

**UNKNOWN LETTER BY**

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**ENVER HOXHA**  
**ON KOSOVO**

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*Documents from the Russian Archive*



SAVA PRESS

### ***Publisher's Note***

This edition of *Unknown Letter by Enver Hoxha on Kosovo* is translated for the first time by Sava Press according to the Albanian edition: Minxhozi, Ymer, ed. *Letër e panjohur e Enver Hoxhës mbi Kosovën: dokumenta të Arkivave Ruse*. Botimpex, 2002.

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## FOREWORD TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

The following publication includes relatively unknown documents relevant to the history of Kosovo within Yugoslav-Soviet-Albanian relations — translated into English for the first time. While Ymer Minxhozi's *A Word to the Reader* has been translated from Albanian, the documents have all been translated from Russian as they appear in *Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov. 1944-1953 gg.*

This collection's main item is a letter written by Enver Hoxha, General Secretary of the Party of Labour of Albania, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), dated no later than September 2, 1949. This letter gives the Albanian Party's *retrospective* (post-Tito-Stalin split) evaluation of Yugoslav-Albanian relations during the war, and makes the case to the Soviet government that anticipated uprisings in Yugoslavia should not only take on an anti-Tito and pro-Soviet character, but in Kosovo, that this should include the demand of unifying Kosovo with Albania. That is, this planned uprising would be stamped with an Albanian national character. Such a tactic, Hoxha argues, would be beneficial in bringing over the masses of Kosovar Albanians to the Cominform line.

The key element in these items, therefore, is in their primary-source illustration of how the Albanian state leadership attempted to utilise the Albanian national question in favour of the broader Com-

inform struggle. This prompts a broader historical discussion on the factor of national questions within various Cominformist struggles. It also stands as a testamentary intervention within contemporary debates surrounding Enver Hoxha's personal stand towards Kosovo. No less revealing is the response of the Soviet leadership to the Albanians' views.

All the questions raised in the prior paragraph serve as matters for readers' and historians' interpretation. As for the book's significance today, in a post-'90s interpretation where the nationalisms of the Balkan Peninsula are often considered as teleologically fixed by historical circumstance, these documents give a glimpse into a no less crucial point in history where the discussion regarding territorial national character was not primarily based on irredentist arguments, but was rather firstly bound up with broader questions of ideology, social systems, tactics and geopolitics.

**Publisher**  
*Ivan Rimac*

## A WORD TO THE READER

Recently, the former Albanian Ambassador to Moscow, my friend Mr. Shaqir Vukaj (currently the Ambassador of Albania to the Czech Republic), introduced me to a book containing documents published in Moscow in 1998. The book is in two volumes and is titled: *Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov. 1944-1953 gg. — Eastern Europe in the Documents of the Russian Archives, 1944-1953*. The documents are extracted from four central archives of Russia: the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (AP RF), the Archive of Foreign Policy (AVP RF), the Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Contemporary History Documents (RCHIDNI) and the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF).

This publication includes documents related to seven countries of Eastern Europe, including Albania, for the first time. As stated in the introduction, the chosen temporal segment is the period from the birth and establishment of the socialist system in the countries of Eastern Europe until the death of Stalin in 1953, an event taken as a dividing line with the subsequent period.

This is a joint publication of five prestigious scientific institutions in Russia in the field of Historical and Scientific Archives:

Russian Academy of Sciences;  
Institute of Slavic Studies;  
Russian Archive Service;

Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Contemporary History Documents;

State Archive of the Russian Federation.

In this collection of about two thousand pages but with a very minimal circulation (only one thousand copies), Albania occupies a smaller place compared to the other six countries. However, the editors of the publication have included some documents of great interest, especially regarding the issue of Kosovo and the Albanian lands in Macedonia and Montenegro.

Among the documents directly related to Albania, the following materials particularly caught my attention:

— The conversation between Enver Hoxha and Stalin, held on March 23, 1949 (according to the Soviet party's notes), where the reader will find Stalin's surprising advice regarding the internal and external politics of Albania at that time.

— The conversation between V.M. Molotov and Enver Hoxha on June 24, 1948 regarding Albanian-Yugoslav relations.

— Three reports from the Soviet ambassador in Tirana, Dimitri Chuvakin, informing the high leadership in Moscow about the special meetings he has had at different times with Enver Hoxha, Koçi Xoxe, Mehmet Shehu and Omer Nishani. The subject of these discussions is the political situation in Albania and Albanian-Yugoslav relations.

— The letter from Enver Hoxha addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) on September 2, 1949 titled: "Regarding Kosovo and Metohija," which is also the most comprehensive and important document in this publication.

The letter is published together with an important note from G. Malenkov regarding its urgent nature and distribution to all members of the Politburo. It is not clear why the letter was sent in the Italian language because, as stated in the archive note, its translation into Russian was done from Italian. The letter is published in the second volume, numbered chronologically as 64, and occupies pages 206-214. (For comparison with the translation into Albanian, the full text of the letter is being published as a facsimile at the end of this book, also in the Russian language).

Thanking Ambassador Vukaj for facilitating my acquaintance with these documents, I thought it appropriate to publish them, as they are of interest to the general public and especially to scholars of this period in Albanian history.

**Ymer Minxhozi**

# LETTER OF E. HOXHA ON KOSOVO

No. 64

*Letter from E. Hoxha to the Central Committee  
of the CPSU(B) on the Background of the Kosovo  
Question and Methods of Its Resolution\**

City of Tirana

No later than September 2, 1949\*\*

SECRET

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE  
CPSU(B) ON KOSOVO AND METOHIJA

The Albanians living in the People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Kosovo constitute a significant national minority by their numbers. This Albanian minority is settled in regions bordering the People's Republic of Albania. The Congress of Berlin and the Treaty of Versailles unjustly violated the interests of Albania and the Albanian national minority in Kosovo.

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\* The document bears the following notes: "To Grigoryan. Prepare for distribution in the prescribed manner. G. Malenkov. 25/IX", "Urgent. To Comrade Medvedev. 1) This document must be distributed today to members of the Politburo. 2) Review the translation editorially and send for processing. 3) Draft a short cover note as per standard procedure. V. Gr[igoryan]. 25/IX", "To the archive. Preserve. Distributed to CC leadership. V. Grigoryan."

\*\* Dated according to the cover note.

According to old, pre-war statistical data (falsified statistics of the royal regimes of Serbia, by which they attempted to prove that the Albanian national minority was numerically insignificant), the Albanian minority numbered about 700,000 people. *In reality*, the number of Albanians in Yugoslavia — in Kosovo, Metohija, Macedonia and Montenegro — reaches one million, if not more. A significant portion of Albanians in these statistics was disguised and hidden by the regimes of that time under the guise of being Muslims or Turks.

The Albanians of Kosovo, Metohija and other areas regarded — and continue to regard — their violent separation from Albania as the greatest injustice committed against them. They did not accept this resolution of the matter and do not wish to remain within the borders of Yugoslavia, regardless of its political system. Such is the reality. Their sole ideal is unification with Albania.

During the Second World War, both fascism and the Albanian reaction relied on this very factor. They raised the issue of Kosovo and “united” Kosovo and Metohija with Albania under the slogan of a “Greater Albania.” On the part of fascism, this was a grand demagogic move which resulted in the Albanians of Kosovo *being neutralised* in the fight against fascism. *They were led to believe* the illusion that their “centuries-old dream of unification with Albania” had supposedly come true, and therefore saw no reason to fight fascism.

Under the influence of the illusory “liberation”

of the Albanians of Kosovo from Yugoslav enslavement and their “unification” with Albania, Kosovo became a fascist and reactionary reserve. No *people’s* liberation\* struggle was waged *there*. This is on the one hand.

On the other hand, we believe that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia already at that time — in 1941-42 and afterwards — pursued an erroneous and incorrect political line on the national question, which was in fact a disguised nationalist line of that time. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, during the struggle, should have given particular attention to the question of Kosovo and Metohija, as these areas were inhabited by a significant national minority bordering Albania. This was a very serious issue, for which a just Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist solution had to be found, in order to prevent the Albanian population of Kosovo from becoming a support base for reaction.

Even during the war, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia should have created for the Albanians of Kosovo appropriate prospects that would have mobilised them in the fight against fascism. The Albanians of Kosovo should have had the assurance that by fighting alongside the peoples of Yugoslavia against fascism, they would be winning for them-

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\* On page 2 of the letter and throughout the text, the editor amended the term *natsional’no-osvoboditel’naia bor’ba* (national liberation struggle) to *narodno-osvoboditel’naia bor’ba* (people’s liberation struggle). During the war and post-war years, Albanians referred to the struggle as national liberation.

selves the right to self-determination — whether to unite with Albania or with Yugoslavia, or to remain independent. Admittedly, we believed that the latter two options would be ruled out, as the Albanians of Kosovo would fight only for the first. This was perfectly clear to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as well, but it was evidently disadvantageous to them — hence the vagueness of their official statements, which led to the population of Kosovo not participating in the struggle, as they did not believe in the justice of the Yugoslavs, even though in this case the latter presented themselves *on behalf* of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The population of Kosovo did not believe in the justice of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and due to the low political level and considerable backwardness of the masses, the fascist demagogy and the creation of a “Greater Albania,” the Albanians of Kosovo not only refrained from fighting fascism but instead fought against the *people’s* liberation war in Yugoslavia.

After their mass extermination by the Great Serbs, and given their low political development, the Albanians of Kosovo could not trust the Yugoslavs, no matter how they presented themselves. Yet this fact was not taken into account by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia — and this was by no means accidental. The organisation of the *people’s* liberation struggle in Kosovo under the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was conducted in a nationalist spirit. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia did not create a single special national committee

for Kosovo and Metohija in which leadership would rest solely in Albanian hands. No party structure or organised struggle was established there, and the issue of the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija was not clarified. This did not happen. What is more, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia did everything in its power to avoid raising the question of Kosovo at all, not to *educate* the Albanian population of Kosovo in a spirit of patriotism, and not to allow the Albanian flag to fly alongside the Yugoslav one — which would have been of great symbolic and mobilising significance for them. On the contrary, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia suppressed these aspirations of the Albanian population of Kosovo, continually opposed them and criticised us when we put forward such a proposal and expressed support for these aspirations.

We considered it inappropriate to raise the question of the unification of Kosovo with Albania in the midst of the struggle. In our view, the Albanians of Kosovo were to fight against fascism within the framework of the Yugoslav state, and only after victory should this issue be resolved between the two fraternal communist parties and the people's democratic regimes that were to be established in Albania and Yugoslavia following the defeat of the enemy.

In order to achieve the greatest possible mobilisation of the Albanians of Kosovo, we believed that the Yugoslavs ought first to resolve the question of securing the broadest possible participation of Kosovar Albanians in governing bodies, of the flag, as well as

the issue of the closest cooperation of Kosovar Albanian partisan units in the country's *people's* liberation struggle under the command of the General Staff of the *People's* Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. Officially, we also requested permission to send one of the Albanian partisan units to Kosovo, with the aim of supporting the widest possible mobilisation of the local Albanian population in the fight against fascism.

It must be emphasised that at that time in Kosovo and Metohija there was no party work being carried out among the masses, nor was there any organisation of resistance against fascism. We expressed this view to Vukmanović Tempo, who at that time was the representative of the Central Committee of the CPY for organising the struggle in Macedonia. In response to our official request, Milutin Milutinović, a member of the CPY Central Committee and organiser of the struggle against fascism in Montenegro, replied to *us* as follows: "There is no need to send your people to Kosovo — our division will be sent there, which will resolve all the issues of Kosovo."

Later it was confirmed that a punitive expedition had been sent to Kosovo, spreading terror there. For holding such a view — expressed by Miladin Popović and myself — Tito, in his letter addressed to Miladin Popović, accused him of national deviation and harshly condemned him.

Thus, the Albanians of Kosovo never accepted the decision imposed on them by the CPY — neither during the struggle itself, nor afterwards. The creation of the Autonomous *Region* of Kosovo and Me-

tohija is nothing more than demagogy. It convinced not a single Albanian in Kosovo, and their ideal — unification with Albania — remained unfulfilled.

Following the persecution and massacres under King Aleksandar, the Albanians of Kosovo were also subjected to mass killings immediately after the liberation of Yugoslavia. These mass executions were carried out by units of the *People's Liberation Army* of Yugoslavia.

If there had been any trust in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the liberation struggle, then after these unjustified repressions — which reflected the truly chauvinist views held by the CPY leadership even at that time — the Albanian population of Kosovo lost all illusions, and it no longer places any trust in the *CPY*. To them, the Great Serbs and the *CPY* leadership are one and the same.

The Albanians of Kosovo reacted sharply to all these repressions and fled to the mountains. But the *CPY* suppressed this movement with iron and blood, presenting it as a reactionary uprising. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia never once sought to study the specific situation in Kosovo and Metohija, and continued to apply the same old brutal methods of suppression. Kosovo and Metohija might have become centres of war within the newborn People's Republic of Yugoslavia had Albanian partisan units not arrived there for one reason or another. The arrival of Albanian army units in Kosovo brought calm, cooled the inflamed passions, revived faith among the Albanians of Kosovo that all questions would be resolved

peacefully, and created confidence that our forces would protect the *Albanian population* — which they indeed did.

Our forces acted as a barrier against Yugoslav attempts to impose *repressions on* the Albanians of Kosovo.

Thus, from the very beginning of the struggle through to liberation and beyond, the CPY maintained a chauvinist position on the question of Kosovo and Metohija.

Even under people's rule in Yugoslavia, the issue of Kosovo and Metohija has not been resolved justly. It is being resolved on the basis of nationalism. The opening of Albanian schools in Kosovo and Metohija is nothing but demagogy. Only a few Albanians were elected to governing bodies. But these measures deceive and satisfy no one in Kosovo and Metohija. The democratic and national rights of the Albanian national minority in Kosovo and Metohija are entirely ignored. There are no ties with Albania! What is more, the CPY skilfully and persistently creates all sorts of obstacles in this regard.

We believed that the issue of Kosovo could not be brought up for discussion during the *people's* liberation struggle, and therefore the line taken by our party on this issue — as stated above — was correct. During the *people's* liberation war, Yugoslavia was our ally, and of course we could not align ourselves with the position of Albanian reaction. Our party maintained a clear stance on the Kosovo issue and effectively countered fascist demagogy. It joined with the

CPY in issuing a joint declaration — an appeal to the Albanians of Kosovo, urging them to fight against the common enemy.

On the eve of the liberation of Yugoslavia and Albania, we once again recognised that raising the issue of Kosovo's unification with Albania was untimely, since we were faced with the tasks of strengthening and consolidating people's democratic power in both Albania and Yugoslavia. We believed that in the People's Democratic Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia we had a loyal and reliable ally, and therefore, in the interests of the socialist camp — and especially in the interest of Albania — it was necessary to avoid difficult situations that might arise in Yugoslavia, as it too was in the process of establishing and strengthening a people's democratic system.

A revision of our borders with Yugoslavia in the direction of uniting Kosovo and Metohija with Albania would at any time have represented a further strengthening of the People's Republic of Albania. But on the other hand, in the initial period after liberation, the small People's Republic of Albania — even together with Kosovo and Metohija — would have been an easy target for imperialism, and in the event of an attack and occupation of Albania by imperialist forces, the damage to the common cause would have been far greater. Therefore, in the immediate post-liberation period, Kosovo remaining within the Yugoslav republic entailed significantly less risk. But later the situation became clearer, and the international and internal standing of the People's Republic

of Yugoslavia was significantly strengthened. Treaties of mutual assistance were signed between the USSR and Yugoslavia, and between Yugoslavia and the people's democracies. Albania's international and internal position also improved, and the signing of the treaty of mutual assistance between Yugoslavia and Albania represented a solid strengthening of Albania's international standing and protected it from potential threats by imperialist forces.

Thus, already at the time of signing the treaty with Yugoslavia, we believed the moment had come to raise the question of Kosovo and Metohija — and *I did* raise this issue with Tito at that time. Tito replied to me: "Kosovo belongs to Albania and should be joined with Albania. We desire this wholeheartedly, but at the present moment we cannot allow it, because the reaction of the Great Serbs is still very strong, and so this just act could only harm us." It was later confirmed that these words of Tito's were nothing but demagoguery.

Under the current circumstances, after the exposure of the betrayal by Tito's clique, we believe the question of Kosovo must be raised once again.

Tito and his cronies are agents of imperialism, harnessing Yugoslavia to the imperialist cart. They are turning Yugoslavia into a prison of nations, where Hitlerite fascist terror reigns. The question of liberating the peoples of Yugoslavia from this fascist gang and the clutches of imperialism is at the same time a question of liberating the Albanian population of Kosovo, and *it* presents itself to us as an urgent issue.

We believe the liberation of the peoples of Yugoslavia can be achieved only through struggle and bloodshed. There is no other way. Tito's clique must be overthrown and destroyed. The struggle for national liberation in Yugoslavia must be led by the Yugoslav proletariat, headed by a new communist party based on Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist and internationalist foundations. Under these new conditions, we believe that we stand today where we stood at the start of the *people's* liberation struggle *against* fascism. The struggle in Yugoslavia must be waged sharply — up to armed insurrection against the fascists, imperialism, and their internal henchmen, led by the agent Tito.

We believe that in the course of fierce struggle against Tito's clique and the imperialists, the leadership of a new Yugoslav communist internationalist party will be forged — a party that will mobilise and lead all the peoples of Yugoslavia into battle, based on sound Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist principles, and that will also wage a sharp struggle against all nationalist tendencies that existed in the past and may emerge again during the course of the struggle.

The national question in particular must be treated as one requiring the most thorough resolution — for the fate and very scale of the struggle depend on it.

So, what must the people of Kosovo do now? We believe the Albanian population of Kosovo, Metohija, Macedonia and Montenegro must fight for its liberation just as the other peoples of Yugoslavia will.

The first thing it must do is enter into a sharp and uncompromising struggle against Tito's clique, up to and including armed uprising. This struggle should begin as soon as possible. If others begin the fight earlier, so much the better, as this will help avoid the isolation and suppression of the movement in Kosovo. The people of Kosovo must consider their struggle closely tied to the struggle of all the peoples of Yugoslavia and conducted within the framework of Yugoslavia — otherwise, it will be isolated and crushed. Therefore, the Albanian population of Kosovo must understand that *its* liberation, and the achievement of national and democratic rights, can only be secured *through its own struggle* — carried out simultaneously with the struggle of the other peoples of Yugoslavia.

The whole issue lies in ensuring that the past mistakes of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in relation to Kosovo and Metohija are not repeated.

Kosovo and Metohija must have their own leadership, developed in the course of the struggle — their own national liberation committee, which would define its line of struggle based on the Cominform resolution and Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist principles. During the struggle, a section of the communist internationalist party for Kosovo and Metohija must be created, organised and tempered — as part of the communist internationalist party of Yugoslavia. The Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija must fight under the Albanian flag. Partisan units must be *under the leadership* of Albanians who emerge in the course of

the struggle, and the principle of self-determination must be clearly defined and must arise as the outcome of the sharp struggle of the Albanians of Kosovo, which they will wage against Tito's clique and imperialism in fraternal cooperation with the other peoples of Yugoslavia. Patriotic and internationalist feelings, as well as love for their homeland — Albania — must be properly developed among the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija. Above all, and on a sound basis, the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija must be educated in boundless faith in and love for the USSR, the Bolshevik Party and Stalin. *The population of Kosovo and Metohija* must firmly grasp that without the USSR, the Bolshevik Party and Stalin, there can be neither a free Albania, nor a free Yugoslavia, nor a free Kosovo — and without them, it will never be able to realise its dreams and aspirations. The Albanians of Kosovo must clearly understand that their ruthless enemy — and the enemy of the entire socialist camp — is American imperialism, its satellites and the Tito clique, which is nothing but its agent.

We believe that unless the Albanian population of Kosovo comes to terms with this truth, it will not be able to wage the struggle — because it has lost all trust in the Yugoslav leadership. If the Yugoslav internationalist communists overlook or ignore the national question of Kosovo, the Albanian population of Kosovo will place no trust in them. The key to the successful development of the struggle in Kosovo and Metohija lies in their unification with Albania. The

Albanian population of Kosovo and Metohija refuses to accept any other solution, and considers any alternative unjust — as do we.

We believe that Kosovo, Metohija and the part of Macedonia bordering Albania that has an Albanian population should, after the liberation of Yugoslavia from the clutches of Tito and imperialism, be united with Albania. Only such a path will lead the Albanians living in Yugoslavia to heroically fight against Tito and imperialism.

We believe that the position we have expressed is positive and fully in line with the Marxist-Leninist path. It will contribute to intensifying the struggle against Tito in the region of Kosovo and Macedonia,\* and to the unification of these lands with the People's Republic of Albania — something that corresponds to Marxist-Leninist principles and will strengthen both the international and internal position of the People's Republic of Albania. It is also of great importance for the strengthening of the socialist camp.

The People's Republic of Albania will devote all its efforts to ensuring that the struggle against Tito's clique in Yugoslavia continues to develop and intensify until complete victory is achieved. We believe that Albania's official position on the issue of Kosovo and Metohija should remain restrained, as otherwise Tito's clique may use it as a tool for mobilising the Great Serbs and accuse Albania of chauvinism, and so forth. Nonetheless, Albania will provide compre-

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\* As in the original text.

hensive support to the peoples of Yugoslavia and to the Albanian population of Kosovo, which must act and demonstrate its own initiative within the framework we have set out above.

The issue of Kosovo and Metohija has become particularly urgent in connection with the assistance our party is providing to anti-Tito Yugoslav comrades, as well as to the population of Kosovo and Metohija, who are willing and ready to fight by every possible means against the Belgrade traitors. But *the Albanians of this region* continually raise the question with us: "How will the national problem of Kosovo and Metohija be resolved?"

We believe this is a very important question.

However, it is possible *that* in seeking to resolve it *we* may be mistaken — and therefore, without the advice of Comrade Stalin, we shall not take a single step. For this reason, we present our point of view, and if we are mistaken, we ask that our errors be *pointed out* so that we may correct them.

For the Central Committee  
of the Party of Labour of Albania  
ENVER HOXHA

*RCHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 137. D. 68. L. 64–73.*

*Translation from the Italian. Copy.*

# CONVERSATION BETWEEN D.S. CHUVAKHIN AND E. HOXHA

No. 266

*From the Diary of D.S. Chuvakhin.  
Record of a Conversation with E. Hoxha on the  
Internal Political Situation in Albania\**

City of Tirana

March 16, 1948  
TOP SECRET

Today I had a conversation with Enver Hoxha, who received me in the presence of Koçi Xoxe. I asked the Prime Minister to share his thoughts on the internal political situation in the country, and also to speak about the changes that had taken place during my absence (since August 1947).

Enver Hoxha described the internal political situation in the country as fully stable, emphasising the continued strengthening of the people's regime. As confirmation of his words, he referred to the recently held elections to local organs of people's power (February 1948), which ended in complete success for the Democratic Front and represented a triumph of people's democracy. Koçi Xoxe, who was present, remarked that these elections showed the great authority the Democratic Front enjoys at the grassroots

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\* Distributed to V. Molotov, V. Zorin, the Department of Balkan Countries, and to file.

level, and that in certain areas nearly 100% of voters cast their ballots for the Front's candidates. Comparing the percentage of votes cast for Democratic Front candidates in previous election campaigns (the elections to the Constituent Assembly on December 2, 1945, the elections to district and municipal councils on February 15, 1948), Enver Hoxha pointed to a gradual increase in the number of votes received by Democratic Front candidates. Thus, on December 2, 1945, Democratic Front candidates received 93.18% of all votes cast, while in the district council elections this percentage rose to 97.6%, and in the most recent elections — to 99.1%.

Speaking about the general atmosphere during the elections and the mood of the population, the Prime Minister stressed that the elections across the country were held with great enthusiasm and without any incidents. The people came to polling stations singing songs and voted unanimously for "our candidates." "The reactionaries and our individual political opponents," noted Koçi Xoxe, "did not dare raise their heads this time." "Whereas in past elections," Xoxe continued, "the elections in some areas, especially in mountainous regions, were accompanied by armed raids, killings and voter intimidation, during the most recent elections no such incidents occurred." According to him, the elections were held in a calm environment, and the local authorities and party organisations coped quite well with their tasks during the campaign.

According to my interlocutors, the success of

the people's regime in the recent elections is especially significant when one considers that the country is still experiencing major difficulties, and that last year the government made many political mistakes in its treatment of the core segment of the population — the peasantry (the politically misguided grain procurement law of May 1947, failure of local land authorities to meet their contractual obligations to peasants, poor procurement policy regarding tobacco and industrial crops, etc.).

Speaking about the overall situation in the country, Enver Hoxha stated that the authorities had achieved great success last year in eliminating armed bands, which had continued to terrorise the local population. At present, according to him, there are no more than 150-160 armed bandits throughout Albania, compared to 500-600 at the beginning of 1947. There are now no serious armed bands in the country waging political struggle against the people's regime. The individuals now hiding in the mountains of the northern and, to some extent, central regions are mainly criminal offenders wanted by the people's protection bodies for murder and theft. As for political criminals, they number only a few individuals and are completely isolated from the people (Cen Elezi, the well-known *bajraktar* from the Dibra region; Dan Kaleshi and others). Koçi Xoxe noted that, according to *Mbrojtja e Popullit*, many political criminals fled Albania to Greece over the past year and are conducting subversive activities against their country from there.

In order to especially underline the calm situation in the country — which truly exists — Koçi Xoxe pointed out that the number of murders, which had long been characteristic of Albania, is now declining. He provided the following figures: if in 1939 the monthly average was 74 murders, in 1945 the number fell to 40-45, in 1946 — to 20, in 1947 — to 15-17, and in January this year only 3-5 such cases were recorded (these figures may require slight correction). He specifically noted that in regions like Mokra, in Korça Prefecture, where during the Zogu era not a single day passed without a killing, only a few such cases have been recorded in recent months. Enver Hoxha and Koçi Xoxe attributed this situation to the undoubted growth in the general political awareness of the broader population and to the work of mass public organisations (the youth and local branches of the Albanian Women's Union), which have penetrated into the very heart of the population and whose activities are becoming increasingly popular among the people.

In this connection, Koçi Xoxe pointed to the successful campaign for the surrender of weapons by the population. He stated that last year the public handed over several tens of thousands of various types of weapons to the police, and that currently one to two thousand rifles, carbines and other weapons are being surrendered by the population each month. The Minister of Internal Affairs noted that this surrender of arms was happening without any particular pressure from the police or people's defence organs. "All

of this,” said Koçi Xoxe, “shows that the authority of our government has risen significantly in the eyes of the people, that the people are no longer worried for their safety, and that they fully rely on the police and people’s defence bodies to protect their property.” Turning to the economic situation in the country, Enver Hoxha stated that the general well-being of the people is now significantly higher and that, despite some difficulties with bread in urban areas, the country as a whole is supplied with grain. He added that the peasantry undoubtedly possesses large stocks of grain — enough not only to feed the urban population, but also to create some reserves. In this regard, the Prime Minister pointed to serious political mistakes in the government’s economic policy in 1947, which sowed a certain distrust among the peasantry. Among these mistakes, Enver Hoxha named the harmful grain procurement law of May 23, 1947, which, he said, undoubtedly killed any motivation among peasants to increase grain production; the flawed procurement policy for industrial crops, particularly tobacco; and the failure of land authorities to fulfil their contractual obligations to peasants. He noted that the government was grateful to the Soviet envoy who, back in May of last year, drew the Prime Minister’s attention to the harmful nature of the law of May 23, 1947 — leading to its timely repeal. He further stated that land authorities “let down” the peasants by not meeting their promises. These authorities insisted that peasants in some regions plant industrial crops at the expense of reducing grain cul-

tivation, yet failed to supply these peasants with the required quantities of grain, despite contractually committing to do so. He gave another example that, in his words, amounted to outright mockery of the peasants. Procurement agencies under the Ministry of Trade had agreed with peasants on the terms of tobacco purchases — price, quality, storage conditions, delivery dates to specific locations, etc. Time passed, but the procurement agencies failed to collect the tobacco. As a result, the quality of the tobacco declined (through no fault of the peasants), and the agencies then reduced their prices — in some cases several times over. “Such policies from our institutions,” Enver Hoxha declared, “could not lead to anything good. These policies only embittered the peasants and sowed distrust in all government initiatives.” “Naturally,” Hoxha continued, “these matters were not without deliberate sabotage from enemies of the people’s power.” In response to my question, the Prime Minister stated that before the new harvest, the urban population would require no less than 60,000 quintals of grain, which the government intends to procure from the peasants. He said the Ministry of Trade is currently working out all issues related to the successful procurement of this quantity. He noted that the main difficulty lies in the lack of reliable statistical data. While the relevant Albanian authorities have more or less correctly estimated crop yields in individual regions, they made serious errors in calculating the total area sown under different crops. Now, as comrades return from the field,

it is becoming clear that the areas sown with certain crops were significantly overestimated, and this is leading to major confusion in fulfilling the grain procurement plan. “It is not hard to guess,” continued the Prime Minister, “that we now have to revise our plans at a rapid pace.” (I did not gain the impression that the grain situation was especially critical at present, although supply disruptions were reported in a number of towns — including even the capital.)

In this connection, Enver Hoxha stated that at the recently concluded plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania, it was necessary to address not only matters of party-building, but also state and economic affairs. According to him, at this most recent plenum — more than ever before — comrades from the regions sharply criticised “our mistakes” and put forward many valuable proposals. A special commission is now at work studying all the proposals raised during the plenum, summarising them and drafting a corresponding resolution of the Central Committee. Turning to the plenum, Enver Hoxha also spoke about the anti-party activities, as he called them, of Nako Spiru, who for years had pursued a very subtle policy allegedly aimed at pushing workers out of the party leadership.\* Hoxha gave several examples illustrating Spi-

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\* This refers to Koçi Xoxe, one of the few members of the Communist Party of Albania who came from a working-class background. The Soviet party leadership favoured him over Nako Spiru — a young, ambitious politician from a wealthy family. Both men competed for influence in the party. Without

ru's attempts to drive a wedge between him and Koçi Xoxe, his efforts to exaggerate Yugoslav mistakes, and so on. According to Hoxha, Nako Spiru had tried to turn the Yugoslavs against him — including through a conversation with Yugoslav envoy Đerđe in 1946 and by passing to Đerđe a speech by Enver Hoxha concerning the Berat Plenum of the Communist Party of Albania Central Committee, in which Hoxha supposedly placed blame on the Yugoslavs for mistakes made at that plenum. There was also an attempt by Spiru to sow distrust towards Hoxha during last year's negotiations with Kidrič and others. At the same time, Enver Hoxha continued, while pursuing this anti-party line, Nako Spiru made every effort to present himself as pro-Soviet — although in reality, he often said “negative things” about the Soviet Union in the company of close friends. According to Hoxha, upon returning from the USSR last year, Nako Spiru spoke very poorly of Soviet people, of collective farms and Soviet factories — claiming that, supposedly, Italian enterprises he had seen during the occupation years were far better run than those in the Soviet Union.

Enver Hoxha also cited several other examples of

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the same level of popularity as Enver Hoxha — either among the public or within the CPA — each sought to win his favour. By the end of 1947, Xoxe's position was seen by the USSR as the more favourable. He was the only Albanian leader invited to rest in the Soviet Union, where consultations with Soviet leaders were held on all major issues of party and state policy in Albania.

Nako Spiru's anti-party behaviour, which, however, he had not noticed earlier — although, as he put it, Nako Spiru had been considered one of his, Enver Hoxha's, close associates. Having said this, Enver Hoxha went on to criticise himself, stating that a large part of the blame for what had happened lay with him for failing to “see through” Nako Spiru in time. “Only now,” Enver Hoxha said, “after we approached the criticism of certain of our leaders' mistakes in a comradesly way, has full unity been achieved within the party.” The case of Nako Spiru, he went on, had taught the leadership of the Albanian Party a great deal. (It is quite telling that while Enver Hoxha was saying all this, Koçi Xoxe made a point of showing that he fully supported Enver Hoxha in everything.) “We have thoroughly informed Comrade Petrov,\* the representative of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, about all of these matters,” said Enver Hoxha. “We passed on to him all the necessary materials.” Enver Hoxha and Koçi Xoxe stated that the Communist Party of Albania, having rid itself of elements like Nako Spiru, had become stronger and its leadership more united.

In conclusion, Koçi Xoxe shared some figures related to party growth. He stated that the party currently had over 22,000 full members and about 14,500 candidate members. According to him, the Youth League (Communist Youth) counted around 31,000 members.

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\* “Petrov” was the alias of P.I. Manchhi.

At the end of the conversation, Enver Hoxha and Koçi Xoxe invited me to stay and have lunch with them. Thanking them, I did not object.

USSR Envoy to Albania  
DM. CHUVAKHIN

*AVP RF. F. 067. Op. 16. P. 111. D. 4. L. 7-13.*

*Original.*

# CONVERSATION BETWEEN V.M. MOLOTOV AND E. HOXHA ON ALBANIAN-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS

No. 293

*From the diary of V.M. Molotov.  
Record of a Conversation with E. Hoxha on  
Albanian-Yugoslav Relations*

City of Warsaw\*

June 24, 1948

16:00

SECRET

After exchanging greetings, Hoxha thanked Molotov for receiving him, saying he was aware of how busy Molotov was at that time.

Molotov asked Hoxha whether he considered the convening of the conference of eight countries to be timely.

Hoxha replied affirmatively.

Molotov then asked Hoxha for his opinion on the draft statement by the foreign ministers of the eight countries.

Hoxha said that he had not had the opportunity

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\* The conversation took place in Warsaw during the conference of foreign ministers of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania on the German question.

to read the document straight away, as it had not been translated into French.

Molotov asked whether he now had a translation.

Hoxha replied that he had received it and that the draft statement was very good.

Molotov remarked that the conference had been called in haste, but action had needed to be swift. There had been no time for preparatory work. Nevertheless, he hoped no serious mistakes would be made.

Hoxha said he wanted to inform Molotov about the situation in Albania.

The letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) had saved Albania from great danger.\* Albania and the Communist Party of Albania had been placed in serious jeopardy as a result of the actions of the Yugoslav leadership.

Molotov noted that this was indeed the case.

Hoxha said the leadership of the Communist Party of Albania had placed complete trust in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and especially in Tito. They had been convinced that this position aligned with the directives of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B). The Albanian leadership had informed the CPSU(B) of their stance. Hoxha recalled that during his first meeting with Molotov in Paris, he had spoken about Albanian-Yugoslav relations. This issue had also been

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\* This refers to the letter from the CPSU(B) Central Committee to the CPY Central Committee dated March 28, 1948, which was circulated for information to the communist parties belonging to the Cominform.

discussed during his stay in Moscow.

Hoxha stated that the letter from the CPSU(B) had allowed the Albanian leadership to understand the true nature of the CPY Central Committee's line. In order to facilitate the implementation of this line, the CPY Central Committee sought, first and foremost, to undermine unity within the leadership of the Communist Party of Albania and to damage the authority of certain Albanian leaders. Hoxha acknowledged that the Communist Party of Albania was still very young. Its leadership lacked sufficient Marxist-Leninist training. The country essentially had no working class. However, the party had considerable experience in struggle. During the war, it had fought for Albania's liberation with great courage and boundless faith in the Soviet Union. Mistakes had been made, but in Hoxha's opinion, there had been no fundamental or principled errors.

During the war, there had been no connection between the leadership of the Communist Party of Albania and the CPY Central Committee. It was true that Popović had been in Albania — he had been freed from the Germans by the Albanians. Popović had rendered assistance to the Albanian communists, but he had not been an official representative of the CPY Central Committee. On the eve of Albania's liberation, the CPY Central Committee sent an official representative. At that time, the Yugoslavs claimed that this representative's task was to help the Albanians organise a government. In fact, his aim was to remove the party's former leadership

and replace them with individuals loyal to the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslavs gave the impression that the Albanian leadership had made a series of errors. In particular, they accused the leadership of attempting to act independently of the CPY Central Committee. In connection with the Kosovo question, the Yugoslavs accused the Albanian leaders of chauvinism.

Hoxha went on to say that, in his view, the Yugoslavs had achieved their objective: on the eve of Albania's liberation, the composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania was shaped in accordance with Yugoslav intentions. The Yugoslavs had succeeded in sowing division within the party leadership. They tried to ensure that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania followed only the directives of the CPY Central Committee. The Albanians, for their part, entered into close cooperation with the Yugoslavs.

The turning point in Albanian-Yugoslav relations was the visit by the Albanian leadership to Moscow. Hoxha said that when he returned from Moscow, a tense situation had arisen in Albania. The Yugoslavs began accusing the Albanians of changing their political line. They accused the Albanian leadership of pursuing an anti-Yugoslav policy and resorted to blackmail. They claimed that portraits of Tito had allegedly been removed from a number of Albanian institutions. In a conversation with the Yugoslav *chargé d'affaires*, Hoxha stated at the time that these accusations were completely unfounded.

The Yugoslavs also began attacking Albania's

economic policy. Even before Hoxha's trip to Moscow, the Albanians had handed over their five-year plan to the Yugoslavs. For a long time, there had been no response. Eventually a reply was received — it was a harsh criticism of the plan. The Yugoslavs accused Albania of striving for autarky. They also said that Yugoslavia's relations with other people's democracies — especially with Bulgaria — were much better than its relations with Albania.

The Yugoslavs openly expressed dissatisfaction with Nako Spiru. They even implied that, in their view, the hand of the enemy could be felt in the activities of the Albanian party leadership.

The situation became very difficult. The Yugoslavs' criticism of the Communist Party of Albania was clearly unfriendly. The Communist Party of Albania was not treated as an independent party. The situation within the Albanian party leadership itself also became very strained. At that moment, a tragic event occurred — the suicide of Nako Spiru.

Molotov said: "We had the impression that, in the person of Nako Spiru, Albania lost a good worker and a friend of the USSR."

Hoxha replied that Nako Spiru had evidently fallen victim to Yugoslav intrigue. However, he, Hoxha, believed that Spiru was an ambitious man.

Molotov remarked that this was possible.

Hoxha continued, saying that Spiru's ambition could be excused when considered in the context of Yugoslav machinations. Hoxha said that at the time he had made a mistake by allowing himself to be

influenced by the Yugoslavs. He believed their criticism. All the circumstances — including the stance taken by Koçi Xoxe — led to his own hostile attitude towards Spiru. Spiru's suicide, in a sense, seemed to justify that attitude.

Molotov remarked that Spiru's suicide was worthy of condemnation. Such an act was unworthy of a communist. Molotov noted that at the time the Yugoslavs had put great pressure on Hoxha.

Hoxha agreed. He said that the Yugoslavs had deliberately escalated tensions with Albania. The accusations of striving for autarky were absurd.

Molotov stated that if Albania wished to move forward, it must develop relations with other countries — including economic relations.

Hoxha responded that the Yugoslavs did not want this. Their policy towards Albania was a colonial policy.

Molotov said this view was absolutely correct. The Yugoslavs were indeed pursuing a colonial policy towards Albania.

To support his point, Hoxha related the following incident. The Yugoslavs had promised to supply Albania with the necessary equipment to increase oil production. However, they failed to fulfil this commitment. When the Albanians raised the issue, the Yugoslavs replied that the Albanians needn't worry, as lower oil output would only harm Yugoslavia. Thus, said Hoxha, the Yugoslavs were thinking only of Yugoslavia's interests. They refused to recognise that Albania was itself interested in boosting oil

production and, more broadly, in developing its own economy.

Molotov apologised to Hoxha for not being able to continue the conversation, as he had to attend a meeting of the Editorial Commission.

In parting, Molotov said that Albania was on the right path, having freed itself from the influence of the bad Yugoslavs. He added that there were good people among the Yugoslavs too.

The conversation lasted 30 minutes.

Recorded by VIDYASOV.

*AVP RF. F. 06. Op. 10. P. 27. D. 334. L. 1-4.*

*Original.*

# CPSU(B) DECISION REGARDING D.S. CHUVAKHIN'S POSITION ON ALBANIAN AFFAIRS

No. 304

*Decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee  
of the CPSU(B) Regarding the Position of D.S.  
Chuvakhin on the Leadership of the Communist  
Party of Albania\**

City of Moscow

November 20, 1948

TOP SECRET

## Telegram to Comrade Chuvakhin

In connection with Comrade Chuvakhin's telegram regarding the congress of the Communist Party of Albania, send him the following telegram:

"Tirana

"Soviet Envoy

"We consider your assessment of the work of the Communist Party of Albania congress to be one-sided and incorrect, and your characterisation of the actions of the party leadership in exposing the anti-party group of Koçi Xoxe as 'Turkishness,' 'Asiatic methods,' etc., to be completely inappropriate and mistaken.

"Your proposals concerning advice to be given to

\* The issue was discussed under item No. 80 of Special Protocol No. 66. Extracts were sent to V. Molotov and V. Zorin.

Enver Hoxha are deemed unacceptable.\*

“THE AUTHORITY”

*RCHIDNI. F. 3. Op. 74. D. 39. L. 139.*

*Certified copy.*

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\* In his memoirs, regarding receipt of the telegram from “the authority” and the subsequent urgent summons to Moscow “for consultations,” D. Chuvakhin writes about the avalanche-like escalation of a denunciatory atmosphere within the party in connection with the criticism of the Koçi Xoxe-Pandi Kristo group. Since supporters of Xoxe often won delegate elections to the congress, the Central Committee ordered re-elections. A campaign to discredit Xoxe’s group was launched to eliminate “errors.” Chuvakhin noted that the criticism took on a “sharp, harsh character, up to demands that they be put on trial and finished off once and for all.” He had requested permission from the Centre to meet with E. Hoxha and “draw his attention to the need to temper the zeal of those fighting against the Koçi Xoxe-Pandi Kristo group and focus on the country’s economic development plans.” This was followed by the above telegram from “the authority.” Summoned to Moscow, the envoy stayed only briefly. After receiving instructions from V. Molotov and J. Stalin, he returned to Tirana. (Chuvakhin D.S., *Notes of a Diplomat // Modern and Contemporary History*, 1995, No. 1, pp. 14–40.)

# CONVERSATION BETWEEN D.S. CHUVAKHIN AND O. NISHANI

No. 305

*From the Diary of D.S. Chuvakhin. Record of a  
Conversation with the Chairman of the Presidium  
of the People's Assembly of Albania, O. Nishani,  
Regarding Abuses by the Police, Albanian-Yugoslav  
and Soviet-Albanian Relations\**

City of Tirana  
December 7, 1948

SECRET

Today, December 7, at 10:00, I received at the Mission building the Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania, Dr. Omer Nishani, at his request.

With a remark that he had long intended to meet with the Soviet envoy, Omer Nishani stated that he wished "in a friendly setting, to share his impressions of recent events in the country." He began his account with the topic of the party congress. Offering a generally positive evaluation of the congress' work, Omer Nishani stated that the broad masses of the Albanian people now live in hope: what practical steps will the government take to correct the mistakes of

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\* Distributed to V. Molotov, V. Zorin, the Department of Balkan Countries of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to file.

the past? He said that after the exposure of the unlawful actions of the state security organs, led by Koçi Xoxe, the people felt an almost immediate relief — as if a weight had been lifted. According to him, the situation had reached the point where people no longer felt safe even with themselves — everyone was being watched, people were afraid to meet friends or acquaintances for fear of drawing suspicion from Koçi Xoxe’s “all-seeing police.” It is no secret now, said Omer Nishani, that the state security bodies and Koçi Xoxe did not abide by the law — they forgot the constitution. People were thrown into prison without charge, held for months without trial or investigation, and were beaten. Matters reached the point of genuine gangster-style tactics, he remarked, with people “disappearing” in broad daylight and no one knowing their fate. To illustrate, Nishani cited the case of a student named Hatibi, who, as he put it, was kidnapped in true gangster fashion and was undoubtedly killed without trial or investigation. Omer Nishani then spoke about the censorship of private correspondence by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He did not fail to note how even his own personal mail had been subject to censorship — and he was certain that Enver Hoxha’s correspondence had also been monitored, among others. All of this, Nishani continued, created great discontent among the people. Every honest patriot was asking the legitimate question: “Can this really be what people’s democracy is supposed to be?” Despite the fact that the current government came to power through the victory

of the entire people in the struggle against the occupiers, the people were ignored, their voice unheard — the government had simply become detached from them. People like Koçi Xoxe, said Nishani, forgot that in the event of a new threat to the country, they, the leaders, would again have to turn to the people for support. The people must be respected, he continued, and the connection with them must be maintained at all times. The Albanian people respect those leaders who observe the law and whose actions are grounded in the legal framework. What our people have endured in recent years, said Omer Nishani, is a dark night in our history. “Even under the Ballists,” he noted, “there wasn’t such lawlessness.”

Nishani then turned to the issue of Albanian-Yugoslav relations. He said that from Gogo Nushi’s report on economic matters at the party congress, he — like the whole country — had learned many new things. According to him, Gogo Nushi presented well the Yugoslavs’ efforts to impose colonial rule in Albania. That was good, Nishani noted. But now the people are asking: “Where was this very same Minister Gogo Nushi before?! Why did he remain silent and go along with what the Yugoslavs were doing and allowing themselves to do?!” In Nishani’s view, all this happened because the Albanian leaders had forgotten their sense of national dignity. It happened because, in the eyes of ordinary Albanians, Tito had become almost like a god to be worshipped. Some of our leaders began to forget that we, too, have our own homeland — one we love and respect. It is only

through love for our homeland that we can truly love our friends. That is how I understand, said Nishani, love and respect for the Soviet Union in particular. We must declare war on demagogues who may outwardly bow and profess love for the Soviet people while inwardly harbouring views that are far from friendly towards the Soviet Union. “Why do the Albanian people love the Soviet Union, the Soviet people?” Omer Nishani asked passionately. Because they see the Soviet people as heroes who defended their homeland against the hordes of Hitler. Because the Soviet people provide fraternal support to little Albania not only by sending bread, various materials and specialists, but also by defending Albania’s interests at international conferences. Because the Albanian people wish to and are following in the footsteps of the Soviet peoples. We need constant support from the Soviet Union, from Moscow, Nishani continued — to avoid repeating the sad mistakes and illegalities that occurred in Albania in recent years. He noted that it is now universally acknowledged that, had it not been for the historic letters from the Bolshevik Party, the situation within the Albanian party would have remained unchanged. Until the cultural level of our people is raised, said Nishani, we will need constant assistance and guidance from the Soviet Union.

Speaking about the changes in the composition of the Albanian government in recent times, Nishani said that good people, respected by the people — people who did not spare themselves in the fight against fascist occupiers — are now coming to leader-

ship. This is a sign, he said, that our leaders are on the right path and have begun practically implementing the wishes expressed by the party congress.

I did not consider it necessary to enter into discussion on the points raised by Omer Nishani and limited myself to a few remarks during the conversation, with which he immediately agreed.

In conclusion, Omer Nishani asked me to clarify the meaning of several Russian words he had encountered while studying the Russian language. (Omer Nishani began learning Russian several months ago and now has sufficient command of the language to read complex texts and carry on simple conversations.)

The conversation ended at this point.

USSR Envoy to Albania  
DM. CHUVAKHIN

*AVP RF. F. 067. Op. 16. P. 111. D. 4. L. 94–97.*

*Original.*

# CONVERSATION BETWEEN J.V. STALIN AND E. HOXHA

No. 16

*Record of a Conversation between J.V. Stalin and  
E. Hoxha on Albanian-Yugoslav Relations, and  
Albania's Foreign and Domestic Policy*

City of Moscow

March 23, 1949

22:00

SECRET

Present: On the Soviet side: A.Y. Vyshinsky, Soviet  
envoy to Albania D.S. Chuvakhin, and V.I.  
Erofeyev (interpreter),  
On the Albanian side: Chairman of the  
State Planning Commission of Albania  
Spiro Koleka and Albanian envoy to the  
USSR M. Prifti

After exchanging greetings, Comrade Stalin asks  
whether the Albanian delegation had a good journey.

Hoxha replies that the Albanian delegation trav-  
elled very well.

Hoxha says that he has been instructed, first and  
foremost, to convey to Comrade Stalin, on behalf of  
the Party and the people of Albania, their deepest  
feelings of love and gratitude for everything that has  
been done — and continues to be done — for Alba-  
nia.

Comrade Stalin thanks him. He then asks whether everything that had been promised was delivered to Albania.

Hoxha confirms that it was.

Comrade Stalin says it was good that the Soviet personnel boarded the Italian battleship and brought it over.\* The ship was delivered in full working condition. As for the cruiser, it had been brought by the Italians — they damaged it in the Black Sea just before handing it over to the Soviet Union. Stalin notes that the Italians behaved poorly in that instance.

Hoxha comments that such behaviour is typical of the Italians.

Comrade Stalin asks what questions Hoxha wishes to raise.

Hoxha replies that he would first like to describe the current situation in the country and in the Party, then move on to some economic requests, speak about the Albanian army and its needs, and finally raise several matters on which Albanian comrades would like Comrade Stalin's clarification. He would also like to briefly describe the situation along Albania's borders.

Comrade Stalin remarks that Hoxha is not limited in what he can raise and may ask any questions he likes.

Hoxha says that the letters of the Bolshevik Par-

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\* This refers to the battleship *Giulio Cesare* ("Julius Caesar"), received by the Soviet Union as part of reparations from Italy. In the USSR, it was renamed *Novorossiysk*. It exploded in Yeyk Bay (near Sevastopol) on October 29, 1955.

ty sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as well as the Cominform resolution, saved Albania from inevitable disaster.

Comrade Stalin asks what kind of disaster that might have been.

Hoxha replies that Yugoslav nationalists were pursuing specific goals — directed against the USSR, against the democratic anti-imperialist camp and against Albania itself.

Comrade Stalin adds: “And against Muslims.”

Hoxha agrees. He states that Tito’s group of Yugoslav nationalists had been conducting subversive activities in Albania ever since the country’s liberation. The Albanian communists could not help noticing that economic and other relations between Albania and Yugoslavia were developing unsatisfactorily. However, the Albanian Party’s revolutionary vigilance had not been sharp enough. The main responsibility for this, he says, lies directly with himself — Enver Hoxha. It also played a role that the Albanians, during the war, had become accustomed to trusting in their friendly ties with the Yugoslavs. All of this together led the Albanian leadership to fail to realise that — as the saying goes — “the fish rots from the head.” The Yugoslav Trotskyists had been engaged in all sorts of intrigue within the Albanian Party, seeking to bring about a split. In this subversive activity, they relied on their supporters — notably Koçi Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and others.\*

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\* For more details, see: Vol. I, docs. No. 302, 305.

Comrade Stalin asks whether these individuals are Slavs.

Hoxha replies affirmatively, stating that Koçi Xoxe was originally from Macedonia, and Pandi Kristo from Korça.\*

Comrade Stalin asks what religion these individuals follow.

Hoxha replies that they are Orthodox Christians.

Hoxha states that the letters from the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) exposed the hostile position of the Yugoslav Trotskyists. If it had not been for those letters, the honest Albanian communists would sooner or later have had to return to the mountains to wage a new struggle. In reviewing its own work, the Albanian Party came to the conclusion that everything stated in the letters from the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) applied fully to the Albanian Party — with the sole exception that the Albanian communists had never lost their feelings of love and loyalty towards the Soviet people, the Bolshevik Party and Comrade Stalin.

Comrade Stalin says that not all matters were covered in those letters, because at the time not everything was known. For example, it only later became clear that when the Yugoslavs sought to send a division to Albania, their aim was not the one they

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\* In Enver Hoxha's book *With Stalin: Memoirs* (Tirana 1984), only Kristo Themelko — mentioned later — is referred to as a Macedonian, i.e., a Slav. In the Soviet transcript of the conversation, all Orthodox Albanians are classified as Slavs.

claimed — to defend Albania against Greek aggression — but another aim: to overthrow the regime in Albania. That we learned only afterwards. Comrade Stalin remarks that not only were the Albanians insufficiently vigilant — we also didn't understand everything at the time.

Hoxha says that the Albanians were in close contact with the Yugoslavs and therefore should have been the first to recognise their behaviour. He adds that when he learned of the Yugoslavs' plan to send a division to Albania, he had assumed the matter had been agreed with the Soviet government.

Comrade Stalin replies that the Yugoslavs had planned to send their division in secret, without informing the USSR — although they may well have led the Albanians to believe it was done with Soviet approval. The USSR only learned of the Yugoslavs' intentions by chance — through a report from Hoxha. When the USSR confronted the Yugoslavs, they apologised and called it a “mistake.”

Comrade Stalin asks what percentage of Albania's population is made up of non-Albanians.

Hoxha replies that Greeks and Jews live in Albania, but they are few. In addition, there are about 5,000 to 6,000 Macedonians, who live near the country's southern border.

Comrade Stalin asks whether there are many Albanians in Yugoslavia.

Hoxha replies that about 1 million Albanians live in Yugoslavia.

Comrade Stalin asks what religion these Alba-

nians follow.

Hoxha replies that they are mainly Muslims, with some Catholics from northern Albania.

Comrade Stalin asks how many Orthodox Christians and people of other non-Muslim faiths live in Albania.

Hoxha replies that Orthodox Christians make up 30-35% of the population, and Catholics 10-15%. Catholics live mainly in the north, Orthodox Christians in central and some southern regions, and Muslims predominantly in the south.

Comrade Stalin asks what language the Orthodox Christians and Catholics speak in Albania.

Hoxha replies that they all speak Albanian.

Hoxha states that after the letters from the Bolshevik Party and the Cominform resolution, the Albanian communists took decisive measures against Yugoslav nationalism — both within the Party and in the economic sphere. At first, it was difficult to carry out a full analysis of the Party and the country's situation. This was due to the fact that one of the main supporters of the Yugoslav Trotskyists — Koçi Xoxe — put up strong resistance and concealed many things from the Party. It took considerable time to uncover the extent of the sabotage in the national economy and the subversive activity within the Party that was being carried out by the Yugoslav Trotskyists and their agents in Albania. By the time of the Party Congress, the country already had a clear picture of the Yugoslav Trotskyists' activities in Albania and their intrigues within the Party. Many serious errors

had been made in the Party. Intra-party democracy barely existed. The Party's organisational structure — entirely copied from the Yugoslavs — was flawed. The Party was under the full control of the security services. Laws and economic directives in the country were not being implemented. The Albanian people's reaction to the betrayal by the Tito clique was very strong. The struggle against the Yugoslav Trotskyists and their supporters went beyond the bounds of the Party — the entire people united around the Party in this fight. Hoxha notes that the Albanian people's attitude towards the Yugoslav people was not damaged by any of this — the Party took care to ensure that.

The Party Congress demonstrated that in the struggle against the Yugoslav Trotskyists, the Party had been healed and had grown stronger. It also showed that although young, the Party possessed great strength and energy for the fight for the correct line. The sharp criticism of the pro-Yugoslav elements was carried out in full view of the Albanian people. The Party acknowledged its mistakes and pointed out the way to overcome them. The Party did not resort to mass repression — it acted with great caution, recognising that many comrades had followed a mistaken path in good faith, believing the Yugoslav line to be correct. Therefore, those comrades who admitted and criticised their errors were given a chance to correct themselves. Only Koçi Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and three others were arrested. Kristo Themelko,\* one of

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\* Kristo Themelko was one of Enver Hoxha's closest com-

those most responsible for promoting the harmful Yugoslav line, and who had repeatedly shown a negative attitude towards the USSR and Soviet specialists working in Albania, was not arrested. Themelko presented all the facts about his activities to the Party bureau and subjected himself to sharp self-criticism, which was deemed sincere and objective.

Comrade Stalin asks what position Kristo Themelko held.

Hoxha replies that he was a general and served as political director of the army.

Comrade Stalin asks where Kristo Themelko is now and what he is doing.

Hoxha replies that Themelko is in Tirana, has been removed from office and is currently not engaged in any official duties.

Comrade Stalin asks what nationality Kristo Themelko is.

Hoxha replies that Kristo Themelko is a Slav. He adds that at one time, the Albanian government requested that the Soviet government permit Themelko to go to Moscow to study at the Lenin Military Academy.

Comrade Stalin asks whether the Albanians received a response to their request.

Hoxha replies that at first the response was positive, but then the matter stalled.

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rades during the national liberation struggle, a participant in the founding meeting of the Communist Party of Albania in November 1941, and a member of the first Central Committee of the CPA.

Comrade Stalin asks whether the Albanians want to get rid of Kristo Themelko by sending him to Moscow.

Hoxha answers that they wanted to send Themelko to study in the USSR in the hope that he might rehabilitate himself.

Comrade Stalin asks whether the Party places political trust in Kristo Themelko.

Hoxha replies that the Party still hopes Themelko can correct himself, but cannot grant him full political trust.

Comrade Stalin remarks that, therefore, the Albanians no longer need Kristo Themelko.

Hoxha agrees.

Comrade Stalin states that if the Albanians don't need Kristo Themelko, then the Soviets don't need him either. He then asks whether the Albanians want to send him to the USSR for reasons of internal security.

Hoxha replies that Themelko himself has long wanted to study at a Soviet military academy.

Comrade Stalin says that if the Albanian comrades wish, the USSR will accept Themelko.

Hoxha continues, saying that after the Party Congress, measures were taken to purge the Party. A number of comrades compromised by their ties to Yugoslav Trotskyists were removed from leadership positions in the Party and army. Steps were taken to strengthen inner-Party democracy, all directives issued under Yugoslav influence were cancelled and so on. At the Congress, a new Central Committee

was elected, composed of young and loyal comrades. Measures were also taken regarding the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where abuses and misconduct had taken place. That ministry has now been reinforced with fresh personnel. Currently, elections are under way in primary Party organisations in the cities and across the country, as well as for district Party committees. As a result, trusted and tested comrades are now coming to lead local Party bodies. Soviet comrades working in Albania have been of great help in correcting the mistakes made in the country's economy.

Hoxha notes that the recent events have also had some negative effects within the Party. In a number of Party organisations, discipline has declined. Among weaker elements, anarchistic tendencies have appeared. In the current moment, with the intensification of class struggle, opportunist moods have become more noticeable among some Party members. Hoxha explains that while the Party was focusing on fighting Yugoslav nationalism and its supporters within the Party, it backed off somewhat in the fight against kulak elements in the countryside. This step was taken to avoid further complicating the situation in the country. However, this resulted in the state not being able to collect enough wheat and maize from the villages due to kulak activity. This has created serious economic difficulties. Another reason for the crisis was that during the Yugoslavs' preparations for their betrayal of Albania, they withheld aid for eight months. This led to economic chaos in Albanian mar-

kets. Peasants stopped bringing their goods to market and prices rose sharply. Only Soviet aid allowed for beginning to ease this situation. Hoxha declares that despite all these difficulties, the Albanian people fully trust their leadership. The Albanian people have always suffered and endured misfortunes, and they are not afraid of hardship.

Comrade Stalin remarks that it seems the Albanians are forming collective farms (kolkhozes).

Hoxha replies that the Congress adopted a decision to begin forming kolkhozes, but not to rush the process.

Comrade Stalin says that Albanian comrades should not rush to create kolkhozes. Albania is an underdeveloped, mountainous country. Even in the Soviet Union, there are no kolkhozes in the mountains. So in Albania, kolkhozes should not be created for now. If the peasants lack fertiliser, livestock and machinery, the state can help them. The state should have machine-tractor stations so that, if the peasants ask for help, the state can plough their land with machines and assist during the harvest by threshing their grain. The state can charge peasants in kind for this assistance. How the peasants divide their grain and maize among themselves is not the concern of the state. The state simply receives its share in kind. The state should have its own farms with tractors, threshers and other machinery to provide assistance if peasants request it. This is not collectivisation, but it gives the peasants a chance to see and appreciate the usefulness of machines. In the Soviet Union,

these were once called machine-rental points. The machines were rented to peasants, then returned to the state. The same approach should be used in Albania. As for dividing the harvest, peasants with more land will receive more, and those with less land will receive less. This is not a struggle against the kulaks, but it will teach the poor peasants to cooperate with each other.

Comrade Stalin asks if there is a national trading bourgeoisie within Albania.

Hoxha replies that there is a trading bourgeoisie, but it has no factories, shops or houses — all of that has been confiscated.\*

Comrade Stalin says that this is not a good thing. The national bourgeoisie could help by producing some goods and engaging in some trade until the state grows stronger, especially if elements of the bourgeoisie value Albania's freedom and independence. Such patriotic elements among the bourgeoisie should be used, not pushed away. Comrade Stalin continues, saying he can offer an example from practice in northern China. Among the Chinese national bourgeoisie, among small and medium manufacturers and merchants, there are some who support the communists. The Soviet Union advised the Chinese comrades not to alienate these elements. This national-patriotic part of the bourgeoisie believes that only the communists can defend China's independence

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\* A series of decrees issued by the Provisional Democratic Government in January 1945 practically eliminated the private sector in industry and trade.

and freedom, and that all other parties have failed. So they have established contact with the communists. This part of the bourgeoisie abandoned Chiang Kai-shek because they saw that his party could not preserve a unified and independent China, and they realised that only the communists were fighting for that goal. This bourgeoisie is truly helping the communists. As is known, China is divided into north and south. Some trade associations in the north are supplying goods to the Chinese communists from the south — even American goods. When asked why they do this and why they sacrifice their money, they reply: “We see no one but the communists who can defend China’s independence from Japan and America.”

Lenin always believed that if a revolution is anti-imperialist, aimed at defending a country’s independence under threat, then communists can cooperate with the national bourgeoisie. This cooperation is acceptable at a certain stage, particularly in the initial period. The Albanian comrades should remember this lesson from Lenin.

In the people’s democracies, the national bourgeoisie discredited itself through its ties with the German and Italian occupiers. Therefore, when Russian troops entered these countries, the bourgeoisie left with the Germans. On Albanian territory, there were neither Yugoslav nor Soviet troops. For that reason, some members of the national bourgeoisie remained — if the Albanian comrades didn’t kill them all. Such a bourgeoisie, which supports the national

independence of the country and can offer assistance, should not be cast aside. The same applies to certain elements among the intelligentsia, who may not sympathise with the communists, but who recognise that only the communists are capable of defending the independence of the country. Therefore, although these intellectuals may not be sympathetic to communism, they can still be of some help. They, too, should not be alienated.

The Russian Bolsheviks did not follow such a policy. At the time of the revolution, Russia was not occupied, nor was it under immediate threat — except for the war with Germany. The Russian revolution was therefore not anti-imperialist in character. It was directed inward, against internal forces. For this reason, the Russian national bourgeoisie became an irreconcilable enemy of the revolution. The struggle against it dragged on for several years. The Russian bourgeoisie was not patriotic — it appealed to the French and British for help, and invited foreign intervention. The Albanian comrades should not copy what happened in Russia or in other countries. They must take into account their own local conditions.

If there are small capitalists in Albania who open small factories, shops or workshops, they should be issued licences, taxed, but also allowed to engage in trade and industry until such time as Albania's economy is strong enough. Once that happens, a different situation will arise and the question of the bourgeoisie can be revisited.

Comrade Stalin asks how many people are in the

Albanian delegation.

Hoxha replies that there are eight in the Albanian delegation.

Comrade Stalin requests a list of the members and their positions.

Hoxha replies that the Albanian government delegation includes: himself; Spiro Koleka, Chairman of the State Planning Commission; Koço Theodhosi, Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission; Vasil Kati, Deputy Minister of Trade; Xhafer Spahiu, Deputy Minister of Industry; Shinazi Dragoti, Deputy Minister of Public Works; Colonel Nexhip Vinçani, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In addition, Theohar Fundo, Albania's trade representative in Moscow, is also part of the delegation. Hoxha adds that the Albanian government intends to appoint Koço Theodhosi as its representative to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Com-econ).

Comrade Stalin asks who is the commander of the Albanian army.

Hoxha replies that he himself is the commander.

Comrade Stalin says that Soviet people, Bolsheviks, follow this principle in the formation of government leadership: if the majority of the population are Muslims, then the majority in the government should also be Muslims. The religion of the people must not be violated. The people will not understand why non-Muslims head the government if Muslims are the majority in the country. This is a basic point — something Yugoslavia failed to grasp. Of course,

this does not mean only Muslims should be in government. Capable individuals from national minorities should also be included to maintain national unity. Having representatives of ethnic and religious minorities in government ensures stability.

Comrade Stalin says that he wanted to ask whether the Albanians had received the army uniforms from the USSR, which the Albanian Chief of the General Staff had previously requested.

Hoxha replies that they have not yet received them, but he has heard that the shipment is on its way.

Comrade Stalin confirms that it was decided to send the uniforms.

Hoxha asks to move on to economic matters, stating that Albania has drawn up a two-year plan for the recovery of the national economy. This plan provides, first, for the creation of new industrial enterprises for the production and processing of textiles, cotton, sugar, construction timber and other goods needed in Albania. Second, the plan focuses on enhancing geological exploration and expanding the extraction of mineral resources. It also proposes the construction of a Patos-Valona\* oil pipeline and a refinery with a capacity of 150,000 tonnes per year. The plan includes the development and exploration of copper, chrome and bitumen deposits. A power plant is to be built to provide energy to the textile complex.

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\* Throughout the text, the Italian spelling of Albanian cities has been retained: "Valona" instead of "Vlora," "Durazzo" instead of "Durrës," "Scutari" instead of "Shkodra."

In terms of transport, the plan provides for the expansion of road transport and the continuation of construction on the Durazzo-Elbasan railway. As for agriculture, the plan aims to expand irrigated land through the use of modern agricultural techniques. The plan does not foresee an increase in agricultural machinery production, since the tractors received from the Soviet Union are considered sufficient for the country's needs.

Comrade Stalin asks which railway is being built.

Hoxha replies that construction is under way on the Durazzo-Elbasan railway. Last year, the first segment — Durazzo to Pekin, 37 km long — was built. The two-year plan includes construction of the Pekin to Elbasan segment, which will be 30 km long.

Comrade Stalin asks whether the Albanians have received rails from the USSR.

Hoxha replies that the rails, wagons, and other materials and equipment have been received by the Albanians. He adds that the two-year plan also includes expanding the school network and increasing the number of hospital beds. To implement the plan, Albania is counting on assistance from the Soviet Union in the form of machines and equipment. On the other hand, Albania has signed trade agreements with the people's democracies and has received loans from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Currently, the Albanian delegation is negotiating with Romania, after which it will travel to Bulgaria.

Comrade Stalin replies that we will provide assistance as much as possible. Jokingly, he adds: "We

hope the Albanians themselves will also do the work.”

Hoxha says that the Albanians will make every effort to fulfil the plan.

He states that Albania would also like to request the sending of Soviet specialists, particularly to assist with the construction of textile and sugar plants.

Comrade Stalin replies that we will send people, but Albania must develop its own cadres. Our people will be in Albania temporarily, and then they will return to the Soviet Union. Albania needs to have permanent national specialists. This is the most important thing.

Hoxha says that the Albanian government will do everything to follow this path. He also states that Albania requests the dispatch of a geological exploration group, as well as a group to study Albania's hydroelectric resources.

Comrade Stalin replies that this can be arranged. He then asks, is there coal in Albania?

Hoxha replies that there is little coal in Albania; small deposits are located in the Tirana and Korça regions. Additionally, the Italians discovered coal deposits in the far south of Albania.

Comrade Stalin asks whether the railways run on coal or oil.

Hoxha replies that the railways run on coal, but the coal in Albania is poor quality. He says that a major issue for Albania now is organising leadership within the state security services. In this regard, the Albanian government requests permission to send 20 officers to the USSR for special courses. After these

officers complete the course, the government would like to send another 20. If that is not possible, the Albanian government requests the dispatch of several Soviet instructors who could organise such courses directly in Albania.

Comrade Stalin replies that officers coming to the USSR for special courses would first need to learn the Russian language, and only then could they begin their training. Therefore, the result would be faster if we send instructors to Albania.

Hoxha says that Albania also needs two instructors for the Ministry of Internal Affairs: one for the police, and one for criminal investigations.

Comrade Stalin says that such instructors can be sent.

Hoxha asks whether the Albanian government could receive written materials in the USSR on the work and organisation of the police.

Comrade Stalin replies that the Albanian government may receive such materials.

Hoxha says he would like to raise another very important issue for Albania. The matter is that Albanian codes were based on the Yugoslav system, and therefore, the Yugoslavs are able to decipher all Albanian telegrams. The Albanian government requests a Soviet instructor to help the Ministry of Internal Affairs develop a new code.

Comrade Stalin asks whether such an instructor is needed for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He also asks, does the Albanian MFA use a cipher?

Hoxha replies that the MFA uses a cipher, but it

is stored at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He adds that the Albanian government also requests two radio direction-finding stations, along with the necessary equipment and technicians. The Albanian security services have established that several secret radio transmitters are operating in Albania, one of which is located somewhere near the city of Scutari.

Comrade Stalin replies that radio direction-finding equipment can be sent. He adds that Comrade Vyshinsky will be in charge of preparing responses to the Albanian delegation's requests, and he will review all the requests. Hoxha may present to Comrade Vyshinsky all issues of concern to the Albanian government. Comrade Stalin reiterates that we will help Albania.

Hoxha says he would like to touch on the Yugoslav issue. Economic and political relations between Albania and Yugoslavia have been severed.

Comrade Stalin asks, who severed these relations?

Hoxha replies that the relations were severed by Albania.

Hoxha says that the Yugoslavs are conducting intense propaganda against Albania, both from Yugoslav territory and within Albania, methodically building up their agent network. Furthermore, the Yugoslavs are conducting propaganda along Albania's northern borders, trying to incite Albanian citizens to flee to Yugoslavia. This propaganda has had some success, and a fair number of peasants have fled from northern Albania to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs

are also trying to take control of bands operating in the mountain regions of Albania. The Yugoslav leaders are trying to unite and organise reactionary elements within Albania in order to overthrow the existing regime. Recently, a band led by the Yugoslav mission was uncovered, and on March 21, the bandits were brought to trial in an Albanian court.

Comrade Stalin asks whether there is still a Yugoslav ambassador in Albania, and whether diplomatic relations remain.

Hoxha replies affirmatively.

Hoxha says that the Albanians are not sitting idle either. They are carrying out activities directed against the Yugoslav Trotskyists and are maintaining contact with the Albanian minority living in Yugoslavia. In addition, the Albanians have organised the immigration of Yugoslavs, although those Yugoslavs arriving in Albania must be treated with great caution, since some of them turn out to be Ranković's men.

Comrade Stalin remarks that Ranković is planting his agents.

Hoxha says that in his opinion, the Tito clique will be destroyed as a result of political struggle, which will eventually develop into an armed partisan movement.

Comrade Stalin replies that this is not out of the question.

Hoxha, moving on to the Greek question, says that the Albanian comrades would like to know Comrade Stalin's opinion on whether Albania is un-

der direct threat from Greece, considering the constant provocations by the monarcho-fascist troops and various rumours about the partition of Albania. The morale of the monarcho-fascist army in Greece is very low, despite ongoing American support for the Greek army. At the same time, the morale of the Democratic Army is high. The Greek Democratic Army is currently well-equipped and well-armed. Hoxha says, however, that some aspects of the behaviour of the Greek comrades raise concerns. In particular, he believes the Democratic Army of Greece is cut off from the people, since the monarcho-fascists evacuate the population from areas threatened by the Democratic Army, and the Democratic Army, in turn, evacuates the population from the areas it occupies into Albania.

Comrade Stalin explains that this happens in the zones where fighting is taking place.

Hoxha agrees with this.

Hoxha says that the form of leadership organisation in the government and army of democratic Greece seems somewhat strange to him. From his conversation with Zachariadis and the Greek comrades, Hoxha got the impression that they somewhat downplay the leading role of the party. There are no political commissars in the army. Zachariadis, due to what seems to Hoxha to be an unclear modesty, still does not serve as head of government. Hoxha believes that all of this stems from the mistakes of the Marcos period, and that the lack of political commissars reflects past errors of EAM and ELAS.

Comrade Stalin says that the Greek comrades do not emphasise the role of the Communist Party because they are appealing to the democratic masses and want to show that the war is being fought by the entire people. They are doing the right thing. As for political commissars, they no longer exist in the Soviet Army either. Political commissars are unnecessary when the army is, in fact, led by the communists themselves.

Comrade Stalin points out that all the talk about dividing Albania is made up to frighten the Albanians. As is known, Albania's independence is guaranteed by the declaration of the three powers — America, Britain and the USSR. Of course, this declaration can be violated, but it's not that easy. As for the Tsaldaris Greeks, they are on too weak a footing to seriously talk about partitioning Albania. If the Albanians behave correctly, do not curse the imperialists too much, do not provoke them, and act more modestly, no one will touch Albania. America and Britain do not want Albania to belong to Italy, because that would strengthen Italy; they do not want it to belong to Greece, because that would strengthen Greece; and they do not want Albania to belong to Yugoslavia. More than that, America does not even want Albania to belong to Britain. Because of this, they support the preservation of Albania's independence.

The conversation lasted 2 hours and 10 minutes.

Recorded by V. EROFEEV

*AP RF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 249. L. 55-74.*

*Certified copy.*

# CONVERSATION BETWEEN D.S. CHUVAKHIN AND M. SHEHU

No. 50

*From the Diary of D.S. Chuvakhin.  
Record of Conversation with PLA Central  
Committee Secretary M. Shehu about the Kosovo  
Issue and the Kukës-Peshkopia District Prosecutor's  
Collaboration with Criminal and Reactionary  
Elements\**

City of Tirana

July 5, 1949  
TOP SECRET

Mehmet Shehu visited me on his own initiative. He stated that he came on the advice of Enver Hoxha to consult about the date of the military parade for the upcoming anniversary, on July 10, marking the creation of the Albanian National Army. Mehmet Shehu said that the Albanian comrades had a question: would it be appropriate to hold the military parade and a reception on July 10, since, according to information they had received, the funeral of Comrade G.M. Dimitrov was to be held on the same day. Enver Hoxha, he said, wanted to know my opinion on this matter. I replied that such matters, of course, should be decided by the Albanian leadership them-

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\* Distributed to A. Vyshinsky, A. Gromyko, V. Zorin, L. Baranov, to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and filed.

selves, but since Comrade Enver Hoxha was asking for my opinion, I felt it would be more appropriate to move the parade and the reception to another date. To this, Mehmet Shehu replied that he personally held the same view. He said the government would decide the matter that evening.

Taking the opportunity, I asked Mehmet Shehu about the status of the creation of the “Liberation Committee” for the autonomous region of Kosovo and Metohija, which Enver Hoxha had mentioned to me recently, and also about the creation in Tirana of a special committee for Yugoslav political émigrés residing in Albania. Mehmet Shehu replied that these matters were still under discussion and that none of the Albanian leadership yet had a final opinion on the issue. “We,” said Mehmet Shehu, “have a question: how should the struggle against the Tito clique in Yugoslavia be organised? We do not know what is better — whether each republic of the Yugoslav federation should carry out the struggle against the Tito clique independently (in which case the struggle of the \*autonomous region of Kosovo and Metohija\*\* could be distinguished), or whether the struggle against the Yugoslav Trotskyists of the Tito clique should be directed from a single centre.” In his view, he personally supported the latter, since he believed that a fragmented struggle by individual Yugoslav republics could only help the Tito clique suppress its

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\* Text marked with a single asterisk is underlined in pencil. The markings appear to be by A.Y. Vyshinsky.

political opponents. As for Kosovo and Metohija, he said that the idea of creating a “Liberation Committee” for this region was still being debated among certain Albanian leaders. “To me personally,” said Mehmet Shehu, “the matter is completely clear in the sense that the Tito clique can only be overthrown through armed struggle, and that this armed struggle should begin in Kosovo and Metohija, where it would be easiest to raise the population to rebel against the Tito clique.” At the same time, Mehmet Shehu made it clear that for the Albanian population of Kosovo and Metohija, the question of whether the region should be joined to Albania was already settled — that is, \*Kosovo and Metohija should in any case be joined to Albania.\* The only question was when would be the most appropriate time to raise this slogan among the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija — after the struggle against the Tito clique, or during it. This, he said, was the essence of the issue before the Albanian party leadership, and one that, he claimed, could only be resolved by Moscow.

After hearing Mehmet Shehu out, I noted that the issue he raised was a significant and complex one, and that any careless step by the Albanian comrades might harm the overall struggle against the Titoite clique. I advised Mehmet Shehu not to rush into a decision and to examine the entire Kosovo and Metohija issue more thoroughly. I also pointed out that, in my view, the struggle of the Albanian population in Kosovo and Metohija against the Tito clique should be conducted jointly with the broader struggle of the

Yugoslav peoples — particularly the Montenegrins, Serbs and Macedonians living in Kosovo and Metohija. “It is doubtful,” I said, “that the slogan of seceding Kosovo and Metohija from Yugoslavia would find support among the Yugoslav peoples at this time. The question of the fate of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia, in my view, can only be successfully resolved after the overthrow of the Yugoslav nationalist dictatorship.”

On his own initiative, Mehmet Shehu then spoke about what he called “outrageous abuses” committed by the Albanian prosecutor’s office, which he had discovered during a recent visit to the Peshkopia-Kukës area. He claimed that the Albanian prosecutor’s office was clearly pursuing an opportunistic line towards reactionary and other criminal elements, issuing orders to release obvious enemies of the people from prison. Mehmet Shehu cited two or three cases in which criminals (spies and reactionaries) were released from prison, and how he, in violation of the law, as he put it, had again “locked these criminals up.” He said that he had discussed these abuses with Enver Hoxha, who fully agreed with him and proposed the immediate dismissal of the current Attorney General, Këlcyra. “But the issue is not with that man,” said Mehmet Shehu, “who is not politically engaged at all.” The real issue, he claimed, was that the inspiration for these opportunistic trends in the prosecutor’s office was the former Attorney General of Albania, Bedri Spahiu — a member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the

Party of Labour of Albania. He added that he had written two letters to the PLA Central Committee demanding that the Politburo address these abuses and the opportunism in the prosecutor's office. However, he noted, time was passing, and the General Secretary still had not dared to bring the issue before the Politburo. "In my life," said Mehmet Shehu at this point, "I made one very serious mistake — supporting at the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee in September 1948 the proposal to reinstate Bedri Spahiu as a member of the Politburo and the subsequent proposal to appoint him as secretary of the Central Committee."

I told Mehmet Shehu that if his accusations against the prosecutor's office for opportunism were well-founded, then he certainly had every right to raise the matter in the Politburo and push for it to be addressed. Mehmet Shehu promised to discuss the matter once more with Enver Hoxha.

At the end of the conversation, Mehmet Shehu reported that on July 4, this year, at Enver Hoxha's suggestion, the Politburo had decided to confer the rank of major general on the former commander of the "People's Defence" division, Colonel Shefqet Peçi; the head of army combat training, Colonel Gjin Marku; and the head of artillery, Colonel Tahir Kadareja. Knowing that Colonel Kadareja had played a negative role at the 8th Plenum of the Party's Central Committee in February 1948 and had been an advocate of the Yugoslav line in the Albanian army, I asked Mehmet Shehu who had initiated

the decision to confer the rank of major general on Tahir Kadareja. Mehmet Shehu confirmed that the Politburo had made the decision on Enver Hoxha's proposal.

That concluded the conversation.

USSR Envoy to Albania  
DM. CHUVAKHIN

*AVP RF. F. 07. Op. 22. P. 31. D. 89. L. 27-30.*  
*Original.*

**FACSIMILE OF THE RUSSIAN TEXT  
OF ENVER HOXHA'S LETTER ON  
KOSOVO**

*Письмо Э. Ходжи в ЦК ВКП(б) о предыстории возникновения косовского вопроса и методах его решения<sup>1</sup>*

г. Тирана

Не позднее 2 сентября 1949 г.<sup>2</sup>

СЕКРЕТНО

## ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОМУ КОМИТЕТУ ВКП(б) О КОСОВО И МЕТОХИИ

Проживающие в Народной Республике Югославии албанцы Косово по своей численности составляют значительное национальное меньшинство. Это албанское меньшинство расселено в районах, граничащих с Народной Республикой Албанией. Берлинский конгресс и Версальский мирный договор несправедливо нарушили интересы Албании и албанского национального меньшинства Косово.

По старым, довоенным статистическим данным (фальсифицированная статистика королевских режимов Сербии, с помощью которой они пытались доказать, что албанское национальное меньшинство по своей численности является незначительным) численность албанского нацменьшинства составляет около 700.000 человек. На самом же деле в Югославии — в Косово, Метохии, Македонии и Черногории — число албанцев достигает миллиона, если не более. Значительная часть албанцев в этой статистике маскировалась и скрывалась режимами того времени под видом мусульман и турок.

Албанцы Косово, Метохии и других мест свой насильственный отрыв от Албании считали и продолжают считать самой большой несправедливостью, допущенной по отношению к ним. Они не согласились с таким решением вопроса и не желают оставаться в границах Югославии, независимо от ее политического строя. Такова действительность. Их единственный идеал — это слияние с Албанией.

Во время второй мировой войны как фашизм, так и албанская реакция опирались именно на этот фактор. Они подняли вопрос о Косово и «соединили» Косово и Метохию с Албанией под лозунгом «Великой Албании». Со стороны фашизма это было большой демагогией, в результате которой албанцы Косово оказались *нейтрализованными* в борьбе с фашизмом и у них создалась иллюзия того, что их «вековая мечта о соединении с Албанией якобы осуществилась, а поэтому нет и причин для борьбы с фашизмом».

Под влиянием иллюзорного «освобождения» албанцев Косово из-под югославского рабства и «соединения» с Албанией Косово превратилось в фашистский и реакционный резерв. *Народно-освободительной*<sup>3</sup> борьбы там не велось. Это с одной

стороны. С другой стороны, мы считаем, что коммунистическая партия Югославии уже в то время, в 1941–1942 г.г. и после, вела ошибочную и неправильную политическую линию в национальном вопросе, являвшуюся замаскированной националистической линией того времени. Коммунистическая партия Югославии в период борьбы должна была бы придать особенное значение вопросу Косово и Метохии потому, что эти места населяются значительным по численности национальным меньшинством, граничащим с Албанией. Это было очень большой проблемой, для которой необходимо было найти справедливое марксистско-ленинско-сталинское решение, для того чтобы албанское население Косово не превращалось бы в опору реакции.

Еще в период войны коммунистическая партия Югославии должна была создать для албанцев Косово соответствующие перспективы, которые мобилизовали бы их на борьбу с фашизмом. Албанцы Косово должны были быть уверенными в том, что, сражаясь наряду с народами Югославии против фашизма, они этим завоевывают себе право на самоопределение для соединения с Албанией или с Югославией или останутся независимыми. Правда, мы считали, что последние два варианта были бы исключены, потому что албанцы Косово боролись бы только за первый вариант. Это было вполне ясным и для югославской компартии, но было для нее явно невыгодным, поэтому-то и были так *туманны* ее принципиальные заявления, приведшие к тому, что население Косово не приняло участия в борьбе, так как оно не верило в справедливость югославов, хотя в данном случае они и представлялись *от имени* коммунистической партии Югославии. Население Косово не верило в справедливость компартии Югославии, а низкий политический уровень и значительная отсталость масс, фашистская демагогия и создание «Великой Албании» привели к тому, что албанцы Косово не только не вели борьбы с фашизмом, а, наоборот, боролись против *народно-освободительной* войны в Югославии.

Албанцы Косово после их массового истребления великосербами, имея к тому же и низкий политический уровень развития, не могли верить югославам, кем бы они ни представлялись. Но этот момент не был принят во внимание югославской компартией, что отнюдь не являлось случайностью. Организация *народно-освободительной* борьбы в Косово под руководством компартии Югославии велась в националистическом духе. Югославская компартия не создала ни одного особого национального комитета для Косово и Метохии, в которых руководство находилось бы только в руках албанцев. Она там не создала ни партии, ни борьбы и не уточнила вопроса об ал-

бандах Косово и Метохии. Этого там не произошло. Более того, коммунистическая партия Югославии приложила все усилия к тому, чтобы не поднимать вообще вопроса о Косово, не *воспитывать* массы албанского населения Косово в духе патриотизма и не допустить того, чтобы наряду с югославским флагом развевался и албанский флаг (что для них явилось бы большой символической и мобилизующей силой). Наоборот, Центральный Комитет Коммунистической партии Югославии подавлял эти стремления албанского населения Косово, постоянно боролся с ними и осудил нас, когда мы внесли такое предложение и высказались в пользу этих стремлений.

Мы считали неуместной постановку вопроса о присоединении Косово к Албании в самый разгар борьбы. По нашему мнению, албанцы Косово должны были бороться с фашизмом в рамках югославского государства, и лишь после победы этот вопрос должен был разрешиться между двумя братскими коммунистическими партиями и народно-демократическими режимами, которые должны были установиться в Албании и Югославии после победы над врагом.

Для достижения возможно большей мобилизации албанцев Косово мы считали, что со стороны югославов предварительно должен быть разрешен вопрос о возможно большем участии албанцев-косоваров в органах власти, о флаге, равно как и вопрос о самом тесном взаимодействии партизанских отрядов албанцев Косово в *народно-освободительной* борьбе страны под командой Генерального Штаба югославской *народно-освободительной* армии. В официальном порядке мы также просили разрешения на посылку в Косово одного из албанских партизанских подразделений, с тем чтобы содействовать возможно большей мобилизации местного албанского населения на борьбу с фашизмом.

Необходимо подчеркнуть, что в тот момент в Косово и Метохии не велось никакой партийной работы среди масс, не велось также организации борьбы с фашизмом. Это наше мнение мы высказали Вукмановичу Темпо, являвшемуся в то время представителем ЦК КПЮ по организации борьбы в Македонии. На наш же официальный запрос Милютин Милютинович, член ЦК КПЮ и организатор борьбы с фашизмом в Черногории, ответил *нам* следующее: «Нет никакой необходимости в посылке ваших людей в Косово, туда будет послана наша дивизия, которая разрешит все вопросы Косово».

Позже подтвердилось, что в Косово была послана карательная экспедиция, посеявшая там ужас. За такую точку зрения, высказанную Миладином Поповичем и мною, Тито в своем письме, адресованном Миладину Поповичу, обвинял его в национальном отклонении и резко осуждал его.

Таким образом, албанцы Косово ни на один момент не соглашались с решением, навязанным им КПЮ, ни во время самой борьбы, ни в послевоенное время. Создание автономной области Косово и Метохии является лишь демагогией, *она* не убедило в этом ни одного албанца Косово, а их идеал — соединение с Албанией — остался неосуществленным.

После гонений и истреблений времен короля Александра албанцы Косово испытали на себе также и массовое истребление в первый момент после освобождения Югославии. Массовые убийства были совершены частями *народно-освободительной* армии Югославии.

Если и было некоторое доверие к коммунистической партии Югославии в период освободительной борьбы, то после этих ничем не оправданных репрессий, свидетельствующих о подлинно шовинистических взглядах руководства КПЮ еще в те времена, у албанского населения Косово исчезли всякие иллюзии, и оно больше не питает к *КПЮ* никакого доверия. Для него великосербы и руководство КПЮ — одно и то же.

Албанцы Косово остро реагировали против всех этих репрессий и бежали в горы. Но КПЮ железом и кровью подавила это движение, представляя его как восстание реакции. Коммунистическая партия Югославии ни разу не захотела изучить специфическое положение Косово и Метохии и продолжала применять старые методы зверского подавления. Косово и Метохия превратились бы в очаги войны в рамках новорожденной Народной Республики Югославии, если бы почему-либо туда не прибыли части албанской партизанской армии. Приход частей албанской армии в Косово внес успокоение, охладил разгоревшиеся страсти, возродил веру среди албанцев Косово в то, что все вопросы будут разрешены мирным путем, создал убеждение в том, что наши части защитят *албанское население*, как это они и сделали.

Наши части явились помехой для югославов в применении ими репрессий *против* албанцев Косово.

Таким образом, КПЮ с самого начала борьбы до освобождения и позже стояла на шовинистических позициях в вопросе о Косово и Метохии.

Даже и при народной власти Югославии вопрос о Косове и Метохии не получил своего справедливого разрешения. Этот вопрос разрешается на основе национализма. Открытие албанских школ в Косово и Метохии есть не что иное, как демагогия. В органы власти были избраны лишь несколько албанцев. Но эти меры в Косово и Метохии никого обмануть и удовлетворить не могут. Демократические и национальные права албанского национального меньшинства Косово и Метохии совершенно не соблюдаются. Никакой связи с Албанией! Более

того, КПЮ мастерски и упорно создает в этом отношении всяческие препятствия.

Мы считали, что вопрос о Косово во время *народно-освободительной* борьбы не мог быть поставлен на обсуждение и что поэтому линия нашей партии в этом вопросе, как об этом говорилось и выше, была правильной. В *народно-освободительной* войне Югославия являлась нашей союзницей, и, конечно, мы не могли становиться на позиции албанской реакции. Наша партия занимала определенную позицию в вопросе о Косово и с успехом боролась с фашистской демагогией. Она вместе с КПЮ приняла общую декларацию — обращение к албанцам Косово, призывая их к борьбе против общего врага.

Накануне освобождения Югославии и Албании мы еще раз признали несвоевременность постановки вопроса об объединении Косово с Албанией, потому что мы находились лицом к лицу с задачами укрепления и консолидации народной демократической власти как в Албании, так и в Югославии. Мы считали, что в лице Народной Демократической Югославии и коммунистической партии Югославии имеем верного и надежного союзника, а поэтому в интересах социалистического лагеря, и в особенности в интересах Албании, необходимо было избегать затруднительных ситуаций, могущих возникнуть в Югославии, так как и там в это время устанавливался и укреплялся народно-демократический строй.

Исправление наших границ с Югославией в сторону объединения Косово и Метохии с Албанией во всякий момент являлось бы новым укреплением Народной Республики Албании. Но, с другой стороны, в первое время после освобождения маленькая Народная Республика Албания, даже вместе с Косово и Метохией, являлась бы легкой добычей для империализма, и в случае нападения и оккупации Албании империалистами ущерб для общего дела был бы значительно большим. Поэтому Косово, оставаясь в первое время после освобождения в рамках югославской республики, подвергалось значительно меньшей опасности. Но затем ситуация прояснилась, а международное и внутреннее положение Народной Республики Югославии значительно окрепло. Были подписаны договоры о взаимопомощи между СССР и Югославией и между последней и странами народной демократии. Также окрепло и международное и внутреннее положение Албании, а заключение между Югославией и Албанией договора о взаимопомощи явилось солидным укреплением международного положения Албании и охраняло ее от возможных угроз со стороны империалистов.

Таким образом, уже в момент подписания договора с Югославией мы считали, что настал момент постановки вопроса о Косово и Метохии, и этот вопрос в то время был *мною* по-

ставлен перед Тито. Тито ответил мне, что «Косово принадлежит Албании и должно быть присоединено к Албании. Мы желаем этого ото всей души, но в настоящий момент не можем этого допустить, потому что реакция великосербов еще очень сильна, так что этот справедливый акт может нам лишь навредить». Позже подтвердилось, что эти слова Тито были лишь демагогией.

При создавшихся ныне условиях, после разоблачения предательства клики Тито, мы считаем, что вопрос о Косово должен быть поднят вновь.

Тито со своими приспешниками являются агентами империализма, впрягающими Югославию в империалистический воз. Они превращают Югославию в тюрьму народов, где царит гитлеровско-фашистский террор. Вопрос освобождения народов Югославии от этой фашистской банды и когтей империализма — одновременно с этим также и вопрос освобождения албанского населения Косово, и он встает перед нами как вопрос безотлагательный.

Мы считаем, что освобождение народов Югославии может быть достигнуто лишь борьбой и кровью. Другого пути нет. Необходимо свергнуть и уничтожить клику Тито. Борьба за национальное освобождение Югославии должна вестись под руководством югославского пролетариата во главе с новой коммунистической партией, опирающейся на марксистско-ленинско-сталинские и интернационалистические основы. В новых условиях мы считаем, что стоим там же, где находились в начале *народно-освободительной борьбы против фашизма*. Борьба в Югославии должна вестись остро, вплоть до вооруженного восстания против фашистов, империализма и их внутренних прислужников во главе с агентом Тито.

Мы считаем, что в острой борьбе с кликой Тито и империалистами будет выковано руководство новой югославской коммунистической интернационалистической партии, которая мобилизует и поведет на борьбу все народы Югославии, опираясь на справедливые марксистско-ленинско-сталинские принципы, одновременно ведя острую борьбу также со всеми националистическими тенденциями, существовавшими в прошлом и могущими появиться и позже, в ходе самой борьбы.

В особенности национальный вопрос должен быть таким, который требует своего самого основательного разрешения потому, что от него зависит судьба и сам масштаб борьбы.

Что же теперь должно предпринять население Косово? Мы думаем, что албанское население Косово, Метохии, Македонии и Черногории должно бороться за свое освобождение так же, как будут бороться и другие народы Югославии. Первое, что оно должно сделать, — это вступить в острую и бескомпромис-

сную борьбу с кликой Тито, вплоть до вооруженного восстания. Эту борьбу оно должно начать возможно скорее. Если эту борьбу ранее начнут другие, тем лучше, потому что этим избегаются изоляция и подавление движения в Косово. Население Косово должно считать свою борьбу тесно связанной с борьбой всех народов Югославии и в рамках Югославии, потому что иначе оно будет изолировано и подавлено. Поэтому албанское население Косово должно понять, что его освобождение и завоевание *им* национальных и демократических прав может быть достигнуто лишь *путем его борьбы*, одновременной с борьбой других народов Югославии.

Весь вопрос состоит в том, чтобы не повторились прошлые ошибки коммунистической партии Югославии в отношении Косово и Метохии.

Косово и Метохия должны иметь свое руководство, выдвинутое в ходе борьбы, свой национально-освободительный комитет, который установил бы свою линию борьбы на основе резолюции Коминформа и марксистско-ленинско-сталинских принципов. В ходе борьбы должна быть создана, организована и закалена часть коммунистической, интернационалистической партии для Косово, Метохии в рамках коммунистической, интернационалистической партии Югославии. Албанцы Косово и Метохии должны бороться под албанским флагом. Партизанские части должны *находиться под руководством албанцев*, выдвинувшихся в ходе борьбы, а принцип самоопределения должен быть точно установлен и явиться следствием острой борьбы албанцев Косово, которую они будут вести против клики Тито и империализма в братском сотрудничестве с другими народами Югославии. Патриотические и интернационалистические чувства, а также и любовь к своей родине — Албании должны получить должное развитие среди албанцев Косово и Метохии. Среди албанцев Косово и Метохии prevыше всего и на здоровых началах должна воспитываться безграничная вера и любовь к СССР, к большевистской партии, к Сталину, и население Косово и Метохии должно основательно усвоить, что без СССР, большевистской партии и Сталина не может быть ни свободной Албании, ни свободной Югославии, ни свободного Косово и без них оно никогда не сможет осуществить свои мечты и стремления. Албанцы Косово должны хорошо усвоить то, что их беспощадным врагом, а также и врагом всего социалистического лагеря является американский империализм, его сателлиты и клика Тито, являющаяся не чем другим, как его агентурой.

Мы считаем, что если албанское население Косово не усвоит себе этой истины, то оно не сможет бороться, потому

что оно потеряло всякое доверие к югославскому руководству. Если югославские коммунисты-интернационалисты в этом направлении пройдут мимо или не заметят национального вопроса Косово, то албанское население Косово не будет иметь к ним никакого доверия. Ключ к успешному развитию борьбы в Косово и Метохии состоит в их объединении с Албанией. Никакого другого решения албанское население Косово и Метохии не желает признавать, а всякое другое решение оно считает несправедливым, несправедливым считаем его и мы.

Мы считаем, что Косово, Метохия и часть пограничной с Албанией Македонии с албанским населением после освобождения Югославии из когтей Тито и империализма должны быть присоединены к Албании. Только такой путь приведет к тому, что албанцы, живущие в Югославии, будут героически бороться против Тито и империализма.

Мы считаем, что высказанное нами положительно и вполне соответствует марксистско-ленинскому пути. Оно послужит усилению борьбы с Тито на участке Косово и Македонии<sup>4</sup> и объединению этих земель с Народной Республикой Албанией, что соответствует марксистско-ленинскому принципу и укрепит международное и внутреннее положение Народной Республики Албании. Оно представляет собой большой интерес также и в деле укрепления социалистического лагеря.

Народная Республика Албания приложит все свои силы к тому, чтобы борьба против клики Тито в Югославии развивалась и обострялась до полной победы. Мы считаем, что официальное отношение Албании к вопросу о Косово и Метохии должно быть сдержанным, потому что иначе это может быть использовано кликой Тито как средство мобилизации великосербов и послужит как обвинение Албании в шовинизме и так далее. Но Албания будет оказывать всестороннюю помощь народам Югославии и албанскому населению Косово, которое должно действовать и проявлять собственную инициативу в рамках высказанного нами выше.

Поставленный вопрос о Косово и Метохии становится особо актуальным в связи с помощью, которую наша партия оказывает югославским антититовским товарищам, а также и населению Косово и Метохии, которое желает и готово всеми средствами бороться против белградских предателей. Но *албанцы этой области* каждый раз ставят перед нами вопрос: «Как будет разрешена национальная проблема Косово и Метохии?»

Мы считаем, что этот вопрос очень важен.

Но возможно, что при его разрешении мы ошибаемся, а поэтому без советов товарища Сталина мы не будем делать ни одного шага. В связи с чем и представляем нашу точку зре-

ния, и если мы ошибаемся, то желаем, чтобы нам указали на наши ошибки, с тем чтобы мы могли их исправить.

За Центральный Комитет  
Трудовой партии Албании

ЭНВЕР ХОДЖА

*РЦХИДНИ. Ф. 17. Оп. 137. Д. 68. Л. 64-73.*

*Перевод с итальянского. Копия.*

<sup>1</sup> На документе имеются пометы: «Григорьяну. Подготовьте к рассылке в установленном порядке. Г. Маленков. 25/IX», «В(есьма) срочно. Тов. Медведеву. 1) Этот документ надо сегодня разослать членам П[олит]Б[юро]. 2) Посмотрите в редакционном отношении перевод и сдайте в работу. 3) Составьте маленькую препроводительную по установленному образцу. В. Гр[игорьян]. 25/IX», «В архив. Хранить. Разослано руководству ЦК. В. Григорьян».

<sup>2</sup> Датировано по сопроводительной записке.

<sup>3</sup> На стр. 2 письма и далее по тексту редактор перевода правил термин «национально-освободительная борьба» на «народно-освободительная». В годы войны и в послевоенное время албанцы определяли борьбу как национально-освободительную.

<sup>4</sup> Так в тексте.