffeur of the Permanent Yugoslav Delegation in the Provisional Committee for the Management of the Affairs of the Iron Gates Administration	By notification of the Rumanian Delegation to the Yugoslav Delegation in the Iron Gates Administration	At the beginning of 1949
4	Ivan Brozna, Warehouse keeper of the Iron Gates Administration	By notification of the Rumanian Delegation to the Yugoslav Delegation in the Iron Gates Administration	March, 1949
5	Vojislav Baldžić, Employee of the Embassy	By Note of the Rumanian Foreign Ministry No. 4363	April 2, 1949
6	Marko Matić, Member of the Repatriation Commission	By verbal notification	July 7, 1949
7	Aleksandar Olujčić, Member of the Repatriation Commission	By verbal notification	July 7, 1949
8	Petar Ženičević, Member of the Repatriation Commission	By verbal notification	July 7, 1949
9	Josip Kulić, Member of the Repatriation Commission	By verbal notification	July 7, 1949
10	Gojko Marković, Chief of the Navigation Service	By notification of the Rumanian Delegation to the Yugoslav Delegation in the Iron Gates Administration	August, 1949

	Name and Position	Manner of Expulsion	Date of Expulsion
11	Vladimir Mitrović, River Captain, Navigation Controller	By notification of the Rumanian Delegation to the Yugoslav Delegation in the Iron Gates Administration	August, 1949
12	Branko Molović, Pilot	By notification of the Rumanian Delegation to the Yugoslav Delegation in the Iron Gates Administration	August, 1949
13	Leonard Vičević, Pilot	By notification of the Rumanian Delegation to the Yugoslav Delegation in the Iron Gates Administration	August, 1949
14	Gojko Čuh, Representative of JUGONAF TA	By Note of the Rumanian Foreign Ministry	September 15, 1949
15	Vasilije Mesko, Employee of the Office of the Yugoslav State River Shipping at Braila	By Note of the Rumanian Foreign Ministry	September 17, 1949
16	Miloslav Brčarević, Employee of the Office of the Yugoslav State River Shipping at Braila	By Note of the Rumanian Foreign Ministry	September 17, 1949
17	Mihailo Lompar, Secretary of the Embassy	By Note of the Rumanian Foreign Ministry	September 19, 1949

FROM BULGARIA

	Name and Position	Manner of Expulsion	Date of Expulsion
1	Dragutin Filipović, Lieutenant Colonel, Military Attaché	By verbal notification	At the beginning of September, 1948
2	Naum Nakov, Secretary of the Embassy and Consul	By Note of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry No. 177/50-I	June 3, 1949
3	Ivan Bačun, Lieutenant Colonel, Military Attaché	By verbal notification	August 19, 1949
4	Arso Mlatović, Major, Assistant Military Attaché	By verbal notification	August 19, 1949
5	Radojica Jovanović, Secretary of the Office of the Military Attaché	By verbal notification	August 19, 1949
6	Nikola Conevski, Chauffeur of the Office of the Military Attaché	By verbal notification	August 19, 1949
7	Ilja Čordić, Chief of the Yugoslav State River Shipping Office at Ruse	By verbal notification	August 19, 1949
8	Josip Gjergja, Ambassador	By Note of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry No. 31-50-I	January 17, 1950
9	Marko Vujačić, First Secretary of the Embassy	By Note of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry No. 31-50-I	January 17, 1950
10	Svetozar Savić, Chief of the Consular Department of the Embassy	By Note of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry No. 31-50-I	January 17, 1950

FROM ALBANIA

	Name and Position	Manner of Expulsion	Date of Expulsion
1	Spiro Srzentić, Instructor of the General Political Administration of the Yugoslav Army attached to the Political Administration of the Albanian Army	By verbal notification	June 24, 1948
2	Vitomir Ristić, Employee of the Yugoslav Shipping Office at Durrës	Arrested and conducted under escort to the Yugoslav frontier	January 13, 1949
3	Janko Havliček, Acting Press Attaché	By Note of the Albanian Foreign Ministry No. 2052	February 22, 1949
4	Mitar Damjanović, Employee of the Legation	By Note of the Albanian Foreign Ministry No. 2052	February 22, 1949
5	Mirko Kadić, Employee of the Legation	By verbal notification	November 4, 1949
6	Said Hasanagić, Employee of the Legation	By verbal notification	November 7, 1949
7	Dragoljub Krstić, Employee of the Legation	By Note of the Albanian Foreign Ministry No. 28000	May 13, 1950
8	Tomo Lončar, Employee of the Legation	By Note of the Albanian Foreign Ministry No. 28000	May 13, 1950

p. 472 Title should read... September 30, 1950, instead of August 31, 1950.

FRONTIER INCIDENTS AND AIRSPACE BY THE ALBANIAN HUNGARIAN FRONTIER ORGANIZATION, 1948-31, 1950, ON THE

INCIDENTS ON THE YUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN FRONTIER

Type of incident	1948 by months											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Frontier incidents								8	5	4	4	3
Violations of territory							3	5	2			
Violations of airspace								2	1	1		

Type of incident	1949 by months											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Frontier incidents	3	2	6	5	5	6	9	8	7	9	4	3
Violations of territory	1			2	4	3	2	1	6	6	3	1
Violations of airspace	1	2	1	2			2	1	1	1	2	1

Type of incident	1950 by months											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Frontier incidents	3	5	2	4	5	4	5	13	1			
Violations of territory	1	2	1			3	4	6				
Violations of airspace		2	2	1	2	1						

Type of incident	Year			TOTAL
	1948	1949	1950	
Frontier incidents	19	67	42	128
Violations of territory	10	29	17	56
Violations of airspace	4	14	8	26
TOTAL	83	110	67	210

INCIDENTS ON THE YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN FRONTIER

Type of incident	1948 by months											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Frontier incidents								4	4		2	2
Violations of territory								3	2	3	3	
Violations of airspace							4		1	2		

Type of incident	1949 by months											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Frontier incidents	2	4	8	12	8	5	6	7	9	13	7	6
Violations of territory	4	3	3	8	4	7	5	4	4	5	3	2
Violations of airspace		2	2	1					1			

Type of incident	1950 by months											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Frontier incidents	7	12	11	15	16	13	7	5	7			
Violations of territory	2	2	5	5	6	3	9	6	1			
Violations of airspace			1		1	1						

Type of incident	Year			TOTAL
	1948	1949	1950	
Frontier incidents	12	87	93	192
Violations of territory	11	52	39	102
Violations of airspace	7	6	3	16
TOTAL	30	145	135	310

INCIDENTS ON THE YUGOSLAV-RUMANIAN FRONTIER

Type of incident	1948 by months											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Frontier incidents												
Violations of territory												
Violations of airspace												

Type of incident	1949 by months											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Frontier incidents	2	2	3	3	2	4	3	3	4	4	3	4
Violations of territory												
Violations of airspace						1						

Type of incident	1950 by months											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Frontier incidents	9	9	19	38	13	12	10	15	21			
Violations of territory								1				
Violations of airspace			2	2		1						

Type of incident	Year			TOTAL
	1948	1949	1950	
Frontier incidents		37	146	183
Violations of territory			1	1
Violations of airspace		1	5	6
TOTAL		38	152	190

INCIDENTS ON THE YUGOSLAV-HUNGARIAN FRONTIER

Type of incident	1948 by months											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Frontier incidents						2				4	2	3
Violations of territory												
Violations of airspace												
Playing searchlights on Yugoslav territory												

Type of incident	1949 by months											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Frontier incidents	3	3	4	8	11	13	10	9	12	12	10	6
Violations of territory						1		1			3	
Violations of airspace	1											
Playing searchlights on Yugoslav territory							1	4	8	14	8	7

Type of incident	1950 by months											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Frontier incidents	7	11	15	8	10	9	9	13	10			
Violations of territory								3	1			
Violations of airspace	5	2	5	2	2							
Playing searchlights on Yugoslav territory	7	13	20	14	8							

Type of incident	Year			TOTAL
	1948	1949	1950	
Frontier incidents	11	101	92	204
Violations of territory		5	4	9
Violations of airspace		1	16	17
Playing searchlights on Yugoslav territory		42	62	104
TOTAL	11	149	174	334

NUMBER OF BROADCASTS FOR YUGOSLAVIA IN THE LANGUAGES OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLES OVER THE STATE RADIO STATIONS OF THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN ONE DAY

	Name of the Station	1948		1949			1950
		Septem-ber	Octo-ber	Janu-ary	March	Septem-ber	July
1	Moscow	3	7	6	7	15*	9*
2	Prague	2	2	3	3	4	7
3	Budapest	1	1	2	2	3	4
4	Bucharest	1	1	1	1	1	2
5	Sofia	2	2	2	2	2	8**
6	Warsaw	1	1	1	1	1	2
7	Tirana	1	1	1	1	4	2
8	Exiles' station						3
	TOTAL	11	15	16	17	30	37

* Besides the mentioned figures there is one more broadcast on Sundays.

** Besides the mentioned figures there are two more broadcasts on Sundays.

TIME AND DURATION OF BROADCASTS FOR YUGOSLAVIA IN THE
LANGUAGES OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLES OVER THE RADIO STATIONS
OF THE USSR AND OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

July 1950

	Name of the Station	Time Broadcast	Wave Lengths	Duration of Broadcast
1	Moscow (In Serbo-Croatian)	06:00	25.08; 25.69; 30.90	0.45
		16:00	19.58; 25.08; 30.90	0.30
		18:00	19.58; 25.08; 25.5; 39.90	0.30
		20:00	25.08; 25.5; 31.48; 320	0.30
		21:30	25.5; 30.90; 31.48; 300; 320	0.30
		22:30	25.5; 30.90; 31.48; 300	0.30
		11:30	25.08; 19.58; 30.90 (on Sun- days only)	1.00
	(In Slovenian)	23:00	30.90; 31.48; 300; 320	0.30
	(In Macedonian)	21:00	30.90; 31.48; 300; 320	0.30
		00:30	30.90; 31.48; 300; 320	0.30
2	Prague (In Serbo-Croatian)	06:00	25.34	1.00
		16:30	25.34; 31.41; (dictation)	0.30
		18:30	25.34	0.30
		20:00	31.41	0.15
		23:00	31.41; 25.34; 273.5; 233.3 427.6	0.15
		24:00	31.41 (dictation from the exile press)	0.30
	(In Slovenian)	17:00	31.41	0.15
3	Budapest (In Serbo-Croatian)	15:15	556; 30.5	0.15
		19:40	556	0.20
		23:00	253	0.45
	(In Slovenian)	18:30	253	0.15
4	Bucharest (In Serbo-Croatian)	13:45	31.2	0.15
		19:30	48.5; 31.2	0.30
5	Sofia (In Serbo-Croatian)	05:30	506	0.15
		18:30	39.11	0.15
		20:45	39.11	0.15
		21:45	506	0.30
		11:00	506 (on Sundays only)	0.30

	Name of the Station	Time of Broadcast	Wave Lengths	Duration of Broadcast
	Sofia (in Macedonian)	06:45	506	0.15
		18:45	506	0.15
		20:15	39.11	0.15
		22:00	36.07	0.30
		11:30	506 (on Sundays only)	0.30
6	Warsaw (in Serbo-Croatian)	19:00	278; 48.5	0.15
		22:00	278; 48.5	0.15
7	Tirana (in Serbo-Croatian)	18:30	38	0.15
		20:30	38	0.30
8	Exiles (in Serbo-Croatian)	07:15	34.02	0.20
		12:15	34.02	0.20
		14:00	34.02	0.20

Note: The radio stations of the USSR and the other Cominform countries beam 37 broadcasts a day to Yugoslavia lasting 15.05 hours and on Sundays 40 broadcasts lasting 17.05 hours.

SURVEY

OF ARTICLES, NEWS REPORTS AND CARTOONS AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA
PUBLISHED IN THE PRINCIPAL NEWSPAPERS OF THE USSR AND
EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THE PERIOD OF AUGUST —
OCTOBER 1949

	Name of Newspaper	1949						Total for all three months	
		August		September		October		No.	%
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%		
1	PRAVDA (USSR)	22	8.3	53	16.2	55	2.3	130	8.9
2	RUDE PRAVO (Czechoslovakia)	35	4.4	30	2.5	21	3.8	86	3.6
3	SZABAD NEP (Hungary)	21	3.9	106	20.0	20	3.4	147	9.1
4	SCANTEIA (Rumania)	49	5.6	46	8.1	29	3.2	124	5.6
5	RABOTNICHESKO DELO (Bulgaria)	55	7.9	45	7.0	32	4.5	132	6.5
6	TRIBUNA LUDU (Poland)	39	3.5	48	7.7	30	1.8	117	4.3
7	ZERI I POPULIT (Albania)	34	6.9	40	12.0	24	4.4	98	7.8
TOTAL		255	5.8	368	10.5	211	3.3	834	6.5

Note: The percentages refer to the space used in the above-mentioned newspapers for attacks against Yugoslavia in the period under review.

VOLUME OF CAPITAL GOODS AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE SOVIET UNION, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1947 TO 1951, AND THE PERCENTAGE OF THEIR FULFILMENT BY THOSE COUNTRIES

COUNTRY	Volume of capital goods agreements concluded for the period from 1947—1951 (in millions of dinars)	Fulfilment up to 1950		Remarks
		In millions of dinars	in %	
USSR	6,750	40	0.6	The Soviet Government stopped implementation of the agreements in the middle of 1948
Czechoslovak Republic	7,500	784	10.5	The Czechoslovak Government stopped implementation of the agreements at the end of May, 1949
Hungary	4,500	360	8.0	The Hungarian Government stopped the implementation of the agreements at the end of May, 1949
TOTAL	18,750	1,184	6.3	

REDUCTION AND COMPLETE STOPPAGE OF TRADE EXCHANGE ON THE BASIS OF TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH YUGOSLAVIA BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE


TOTAL VOLUME OF EXCHANGE (in millions of dinars)			1950	Remarks
	Under the last valid agreement before the Cominform Resolution of June, 1948	Under the last newly concluded agreement after the Cominform Resolution of June, 1948		
Bulgaria	192	—	No new quota lists or contracts were concluded with any country, nor were any renewed. Economic exchange with Yugoslavia ceased altogether.	Bulgarian representatives did not attend negotiations
Hungary	425	—		An agreement was not concluded although there were negotiations
Poland	600	300		
Rumania	150	—		The Rumanian Government did not answer the invitation to negotiate at all
USSR	2,641	322		
Czechoslovakia	2,700	1,500		
TOTAL	6,708	2,122		



REDUCTION AND COMPLETE STOPPAGE OF TRADE EXCHANGE ON THE BASIS OF TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH YUGOSLAVIA BY THE GOVERNMENT

TOTAL
Bulgaria
Hungary
Poland
Rumania
USSR
Czecho- slovakia
TOTAL

ALF Collections Vault



3 0000 118 707 367